CWE-407
Allowed-with-ReviewInefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.
437 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-382J-8MXH-C7X2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:35Summary
MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime() can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed tokenSize includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a stackalloc operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.
A very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException, terminating the host process.
Impact
Applications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing DateTime values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.
MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData and MaximumObjectGraphDepth do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.
An attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.
Affected components
- Package:
MessagePack - API:
MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime - Data types:
DateTimeand formatter paths that callReadDateTime - Finding IDs:
MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020, related stack allocation findingMESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001
Patches
Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.
Upgrade guidance:
- Upgrade
MessagePackto the patched version for your release line. - Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.
The fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.
Workarounds
Patching is recommended.
Until a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain DateTime or DateTimeOffset values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.
There is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.
Resources
MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020:ReadDateTimestack allocation from attacker-controlled extension lengthMESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding inMessagePackReader- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
CVE split rationale
This vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "MessagePack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-407",
"CWE-409",
"CWE-470",
"CWE-502",
"CWE-674",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime()` can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed `tokenSize` includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a `stackalloc` operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.\n\nA very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`, terminating the host process.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing `DateTime` values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.\n\n`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` and `MaximumObjectGraphDepth` do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.\n\nAn attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime`\n- Data types: `DateTime` and formatter paths that call `ReadDateTime`\n- Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`, related stack allocation finding `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain `DateTime` or `DateTimeOffset` values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.\n\nThere is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`: `ReadDateTime` stack allocation from attacker-controlled extension length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding in `MessagePackReader`\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\n## CVE split rationale\n\nThis vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.",
"id": "GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2",
"modified": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48502"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows"
}
GHSA-387J-4PFQ-CMJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 00:31MOOS-IvP versions through 24.8.1 contain a quadratic processing vulnerability in uFldNodeComms where each new node identity creates a ledger entry and triggers all-pairs distribution work. Attackers can supply unbounded distinct node names in reports to drive the shoreside broker into quadratic processing, delaying or preventing distribution of legitimate node reports.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T23:17:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MOOS-IvP versions through 24.8.1 contain a quadratic processing vulnerability in uFldNodeComms where each new node identity creates a ledger entry and triggers all-pairs distribution work. Attackers can supply unbounded distinct node names in reports to drive the shoreside broker into quadratic processing, delaying or preventing distribution of legitimate node reports.",
"id": "GHSA-387j-4pfq-cmj4",
"modified": "2026-09-04T00:31:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T00:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/pull/131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/commit/8e30008d4eb68d83797187bd46e929e6cb06b195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/blob/1de9ae146cd63c209e8c3fd81611a4ed2472971b/ivp/src/uFldNodeComms/FldNodeComms.cpp#L169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/moos-ivp-through-24.8.1-ufldnodecomms-quadratic-processing-denial-of-service"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-395F-4HP3-45GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:49 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:49Summary
shell-quote's parse() finalizes its token list with a reduce that uses
Array.prototype.concat as the accumulator. Each prev.concat(arg) copies the entire growing
array, so parse() runs in O(n²) in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who
can submit a string to any code path that calls parse() on it can block the single-threaded
Node.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input — a denial of service. The trigger
needs no shell metacharacters (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that
only screen for ;, |, $, or backticks do not help.
Root cause
parse.js (lines 200–203), in parseInternal — this path runs on every parse() call:
}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments
// TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat
return typeof arg === 'undefined' ? prev : prev.concat(arg);
}, []);
prev.concat(arg) allocates a new array and copies all of prev on every iteration, so
producing an N-token result costs 1 + 2 + … + N = O(N²) copies. A second acc.concat(s)
reduce in the module.exports wrapper (lines 211–224, reached only when env is a function)
has the same shape. The maintainer's own // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat
already flags the construct.
Proof of Concept
const { parse } = require('shell-quote');
const ms = fn => { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };
for (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {
console.log(N, 'tokens ->', ms(() => parse('x '.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), 'ms');
}
Measured on shell-quote@1.8.4, Node v24:
| input (N tokens) | bytes | parse() |
ratio vs prev (2× input) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 000 | 32 KB | 678 ms | — |
| 32 000 | 64 KB | 4 169 ms | ×6.2 |
| 64 000 | 128 KB | 14 914 ms | ×3.6 |
| 128 000 | 256 KB | 57 319 ms | ×3.8 |
Time grows ~×4 per 2× input → confirmed O(n²). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s;
~256 KB → ~57 s; a few hundred KB more → minutes.
poc.js
Impact
parse() is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire
event loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls parse()
on attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs,
build-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small
request. No code execution and no data disclosure — availability only.
End-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls parse() on the request body, hit
with one POST of 'x '.repeat(32000) (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe
client issuing harmless GET /ping requests (normally ~1 ms) observed 27 consecutive pings
stalled by up to 4374 ms during that single request — i.e. every concurrent client was denied
service for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.
