Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-346

Allowed-with-Review

Origin Validation Error

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.

961 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-PMQ5-34W8-5C92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-10 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:58
VLAI
Details

Improper access control vulnerability in SkyBridge MB-A200 firmware Ver. 01.00.05 and earlier allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to connect to the product's ADB port.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T06:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper access control vulnerability in SkyBridge MB-A200 firmware Ver. 01.00.05 and earlier allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to connect to the product\u0027s ADB port.",
  "id": "GHSA-pmq5-34w8-5c92",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:58:25Z",
  "published": "2023-05-10T06:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN40604023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.seiko-sol.co.jp/archives/73969"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.seiko-sol.co.jp/products/skybridge/skybridge_download/mb-a100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.seiko-sol.co.jp/products/skybridge/skybridge_download/mb-a130"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.seiko-sol.co.jp/products/skybridge/skybridge_download/mb-a200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.seiko-sol.co.jp/products/skyspider/skyspider_download/mb-r210"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PP42-FQP9-76JC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-03 18:30
VLAI
Details

Inappropriate implementation in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17748"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
  "id": "GHSA-pp42-fqp9-76jc",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T18:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T03:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17748"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/500494349"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PP59-H84V-CQMH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-02 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:46
VLAI
Details

Improper access control in Subscriptions Folder path filter in Devolutions Server 2023.1.1 and earlier allows attackers with administrator privileges to retrieve usage information on folders in user vaults via a specific folder name.

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2445"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-02T14:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper access control in Subscriptions Folder path filter in Devolutions Server 2023.1.1 and earlier allows attackers with administrator privileges to retrieve usage information on folders in user vaults via a specific folder name.",
  "id": "GHSA-pp59-h84v-cqmh",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:46:31Z",
  "published": "2023-05-02T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://devolutions.net/security/advisories/DEVO-2023-0013"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PP6F-JF25-X95P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 15:30 – Updated: 2026-07-22 21:31
VLAI
Details

Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: DNS component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 153 and Firefox ESR 140.13.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-16381"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T13:17:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: DNS component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 153 and Firefox ESR 140.13.",
  "id": "GHSA-pp6f-jf25-x95p",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T21:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T15:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16381"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2041001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-70"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-72"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PPF2-9CWV-HPF8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-08-18 21:31
VLAI
Details

Same-origin policy bypass in the Audio/Video: Playback component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 140.14, and Firefox ESR 153.1.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74967"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T13:17:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Audio/Video: Playback component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 140.14, and Firefox ESR 153.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-ppf2-9cwv-hpf8",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T21:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74967"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2055697"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-74"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-76"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-77"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-78"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-79"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-80"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PQ35-39HR-58R8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 21:31
VLAI
Details

Inappropriate implementation in ReportingAndNEL in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17817"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in ReportingAndNEL in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
  "id": "GHSA-pq35-39hr-58r8",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T21:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T03:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17817"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/517461759"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PQ76-9M6X-M6MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-10 15:31
VLAI
Details

Same-origin policy bypass in the Request Handling component. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 146, Firefox ESR < 115.31, and Firefox ESR < 140.6.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14331"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Request Handling component. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 146, Firefox ESR \u003c 115.31, and Firefox ESR \u003c 140.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-pq76-9m6x-m6mx",
  "modified": "2025-12-10T15:31:23Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14331"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2000218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-93"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-94"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-95"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-96"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PQ9V-7WPP-6H45

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:11 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:11
VLAI
Details

In Ping Identity RSA SecurID Integration Kit before 3.2, user impersonation can occur.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-39270"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-18T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Ping Identity RSA SecurID Integration Kit before 3.2, user impersonation can occur.",
  "id": "GHSA-pq9v-7wpp-6h45",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:11:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:11:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.pingidentity.com/bundle/integrations/page/yqq1563995045546.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.pingidentity.com/en/resources/downloads/pingfederate.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-PQG8-CRX9-G8M4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-13 23:40 – Updated: 2024-02-05 11:13
VLAI
Summary
Backend Same-Site Request Forgery in TYPO3 CMS
Details

Meta

  • CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C
  • CWE-352
  • CWE-346

Problem

It has been discovered that backend user interface and install tool are vulnerable to same-origin request forgery. A backend user can be tricked into interacting with a malicious resource an attacker previously managed to upload to the web server - scripts are then executed with the privileges of the victims' user session.

