GHSA-RQ7H-C2JC-7F22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 16:47 – Updated: 2026-10-21 16:47Summary
The content of files outside server.fs setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the root. For example, if the project references <path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of /etc/hosts was possible to be returned.
The content of files outside the server.fs.allow option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing <project-root>/etc/hosts could make Vite return the host's /etc/hosts file.
Impact
Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using
--hostor theserver.hostoption) - contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host
- The sensitive file is not matched by
server.fs.deny - the dev server is not running on Windows
Details
When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as /etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with fsPathFromUrl and adds the result to safeModulePaths. Because fsPathFromUrl ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL /etc/hostname is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path /etc/hostname.
For a later request to /@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets /etc/hostname as an absolute path. The access check applies server.fs.deny, then accepts paths present in safeModulePaths before checking server.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated safeModulePaths.
PoC
The following example requires Linux with a readable /etc/hostname:
$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ npm init -y
$ npm install vite@8.3.1
$ mkdir -p etc
$ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname
$ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js
$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1
In another terminal:
$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js
200
$ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname
200
$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file'
response matches host file
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.3.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.3.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite-plus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112946"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T16:47:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `\u003cpath-to-project-root\u003e/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned.\n\nThe content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `\u003cproject-root\u003e/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host\u0027s `/etc/hosts` file.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:\n\n- explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or the [`server.host` option](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host))\n- contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host\n- The sensitive file is not matched by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)\n- the dev server is not running on Windows\n\n### Details\n\nWhen Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as `/etc/hostname`. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with `fsPathFromUrl` and adds the result to `safeModulePaths`. Because `fsPathFromUrl` ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL `/etc/hostname` is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path `/etc/hostname`.\n\nFor a later request to `/@fs/etc/hostname`, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets `/etc/hostname` as an absolute path. The access check applies `server.fs.deny`, then accepts paths present in `safeModulePaths` before checking `server.fs.allow`. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated `safeModulePaths`.\n\n### PoC\nThe following example requires Linux with a readable `/etc/hostname`:\n```bash\n$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc\n$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc\n$ npm init -y\n$ npm install vite@8.3.1\n$ mkdir -p etc\n$ echo \u0027PROJECT-DECOY\\n\u0027 \u003e etc/hostname\n$ echo \u0027import \"./etc/hostname\"\\n\u0027 \u003e main.js\n$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1\n```\n\nIn another terminal:\n```bash\n$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js\n200\n$ curl -sS -o response -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname\n200\n$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname \u0026\u0026 echo \u0027response matches host file\u0027\nresponse matches host file\n```",
"id": "GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22",
"modified": "2026-10-21T16:47:42Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T16:47:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112946"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/170b92791421bcd484f7325936d989a82d6bd4aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/45c0e3392a298626955a0ab93a8e51232daac721"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c3e06f92e969952466b4e2f5801e85e1e00cd905"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e570d8d016096b5f8f6f09808376ca6cf73f27d0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f0d76c7da13d5e794807b82f0b86c1931a8438e3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine"
}
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