This is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on
untrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550,
python-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is distinct from the known shell-quote
command-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in
quote(), not parse().
Suggested remediation
Replace the O(n²) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that pushes into the
accumulator instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the
same shape to the wrapper's acc.concat(s) reduce. A defensive input-length cap on
parse() is a cheap additional stop-gap.
Maintainer note (edit): the originally-suggested
Array.prototype.flat()is ES2019 / Node 11+, butshell-quotedeclaresengines: node >= 0.4, so.flat()would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level array tokens withforEach/push— and deliberately notpush.apply(...), since spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine's argument count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings,undefinedholes, one-level array tokens, and{op}/{comment}/{op:'glob'}objects, and finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before). Thanks for the clear report and PoC — the analysis and reproduction were spot on.
Disclosure
Found by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is
present on main). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "shell-quote"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13311"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T05:16:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`shell-quote`\u0027s `parse()` finalizes its token list with a `reduce` that uses\n`Array.prototype.concat` as the accumulator. Each `prev.concat(arg)` copies the entire growing\narray, so `parse()` runs in **O(n\u00b2)** in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who\ncan submit a string to any code path that calls `parse()` on it can block the single-threaded\nNode.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input \u2014 a denial of service. The trigger\nneeds **no shell metacharacters** (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that\nonly screen for `;`, `|`, `$`, or backticks do not help.\n\n### Root cause\n`parse.js` (lines 200\u2013203), in `parseInternal` \u2014 this path runs on **every** `parse()` call:\n\n```js\n}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments\n // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat\n return typeof arg === \u0027undefined\u0027 ? prev : prev.concat(arg);\n}, []);\n```\n\n`prev.concat(arg)` allocates a new array and copies all of `prev` on every iteration, so\nproducing an N-token result costs `1 + 2 + \u2026 + N = O(N\u00b2)` copies. A second `acc.concat(s)`\nreduce in the `module.exports` wrapper (lines 211\u2013224, reached only when `env` is a function)\nhas the same shape. The maintainer\u0027s own `// TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat`\nalready flags the construct.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst { parse } = require(\u0027shell-quote\u0027);\nconst ms = fn =\u003e { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };\nfor (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {\n console.log(N, \u0027tokens -\u003e\u0027, ms(() =\u003e parse(\u0027x \u0027.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), \u0027ms\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nMeasured on `shell-quote@1.8.4`, Node v24:\n\n| input (N tokens) | bytes | `parse()` | ratio vs prev (2\u00d7 input) |\n|-----------------:|-------:|----------:|:------------------------:|\n| 16 000 | 32 KB | 678 ms | \u2014 |\n| 32 000 | 64 KB | 4 169 ms | \u00d76.2 |\n| 64 000 | 128 KB | 14 914 ms | \u00d73.6 |\n| 128 000 | 256 KB | **57 319 ms** | \u00d73.8 |\n\nTime grows ~\u00d74 per 2\u00d7 input \u2192 confirmed O(n\u00b2). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s;\n~256 KB \u2192 ~57 s; a few hundred KB more \u2192 minutes.\n\u003cimg width=\"656\" height=\"214\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e8955b0e-0527-45ca-94b7-c3a2d8c0c82e\" /\u003e\n[poc.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29255995/poc.js)\n\n### Impact\n`parse()` is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire\nevent loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls `parse()`\non attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs,\nbuild-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small\nrequest. No code execution and no data disclosure \u2014 availability only.\n\nEnd-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls `parse()` on the request body, hit\nwith **one** `POST` of `\u0027x \u0027.repeat(32000)` (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe\nclient issuing harmless `GET /ping` requests (normally ~1 ms) observed **27 consecutive pings\nstalled by up to 4374 ms** during that single request \u2014 i.e. every concurrent client was denied\nservice for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.\n\nThis is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on\nuntrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550,\npython-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is **distinct** from the known `shell-quote`\ncommand-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in\n`quote()`, not `parse()`.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nReplace the O(n\u00b2) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that **pushes into the\naccumulator** instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the\nsame shape to the wrapper\u0027s `acc.concat(s)` reduce. A defensive input-length cap on\n`parse()` is a cheap additional stop-gap.\n\n\u003e **Maintainer note (edit):** the originally-suggested `Array.prototype.flat()` is\n\u003e ES2019 / Node 11+, but `shell-quote` declares `engines: node \u003e= 0.4`, so `.flat()`\n\u003e would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level\n\u003e array tokens with `forEach`/`push` \u2014 and deliberately not `push.apply(...)`, since\n\u003e spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine\u0027s argument\n\u003e count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings, `undefined`\n\u003e holes, one-level array tokens, and `{op}`/`{comment}`/`{op:\u0027glob\u0027}` objects, and\n\u003e finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before).\n\u003e Thanks for the clear report and PoC \u2014 the analysis and reproduction were spot on.\n\n### Disclosure\nFound by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is\npresent on `main`). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.",
"id": "GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/security/advisories/GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13311"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/7ff5488599d01c323514f02f5efb74088dd134ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/releases/tag/v1.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)"