In a worst case scenario new admin users can be created which can directly be used by an attacker. The vulnerability is basically a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) triggered by a cross-site scripting vulnerability (XSS) - but happens on the same target host - thus, it’s actually a same-origin request forgery.

Malicious payload such as HTML containing JavaScript might be provided by either an authenticated backend user or by a non-authenticated user using a 3rd party extension - e.g. file upload in a contact form with knowing the target location.

The attacked victim requires an active and valid backend or install tool user sessions at the time of the attack to be successful.

Solution

Update to TYPO3 versions 9.5.17 or 10.4.2 that mitigates the problem described.

Additional Considerations

The deployment of additional mitigation techniques is suggested as described below.

Sudo Mode Extension

This TYPO3 extension intercepts modifications to security relevant database tables, e.g. those storing user accounts or storages of the file abstraction layer. Modifications need to confirmed by again by the acting user with providing their password again - this technique is known as "sudo mode". This way unintended actions happening in the background can be mitigated.

  • https://github.com/FriendsOfTYPO3/sudo-mode
  • https://extensions.typo3.org/extension/sudo_mode

Content Security Policy

Content Security Policies tell (modern) browsers how resources served a particular site are handled - it also it possible to disallow script executions for specific locations. In a TYPO3 context it is suggested to disallow direct script execution at least for locations /fileadmin/ and /uploads/.

# in fileadmin/.htaccess
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
    Header add Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'none';"
</IfModule>

Credits

Thanks to Matteo Bonaker who reported this issue and to TYPO3 security team member Oliver Hader who fixed the issue.

References

  • https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-006
Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-13T23:38:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-05-14T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\u003e ### Meta\n\u003e * CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C\n\u003e * CWE-352\n\u003e * CWE-346\n\n### Problem\nIt has been discovered that backend user interface and install tool are vulnerable to same-origin request forgery. A backend user can be tricked into interacting with a malicious resource an attacker previously managed to upload to the web server - scripts are then executed with the privileges of the victims\u0027 user session.\n\nIn a worst case scenario new admin users can be created which can directly be used by an attacker. The vulnerability is basically a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) triggered by a cross-site scripting vulnerability (XSS) - but happens on the same target host - thus, it\u2019s actually a same-origin request forgery.\n\nMalicious payload such as HTML containing JavaScript might be provided by either an authenticated backend user or by a non-authenticated user using a 3rd party extension - e.g. file upload in a contact form with knowing the target location.\n\nThe attacked victim requires an active and valid backend or install tool user sessions at the time of the attack to be successful.\n\n### Solution\nUpdate to TYPO3 versions 9.5.17 or 10.4.2 that mitigates the problem described.\n\n### Additional Considerations\n\nThe deployment of additional mitigation techniques is suggested as described below.\n\n#### Sudo Mode Extension\n\nThis TYPO3 extension intercepts modifications to security relevant database tables, e.g. those storing user accounts or storages of the file abstraction layer. Modifications need to confirmed by again by the acting user with providing their password again - this technique is known as \"sudo mode\". This way unintended actions happening in the background can be mitigated.\n\n* https://github.com/FriendsOfTYPO3/sudo-mode\n* https://extensions.typo3.org/extension/sudo_mode\n\n#### Content Security Policy\n\n[Content Security Policies](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy) tell (modern) browsers how resources served a particular site are handled - it also it possible to disallow script executions for specific locations. In a TYPO3 context it is suggested to disallow direct script execution at least for locations `/fileadmin/` and `/uploads/`.\n\n```\n# in fileadmin/.htaccess\n\u003cIfModule mod_headers.c\u003e\n\tHeader add Content-Security-Policy \"default-src \u0027self\u0027; script-src \u0027none\u0027;\"\n\u003c/IfModule\u003e\n```\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Matteo Bonaker who reported this issue and to TYPO3 security team member Oliver Hader who fixed the issue.\n\n### References\n* https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-006",
  "id": "GHSA-pqg8-crx9-g8m4",
  "modified": "2024-02-05T11:13:08Z",
  "published": "2020-05-13T23:40:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/TYPO3.CMS/security/advisories/GHSA-pqg8-crx9-g8m4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms-core/CVE-2020-11069.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms/CVE-2020-11069.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-006"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Backend Same-Site Request Forgery in TYPO3 CMS"
}

