Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-G5PH-F57V-MWJC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 17:25 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:33
VLAI
Summary
OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification
Details

Summary

The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.

Details

Vulnerable code — App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts lines 372-430:

router.post(
  "/webhook",
  async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
    try {
      const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
      // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!

      if (
        (body["object"] as string | undefined) !== "whatsapp_business_account"
      ) {
        return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
      }

      const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body["entry"] as JSONArray | undefined;
      // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records

Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:

Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts line 58:

const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
    Buffer.from(computedSignature),
    Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);

The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.

No existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.

PoC

Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)

# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification — no auth, no signature
curl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "object": "whatsapp_business_account",
    "entry": [{
      "id": "FAKE_WABA_ID",
      "changes": [{
        "value": {
          "messaging_product": "whatsapp",
          "metadata": {
            "display_phone_number": "+15550000000",
            "phone_number_id": "FAKE_PHONE_ID"
          },
          "messages": [{
            "from": "15551234567",
            "id": "wamid.FAKE",
            "timestamp": "1234567890",
            "text": {"body": "INJECTED_MESSAGE"},
            "type": "text"
          }]
        },
        "field": "messages"
      }]
    }]
  }'

Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):

< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{}
  • Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200
  • No X-Hub-Signature-256 header provided — no signature verification at all
  • Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates

Impact

Any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:

  • False delivery status: Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as "delivered", hiding delivery failures from administrators
  • Alert suppression: Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation
  • Log manipulation: WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails
  • Incident response disruption: During active incidents, forging "delivered" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries
Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "oneuptime"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33143"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T21:17:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:**\n```typescript\nrouter.post(\n  \"/webhook\",\n  async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) =\u003e {\n    try {\n      const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;\n      // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!\n\n      if (\n        (body[\"object\"] as string | undefined) !== \"whatsapp_business_account\"\n      ) {\n        return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);\n      }\n\n      const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body[\"entry\"] as JSONArray | undefined;\n      // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records\n```\n\nCompare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:\n\n**`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:**\n```typescript\nconst isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(\n    Buffer.from(computedSignature),\n    Buffer.from(slackSignature)\n);\n```\n\nThe WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token \u2014 only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.\n\nNo existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** OneUptime v10.0.23 via `docker compose up` (default configuration)\n\n```bash\n# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification \u2014 no auth, no signature\ncurl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"object\": \"whatsapp_business_account\",\n    \"entry\": [{\n      \"id\": \"FAKE_WABA_ID\",\n      \"changes\": [{\n        \"value\": {\n          \"messaging_product\": \"whatsapp\",\n          \"metadata\": {\n            \"display_phone_number\": \"+15550000000\",\n            \"phone_number_id\": \"FAKE_PHONE_ID\"\n          },\n          \"messages\": [{\n            \"from\": \"15551234567\",\n            \"id\": \"wamid.FAKE\",\n            \"timestamp\": \"1234567890\",\n            \"text\": {\"body\": \"INJECTED_MESSAGE\"},\n            \"type\": \"text\"\n          }]\n        },\n        \"field\": \"messages\"\n      }]\n    }]\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n**Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):**\n```\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{}\n```\n\n- Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200\n- No `X-Hub-Signature-256` header provided \u2014 no signature verification at all\n- Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:\n\n- **False delivery status:** Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as \"delivered\", hiding delivery failures from administrators\n- **Alert suppression:** Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation\n- **Log manipulation:** WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails\n- **Incident response disruption:** During active incidents, forging \"delivered\" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries",
  "id": "GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:33:33Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33143"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification"
}

GHSA-G8WQ-427W-WGQM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:37 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:37
VLAI
Details

Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-12740"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-494"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-12-26T04:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-g8wq-427w-wgqm",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12740"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-888929.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G962-2J28-3CG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:52 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:52
VLAI
Summary
OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes
Details

Summary

When JWT authentication is configured using either:

  • authJwtPubKeyPath (local RSA public key), or
  • authJwtHmacSecret (HMAC secret),

the configured audience value (authJwtAud) is not enforced during token parsing. As a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect aud claim are accepted for authentication. This allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.