}
GHSA-3C26-P5FG-7R3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 15:31Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in Apache Thrift Lua bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-94658"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T13:18:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in Apache Thrift Lua bindings.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-3c26-p5fg-7r3c",
"modified": "2026-10-02T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/33otcgbqd27wf6qq810q56znzbomnhg1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/hv6b1nyk2p15gy5pmtprwo7z9m46mfcx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-3C89-47F8-W5C6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-09 06:30An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 17.5.5, starting from 17.6 prior to 17.6.3, and starting from 17.7 prior to 17.7.1. It was possible to trigger a DoS by creating cyclic references between epics.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6324"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T06:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 17.5.5, starting from 17.6 prior to 17.6.3, and starting from 17.7 prior to 17.7.1. It was possible to trigger a DoS by creating cyclic references between epics.",
"id": "GHSA-3c89-47f8-w5c6",
"modified": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
"published": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2553716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2025/01/08/patch-release-gitlab-17-7-1-released/#cyclic-reference-of-epics-leads-resource-exhaustion"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/468914"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3JXR-9VMJ-R5CP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 20:51 – Updated: 2026-07-20 20:51Summary
brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.
In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:
const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : ['']; // always recurses
...
if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded
}
return [str];
}
For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away.
Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).
The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.
Measured on 5.0.6:
| groups (n) | input bytes | time |
|---|---|---|
| 20 | 60 | 130 ms |
| 24 | 72 | 1.9 s |
| 26 | 78 | 7.8 s |
| 30 (PoC) | 90 | ~2 min |
Proof of concept
const { expand } = require('brace-expansion');
// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes:
expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');
Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix: 1. Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential. 1. Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.
Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13149"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T20:51:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T10:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nbrace-expansion\u0027s expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2\u207f) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node\u0027s single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.\n\nIn `expand_`, `post` is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don\u0027t use it:\n```js\nconst post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [\u0027\u0027]; // always recurses\n ...\nif (!isSequence \u0026\u0026 !isOptions) {\n if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\\}/)) {\n str = m.pre + \u0027{\u0027 + m.body + escClose + m.post;\n return expand_(str, max, true); // restart \u2014 `post` discarded\n }\n return [str];\n}\n```\n\nFor input like a{},{},\u2026, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but `expand_` has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away.\nEach level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: `T(n) = 2\u00b7T(n\u22121) \u21d2 O(2\u207f)`.\n\nThe max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.\n \nMeasured on 5.0.6:\n\n| groups (n) | input bytes | time |\n|---|---|---|\n| 20 | 60 | 130 ms |\n| 24 | 72 | 1.9 s |\n| 26 | 78 | 7.8 s |\n| 30 (PoC) | 90 | ~2 min |\n\n### Proof of concept\n```js\nconst { expand } = require(\u0027brace-expansion\u0027);\n// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes \u2014 blocks for minutes:\nexpand(\u0027a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}\u0027);\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release. The fix:\n1. Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.\n1. Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.\n\nVerified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n\u00b2) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.\n\nIf immediate upgrade isn\u0027t possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.",
"id": "GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp",
"modified": "2026-07-20T20:51:10Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T20:51:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13149"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/835d6be91201122d9adffb0c0c8c094189ace265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/c7e33ec13ac1a684c116720843ce24e208611754"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/d74e63030c012e3b7ae81657b8d665619cd51b95"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v1.1.16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v2.1.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v5.0.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/brace-expansion"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups"
}
GHSA-3Q6V-R5MR-HXV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:36 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:36Summary
league/commonmark's GitHub Flavored Markdown Table extension registers TableStartParser as a block-start parser. While a paragraph is the active block, the core block parser calls TableStartParser::tryStart() on every non-blank line. Its first action fetches the entire growing paragraph buffer via getParagraphContent() and runs strpos($paragraph, '|') across all of it. For a paragraph of M pipe-free lines, line k rescans about k lines of buffer, so total work is 1+2+...+M, which is O(M^2). An unauthenticated user who submits a single large paragraph of pipe-free lines that do not begin with a letter (see Attack Chain) to any service that converts untrusted Markdown with GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter (or any environment that enables TableExtension) drives seconds to tens of seconds of single-core CPU that grows quadratically with body size, enough to exhaust worker processes and deny service.