GHSA-PRQ8-7WVH-44QH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 16:27 – Updated: 2026-07-28 16:27
VLAI
Summary
OAuth: Cross-origin token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata
Details

Cross-origin OAuth token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata

Summary

When an application uses OAuth::Consumer to request OAuth 1.0 request tokens or access tokens, the token request helper follows 300..399 redirects returned by the OAuth server. In affected versions, OAuth::Consumer#token_request parses the raw Location header, follows the redirect recursively, and can mutate the consumer's configured site when the redirect points to a different host with the same path.

The result is a cross-origin signed-request disclosure primitive: if an OAuth server token endpoint returns a redirect whose target an attacker controls, the client can re-sign the token request and send OAuth 1.0 request metadata, including the OAuth signature, nonce, timestamp, consumer key, and any request parameters included in the signature base string, to the attacker-controlled host. The same behavior can also be used as an SSRF or confused-deputy primitive because the application server follows the redirect and sends the next request from its own network position.

Affected

  • oauth v1.1.5 and prior versions back to and including v0.5.5.
  • The cross-host token redirect behavior was introduced by https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d74b767f
  • The behavior is documented in the v0.5.5 changelog as "Allow redirect to different host but same path".
  • The vulnerable behavior is in OAuth::Consumer#token_request, which is used by the documented request-token and access-token flows.
  • The issue is not specific to a Ruby engine or platform. It is caused by the gem's redirect handling and recursive token request behavior.

Patched version: oauth v1.1.6.

Impact

A consumer that calls OAuth::Consumer#get_request_token, OAuth::Consumer#get_access_token, or lower-level token request helpers against an OAuth server whose token endpoint redirect target can be influenced may lose three security properties:

  1. Cross-origin signed-request metadata disclosure. The redirected request is signed for the attacker-controlled endpoint. Depending on the request method, scheme, and parameters, the attacker may receive OAuth 1.0 parameters such as oauth_consumer_key, oauth_signature_method, oauth_timestamp, oauth_nonce, oauth_version, and oauth_signature.
  2. SSRF from the application server. The OAuth client follows the redirect on behalf of the application, so the redirected host is contacted from the application server's network position.
  3. Confused-deputy behavior. A malicious or compromised token endpoint can cause an otherwise trusted application to initiate signed requests to an unintended origin.

The disclosed OAuth 1 signature is not equivalent to an OAuth 2 bearer token: it is bound to the signed request, timestamp, nonce, HTTP method, and request URL. However, it can still disclose sensitive integration metadata, may be replayable within the receiver's accepted nonce/timestamp window in some deployments, and can expose application-server reachability to attacker-selected hosts.

Vulnerable code

lib/oauth/consumer.rb at tag v1.1.5:

def token_request(http_method, path, token = nil, request_options = {}, *arguments)
  request_options[:token_request] ||= true
  response = request(http_method, path, token, request_options, *arguments)
  case response.code.to_i

  when (200..299)
    # parse token response
  when (300..399)
    # Parse redirect to follow
    uri = URI.parse(response["location"])
    our_uri = URI.parse(site)

    # Guard against infinite redirects
    response.error! if uri.path == path && our_uri.host == uri.host

    if uri.path == path && our_uri.host != uri.host
      options[:site] = "#{uri.scheme}://#{uri.host}"
      @http = create_http
    end

    token_request(http_method, uri.path, token, request_options, arguments)
  when (400..499)
    raise OAuth::Unauthorized, response
  else
    response.error!
  end
end

The vulnerable behavior has several parts:

  • response["location"] is trusted as the next token request target.
  • Redirects are followed for every 300..399 response.
  • There is no general redirect counter or maximum redirect limit.
  • Cross-host redirects with the same path can mutate options[:site] and rebuild the underlying HTTP client.
  • The recursive call continues the token request flow and signs the next request for the redirected destination.

