FKIE_CVE-2026-10684
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-29 19:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 13:10
Severity
Summary
In subsys/debug/coredump/coredump_shell.c, print_coredump_hdr() used the 16-bit tgt_code field of a stored Zephyr coredump header directly as an index into coredump_target_code2str[], a fixed 7-element array of string pointers, with no bounds check.
A stored coredump whose tgt_code is >= 7 causes an out-of-bounds read of a char* up to ~64K entries past the array; that value is passed as the %s argument to shell_print, which dereferences and walks it as a string. The result is either disclosure of device memory contents to the shell user or a crash when the out-of-bounds pointer is unmapped.
The defect is reached via the coredump print shell command (cmd_coredump_print_stored_dump -> pretty_print_coredump -> parse_and_print_coredump -> print_coredump_hdr). The tgt_code field is device-generated and in-range during normal crash handling, so triggering requires local shell access plus the ability to stage or corrupt the stored coredump in the flash/in-memory backend.
Introduced in v4.2.0 (commit 13abd7fe730) and present through v4.4.0; fixed by clamping out-of-range codes to the 'unknown' (index 0) entry.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"subsys/debug/coredump/coredump_shell.c"
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.3.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.2.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In subsys/debug/coredump/coredump_shell.c, print_coredump_hdr() used the 16-bit tgt_code field of a stored Zephyr coredump header directly as an index into coredump_target_code2str[], a fixed 7-element array of string pointers, with no bounds check.\n\nA stored coredump whose tgt_code is \u003e= 7 causes an out-of-bounds read of a char* up to ~64K entries past the array; that value is passed as the %s argument to shell_print, which dereferences and walks it as a string. The result is either disclosure of device memory contents to the shell user or a crash when the out-of-bounds pointer is unmapped.\n\nThe defect is reached via the coredump print shell command (cmd_coredump_print_stored_dump -\u003e pretty_print_coredump -\u003e parse_and_print_coredump -\u003e print_coredump_hdr). The tgt_code field is device-generated and in-range during normal crash handling, so triggering requires local shell access plus the ability to stage or corrupt the stored coredump in the flash/in-memory backend.\n\nIntroduced in v4.2.0 (commit 13abd7fe730) and present through v4.4.0; fixed by clamping out-of-range codes to the \u0027unknown\u0027 (index 0) entry."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En subsys/debug/coredump/coredump_shell.c, print_coredump_hdr() usaba el campo tgt_code de 16 bits de un encabezado de volcado de memoria (coredump) de Zephyr almacenado directamente como un \u00edndice en coredump_target_code2str[], un array fijo de 7 elementos de punteros a cadenas, sin verificaci\u00f3n de l\u00edmites.\n\nUn volcado de memoria almacenado cuyo tgt_code es \u003e= 7 provoca una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites de un char hasta ~64K entradas m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del array; ese valor se pasa como el argumento %s a shell_print, que lo desreferencia y lo recorre como una cadena. El resultado es la divulgaci\u00f3n del contenido de la memoria del dispositivo al usuario de la shell o un fallo (crash) cuando el puntero fuera de l\u00edmites no est\u00e1 mapeado.\n\nEl defecto se alcanza a trav\u00e9s del comando de shell de impresi\u00f3n de volcado de memoria (cmd_coredump_print_stored_dump -\u003e pretty_print_coredump -\u003e parse_and_print_coredump -\u003e print_coredump_hdr). El campo tgt_code es generado por el dispositivo y est\u00e1 dentro del rango durante el manejo normal de fallos, por lo que su activaci\u00f3n requiere acceso local a la shell m\u00e1s la capacidad de preparar o corromper el volcado de memoria almacenado en el backend de flash/en memoria.\n\nIntroducido en v4.2.0 (commit 13abd7fe730) y presente hasta v4.4.0; corregido al limitar los c\u00f3digos fuera de rango a la entrada \u2019unknown\u2019 (\u00edndice 0)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-10684",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 3.0,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.5,
"impactScore": 2.5,
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-10684",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-29T18:47:12.610944Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-29T19:16:43.677",
"references": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a9226324e8bd1f8adecafb1b6e0603f781dc750c"
},
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9fw2-4429-49q8"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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