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    2 vulnerabilities found for Lightstreamer Server by unknown

    GCVE-1988-2026-0427

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
    VLAI
    Title
    [0day-rubbish] Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 Shipped placeholder JMX/RMI credentials plus MLet remote class loading to root RCE (9.8)
    Summary
    0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 ENTERPRISE (with JMS Extender 2.1.0). Type: a hard-coded placeholder credential shipped in the distribution (user_changeme / password_changeme) authenticating a cleartext RMI management connector on TCP 8888 bound to every interface; because the connector exposes createMBean, an attacker registers javax.management.loading.MLet and calls getMBeansFromURL against an origin they control, and the loaded MBean's constructor runs Runtime.exec (CWE-798, CWE-319) Scoring. This finding is dual-scored because remote reach depends on the shipped placeholder being left unchanged. Both figures are published: - PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This applies with the shipped placeholder credential unchanged, which is how the distribution archive delivers it (byte-identical to the deployed file, with no documented first-login rotation gate). - CONDITIONAL, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This applies where an operator has rotated the credential but createMBean and MLet remain exposed: the step then needs a genuinely privileged account. Impact: arbitrary command execution as the broker process user, which was root in the tested deployment. Configuration, TLS material and keystores, streamed application data and any other credential configured in lightstreamer_conf.xml are all reachable; the payload MBean stays registered for the JVM lifetime as a persistent command channel. Authentication: none beyond the shipped placeholder pair (empty and wrong credentials were both rejected with SecurityException, so the defect is the credential's provenance, not a bypassable check). Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the chain end to end over loopback against a broker unpacked from the distribution archive and started as root, with the attacker HTTP origin simulated on the same research host: four runs (three against the jmxrmi platform MBean server, one against the lsjmx application MBean server), an out-of-band HTTP access log proving a uniquely named JAR was really fetched rather than cached, runCmd returning uid=0(root) and a root-owned proof file. Remote cross-network reach is an assessment of the shipped bind topology (TCP 8888 binds 0.0.0.0 because <listening_interface> is commented out, with no host firewall rule dropping it), not an observed attack crossing a network boundary. The one genuine precondition is that the operator has not replaced the shipped placeholder pair. This is a distinct defect from the separate unauthenticated jvmtiAgentLoad primitive we are disclosing in the same product; it reaches code execution via remote Java class loading rather than a native agent load. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-default-creds-jmx-rmi-mlet-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 445 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products

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              "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in\nLightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 ENTERPRISE (with JMS Extender 2.1.0).\n\nType: a hard-coded placeholder credential shipped in the distribution\n(user_changeme / password_changeme) authenticating a cleartext RMI management\nconnector on TCP 8888 bound to every interface; because the connector exposes\ncreateMBean, an attacker registers javax.management.loading.MLet and calls\ngetMBeansFromURL against an origin they control, and the loaded MBean\u0027s\nconstructor runs Runtime.exec (CWE-798, CWE-319)\n\nScoring. This finding is dual-scored because remote reach depends on the\nshipped placeholder being left unchanged. Both figures are published:\n- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This\n  applies with the shipped placeholder credential unchanged, which is how the\n  distribution archive delivers it (byte-identical to the deployed file, with no\n  documented first-login rotation gate).\n- CONDITIONAL, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This\n  applies where an operator has rotated the credential but createMBean and MLet\n  remain exposed: the step then needs a genuinely privileged account.\n\nImpact: arbitrary command execution as the broker process user, which was root\nin the tested deployment. Configuration, TLS material and keystores, streamed\napplication data and any other credential configured in lightstreamer_conf.xml\nare all reachable; the payload MBean stays registered for the JVM lifetime as a\npersistent command channel.\n\nAuthentication: none beyond the shipped placeholder pair (empty and wrong\ncredentials were both rejected with SecurityException, so the defect is the\ncredential\u0027s provenance, not a bypassable check).\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the chain end to end over\nloopback against a broker unpacked from the distribution archive and started as\nroot, with the attacker HTTP origin simulated on the same research host: four\nruns (three against the jmxrmi platform MBean server, one against the lsjmx\napplication MBean server), an out-of-band HTTP access log proving a uniquely\nnamed JAR was really fetched rather than cached, runCmd returning uid=0(root)\nand a root-owned proof file. Remote cross-network reach is an assessment of the\nshipped bind topology (TCP 8888 binds 0.0.0.0 because \u003clistening_interface\u003e is\ncommented out, with no host firewall rule dropping it), not an observed attack\ncrossing a network boundary. The one genuine precondition is that the operator\nhas not replaced the shipped placeholder pair.\n\nThis is a distinct defect from the separate unauthenticated jvmtiAgentLoad\nprimitive we are disclosing in the same product; it reaches code execution via\nremote Java class loading rather than a native agent load.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-default-creds-jmx-rmi-mlet-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to\nthis finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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    GCVE-1988-2026-0428

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
    VLAI
    Title
    [0day-rubbish] Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 Unauthenticated JMX jvmtiAgentLoad native code execution (8.1)
    Summary
    0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 (with JMS Extender 2.1.0). Type: unauthenticated JMX inspection console allowing an anonymous caller to invoke any MBean operation, reaching jvmtiAgentLoad on com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand to load and run a native agent library inside the broker JVM (CWE-306, CWE-345, CWE-20, CWE-250, CWE-1188) Scoring. This finding is dual-scored on one documented delivery precondition, and both figures are published rather than a single headline number: - PRIMARY, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the conservative figure for an attacker with network access only: the agent library must be delivered to a filesystem path by means outside this endpoint. - CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the shipped-default exposure where the precondition is ALREADY satisfied, that is a native shared object is already reachable at a filesystem path the attacker names. Exploitation is then one deterministic HTTP request. The 9.8 figure is conditional, not the primary rating, and is not the headline. Impact: native code execution inside the Lightstreamer JVM as the service process, inheriting that process's full identity. In the verified deployment the process ran as uid=0(root), so the executed commands ran as root; root is not claimed to be a factory-mandated identity, it is whatever account launched the service. The shipping configuration sets <jmxtree_enabled>Y</jmxtree_enabled> and <dashboard><public>Y</public> even though the adjacent comments claim the default is N, and the only remaining check is a Referer header matching the target host, which any HTTP client forges. Authentication: unauthenticated (no credential of any kind). Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the MBean-invocation and native-code-execution legs against a research-host deployment reached over loopback (HTTP 200 with "return code: 0", marker files recording uid=0(root), and id/whoami commands chosen by the HTTP client at send time). The native agent library, however, was already present on disk, placed beforehand over an authenticated root session. jvmtiAgentLoad takes a filesystem path and fetches nothing (http:// and file:// were both treated as literal strings), so the fully remote chain including payload delivery is NOT demonstrated by this advisory; what is proven unauthenticated is the request leg, not the delivery leg. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-unauth-jmx-jvmti-agentload-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 445 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products

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