Reachable in production

The vulnerable path is reachable through the normal OAuth 1 token exchange:

consumer = OAuth::Consumer.new(
  consumer_key,
  consumer_secret,
  site: "https://provider.example"
)

request_token = consumer.get_request_token

If https://provider.example/oauth/request_token returns a redirect to an attacker-controlled host, the library follows that redirect as part of the token request flow. A realistic trigger is an OAuth provider, gateway, or reverse proxy that emits Location based on user-controlled or tenant-controlled input, or a malicious tenant-controlled OAuth endpoint in a multi-tenant integration.

No application-level redirect handling is required. The redirect is followed inside the gem before the application receives the token response.

Reproduction

A vulnerable application is one that uses OAuth::Consumer to perform an OAuth 1 token exchange against a token endpoint that can be made to return a redirect to another origin.

Example shape:

consumer = OAuth::Consumer.new(
  consumer_key,
  consumer_secret,
  site: "https://provider.example"
)

consumer.get_request_token

If https://provider.example/oauth/request_token responds with a 30x redirect whose Location points to https://attacker.example/..., affected versions may follow that redirect as part of the token request flow. The redirected request is then generated and signed by the application server for the new destination. Depending on the configured OAuth request scheme, OAuth 1 parameters may be sent in the Authorization header, request body, or query string.

Expected vulnerable behavior:

  • the token request leaves the configured OAuth provider origin;
  • the redirected host receives a signed OAuth 1 token request;
  • the application does not get a chance to inspect or approve the redirect target before the redirected request is sent.

Expected patched behavior:

  • same-origin redirects continue to work, subject to a redirect limit;
  • cross-origin token endpoint redirects are rejected by default;
  • applications that intentionally require cross-origin token redirects must opt in explicitly with token_request_cross_origin_redirects.

Suggested fix

Reject cross-origin token endpoint redirects by default and require explicit opt-in for integrations that intentionally depend on that behavior.

The fix released in v1.1.6 does the following:

current_uri = token_request_uri(path)
redirected_uri = token_request_redirect_uri(current_uri, response)
response.error! unless redirected_uri

redirect_count = request_options[:token_request_redirect_count].to_i + 1
response.error! if redirect_count > token_request_max_redirects(request_options)
response.error! if token_request_cross_origin?(current_uri, redirected_uri) &&
  !token_request_cross_origin_redirects?(request_options)

redirect_options = request_options.merge(token_request_redirect_count: redirect_count)
token_request(http_method, token_request_redirect_path(current_uri, redirected_uri), token, redirect_options, *arguments, &block)

The fix intentionally preserves same-origin redirect compatibility while making cross-origin token endpoint redirects an explicit choice. It also avoids placing internal redirect state in request_options passed to OAuth signing.

Workarounds

Until a patched release is available, applications can reduce exposure by doing one or more of the following:

  • Ensure configured OAuth token endpoints are fixed absolute URLs controlled by a trusted provider.
  • Do not use tenant-controlled OAuth token endpoint URLs unless the tenant is trusted to receive signed OAuth token requests.
  • Block outbound application-server traffic to internal metadata services and other sensitive internal addresses at the network layer.
  • Place a trusted proxy in front of OAuth providers that rejects token endpoint redirects to a different origin.

These mitigations reduce exploitability but do not remove the vulnerable redirect logic from the gem.

Credit

Found during the follow-up audit for GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9.

Reporter/coordinator: Peter H. Boling (pboling).

