CVE-2026-81315 (GCVE-0-2026-81315)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-31 00:57 – Updated: 2026-08-31 16:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
MCP DNS-rebinding origin check in AshAi is bypassed by a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto header
Summary
Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor.
In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-31 16:02 UTC
CWE
- CWE-346 - Origin Validation Error
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/security/ad… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81315.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81315 | related |
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/commit/28af… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_ai |
Affected:
0.8.0 , < 1.0.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| ash-project | ash_ai |
Affected:
c94f0b17fbe252f68755ba512678586164ba6139 , < 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker\u0027s origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist.\\n\\nThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eOrigin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server\u0027s DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user\u0027s local MCP server with that user\u0027s actor.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ccode\u003eAshAi.Mcp.Server\u003c/code\u003e, with the default \u003ccode\u003eallowed_origins: nil\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eorigin_allowed?/3\u003c/code\u003e accepts an origin when \u003ccode\u003euri.host == conn.host\u003c/code\u003e and the forwarded scheme is \u003ccode\u003ehttps\u003c/code\u003e. Both values are attacker-controlled: \u003ccode\u003econn.host\u003c/code\u003e comes from the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e header and the scheme is read from the raw \u003ccode\u003ex-forwarded-proto\u003c/code\u003e header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker\u0027s origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set \u003ccode\u003eX-Forwarded-Proto: https\u003c/code\u003e, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit \u003ccode\u003eallowed_origins\u003c/code\u003e allowlist.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server\u0027s DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user\u0027s local MCP server with that user\u0027s actor.\\n\\nIn `AshAi.Mcp.Server`, with the default `allowed_origins: nil`, `origin_allowed?/3` accepts an origin when `uri.host == conn.host` and the forwarded scheme is `https`. Both values are attacker-controlled: `conn.host` comes from the `Host` header and the scheme is read from the raw `x-forwarded-proto` header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker\u0027s origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit `allowed_origins` allowlist.\\n\\nThis issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-346\", \"description\": \"CWE-346 Origin Validation Error\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"1.0.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.8.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-31T00:57:55.910Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-81315\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-31T16:02:38.700Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-30T20:00:01.860Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-31T00:57:55.910Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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