CVE-2026-31607 (GCVE-0-2026-31607)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-24 14:42 – Updated: 2026-04-24 14:42
VLAI?
Title
usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,
usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites
urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is
subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible
array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the
*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.
A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response
to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap
out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to
urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.
KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)
The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already
validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits
c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle
malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden
CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates
against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.
On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter
bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.
This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against
transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the
response value against the original allocation size.
Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in
usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;
this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its
source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and
using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global
USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.
Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against
urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the
overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384
(git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3 (git) |
||
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.83",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.24",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.1",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.83",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.24",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.14",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.0.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()\n\nWhen a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,\nusbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is\nsubsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and\nusbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[], a flexible\narray whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the\n*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.\n\nA malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response\nto a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap\nout-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to\nurb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.\n\nKASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69\n\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)\n\nThe server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already\nvalidate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits\nc6688ef9f297 (\"usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle\nmalicious input\") and b78d830f0049 (\"usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden\nCMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input\"). The server side validates\nagainst USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.\nOn the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter\nbound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.\n\nThis mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against\ntransfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the\nresponse value against the original allocation size.\n\nKelvin Mbogo\u0027s series (\"usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in\nusbip_recv_iso()\", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;\nthis patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its\nsource -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and\nusing the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global\nUSBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.\n\nFix this by checking rpdu-\u003enumber_of_packets against\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the\noverwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and\nusbip_pad_iso() safely return early."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3"
}
],
"title": "usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-31607",
"datePublished": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-03-09T15:48:24.122Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-31607",
"date": "2026-04-25",
"epss": "0.00018",
"percentile": "0.04621"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-31607\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-04-24T15:16:39.940\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-04-24T17:51:40.810\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Awaiting Analysis\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nusbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()\\n\\nWhen a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,\\nusbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites\\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is\\nsubsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and\\nusbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[], a flexible\\narray whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the\\n*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.\\n\\nA malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response\\nto a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap\\nout-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to\\nurb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.\\n\\nKASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:\\n\\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640\\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69\\n\\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\\n allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)\\n\\nThe server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already\\nvalidate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits\\nc6688ef9f297 (\\\"usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle\\nmalicious input\\\") and b78d830f0049 (\\\"usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden\\nCMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input\\\"). The server side validates\\nagainst USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.\\nOn the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter\\nbound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.\\n\\nThis mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against\\ntransfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the\\nresponse value against the original allocation size.\\n\\nKelvin Mbogo\u0027s series (\\\"usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in\\nusbip_recv_iso()\\\", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;\\nthis patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its\\nsource -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and\\nusing the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global\\nUSBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.\\n\\nFix this by checking rpdu-\u003enumber_of_packets against\\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the\\noverwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and\\nusbip_pad_iso() safely return early.\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…