Root Cause
The GFM table detector performs a per-line "quick check" against the whole accumulated paragraph rather than only the portion that could form a table header. A paragraph never closes while non-blank lines keep arriving, so its buffer grows without bound, and the quick check rescans the entire buffer on each line. Only the paragraph's last line can ever be a table header (it is extracted separately via strrpos/substr), so scanning the full multi-line buffer for a pipe on every line is unnecessary work and creates quadratic time complexity. There is no input-size cap and the default nesting limit is not reached, so nothing bounds the scan.
Affected function: League\CommonMark\Extension\Table\TableStartParser::tryStart
Location: src/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.php:35-38
$paragraph = $parserState->getParagraphContent(); // returns the FULL growing buffer
if ($paragraph === null || \strpos($paragraph, '|') === false) {
return BlockStart::none(); // strpos scans whole buffer each line
}
Buffer growth: src/Reference/ReferenceParser.php:89-95 ($this->paragraph .= "\n"; $this->paragraph .= $line;)
Per-line dispatch: src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:135-147 and :224-236
Impact
An unauthenticated, remote attacker with no user interaction can cause denial of service against any application that renders untrusted Markdown with the GitHub Flavored Markdown converter or any configuration that enables the Table extension (the default GFM bundle enables it). A single request carrying a large paragraph of pipe-free, blank-line-free lines that do not begin with a letter consumes CPU proportional to the square of the input size: measured runs show roughly 4x CPU growth per input doubling. A body of a few megabytes ties up a worker for seconds to tens of seconds; repeated or concurrent requests exhaust all available PHP worker processes, denying service to legitimate users. Impact is limited to availability; there is no confidentiality or integrity impact.
Proof of Concept
Requires PHP with league/commonmark 2.x installed. The harness parses pipe-free paragraphs of increasing size with the real MarkdownParser and the real block-start parsers, comparing a GFM-plus-Table configuration against a core-only configuration to isolate the Table parser's contribution.
- Install
league/commonmark(2.10.1 or any 2.x release). - Convert a single large paragraph of pipe-free, blank-line-free lines that do not begin with a letter, with
GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter. - Measure wall-clock time as the paragraph size doubles.
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use League\CommonMark\GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter;
$converter = new GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter();
foreach ([25000, 50000, 100000, 200000] as $lines) {
$md = str_repeat("12345678\n", $lines); // one paragraph, no blank lines, no '|', lines not starting with a letter
$t = microtime(true);
$converter->convert($md);
printf("%7d lines %6.3fs\n", $lines, microtime(true) - $t);
}
lines input letter-leading non-letter-leading
("aaaaaaaa") ("12345678")
25000 0.23MB 0.27s 0.75s
50000 0.45MB 0.50s 2.36s
100000 0.90MB 1.07s 7.70s
200000 1.80MB 2.26s 27.81s
Letter-leading input scales linearly (doubles per input doubling) because SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser aborts before the Table parser is reached. Non-letter-leading input quadruples per doubling (0.75, 2.36, 7.70, 27.81), confirming O(M^2) behavior attributable to the Table start parser.
Attack Chain
- Exposure: The attacker submits a Markdown body to any endpoint that converts untrusted Markdown with
GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter, or any environment that addsTableExtension. The default GFM bundle registers the Table extension:GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtensionaddsTableExtension(src/Extension/GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension.php:30), which registersTableStartParser(src/Extension/Table/TableExtension.php:56). - Control: The attacker fully controls the Markdown body. The exploit input is one paragraph with no blank lines, no
|character, and lines that do not begin with a letter (for examplestr_repeat("12345678\n", 200000)). - Path:
MarkdownParser::parseLine()loops over block-start parsers for every non-blank line while a paragraph is active (src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:135-147).ParagraphParser::tryContinue()keeps the paragraph open for every non-blank line, so the buffer keeps growing (src/Parser/Block/ParagraphParser.php:46-53), appended line by line inReferenceParser::parse()(src/Reference/ReferenceParser.php:89-95). Since 2.0.2, the highest-prioritySkipLinesStartingWithLettersParserreturnsBlockStart::abort()for any line whose first non-space character is a letter, short-circuitingfindBlockStart()beforeTableStartParser. When lines begin with a non-letter (e.g. a digit), that parser returns none and every remaining core parser returns null, so control reachesTableStartParseron every line (src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:224-236). - Guard: There is no input-size cap in
MarkdownInput, andmax_nesting_leveldefaults toPHP_INT_MAX, which the depth-1 paragraph never approaches. No guard bounds the whole-buffer scan. - Primitive:
TableStartParser::tryStart()runsstrpos($paragraph, '|')over the entire buffer returned bygetParagraphContent()(src/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.php:35-38). With no pipe present,strposscans to the end of the buffer on every line. - Result: Cumulative scanning work is O(M^2). A single small request drives disproportionate, quadratically growing CPU, exhausting worker processes and denying service.
