CVE-2026-78699 (GCVE-0-2026-78699)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-30 15:13 – Updated: 2026-08-30 15:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
rename_tenant returns :ok on a failed rename, enabling cross-tenant access in AshPostgres
Summary
Unchecked Return Value vulnerability in ash-project ash_postgres allows a user who can drive a tenant rename to a name that collides with an existing tenant's schema to have their tenant record repointed at that other tenant's live schema, gaining access to its data.
AshPostgres.MultiTenancy.rename_tenant/3 issues the ALTER SCHEMA ... RENAME TO ... with the non-raising Ecto.Adapters.SQL.query/2, discards its {:ok, _} | {:error, _} result, and unconditionally returns :ok. PostgreSQL rejects the rename when the target schema already exists (and on insufficient privilege or lock timeout), but that failure never reaches the caller. The calling manage_tenant update action therefore sees success and commits the tenant row with the new name, which is the schema of a different existing tenant, so subsequent reads and writes for that tenant run against the other tenant's data.
This issue affects ash_postgres: from 0.25.0 before 2.13.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-252 - Unchecked Return Value
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres/secur… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78699.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-78699 | related |
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_postgres/commi… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_postgres |
Affected:
0.25.0 , < 2.13.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_postgres:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| ash-project | ash_postgres |
Affected:
03510dae24020e302558ef947be7ea874a9ce756 , < 8544ab15fe45784553c2d2da8ee1a388eee0174b
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_postgres:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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