FKIE_CVE-2026-59147
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 20:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "Data-DisjointSet-Shared",
"product": "Data::DisjointSet::Shared",
"programFiles": [
"dsu.h"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "dsu_find"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/vividsnow/perl5-data-disjointset-shared",
"vendor": "EGOR",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.02",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Data::DisjointSet::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads and writes via an unvalidated parent index in dsu_find.\n\nThe attach-time validator dsu_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. dsu_find walks and path-compresses parent[x] with x a raw file-stored index never bounded against the node count, so both the read and the compression write-back land out of bounds.\n\nA local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the parent array, so the next find or union both reads and writes through an out-of-bounds parent index, corrupting memory or crashing the process."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Las versiones de Data::DisjointSet::Shared anteriores a la 0.02 para Perl permiten lecturas y escrituras fuera de l\u00edmites a trav\u00e9s de un \u00edndice padre no validado en dsu_find.\n\nEl validador en tiempo de adjunci\u00f3n dsu_validate_header comprueba los escalares del encabezado y la disposici\u00f3n de la regi\u00f3n contra el tama\u00f1o del archivo, pero no valida el contenido del array en el que luego conf\u00eda. dsu_find recorre y comprime la ruta de parent[x], siendo x un \u00edndice sin procesar almacenado en el archivo nunca acotado contra el recuento de nodos, por lo que tanto la lectura como la reescritura de la compresi\u00f3n caen fuera de l\u00edmites.\n\nUn par local que puede escribir el archivo de respaldo puede dejar el encabezado v\u00e1lido mientras envenena el array padre, por lo que la siguiente b\u00fasqueda o uni\u00f3n lee y escribe a trav\u00e9s de un \u00edndice padre fuera de l\u00edmites, corrompiendo la memoria o bloqueando el proceso."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-59147",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-59147",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-23T12:17:00.916862Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-21T20:17:03.513",
"references": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-DisjointSet-Shared-0.02/changes"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-DisjointSet-Shared-0.02/diff/EGOR/Data-DisjointSet-Shared-0.01#dsu.h"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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