CVE-2026-75084 (GCVE-0-2026-75084)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-14 16:46 – Updated: 2026-10-14 16:46
VLAI
Title
Out-of-bounds write in the TI CC1200 IEEE 802.15.4 driver from an unvalidated radio-supplied packet length
Summary
The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len < 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped. An unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf->data and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.
CWE
Assigner
zephyr CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 77/100 over 175 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
zephyrproject zephyr Affected: 1.11.0 , ≤ 4.4.2 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "cc1200_rx"
            },
            {
              "name": "read_rxfifo_content"
            },
            {
              "name": "verify_rxfifo_validity"
            }
          ],
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          "value": "The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio\u0027s RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip\u0027s 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver\u0027s RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment\u0027s buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
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        "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
        "shortName": "zephyr"
      },
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          "name": "Fix commit",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/26a8b8294bf28523c7aa2f15cf728517980ee593"
        },
        {
          "name": "GHSA-pgg5-wwxw-vmj8",
          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-pgg5-wwxw-vmj8"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Out-of-bounds write in the TI CC1200 IEEE 802.15.4 driver from an unvalidated radio-supplied packet length",
      "x_generator": {
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    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-75084",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-14T16:46:01.701Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-17T16:17:47.262Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-14T16:46:01.701Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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                "programFiles": [
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        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio\u0027s RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip\u0027s 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver\u0027s RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment\u0027s buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-75084",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-15T14:46:15.327",
        "metrics": {
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                "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
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                "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
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        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



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