Details

Affected Code

File: jwt.go Lines: 51–59, 144–157, 161–168

Current Behavior

Remote JWKS Mode (Correct):

return jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))

Audience validation is enforced.

Local Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):

return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })

No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.

HMAC Mode (Vulnerable):

return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })

No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.

Why This Is Vulnerable: authJwtAud is ignored for authJwtPubKeyPath and authJwtHmacSecret modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.

PoC

  1. Configure OliveTin

Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication: ```yaml authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem authJwtHeader: Authorization authJwtClaimUsername: sub authJwtAud: expected-audience

authRequireGuestsToLogin: true ```

  1. Generate a Wrong-Audience Token ```python python3 - <<EOF import jwt, datetime

with open("private.pem") as f: key = f.read()

token = jwt.encode( { "sub": "low", "aud": "wrong-audience", # intentionally wrong "exp": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30) }, key, algorithm="RS256" )

print(token) EOF `` This prints the$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.

  1. Test Without Token (Baseline) bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{}' Expected response: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized

  2. Test With Wrong-Audience Token bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN" \ -d '{}' Expected response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"authenticatedUser":"low","provider":"jwt","usergroup":"","acls":[],"sid":""} Authentication succeeds even though the aud claim is incorrect.

Impact

An attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.

This enables:

  • Cross-service token reuse
  • Authentication using tokens issued for other systems
  • Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments

This is particularly severe when:

  • OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider
  • The same signing key is reused across services
  • Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation

This does not bypass ACL authorization. It is strictly an authentication validation flaw.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30223"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T21:16:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen JWT authentication is configured using either:\n\n- `authJwtPubKeyPath` (local RSA public key), or\n- `authJwtHmacSecret` (HMAC secret),\n\nthe configured audience value (`authJwtAud`) is not enforced during token parsing.\nAs a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect `aud` claim are accepted for authentication.\nThis allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected Code**\n\nFile: `jwt.go`\nLines: 51\u201359, 144\u2013157, 161\u2013168\n\n**Current Behavior**\n\nRemote JWKS Mode (Correct):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))\n```\nAudience validation is enforced.\n\nLocal Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\nHMAC Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\n**Why This Is Vulnerable:** `authJwtAud` is ignored for `authJwtPubKeyPath` and `authJwtHmacSecret` modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. **Configure OliveTin**\n\n   Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication:\n   ```yaml\n   authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem\n   authJwtHeader: Authorization\n   authJwtClaimUsername: sub\n   authJwtAud: expected-audience\n\n   authRequireGuestsToLogin: true\n   ```\n\n2. **Generate a Wrong-Audience Token**\n   ```python\n   python3 - \u003c\u003cEOF\n   import jwt, datetime\n\n   with open(\"private.pem\") as f:\n       key = f.read()\n\n   token = jwt.encode(\n       {\n           \"sub\": \"low\",\n           \"aud\": \"wrong-audience\",   # intentionally wrong\n           \"exp\": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30)\n       },\n       key,\n       algorithm=\"RS256\"\n   )\n\n   print(token)\n   EOF\n   ```\n   This prints the `$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.\n\n3. **Test Without Token (Baseline)**\n   ```bash\n   curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n     -d \u0027{}\u0027\n   ```\n   Expected response:\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n   ```\n\n4. **Test With Wrong-Audience Token**\n   ```bash\n   curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n     -H \"Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN\" \\\n     -d \u0027{}\u0027\n   ```\n   Expected response:\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n   {\"authenticatedUser\":\"low\",\"provider\":\"jwt\",\"usergroup\":\"\",\"acls\":[],\"sid\":\"\"}\n   ```\n   Authentication succeeds even though the `aud` claim is incorrect.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.\n\nThis enables:\n\n- Cross-service token reuse\n- Authentication using tokens issued for other systems\n- Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments\n\nThis is particularly severe when:\n\n- OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider\n- The same signing key is reused across services\n- Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation\n\nThis does **not** bypass ACL authorization.\nIt is strictly an authentication validation flaw.",
  "id": "GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:52:10Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/e97d8ecbd8d6ba468c418ca496fcd18f78131233"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes"
}

GHSA-G96C-X7RH-99R3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 20:51 – Updated: 2023-09-07 21:19
VLAI
Summary
Graylog vulnerable to insecure source port usage for DNS queries
Details

Summary

Graylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.

