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2 vulnerabilities found for BR-6478AC firmware by Edimax
GCVE-1988-2026-0494
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the formWlanMP manufacturing-test handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO
wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single
authenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still
registered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request
fields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that
executes it runs as root.
Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler
of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management
interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I,
uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256
ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a
SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp
from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("formWlanMP", ...) at 0x477a1c
publishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty
radio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through
websGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at
0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID,
e2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7,
ateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB,
e2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url
field. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by
sprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98,
/bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ... (thirty %s conversions)
and the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at
0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no
validation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no
strcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no
argument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation
on the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null
so that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it
removes no shell metacharacter.
system() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh
with -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no
quoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated
during expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload
used here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current
command; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background
job, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an
embedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip,
because it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id >
/tmp/marker) therefore runs id first.
The shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the
command word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127.
This looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program
lookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell
reports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit
status alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence
for anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can
succeed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the
interpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the
shell helps.
Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in
normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration
object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is
past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic
registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd" by the Auth handler
at 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The
product has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password
file, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a
non-functional stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access
controls", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no
Allow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low.
/goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime
gate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and
/goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime
exceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is
reachable at any time while the device is running.
Execution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the
shipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType
application/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is
started by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during
early init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires
root to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop.
The landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved:
the executing process is already root.
Scope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than
an isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91
/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call.
Two further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the
uptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle
but confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same
factory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port
52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but
LAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no
established request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded
rather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade,
formPreventionSetup and wscd.
Severity. The published score is 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =
0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x
0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =
Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it
is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next
to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so
the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the
researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with
their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from
Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no
basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1
High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base
Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root
after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6
High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing
about success depends on a condition outside the attacker's control: no race,
no window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An
adjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected
outright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base
Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose
WAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets
a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at
firewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N
is retained because the service is bound to the device's own network stack and
is addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves,
including guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind
it, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on
the WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet.
Default internet exposure is not claimed anywhere.
Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals
and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts
the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than
demonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an
inference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the
sink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately
not published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still
in its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads
zero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path
outside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers
204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that
state as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at
0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO
- LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as
web/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to
switch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from
the binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an
early pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state,
and the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be
contested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from
Exploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286.
The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image
contains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem,
referenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model's
published factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own
right, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would
double-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated
rather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped
digest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during
analysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the
weakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside
the firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest
algorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined
is recorded under the name root while the model's published management login
is admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name
the HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is
asserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of
privilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs
serves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts
every injection in the handler population into full-device takeover.
Verification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of
the research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical
device was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the
product. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form
registration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between
source and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary,
its configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent
review passes: one re-deriving the sink from
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edimax | BR-6478AC firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
"vendor": "Edimax",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still\nregistered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request\nfields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that\nexecutes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler\nof bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management\ninterface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I,\nuClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"formWlanMP\", ...) at 0x477a1c\npublishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty\nradio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through\nwebsGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at\n0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID,\ne2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7,\nateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB,\ne2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url\nfield. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by\nsprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98,\n\n/bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ... (thirty %s conversions)\n\nand the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at\n0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no\nvalidation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no\nstrcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no\nargument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation\non the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null\nso that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it\nremoves no shell metacharacter.\n\nsystem() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh\nwith -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no\nquoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated\nduring expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload\nused here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current\ncommand; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background\njob, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an\nembedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip,\nbecause it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id \u003e\n/tmp/marker) therefore runs id first.\n\nThe shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the\ncommand word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127.\nThis looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program\nlookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell\nreports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit\nstatus alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence\nfor anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can\nsucceed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the\ninterpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the\nshell helps.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\" by the Auth handler\nat 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The\nproduct has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password\nfile, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a\nnon-functional stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no\nAllow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low.\n/goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime\ngate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and\n/goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime\nexceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is\nreachable at any time while the device is running.\n\nExecution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the\nshipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType\napplication/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is\nstarted by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during\nearly init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires\nroot to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop.\nThe landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved:\nthe executing process is already root.\n\nScope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than\nan isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call.\nTwo further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the\nuptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle\nbut confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same\nfactory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port\n52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but\nLAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no\nestablished request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded\nrather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade,\nformPreventionSetup and wscd.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing\nabout success depends on a condition outside the attacker\u0027s control: no race,\nno window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An\nadjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected\noutright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base\nRoundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose\nWAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets\na default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at\nfirewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N\nis retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own network stack and\nis addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves,\nincluding guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind\nit, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on\nthe WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet.\nDefault internet exposure is not claimed anywhere.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an\ninference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the\nsink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately\nnot published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still\nin its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads\nzero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path\noutside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers\n204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that\nstate as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at\n0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO\n- LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as\nweb/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to\nswitch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from\nthe binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an\nearly pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state,\nand the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be\ncontested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from\nExploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image\ncontains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem,\nreferenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model\u0027s\npublished factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own\nright, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would\ndouble-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated\nrather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped\ndigest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during\nanalysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the\nweakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside\nthe firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest\nalgorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined\nis recorded under the name root while the model\u0027s published management login\nis admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name\nthe HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is\nasserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of\nprivilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs\nserves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts\nevery injection in the handler population into full-device takeover.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of\nthe research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical\ndevice was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the\nproduct. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form\nregistration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between\nsource and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary,\nits configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent\nreview passes: one re-deriving the sink from"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0495
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO
wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single
authenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches
system() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell
command line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the
web server process that executes it runs as root.
Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN
WAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server
that serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit
big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256
ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a
SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp
from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("setWAN", ...) at 0x478484, handler
at 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside
the handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:
websGetVar(wp, "wanMode", "") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,
&wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,
0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is
taken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at
0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured
with strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc
and 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.
Finding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is
the entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at
0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,
echo %s > /tmp/UserName
and from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at
0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a
backtick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never
inspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.
The verified payload is a username of |id > /tmp/marker #, which builds the
command line
echo |id > /tmp/marker # > /tmp/UserName
The shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink's own redirect
and runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command
executes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.
The defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a
backslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c
and 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop
is after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the
buffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is
what apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the
shell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored
and escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible
priority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some
later script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this
sink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the
injected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink's own redirect
never fires.
The sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.
Between websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at
0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted
sprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no
strchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator
appears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at
0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via
the branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to
the PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation
therefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address
validation while the path that matters contains none.
One root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears
three times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:
pppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and
configuration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,
from 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode
6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same
immediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call
shape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and
replicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same
handler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch
confined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.
A static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a
finding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a
different webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256
3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN
implementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,
websGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline
immediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into
/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at
0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the
same single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration
flag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product
build; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is
a shared source component in the vendor's router software base. That model was
not tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it
is not an exploited finding on it.
Scope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91
/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,
so the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell
command lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.
/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate
(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,
which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is
reachable at any time the device is up.
Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in
normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration
object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is
past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic
registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd", covers every
/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second
lower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one
realm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at
0x407688 that is a stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access
controls", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,
and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow
directive. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf
declares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or
capability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this
filesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation
step in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,
wanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,
memory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical
network position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated
wireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN
at firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187
and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position
includes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and
anything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward
moves it to the open internet.
Severity. The published score is 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =
0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x
0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =
Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it
is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next
to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so
the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the
researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with
their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from
Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no
basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1
High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base
Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root
after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6
High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success
depends on no condition outside the attacker's control. An adjacent-vector
reading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from
Exploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest
description of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new
connections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device's own
network stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router
serves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary
documented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.
Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals
and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts
the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than
demonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference
from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its
Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published
for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its
pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,
auth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,
/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is
captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the
setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc
resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -
LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214
and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.
That branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never
exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this
research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction
downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than
found open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base
8.094286.
The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edimax | BR-6478AC firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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"product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
"vendor": "Edimax",
"versions": [
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"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches\nsystem() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell\ncommand line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the\nweb server process that executes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN\nWAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server\nthat serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit\nbig-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"setWAN\", ...) at 0x478484, handler\nat 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside\nthe handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:\nwebsGetVar(wp, \"wanMode\", \"\") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,\n\u0026wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,\n0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is\ntaken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at\n0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured\nwith strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc\nand 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.\nFinding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is\nthe entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at\n0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,\n\n echo %s \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nand from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at\n0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a\nbacktick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never\ninspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.\nThe verified payload is a username of |id \u003e /tmp/marker #, which builds the\ncommand line\n\n echo |id \u003e /tmp/marker # \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nThe shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink\u0027s own redirect\nand runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command\nexecutes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.\n\nThe defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a\nbackslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c\nand 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop\nis after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the\nbuffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is\nwhat apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the\nshell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored\nand escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible\npriority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some\nlater script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this\nsink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the\ninjected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink\u0027s own redirect\nnever fires.\n\nThe sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.\nBetween websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at\n0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted\nsprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no\nstrchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator\nappears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at\n0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via\nthe branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to\nthe PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation\ntherefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address\nvalidation while the path that matters contains none.\n\nOne root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears\nthree times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:\npppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and\nconfiguration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,\nfrom 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode\n6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same\nimmediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call\nshape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and\nreplicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same\nhandler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch\nconfined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.\n\nA static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a\nfinding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a\ndifferent webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256\n3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN\nimplementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,\nwebsGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline\nimmediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into\n/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at\n0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the\nsame single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration\nflag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product\nbuild; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is\na shared source component in the vendor\u0027s router software base. That model was\nnot tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it\nis not an exploited finding on it.\n\nScope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,\nso the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell\ncommand lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.\n/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate\n(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,\nwhich redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is\nreachable at any time the device is up.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\", covers every\n/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second\nlower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one\nrealm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at\n0x407688 that is a stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,\nand a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow\ndirective. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf\ndeclares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or\ncapability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this\nfilesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation\nstep in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,\nwanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,\nmemory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical\nnetwork position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated\nwireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN\nat firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187\nand accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position\nincludes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and\nanything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward\nmoves it to the open internet.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success\ndepends on no condition outside the attacker\u0027s control. An adjacent-vector\nreading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from\nExploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest\ndescription of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new\nconnections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own\nnetwork stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router\nserves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary\ndocumented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference\nfrom the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its\nScope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published\nfor the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its\npre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,\nauth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,\n/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is\ncaptive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the\nsetup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc\nresets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -\nLOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214\nand web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.\nThat branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never\nexercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this\nresearch misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction\ndowngraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than\nfound open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base\n8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)",
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"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0495"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}