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CERTFR-2026-AVI-1496
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2026-11-10 - Updated: 2026-11-10
De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans OpenSSL. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer un déni de service à distance, une atteinte à la confidentialité des données et un contournement de la politique de sécurité.
Solutions
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 3.0.x antérieures à 3.0.24 | ||
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 1.1.1x antérieures à 1.1.1zk | ||
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 3.5.x antérieures à 3.5.10 | ||
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 1.0.2x antérieures à 1.0.2zt | ||
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 4.0.x antérieures à 4.0.4 | ||
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | OpenSSL versions 4.1.x antérieures à 4.1.1 |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 3.0.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 3.0.24",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 1.1.1x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.1.1zk",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 3.5.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 3.5.10",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 1.0.2x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.0.2zt",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 4.0.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 4.0.4",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "OpenSSL versions 4.1.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 4.1.1",
"product": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": {
"name": "OpenSSL",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": "",
"content": "## Solutions\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2026-95692",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-95692"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-88822",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88822"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-88823",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88823"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-95691",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-95691"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-107496",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107496"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-10T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2026-11-10T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1496",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "Version initiale",
"revision_date": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "De multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans OpenSSL. Certaines d\u0027entre elles permettent \u00e0 un attaquant de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance, une atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es et un contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9.",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans OpenSSL",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": "2026-11-10",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 OpenSSL",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
}
]
}
CVE-2026-107496 (GCVE-0-2026-107496)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:14 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:14- CWE-835 - Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
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"datePublic": "2026-11-10T11:00:00.000Z",
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"value": "Issue summary: Encrypting a CMS message to an EC certificate whose group order\u003cbr\u003eis 1 may cause CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() to loop indefinitely.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: An attacker able to supply the recipient certificate to an\u003cbr\u003eapplication performing CMS encryption can cause that application to loop\u003cbr\u003eindefinitely, consuming CPU and resulting in Denial of Service.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: CMS_encrypt() and CMS_encrypt_ex() encrypt a message to one or\u003cbr\u003emore recipient certificates and, for an EC recipient, generate an ephemeral\u003cbr\u003ekey in the recipient\u0027s group. If the certificate declares a group order of 1,\u003cbr\u003erandom scalar generation can only produce zero. The key generation routine\u003cbr\u003ethen retries without limit while waiting for a nonzero private scalar, so the\u003cbr\u003ecall never returns.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe OpenSSL TLS and QUIC implementations do not use this path. An application\u003cbr\u003eis exposed only if it calls CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() with a recipient\u003cbr\u003ecertificate whose EC parameters are attacker-controlled. Certificates with\u003cbr\u003enormal EC group orders do not trigger the loop.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOpenSSL 4.0 and later reject unknown explicit EC groups in default builds.\u003cbr\u003eThese versions are affected only when configured with the\u003cbr\u003eenable-ec_explicit_curves option.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe result is a hang that consumes a CPU core until the process is\u003cbr\u003einterrupted, a Denial of Service. The severity is Low because the attacker\u003cbr\u003emust supply the recipient certificate and the application must choose to\u003cbr\u003eencrypt to it; ordinary CMS encryption to trusted recipients is unaffected.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe fix makes EC key generation fail when the group has no valid nonzero\u003cbr\u003eprivate scalar, instead of retrying indefinitely.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules in 4.1, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.0 are not affected. The FIPS provider\u003cbr\u003edoes not support arbitrary explicit EC domain parameters, so an order-1 group\u003cbr\u003eis rejected during key import before the vulnerable key generation path is\u003cbr\u003ereached."
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CVE-2026-88822 (GCVE-0-2026-88822)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:15 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:15- CWE-457 - Use of Uninitialized Variable
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"value": "Issue summary: QUIC, when performing automated peer detection, may allow\u003cbr\u003euninitialized stack data to leak into the received address which is then used\u003cbr\u003eas the destination for outgoing packets.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: Applications using QUIC\u0027s automated peer detection mechanism\u003cbr\u003emay receive an invalid address, leading to connection loss and disclosure of\u003cbr\u003euninitialized stack data to an attacker observing the outgoing network traffic.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-457 (Use of Uninitialized Variable)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: The OpenSSL QUIC stack contains a feature in which, when using an\u003cbr\u003ealready connected socket, it will auto-detect the peer address during the SSL\u003cbr\u003ehandshake. This feature uses the getpeername() function, passing a buffer of\u003cbr\u003esufficient length to hold any supported address family, but passes a buffer\u003cbr\u003elength that is only sized such that larger addresses, such as IPv6, cannot be\u003cbr\u003eretrieved. The getpeername() function however, still returns the full address\u003cbr\u003elength, which is accepted as the valid input buffer length, leading to the\u003cbr\u003eaddress buffer containing uninitialized stack data instead of the actual peer\u003cbr\u003eaddress. The invalid peer address is then used as destination for the outgoing\u003cbr\u003epackets which leads to a connectivity breakage and a leakage of the\u003cbr\u003euninitialized stack data to passive network observers.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this CVE as\u003cbr\u003ethe affected protocol is not implemented in the FIPS module."