Details

Graylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.

PoC

The attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.

image

Impact

Although unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog's lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.

(Credit to Iratxe Niño from Fundación Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)

Severity
3.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-41045"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nGraylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.\n\n### Details\nGraylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.\n\n\n### PoC \n\nThe attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind.  The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.\n\n![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/67056857/242301750-6a5a8d0d-fcd2-40d1-bbd4-73baa8279ed3.png)\n\n### Impact\nAlthough unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog\u0027s lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.\n\n\n\n(Credit to Iratxe Ni\u00f1o from Fundaci\u00f3n Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)",
  "id": "GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3",
  "modified": "2023-09-07T21:19:13Z",
  "published": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41045"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/466af814523cffae9fbc7e77bab7472988f03c3e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/a101f4f12180fd3dfa7d3345188a099877a3c327"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Graylog vulnerable to insecure source port usage for DNS queries"
}

GHSA-G973-978J-2C3P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-22 19:47 – Updated: 2022-02-08 21:02
VLAI
Summary
Denial of Service in SheetJS Pro
Details

SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xlsx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.webjars.npm:xlsx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32014"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-19T21:44:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-19T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.",
  "id": "GHSA-g973-978j-2c3p",
  "modified": "2022-02-08T21:02:26Z",
  "published": "2021-07-22T19:47:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://floqast.com/engineering-blog/post/fuzzing-and-parsing-securely"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sheetjs.com/pro"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/xlsx/v/0.17.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of Service in SheetJS Pro"
}

GHSA-G9F6-9775-HFFM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:21 – Updated: 2026-06-09 11:52
VLAI
Summary
Nhost Storage Affected by MIME Type Spoofing via Trusted Client Content-Type Header in Storage Upload
Details

Summary

The storage service's file upload handler trusts the client-provided Content-Type header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets.

Affected Component

  • Service: services/storage
  • File: services/storage/controller/upload_files.go
  • Function: getMultipartFile (lines 48-70)

Root Cause

In getMultipartFile, if the client provides a non-empty Content-Type header that isn't application/octet-stream, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection:

contentType := file.header.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if contentType != "" && contentType != "application/octet-stream" {
    return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely
}

// mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type
// or sends application/octet-stream
mt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent)

Impact

Incorrect MIME type in file metadata. The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type.

Suggested Fix

Always detect MIME type from file content using mimetype.DetectReader, ignoring the client-provided Content-Type header entirely.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nhost/nhost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33221"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-343",
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:21:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T23:16:46Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe storage service\u0027s file upload handler trusts the client-provided `Content-Type` header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **Service**: `services/storage`\n- **File**: `services/storage/controller/upload_files.go`\n- **Function**: `getMultipartFile` (lines 48-70)\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `getMultipartFile`, if the client provides a non-empty `Content-Type` header that isn\u0027t `application/octet-stream`, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection:\n\n```go\ncontentType := file.header.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\")\nif contentType != \"\" \u0026\u0026 contentType != \"application/octet-stream\" {\n    return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely\n}\n\n// mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type\n// or sends application/octet-stream\nmt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n**Incorrect MIME type in file metadata.** The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAlways detect MIME type from file content using `mimetype.DetectReader`, ignoring the client-provided `Content-Type` header entirely.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9f6-9775-hffm",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T11:52:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T20:21:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost/security/advisories/GHSA-g9f6-9775-hffm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost/pull/4018"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost/commit/c4bd53f042d7f568e567e18e2665af81660fce85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost/releases/tag/storage%400.12.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nhost/nhost/releases/tag/storage@0.12.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nhost Storage Affected by MIME Type Spoofing via Trusted Client Content-Type Header in Storage Upload"
}

GHSA-GCJ7-R3HG-M7W6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:25 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:25
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity
Details

Summary

The voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (i-twilio-idempotency-token), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.25 (latest published npm version at triage time)
  • Fixed on main: commit 1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4
  • Planned patched npm version: 2026.2.26

Impact

Deployments using the optional voice-call Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header.

