FKIE_CVE-2025-64526
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-14 19:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "strapi",
"vendor": "strapi",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 5.45.0"
}
]
},
{
"product": "@strapi/plugin-users-permissions",
"vendor": "strapi",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 5.45.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:strapi:strapi:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "159CF789-9090-4B24-9968-B60BB2AD1445",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.45.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Strapi es un sistema de gesti\u00f3n de contenido headless de c\u00f3digo abierto. En versiones de Strapi anteriores a la 5.45.0, el middleware de l\u00edmite de tasa (rate-limit) en el plugin de permisos de usuario (users-permissions) derivaba su clave de l\u00edmite de tasa en parte de \u0027ctx.request.body.email\u0027, incluso en rutas cuyo esquema de cuerpo no contiene un campo \u0027email\u0027 (\u0027/auth/local\u0027, \u0027/auth/reset-password\u0027, \u0027/auth/change-password\u0027). Un atacante no autenticado podr\u00eda incluir un valor \u0027email\u0027 arbitrario en el cuerpo de la solicitud para obtener una nueva clave de l\u00edmite de tasa por solicitud, eludiendo efectivamente la limitaci\u00f3n por IP en esas rutas y permitiendo intentos de fuerza bruta de credenciales de alto volumen, fuerza bruta de c\u00f3digos de restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a y relleno de credenciales (credential-stuffing). La clave de l\u00edmite de tasa se constru\u00eda como \u0027${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}\u0027, donde \u0027userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email\u0027. En rutas que utilizan leg\u00edtimamente el correo electr\u00f3nico como su identificador (por ejemplo, \u0027/auth/forgot-password\u0027, \u0027/auth/local/register\u0027), este alcance es correcto. En rutas que utilizan un identificador diferente (\u0027identifier\u0027 para el inicio de sesi\u00f3n, \u0027code\u0027 para el restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a, \u0027currentPassword\u0027 para el cambio de contrase\u00f1a), el campo de correo electr\u00f3nico no formaba parte del contrato de la ruta, pero el middleware a\u00fan lo incorporaba a la clave, permitiendo a un llamador rotar el valor y obtener una clave \u00fanica en cada solicitud. El parche en la versi\u00f3n 5.45.0 mantiene una lista de permitidos (allow-list) de rutas que leg\u00edtimamente se basan en el campo de correo electr\u00f3nico y excluye ese componente de clave en cualquier otra ruta en la que est\u00e9 montado el middleware. Las rutas de devoluci\u00f3n de llamada de OAuth (\u0027/connect/*\u0027) se tratan sin identificador. En rutas fuera de la lista de permitidos, el middleware ahora recurre a una clave fija sin identificador, asegurando que la limitaci\u00f3n por IP siga siendo efectiva incluso cuando el cuerpo de la solicitud est\u00e9 controlado por el atacante."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-64526",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-64526",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-16T00:48:16.468125Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-14T19:16:29.233",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-307"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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