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CVE-2026-88823 (GCVE-0-2026-88823)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:15 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:15- CWE-325 - Missing Cryptographic Step
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"type": "reporter",
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"type": "reporter",
"value": "Bhargava Shastry"
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{
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"type": "reporter",
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"datePublic": "2026-11-10T11:05:35.000Z",
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"value": "Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional\u003cbr\u003eAuthenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far,\u003cbr\u003einstead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in\u003cbr\u003eseveral fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies\u003cbr\u003emessages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before\u003cbr\u003ethe empty fragment.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a\u003cbr\u003emessage is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such\u003cbr\u003ea message.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have\u003cbr\u003ezero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also,\u003cbr\u003eon context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD\u003cbr\u003eaccumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the\u003cbr\u003enew message.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD\u003cbr\u003ewhenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce.\u003cbr\u003eA re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved\u003cbr\u003ealgorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the\u003cbr\u003eOpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
}
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CVE-2026-95691 (GCVE-0-2026-95691)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:16- CWE-416 - Use After Free
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"value": "Issue summary: A retransmitted QUIC CRYPTO frame can release packet storage\u003cbr\u003ewhile the TLS record layer retains a direct pointer into that storage causing\u003cbr\u003euse after free.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: A malicious QUIC server can cause a heap-use-after-free read\u003cbr\u003ein the OpenSSL QUIC client. The server can also identify one allocator-adjacent\u003cbr\u003ebyte through the client\u0027s protected Handshake response.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-416: Use After Free\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: During CRYPTO stream processing, a pointer into the first frame\u0027s\u003cbr\u003ememory on the stream is lent to the TLS handshake processing. The memory\u003cbr\u003emust remain stable until it is processed and released. However the processing\u003cbr\u003eof retransmitted CRYPTO frames could release the memory if the retransmitted\u003cbr\u003eframe fully overlapped the existing frame. This then causes use-after-free read\u003cbr\u003ewhen the TLS handshake processing continues.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe use-after-free read can lead to a Denial-of-Service of the client\u003cbr\u003eapplication or a minor leak of information about the heap memory contents\u003cbr\u003ethat might be overwritten with other data, subsequently allocated by\u003cbr\u003ethe application, to the peer.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\u003cbr\u003ethe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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CVE-2026-95692 (GCVE-0-2026-95692)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:16- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
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"value": "Billy Brumley (Rochester Institute of Technology)"
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"value": "Issue summary: Setting an AES-GCM-SIV IV shorter than the expected nonce\u003cbr\u003elength via EVP_CipherInit_ex() may trigger a heap out-of-bounds read.\u003cbr\u003eSupplying a longer IV is silently truncated instead of rejected.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: An application passing a caller-supplied IV of the wrong\u003cbr\u003elength may crash or read beyond its buffer. Because trailing IV bytes are\u003cbr\u003eignored, an attacker who knows one message and tag may forge messages under a\u003cbr\u003edifferent IV.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: AES-GCM-SIV copies the caller-supplied IV or nonce into its\u003cbr\u003einternal state using a copy whose length is taken from the expected nonce size\u003cbr\u003erather than from the length the caller actually provided. When the caller\u003cbr\u003epasses a shorter IV, the copy reads past the end of the caller\u0027s buffer;\u003cbr\u003eAddressSanitizer confirms a heap out-of-bounds read reached through\u003cbr\u003eEVP_CipherInit_ex() into ossl_aes_gcm_siv_init(). When the caller passes a\u003cbr\u003elonger IV, the implementation silently discards the trailing bytes instead of\u003cbr\u003erejecting the length.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe truncation breaks the binding between the IV and the computed\u003cbr\u003eauthentication tag. An attacker who has observed a message and its tag under\u003cbr\u003eone IV can produce a message and tag that verify under a different IV whose\u003cbr\u003efirst bytes match, since the surplus bytes never influence the computation.\u003cbr\u003eThe message itself is unchanged, so this is a failure of IV commitment rather\u003cbr\u003ethan a classic existential forgery.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOnly applications that call EVP_CipherInit_ex() (or the equivalent provider\u003cbr\u003ecipher initialization) with an IV length other than the standard 12 bytes for\u003cbr\u003eAES-GCM-SIV are affected. The severity is limited because the out-of-bounds\u003cbr\u003eread is small and attacker-controlled only in length, and the forgery requires\u003cbr\u003ean unusual IV length choice by the application.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as AES-GCM-SIV is not an\u003cbr\u003eapproved algorithm."
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.