CVE-2026-10849 (GCVE-0-2026-10849)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-03 21:21 – Updated: 2026-11-04 04:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Heap out-of-bounds write in Zephyr hawkBit OTA client when terminating server response body
Summary
The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in response_json_cb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes response_data[downloaded_size] = '\0' — and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787).
The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->body_frag_start / rsp->body_frag_len) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloaded_size + body_len, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloaded_size + body_len) > response_buffer_size) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation — 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer — skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at response_data[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write.
The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation.
Severity
8.2 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-04 19:29 UTC
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
2.4.0 , < 4.3.2
(semver)
Affected: 4.4.0 , < 4.4.2 (semver) |
guessed |
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How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.