FKIE_CVE-2026-78699

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-30 16:16 - Updated: 2026-08-30 16:16
Summary
Unchecked Return Value vulnerability in ash-project ash_postgres allows a user who can drive a tenant rename to a name that collides with an existing tenant's schema to have their tenant record repointed at that other tenant's live schema, gaining access to its data. AshPostgres.MultiTenancy.rename_tenant/3 issues the ALTER SCHEMA ... RENAME TO ... with the non-raising Ecto.Adapters.SQL.query/2, discards its {:ok, _} | {:error, _} result, and unconditionally returns :ok. PostgreSQL rejects the rename when the target schema already exists (and on insufficient privilege or lock timeout), but that failure never reaches the caller. The calling manage_tenant update action therefore sees success and commits the tenant row with the new name, which is the schema of a different existing tenant, so subsequent reads and writes for that tenant run against the other tenant's data. This issue affects ash_postgres: from 0.25.0 before 2.13.0.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_postgres:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.AshPostgres.MultiTenancy\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "ash_postgres",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_postgres",
          "product": "ash_postgres",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/multitenancy.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshPostgres.MultiTenancy\u0027:rename_tenant/3"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres",
          "vendor": "ash-project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.13.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.25.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_postgres:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.AshPostgres.MultiTenancy\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "ash-project/ash_postgres",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/ash-project/ash_postgres",
          "product": "ash_postgres",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/multitenancy.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshPostgres.MultiTenancy\u0027:rename_tenant/3"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres",
          "vendor": "ash-project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "8544ab15fe45784553c2d2da8ee1a388eee0174b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "03510dae24020e302558ef947be7ea874a9ce756",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Unchecked Return Value vulnerability in ash-project ash_postgres allows a user who can drive a tenant rename to a name that collides with an existing tenant\u0027s schema to have their tenant record repointed at that other tenant\u0027s live schema, gaining access to its data.\n\nAshPostgres.MultiTenancy.rename_tenant/3 issues the ALTER SCHEMA ... RENAME TO ... with the non-raising Ecto.Adapters.SQL.query/2, discards its {:ok, _} | {:error, _} result, and unconditionally returns :ok. PostgreSQL rejects the rename when the target schema already exists (and on insufficient privilege or lock timeout), but that failure never reaches the caller. The calling manage_tenant update action therefore sees success and commits the tenant row with the new name, which is the schema of a different existing tenant, so subsequent reads and writes for that tenant run against the other tenant\u0027s data.\n\nThis issue affects ash_postgres: from 0.25.0 before 2.13.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-78699",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-30T16:16:42.623",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-30T16:16:42.623",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78699.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres/commit/8544ab15fe45784553c2d2da8ee1a388eee0174b"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres/security/advisories/GHSA-6fqq-j9c4-5766"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-78699"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-252"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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