Technical Details

The fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Severity
3.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.26"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-294",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:25:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (`i-twilio-idempotency-token`), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.25` (latest published npm version at triage time)\n- Fixed on `main`: commit `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4`\n- Planned patched npm version: `2026.2.26`\n\n### Impact\nDeployments using the optional `voice-call` Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T22:25:37Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T22:25:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity"
}

GHSA-GF7P-63P6-4M97

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:34 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected product's update service does not sufficiently verify the authenticity of the data uploaded. An attacker who obtains per-product credentials from the monitor and paired implantable cardiac device information can potentially upload invalid data to the Medtronic CareLink network.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-10626"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-08-10T18:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected product\u0027s update service does not sufficiently verify the authenticity of the data uploaded. An attacker who obtains per-product credentials from the monitor and paired implantable cardiac device information can potentially upload invalid data to the Medtronic CareLink network.",
  "id": "GHSA-gf7p-63p6-4m97",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:34:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10626"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2018/icsma-18-219-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://global.medtronic.com/xg-en/product-security/security-bulletins/mycarelink-8-7-18.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-219-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-18-219-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105042"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GFR9-HJ74-58WR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-19 06:31 – Updated: 2024-09-19 06:31
VLAI
Details

The Limit Login Attempts Plus plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to IP Address Spoofing in versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This is due to insufficient restrictions on where the IP Address information is being retrieved for request logging and login restrictions. Attackers can supply the X-Forwarded-For header with with a different IP Address that will be logged and can be used to bypass settings that may have blocked out an IP address or country from logging in.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-4533"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-348"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-19T04:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Limit Login Attempts Plus plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to IP Address Spoofing in versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This is due to insufficient restrictions on where the IP Address information is being retrieved for request logging and login restrictions. Attackers can supply the X-Forwarded-For header with with a different IP Address that will be logged and can be used to bypass settings that may have blocked out an IP address or country from logging in.",
  "id": "GHSA-gfr9-hj74-58wr",
  "modified": "2024-09-19T06:31:36Z",
  "published": "2024-09-19T06:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/limit-login-attempts-plus/trunk/core/LimitLoginAttempts.php#L1043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aec7b59f-1c8a-4403-b33b-c119bd96ad9d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GG6G-G43M-8HWR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-27 09:30
VLAI
Details

On Wear OS devices, when Google Messages is configured as the default SMS/MMS/RCS application, the handling of ACTION_SENDTO intents utilizing the sms:, smsto:, mms:, and mmsto: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes is incorrectly implemented.

Due to this misconfiguration, an attacker capable of invoking an Android intent can exploit this vulnerability to send messages on the user’s behalf to arbitrary receivers without requiring any further user interaction or specific permissions. This allows for the silent and unauthorized transmission of messages from a compromised Wear OS device.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12080"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T09:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "On Wear OS devices, when Google Messages is configured as the default SMS/MMS/RCS application, the handling of ACTION_SENDTO intents utilizing the sms:, smsto:, mms:, and mmsto: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes is incorrectly implemented.\n\nDue to this misconfiguration, an attacker capable of invoking an Android intent can exploit this vulnerability to send messages on the user\u2019s behalf to arbitrary receivers without requiring any further user interaction or specific permissions. This allows for the silent and unauthorized transmission of messages from a compromised Wear OS device.",
  "id": "GHSA-gg6g-g43m-8hwr",
  "modified": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12080"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://towerofhanoi.it/writeups/cve-2025-12080"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.

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