References

  • Related OAuth 2 advisory: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth2/security/advisories/GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9
  • Fixed version: oauth v1.1.6
  • Behavior-introducing commit: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d74b767f
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "oauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.5.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T16:27:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Cross-origin OAuth token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen an application uses `OAuth::Consumer` to request OAuth 1.0 request tokens or\naccess tokens, the token request helper follows `300..399` redirects returned by\nthe OAuth server. In affected versions, `OAuth::Consumer#token_request` parses the\nraw `Location` header, follows the redirect recursively, and can mutate the\nconsumer\u0027s configured `site` when the redirect points to a different host with\nthe same path.\n\nThe result is a cross-origin signed-request disclosure primitive: if an OAuth\nserver token endpoint returns a redirect whose target an attacker controls, the\nclient can re-sign the token request and send OAuth 1.0 request metadata,\nincluding the OAuth signature, nonce, timestamp, consumer key, and any request\nparameters included in the signature base string, to the attacker-controlled\nhost. The same behavior can also be used as an SSRF or confused-deputy primitive\nbecause the application server follows the redirect and sends the next request\nfrom its own network position.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `oauth` v1.1.5 and prior versions back to and including v0.5.5.\n  - The cross-host token redirect behavior was introduced by\n    https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d74b767f\n  - The behavior is documented in the v0.5.5 changelog as \"Allow redirect to\n    different host but same path\".\n- The vulnerable behavior is in `OAuth::Consumer#token_request`, which is used by\n  the documented request-token and access-token flows.\n- The issue is not specific to a Ruby engine or platform. It is caused by the\n  gem\u0027s redirect handling and recursive token request behavior.\n\nPatched version: `oauth` v1.1.6.\n\n## Impact\n\nA consumer that calls `OAuth::Consumer#get_request_token`,\n`OAuth::Consumer#get_access_token`, or lower-level token request helpers against\nan OAuth server whose token endpoint redirect target can be influenced may lose\nthree security properties:\n\n1. **Cross-origin signed-request metadata disclosure.** The redirected request is\n   signed for the attacker-controlled endpoint. Depending on the request method,\n   scheme, and parameters, the attacker may receive OAuth 1.0 parameters such as\n   `oauth_consumer_key`, `oauth_signature_method`, `oauth_timestamp`,\n   `oauth_nonce`, `oauth_version`, and `oauth_signature`.\n2. **SSRF from the application server.** The OAuth client follows the redirect on\n   behalf of the application, so the redirected host is contacted from the\n   application server\u0027s network position.\n3. **Confused-deputy behavior.** A malicious or compromised token endpoint can\n   cause an otherwise trusted application to initiate signed requests to an\n   unintended origin.\n\nThe disclosed OAuth 1 signature is not equivalent to an OAuth 2 bearer token: it\nis bound to the signed request, timestamp, nonce, HTTP method, and request URL.\nHowever, it can still disclose sensitive integration metadata, may be replayable\nwithin the receiver\u0027s accepted nonce/timestamp window in some deployments, and\ncan expose application-server reachability to attacker-selected hosts.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n[`lib/oauth/consumer.rb`](https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/blob/v1.1.5/lib/oauth/consumer.rb)\nat tag `v1.1.5`:\n\n```ruby\ndef token_request(http_method, path, token = nil, request_options = {}, *arguments)\n  request_options[:token_request] ||= true\n  response = request(http_method, path, token, request_options, *arguments)\n  case response.code.to_i\n\n  when (200..299)\n    # parse token response\n  when (300..399)\n    # Parse redirect to follow\n    uri = URI.parse(response[\"location\"])\n    our_uri = URI.parse(site)\n\n    # Guard against infinite redirects\n    response.error! if uri.path == path \u0026\u0026 our_uri.host == uri.host\n\n    if uri.path == path \u0026\u0026 our_uri.host != uri.host\n      options[:site] = \"#{uri.scheme}://#{uri.host}\"\n      @http = create_http\n    end\n\n    token_request(http_method, uri.path, token, request_options, arguments)\n  when (400..499)\n    raise OAuth::Unauthorized, response\n  else\n    response.error!\n  end\nend\n```\n\nThe vulnerable behavior has several parts:\n\n- `response[\"location\"]` is trusted as the next token request target.\n- Redirects are followed for every `300..399` response.\n- There is no general redirect counter or maximum redirect limit.\n- Cross-host redirects with the same path can mutate `options[:site]` and rebuild\n  the underlying HTTP client.\n- The recursive call continues the token request flow and signs the next request\n  for the redirected destination.