FKIE_CVE-2026-10680

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 22:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 19:10
Summary
The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
zephyrproject zephyr *
zephyrproject zephyr *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c"
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.3.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7A9B9011-247E-42B6-9000-FC4564C07197",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.3.1",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.2.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BF44F4FC-9EF2-4562-ACEB-2BE5AE165E9C",
              "versionEndIncluding": "4.4.1",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.4.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf-\u003elen (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf-\u003elen may exceed a command\u0027s len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf-\u003elen still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf-\u003elen guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf-\u003elen in both handlers."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Los manejadores de se\u00f1alizaci\u00f3n L2CAP Classic (BR/EDR) l2cap_br_conf_req() y l2cap_br_conf_rsp() en subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validaron el tama\u00f1o m\u00ednimo del comando contra buf  -\u003e  len (los bytes restantes en la PDU recibida completa) en lugar de len (la longitud de datos por comando del encabezado de se\u00f1alizaci\u00f3n L2CAP). Debido a que m\u00faltiples comandos de se\u00f1alizaci\u00f3n pueden empaquetarse en una PDU, buf  -\u003e  len puede exceder la longitud de un comando. Un atacante puede enviar un comando CONF_REQ con una longitud de encabezado menor que la estructura de solicitud de configuraci\u00f3n (por ejemplo, 0), seguido de otro comando para que buf  -\u003e  len a\u00fan satisfaga la verificaci\u00f3n. La verificaci\u00f3n entonces pasa incorrectamente y opt_len = len - sizeof(req) provoca un desbordamiento negativo del uint16_t a un valor cercano a 0xFFFF. El bucle de opciones de configuraci\u00f3n, que carece de una protecci\u00f3n opt_len-versus-buf  -\u003e  len, entonces avanza mucho m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del final del b\u00fafer de recepci\u00f3n ACL agrupado utilizando primitivas de extracci\u00f3n net_buf que no realizan ninguna verificaci\u00f3n de l\u00edmites en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n, produciendo una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites de la memoria del host y, cuando los bytes de opci\u00f3n fuera de l\u00edmites codifican una opci\u00f3n MTU o de tiempo de espera de vaciado, una escritura fuera de l\u00edmites. El canal de se\u00f1alizaci\u00f3n BR/EDR se procesa antes del emparejamiento/cifrado y un canal L2CAP a un servicio L0 como SDP puede abrirse sin emparejamiento, por lo que un par no autenticado dentro del alcance de la radio que pueda establecer una conexi\u00f3n ACL puede activar la falla, lo que lleva a corrupci\u00f3n de memoria y denegaci\u00f3n de servicio (bloqueo del host/dispositivo). El defecto est\u00e1 presente en versiones lanzadas, incluida la v4.4.0. La soluci\u00f3n valida contra len en lugar de buf  -\u003e  len en ambos manejadores."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-10680",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.7,
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-10680",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-22T19:33:04.837486Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-21T22:17:00.303",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/1d451683377f4c8e56d7718565bea7b5c1155159"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-vrwx-p97q-8854"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-125"
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.