CVE-2026-10672 (GCVE-0-2026-10672)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-14 15:02 – Updated: 2026-11-04 04:58- CWE-125 - bounds
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 4.6.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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