\n\n## Reachable in production\n\nThe vulnerable path is reachable through the normal OAuth 1 token exchange:\n\n```ruby\nconsumer = OAuth::Consumer.new(\n  consumer_key,\n  consumer_secret,\n  site: \"https://provider.example\"\n)\n\nrequest_token = consumer.get_request_token\n```\n\nIf `https://provider.example/oauth/request_token` returns a redirect to an\nattacker-controlled host, the library follows that redirect as part of the token\nrequest flow. A realistic trigger is an OAuth provider, gateway, or reverse proxy\nthat emits `Location` based on user-controlled or tenant-controlled input, or a\nmalicious tenant-controlled OAuth endpoint in a multi-tenant integration.\n\nNo application-level redirect handling is required. The redirect is followed\ninside the gem before the application receives the token response.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nA vulnerable application is one that uses `OAuth::Consumer` to perform an OAuth\n1 token exchange against a token endpoint that can be made to return a redirect\nto another origin.\n\nExample shape:\n\n```ruby\nconsumer = OAuth::Consumer.new(\n  consumer_key,\n  consumer_secret,\n  site: \"https://provider.example\"\n)\n\nconsumer.get_request_token\n```\n\nIf `https://provider.example/oauth/request_token` responds with a `30x` redirect\nwhose `Location` points to `https://attacker.example/...`, affected versions may\nfollow that redirect as part of the token request flow. The redirected request is\nthen generated and signed by the application server for the new destination.\nDepending on the configured OAuth request scheme, OAuth 1 parameters may be sent\nin the `Authorization` header, request body, or query string.\n\nExpected vulnerable behavior:\n\n- the token request leaves the configured OAuth provider origin;\n- the redirected host receives a signed OAuth 1 token request;\n- the application does not get a chance to inspect or approve the redirect target\n  before the redirected request is sent.\n\nExpected patched behavior:\n\n- same-origin redirects continue to work, subject to a redirect limit;\n- cross-origin token endpoint redirects are rejected by default;\n- applications that intentionally require cross-origin token redirects must opt\n  in explicitly with `token_request_cross_origin_redirects`.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nReject cross-origin token endpoint redirects by default and require explicit\nopt-in for integrations that intentionally depend on that behavior.\n\nThe fix released in v1.1.6 does the following:\n\n```ruby\ncurrent_uri = token_request_uri(path)\nredirected_uri = token_request_redirect_uri(current_uri, response)\nresponse.error! unless redirected_uri\n\nredirect_count = request_options[:token_request_redirect_count].to_i + 1\nresponse.error! if redirect_count \u003e token_request_max_redirects(request_options)\nresponse.error! if token_request_cross_origin?(current_uri, redirected_uri) \u0026\u0026\n  !token_request_cross_origin_redirects?(request_options)\n\nredirect_options = request_options.merge(token_request_redirect_count: redirect_count)\ntoken_request(http_method, token_request_redirect_path(current_uri, redirected_uri), token, redirect_options, *arguments, \u0026block)\n```\n\nThe fix intentionally preserves same-origin redirect compatibility while making\ncross-origin token endpoint redirects an explicit choice. It also avoids placing\ninternal redirect state in `request_options` passed to OAuth signing.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil a patched release is available, applications can reduce exposure by doing\none or more of the following:\n\n- Ensure configured OAuth token endpoints are fixed absolute URLs controlled by a\n  trusted provider.\n- Do not use tenant-controlled OAuth token endpoint URLs unless the tenant is\n  trusted to receive signed OAuth token requests.\n- Block outbound application-server traffic to internal metadata services and\n  other sensitive internal addresses at the network layer.\n- Place a trusted proxy in front of OAuth providers that rejects token endpoint\n  redirects to a different origin.\n\nThese mitigations reduce exploitability but do not remove the vulnerable redirect\nlogic from the gem.\n\n## Credit\n\nFound during the follow-up audit for `GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9`.\n\nReporter/coordinator: Peter H. Boling (`pboling`).\n\n## References\n\n- Related OAuth 2 advisory: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth2/security/advisories/GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9\n- Fixed version: `oauth` v1.1.6\n- Behavior-introducing commit: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d74b767f",
  "id": "GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T16:27:11Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T16:27:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/security/advisories/GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d069dc8c4c9631947451215f07460d6cdf0caf3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/releases/tag/v1.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OAuth: Cross-origin token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs

Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.

CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers

An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery

An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files

Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-89: Pharming

A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.

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