Bypass Evidence
No prior fix exists for this code path, so this is not an incomplete-fix or regression case; it is a distinct, previously undisclosed quadratic path. The strongest disproof attempts were made and all failed:
- Attempt: the observed quadratic is core-parser or PHP string overhead, not the Table parser. Refuted: the only difference between the two measured configurations is
TableStartParser; the core-only baseline is linear while the isolated Table contribution quadruples per input doubling. - Attempt:
strposshort-circuits or the buffer does not actually grow. Refuted by source trace:ReferenceParser::parse()appends every line unconditionally before its state switch, and for pipe-free textstrposfinds no|and scans the full buffer each line. - Attempt: another parser short-circuits before
TableStartParser. Partially correct: since 2.0.2SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParseraborts block-start scanning for lines beginning with a letter, so letter-leading input (including the originalaaaaaaaaPoC) never reaches the Table parser and runs in linear time. Input whose lines begin with a non-letter (e.g. a digit) passes every core parser and reachesTableStartParseron every line, exhibiting the quadratic behavior. - Attempt: an input-size or nesting guard neutralizes it. Refuted: there is no size cap and the default nesting limit is never reached.
- Attempt: this duplicates an existing quadratic-DoS advisory or was already fixed. Refuted: published quadratic advisories address per-line position translation and other distinct mechanisms in other files;
git logonsrc/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.phpshows no security fix ever touched this rescan, and the code is present unchanged in the latest release.
Affected Versions
Ecosystem: composerPackage: league/commonmarkConfirmed affected range: >= 2.0.0, <= 2.10.1Latest release checked: 2.10.1 (Packagist, repo.packagist.org/p2/league/commonmark.json)Fix status: not fixed
Note: SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser was introduced in 2.0.2. On 2.0.0 and 2.0.1 the issue can also be triggered with letter-leading lines. Regardless, the underlying quadratic scan itself is present across the whole >= 2.0.0, <= 2.10.1 range.
The vulnerable rescan is artifact-verified present in tags 2.8.0 and 2.10.1 (the latest published release). The lower bound 2.0.0 is inferred from the 2.x block-parser rewrite that introduced the getParagraphContent()-based architecture this quick check depends on; the checkout contains only tags 2.8.0 through 2.10.1, so the path is not artifact-verified below 2.8.0. No published release removes or bounds the whole-buffer scan.
Suggested Fix
Enforce that the per-line quick check inspects only the paragraph's last line, which is the only line that can form a table header. Compute the last line break with strrpos($paragraph, "\n"), derive the last line, and test strpos($lastLine, '|') instead of scanning the whole buffer. This bounds the per-line check to the length of the last line and removes the quadratic behavior without changing table detection semantics. As an interim mitigation without a code change, operators can cap the size of untrusted Markdown accepted for conversion, or disable the Table extension for untrusted input, which reduces exposure but does not remove the underlying quadratic path.
Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.10.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "league/commonmark"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:36:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`league/commonmark`\u0027s GitHub Flavored Markdown Table extension registers `TableStartParser` as a block-start parser. While a paragraph is the active block, the core block parser calls `TableStartParser::tryStart()` on every non-blank line. Its first action fetches the entire growing paragraph buffer via `getParagraphContent()` and runs `strpos($paragraph, \u0027|\u0027)` across all of it. For a paragraph of M pipe-free lines, line k rescans about k lines of buffer, so total work is 1+2+...+M, which is O(M^2). An unauthenticated user who submits a single large paragraph of pipe-free lines that do not begin with a letter (see Attack Chain) to any service that converts untrusted Markdown with `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter` (or any environment that enables `TableExtension`) drives seconds to tens of seconds of single-core CPU that grows quadratically with body size, enough to exhaust worker processes and deny service.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe GFM table detector performs a per-line \"quick check\" against the whole accumulated paragraph rather than only the portion that could form a table header. A paragraph never closes while non-blank lines keep arriving, so its buffer grows without bound, and the quick check rescans the entire buffer on each line. Only the paragraph\u0027s last line can ever be a table header (it is extracted separately via `strrpos`/`substr`), so scanning the full multi-line buffer for a pipe on every line is unnecessary work and creates quadratic time complexity. There is no input-size cap and the default nesting limit is not reached, so nothing bounds the scan.\n\n```text\nAffected function: League\\CommonMark\\Extension\\Table\\TableStartParser::tryStart\nLocation: src/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.php:35-38\n $paragraph = $parserState-\u003egetParagraphContent(); // returns the FULL growing buffer\n if ($paragraph === null || \\strpos($paragraph, \u0027|\u0027) === false) {\n return BlockStart::none(); // strpos scans whole buffer each line\n }\nBuffer growth: src/Reference/ReferenceParser.php:89-95 ($this-\u003eparagraph .= \"\\n\"; $this-\u003eparagraph .