https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 08:42:52 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45774 <p>compliance-trestle is a tooling platform for managing compliance as code. Prior to versions 3.12.2 and 4.0.3, the compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Versions 3.12.3 and 4.0.3 patch the issue.</p> <p>compliance-trestle is a tooling platform for managing compliance as code. Prior to versions 3.12.2 and 4.0.3, the compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Versions 3.12.3 and 4.0.3 patch the issue.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45774 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.</p> <p>Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` — via relative path in href 3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths</p> <p>**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle **File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179) **File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104) **Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code</p> <p>### cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)</p> <p>```python class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -&gt; None: super().__init__(trestle_root, uri) # ... elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING): uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :]) self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve() # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.</p> <p>Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` — via relative path in href 3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths</p> <p>**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle **File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179) **File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104) **Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code</p> <p>### cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)</p> <p>```python class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -&gt; None: super().__init__(trestle_root, uri) # ... elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING): uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :]) self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve() # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-2426 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.</p> <p>Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` — via relative path in href 3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths</p> <p>**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle **File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179) **File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104) **Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code</p> <p>### cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)</p> <p>```python class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -&gt; None: super().__init__(trestle_root, uri) # ... elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING): uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :]) self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve() # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The compliance-trestle library&#39;s profile import mechanism resolves `trestle://` URIs and relative file paths by joining them with `trestle_root` and calling `.resolve()`, but performs **no boundary check** to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with `imports[].href` containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.</p> <p>Three attack vectors confirmed: 1. **PT-001:** `trestle://../../etc/passwd` — via trestle:// URI scheme 2. **PT-002:** `../../etc/passwd` — via relative path in href 3. **PT-003:** back_matter rlinks with traversal paths</p> <p>**Preconditions:** Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.</p> <p>## Affected Component</p> <p>**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle **File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 175-179) **File:** `trestle/core/resolver/_import.py` (line 104) **Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code</p> <p>### cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)</p> <p>```python class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -&gt; None: super().__init__(trestle_root, uri) # ... elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING): uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :]) self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve() # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-2426