BREW-VITE-CVE-2026-112946 (GHSA-RQ7H-C2JC-7F22)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 11:18 – Updated: 2026-10-22 11:18 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine
Details

Summary

The content of files outside server.fs setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the root. For example, if the project references <path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of /etc/hosts was possible to be returned.

The content of files outside the server.fs.allow option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing <project-root>/etc/hosts could make Vite return the host's /etc/hosts file.

Impact

Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host option)
  • contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host
  • The sensitive file is not matched by server.fs.deny
  • the dev server is not running on Windows

Details

When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as /etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with fsPathFromUrl and adds the result to safeModulePaths. Because fsPathFromUrl ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL /etc/hostname is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path /etc/hostname.

For a later request to /@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets /etc/hostname as an absolute path. The access check applies server.fs.deny, then accepts paths present in safeModulePaths before checking server.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated safeModulePaths.

PoC

The following example requires Linux with a readable /etc/hostname:

$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ npm init -y
$ npm install vite@8.3.1
$ mkdir -p etc
$ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname
$ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js
$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1

In another terminal:

$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js
200
$ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname
200
$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file'
response matches host file
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "8.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "vite",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/vite@8.3.4",
        "name": "vite",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "8.3.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `\u003cpath-to-project-root\u003e/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned.\n\nThe content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `\u003cproject-root\u003e/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host\u0027s `/etc/hosts` file.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or the [`server.host` option](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host))\n- contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host\n- The sensitive file is not matched by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)\n- the dev server is not running on Windows\n\n### Details\n\nWhen Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as `/etc/hostname`. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with `fsPathFromUrl` and adds the result to `safeModulePaths`. Because `fsPathFromUrl` ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL `/etc/hostname` is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path `/etc/hostname`.\n\nFor a later request to `/@fs/etc/hostname`, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets `/etc/hostname` as an absolute path. The access check applies `server.fs.deny`, then accepts paths present in `safeModulePaths` before checking `server.fs.allow`. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated `safeModulePaths`.\n\n### PoC\nThe following example requires Linux with a readable `/etc/hostname`:\n```bash\n$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc\n$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc\n$ npm init -y\n$ npm install vite@8.3.1\n$ mkdir -p etc\n$ echo \u0027PROJECT-DECOY\\n\u0027 \u003e etc/hostname\n$ echo \u0027import \"./etc/hostname\"\\n\u0027 \u003e main.js\n$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1\n```\n\nIn another terminal:\n```bash\n$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js\n200\n$ curl -sS -o response -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname\n200\n$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname \u0026\u0026 echo \u0027response matches host file\u0027\nresponse matches host file\n```",
  "id": "BREW-vite-CVE-2026-112946",
  "modified": "2026-10-22T11:18:44Z",
  "published": "2026-10-22T11:18:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112946"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23656"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/170b92791421bcd484f7325936d989a82d6bd4aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/45c0e3392a298626955a0ab93a8e51232daac721"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c3e06f92e969952466b4e2f5801e85e1e00cd905"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e570d8d016096b5f8f6f09808376ca6cf73f27d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f0d76c7da13d5e794807b82f0b86c1931a8438e3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22",
    "CVE-2026-112946"
  ]
}



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