= $line;)\nPer-line dispatch: src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:135-147 and :224-236\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated, remote attacker with no user interaction can cause denial of service against any application that renders untrusted Markdown with the GitHub Flavored Markdown converter or any configuration that enables the Table extension (the default GFM bundle enables it). A single request carrying a large paragraph of pipe-free, blank-line-free lines that do not begin with a letter consumes CPU proportional to the square of the input size: measured runs show roughly 4x CPU growth per input doubling. A body of a few megabytes ties up a worker for seconds to tens of seconds; repeated or concurrent requests exhaust all available PHP worker processes, denying service to legitimate users. Impact is limited to availability; there is no confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n`Requires PHP with league/commonmark 2.x installed. The harness parses pipe-free paragraphs of increasing size with the real MarkdownParser and the real block-start parsers, comparing a GFM-plus-Table configuration against a core-only configuration to isolate the Table parser\u0027s contribution.`\n\n1. Install `league/commonmark` (2.10.1 or any 2.x release).\n2. Convert a single large paragraph of pipe-free, blank-line-free lines that do not begin with a letter, with `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter`.\n3. Measure wall-clock time as the paragraph size doubles.\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire \u0027vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\nuse League\\CommonMark\\GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter;\n\n$converter = new GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter();\nforeach ([25000, 50000, 100000, 200000] as $lines) {\n $md = str_repeat(\"12345678\\n\", $lines); // one paragraph, no blank lines, no \u0027|\u0027, lines not starting with a letter\n $t = microtime(true);\n $converter-\u003econvert($md);\n printf(\"%7d lines %6.3fs\\n\", $lines, microtime(true) - $t);\n}\n```\n\n```text\n lines input letter-leading non-letter-leading\n (\"aaaaaaaa\") (\"12345678\")\n 25000 0.23MB 0.27s 0.75s\n 50000 0.45MB 0.50s 2.36s\n 100000 0.90MB 1.07s 7.70s\n 200000 1.80MB 2.26s 27.81s\n```\n\nLetter-leading input scales linearly (doubles per input doubling) because `SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser` aborts before the Table parser is reached. Non-letter-leading input quadruples per doubling (0.75, 2.36, 7.70, 27.81), confirming O(M^2) behavior attributable to the Table start parser.\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. **Exposure:** The attacker submits a Markdown body to any endpoint that converts untrusted Markdown with `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter`, or any environment that adds `TableExtension`. The default GFM bundle registers the Table extension: `GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension` adds `TableExtension` (src/Extension/GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension.php:30), which registers `TableStartParser` (src/Extension/Table/TableExtension.php:56).\n2. **Control:** The attacker fully controls the Markdown body. The exploit input is one paragraph with no blank lines, no `|` character, and lines that do not begin with a letter (for example `str_repeat(\"12345678\\n\", 200000)`).\n3. **Path:** `MarkdownParser::parseLine()` loops over block-start parsers for every non-blank line while a paragraph is active (src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:135-147). `ParagraphParser::tryContinue()` keeps the paragraph open for every non-blank line, so the buffer keeps growing (src/Parser/Block/ParagraphParser.php:46-53), appended line by line in `ReferenceParser::parse()` (src/Reference/ReferenceParser.php:89-95). Since 2.0.2, the highest-priority `SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser` returns `BlockStart::abort()` for any line whose first non-space character is a letter, short-circuiting `findBlockStart()` before `TableStartParser`. When lines begin with a non-letter (e.g. a digit), that parser returns none and every remaining core parser returns null, so control reaches `TableStartParser` on every line (src/Parser/MarkdownParser.php:224-236).\n5. **Guard:** There is no input-size cap in `MarkdownInput`, and `max_nesting_level` defaults to `PHP_INT_MAX`, which the depth-1 paragraph never approaches. No guard bounds the whole-buffer scan.\n6. **Primitive:** `TableStartParser::tryStart()` runs `strpos($paragraph, \u0027|\u0027)` over the entire buffer returned by `getParagraphContent()` (src/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.php:35-38). With no pipe present, `strpos` scans to the end of the buffer on every line.\n7. **Result:** Cumulative scanning work is O(M^2). A single small request drives disproportionate, quadratically growing CPU, exhausting worker processes and denying service.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n\nNo prior fix exists for this code path, so this is not an incomplete-fix or regression case; it is a distinct, previously undisclosed quadratic path. The strongest disproof attempts were made and all failed:\n\n- Attempt: the observed quadratic is core-parser or PHP string overhead, not the Table parser. Refuted: the only difference between the two measured configurations is `TableStartParser`; the core-only baseline is linear while the isolated Table contribution quadruples per input doubling.\n- Attempt: `strpos` short-circuits or the buffer does not actually grow. Refuted by source trace: `ReferenceParser::parse()` appends every line unconditionally before its state switch, and for pipe-free text `strpos` finds no `|` and scans the full buffer each line.\n- Attempt: another parser short-circuits before `TableStartParser`. Partially correct: since 2.0.2 `SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser` aborts block-start scanning for lines beginning with a letter, so letter-leading input (including the original `aaaaaaaa` PoC) never reaches the Table parser and runs in linear time. Input whose lines begin with a non-letter (e.g. a digit) passes every core parser and reaches `TableStartParser` on every line, exhibiting the quadratic behavior.\n- Attempt: an input-size or nesting guard neutralizes it. Refuted: there is no size cap and the default nesting limit is never reached.\n- Attempt: this duplicates an existing quadratic-DoS advisory or was already fixed. Refuted: published quadratic advisories address per-line position translation and other distinct mechanisms in other files; `git log` on `src/Extension/Table/TableStartParser.php` shows no security fix ever touched this rescan, and the code is present unchanged in the latest release.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- `Ecosystem: composer`\n- `Package: league/commonmark`\n- `Confirmed affected range: \u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 2.10.1`\n- `Latest release checked: 2.10.1 (Packagist, repo.packagist.org/p2/league/commonmark.json)`\n- `Fix status: not fixed`\n\nNote: `SkipLinesStartingWithLettersParser` was introduced in 2.0.2. On 2.0.0 and 2.0.1 the issue can also be triggered with letter-leading lines. Regardless, the underlying quadratic scan itself is present across the whole \u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 2.10.1 range.\n\nThe vulnerable rescan is artifact-verified present in tags 2.8.0 and 2.10.1 (the latest published release). The lower bound 2.0.0 is inferred from the 2.x block-parser rewrite that introduced the `getParagraphContent()`-based architecture this quick check depends on; the checkout contains only tags 2.8.0 through 2.10.1, so the path is not artifact-verified below 2.8.0. No published release removes or bounds the whole-buffer scan.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEnforce that the per-line quick check inspects only the paragraph\u0027s last line, which is the only line that can form a table header. Compute the last line break with `strrpos($paragraph, \"\\n\")`, derive the last line, and test `strpos($lastLine, \u0027|\u0027)` instead of scanning the whole buffer. This bounds the per-line check to the length of the last line and removes the quadratic behavior without changing table detection semantics. As an interim mitigation without a code change, operators can cap the size of untrusted Markdown accepted for conversion, or disable the Table extension for untrusted input, which reduces exposure but does not remove the underlying quadratic path.\n\nReported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).",
"id": "GHSA-3q6v-r5mr-hxv8",
"modified": "2026-09-30T15:36:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T15:36:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/security/advisories/GHSA-3q6v-r5mr-hxv8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/5f63680a5e29dd57f9c6be9743b0e90493d3c2d0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/releases/tag/2.10.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "league/commonmark: Quadratic-time denial of service in the GitHub Flavored Markdown Table extension block-start scan"
}
GHSA-3QV4-JM22-WQX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-21 18:32 – Updated: 2024-10-20 00:30The dormakaba Saflok system before the November 2023 software update allows an attacker to unlock arbitrary doors at a property via forged keycards, if the attacker has obtained one active or expired keycard for the specific property, aka the "Unsaflok" issue. This occurs, in part, because the key derivation function relies only on a UID. This affects, for example, Saflok MT, and the Confidant, Quantum, RT, and Saffire series.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-29916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-21T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The dormakaba Saflok system before the November 2023 software update allows an attacker to unlock arbitrary doors at a property via forged keycards, if the attacker has obtained one active or expired keycard for the specific property, aka the \"Unsaflok\" issue. This occurs, in part, because the key derivation function relies only on a UID. This affects, for example, Saflok MT, and the Confidant, Quantum, RT, and Saffire series.",
"id": "GHSA-3qv4-jm22-wqx7",
"modified": "2024-10-20T00:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-03-21T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39779291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://unsaflok.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/saflok-hotel-lock-unsaflok-hack-technique"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cx0RUV7i0s"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3RXQ-G8RJ-R2CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 20:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 19:19Executive summary
Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in System.Security.Cryptography.Xml; System.Private.Xml. This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to remove this vulnerability.
Signed XML fixes add input-depth and operation-count limits, prohibit DTD processing by default, validate entity references, bound encrypted-data candidate processing, and cap attributes and namespaces used by C14N transforms.
Announcement
Announcement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/449
CVSS Details
- Version: 3.1
- Severity: High
- Score: 7.5
-
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H -
Weakness: CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity)
Affected Platforms
- Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS
- Architectures: All
Affected Packages
The vulnerability affects Microsoft .NET projects that use an affected package version listed below.
Advisory FAQ
How do I know if I am affected?
If using a package listed in affected packages, you're exposed to the vulnerability.
How do I fix the issue?
- To fix the issue please install the latest version of .NET. If you have installed one or more .NET SDKs through Visual Studio, Visual Studio will prompt you to update Visual Studio, which will also update your .NET SDKs.
- If your application references the vulnerable package, update the package reference to the patched version. You can list the versions you have installed by running the
dotnet --infocommand.
Once you have installed the updated runtime or SDK, restart your apps for the update to take effect.
Additionally, if you've deployed self-contained applications targeting any of the impacted versions, these applications are also vulnerable and must be recompiled and redeployed.
Other Information
Reporting Security Issues
If you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the MSRC Researcher Portal. Further information can be found in the MSRC Report an Issue FAQ.
Security reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.
Support
You can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.
Disclaimer
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
External Links
Acknowledgements
- l8BL with ENKI WhiteHat (https://enki.co.kr/)
- Leandro Batista
- Kevin Schmidt
- Dr.-Ing Ashar Javed (@soaj1664ashar)
Revisions
V1.0 (10/13/2026): Advisory published.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.31"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-13T20:32:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T19:18:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Executive summary\n\nMicrosoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in System.Security.Cryptography.Xml; System.Private.Xml. This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to remove this vulnerability.\n\nSigned XML fixes add input-depth and operation-count limits, prohibit DTD processing by default, validate entity references, bound encrypted-data candidate processing, and cap attributes and namespaces used by C14N transforms.\n\n## Announcement\n\nAnnouncement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/449\n\n## CVSS Details\n\n- **Version:** 3.1\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Score:** 7.5\n- **Vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n- **Weakness:** CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity)\n## Affected Platforms\n\n- **Platforms:** Windows, Linux, macOS\n- **Architectures:** All\n\n## \u003ca name=\"affected-packages\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAffected Packages\n\nThe vulnerability affects Microsoft .NET projects that use an affected package version listed below.\n\nPackage name | Affected version | Patched version\n------------ | ---------------- | ---------------\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.20 | 9.0.21\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86) | \u003e= 11.0.0-preview.1, \u003c= 11.0.0-rc.1 | 11.0.0-rc.2\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.12 | 10.0.13\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x64) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n[Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.NETCore.App.Runtime.win-x86) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.31 | 8.0.32\n\n## Advisory FAQ\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-affected\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I know if I am affected?\n\nIf using a package listed in [affected packages](#affected-packages), you\u0027re exposed to the vulnerability.\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-fix\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I fix the issue?\n\n1. To fix the issue please install the latest version of .NET. If you have installed one or more .NET SDKs through Visual Studio, Visual Studio will prompt you to update Visual Studio, which will also update your .NET SDKs.\n2. If your application references the vulnerable package, update the package reference to the patched version. You can list the versions you have installed by running the `dotnet --info` command.\n\nOnce you have installed the updated runtime or SDK, restart your apps for the update to take effect.\n\nAdditionally, if you\u0027ve deployed [self-contained applications](https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/core/deploying/#self-contained-deployments-scd) targeting any of the impacted versions, these applications are also vulnerable and must be recompiled and redeployed.\n\n## Other Information\n\n### Reporting Security Issues\n\nIf you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the [MSRC Researcher Portal](https://msrc.microsoft.com/report/vulnerability/new). Further information can be found in the MSRC [Report an Issue FAQ](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/faqs-report-an-issue).\n\nSecurity reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.\n\n### Support\n\nYou can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThe information provided in this advisory is provided \"as is\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.\n\n### External Links\n\n[CVE-2026-69651](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-69651)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\n- l8BL with ENKI WhiteHat (https://enki.co.kr/)\n- Leandro Batista\n- Kevin Schmidt\n- Dr.-Ing Ashar Javed (@soaj1664ashar)\n\n### Revisions\n\nV1.0 (10/13/2026): Advisory published.",
"id": "GHSA-3rxq-g8rj-r2cf",
"modified": "2026-10-19T19:19:43Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T20:32:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-3rxq-g8rj-r2cf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/135698"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69651"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-69651 - .NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-3VJV-JH7H-XV9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 15:35 – Updated: 2026-09-09 15:35PocketMine-MP versions before 4.12.5 contain a denial-of-service vulnerability in ModalFormResponsePacket processing that allows attackers to cause server resource exhaustion by sending large JSON payloads. Attackers can send numerous oversized modal form response packets to consume CPU time and prevent the server from processing legitimate connections.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-54395"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T14:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PocketMine-MP versions before 4.12.5 contain a denial-of-service vulnerability in ModalFormResponsePacket processing that allows attackers to cause server resource exhaustion by sending large JSON payloads. Attackers can send numerous oversized modal form response packets to consume CPU time and prevent the server from processing legitimate connections.",
"id": "GHSA-3vjv-jh7h-xv9f",
"modified": "2026-09-09T15:35:10Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T15:35:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/security/advisories/GHSA-7m9r-rq9j-wmmh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54395"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/3baa5ab71214f96e6e7ab12cb9beef08118473b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pocketmine-mp-before-4.12.5-denial-of-service-via-modalformresponsepacket"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.