CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
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updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
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16104 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2XMW-F8J8-WFXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 22:25 – Updated: 2026-07-28 22:25Summary
Pagy::I18n.locale= did not validate its argument before using it as a
path component to load the matching dictionary file (<locale>.yml). An
application that assigns untrusted input to the locale — e.g. the common
pattern Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale] — let that input influence
which file Pagy attempted to load.
Details
The setter stored the value as-is, and the loader joined it into a path and read it:
# gem/lib/pagy/modules/i18n/i18n.rb
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s
end
# ...later, when translating:
path = pathnames.reverse.map { |p| p.join("#{locale}.yml") }.find(&:exist?)
dictionary = YAML.load_file(path)[locale]
Because the locale was used verbatim, a value such as an absolute path or
a ../-style string redirected the lookup outside the locales directory.
Pagy's subsequent structural check (dictionary['pagy']['p11n'])
prevents the file's contents from being returned, so this is not a
direct file read.
Fixed in 43.5.6 by constraining the locale to a BCP 47 shape before use:
LOCALE_PATTERN = /\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s[LOCALE_PATTERN]
end
Any non-matching value (including nil) resolves to the default locale
and never reaches the file lookup.
PoC
In an application that sets Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale], the
loader appends .yml and reads <locale>.yml, so the request param
controls the target path. For example, pointing it at the app's
config/database.yml:
- Send a request with
?locale=../../../config/database(adjust the number of../to reach the app root from the gem'slocales/directory). - Pagy calls
YAML.load_fileon the resulting…/config/database.yml. - The outcome differs by whether that
.ymlexists, is readable, parses as YAML, and has Pagy's expected structure — an existing, readableconfig/database.ymlraises a different error than a non-existent path (which silently falls back to the default locale). This yields a file-existence / readability oracle for.ymlpaths, and the targeted file is read into the process during the attempt.
Impact
Information disclosure (CWE-22 / CWE-200): a file-existence / readability
oracle for .yml paths on the host, plus a server-side read of
attacker-chosen files into the process. The file contents are not
returned in the response.
Only applications that pass unsanitized end-user input into
Pagy::I18n.locale= are affected. Applications that set the locale from
trusted values are not affected.
Patched: pagy 43.5.6.
Workaround (if you cannot upgrade): validate the locale before
assigning it, e.g.
Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale].to_s[/\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/],
or restrict it to your known set of locales.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "pagy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "43.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "43.5.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54659"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T22:25:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`Pagy::I18n.locale=` did not validate its argument before using it as a\npath component to load the matching dictionary file (`\u003clocale\u003e.yml`). An\napplication that assigns untrusted input to the locale \u2014 e.g. the common\npattern `Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale]` \u2014 let that input influence\nwhich file Pagy attempted to load.\n\n### Details\n\nThe setter stored the value as-is, and the loader joined it into a path\nand read it:\n\n```ruby\n# gem/lib/pagy/modules/i18n/i18n.rb\ndef locale=(value)\n Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s\nend\n\n# ...later, when translating:\npath = pathnames.reverse.map { |p| p.join(\"#{locale}.yml\") }.find(\u0026:exist?)\ndictionary = YAML.load_file(path)[locale]\n```\n\nBecause the locale was used verbatim, a value such as an absolute path or\na `../`-style string redirected the lookup outside the locales directory.\nPagy\u0027s subsequent structural check (`dictionary[\u0027pagy\u0027][\u0027p11n\u0027]`)\nprevents the file\u0027s contents from being returned, so this is **not** a\ndirect file read.\n\nFixed in 43.5.6 by constraining the locale to a BCP 47 shape before use:\n\n```ruby\nLOCALE_PATTERN = /\\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\\z/\n\ndef locale=(value)\n Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s[LOCALE_PATTERN]\nend\n```\n\nAny non-matching value (including `nil`) resolves to the default locale\nand never reaches the file lookup.\n\n### PoC\n\nIn an application that sets `Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale]`, the\nloader appends `.yml` and reads `\u003clocale\u003e.yml`, so the request param\ncontrols the target path. For example, pointing it at the app\u0027s\n`config/database.yml`:\n\n1. Send a request with `?locale=../../../config/database` (adjust the\n number of `../` to reach the app root from the gem\u0027s `locales/`\n directory).\n2. Pagy calls `YAML.load_file` on the resulting `\u2026/config/database.yml`.\n3. The outcome differs by whether that `.yml` exists, is readable, parses\n as YAML, and has Pagy\u0027s expected structure \u2014 an existing, readable\n `config/database.yml` raises a different error than a non-existent\n path (which silently falls back to the default locale). This yields a\n file-existence / readability oracle for `.yml` paths, and the targeted\n file is read into the process during the attempt.\n\n### Impact\n\nInformation disclosure (CWE-22 / CWE-200): a file-existence / readability\noracle for `.yml` paths on the host, plus a server-side read of\nattacker-chosen files into the process. The file contents are not\nreturned in the response.\n\nOnly applications that pass **unsanitized end-user input** into\n`Pagy::I18n.locale=` are affected. Applications that set the locale from\ntrusted values are not affected.\n\n**Patched:** pagy 43.5.6.\n**Workaround (if you cannot upgrade):** validate the locale before\nassigning it, e.g.\n`Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale].to_s[/\\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\\z/]`,\nor restrict it to your known set of locales.",
"id": "GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc",
"modified": "2026-07-28T22:25:29Z",
"published": "2026-07-28T22:25:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy/security/advisories/GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy/pull/908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy/commit/efcf09690e9fa7d7abdfb987b785a55f87e287df"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy/releases/tag/43.5.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pagy I18n locale option is not validated before being used in a file path"
}
GHSA-2XQ7-XF7V-58QW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:52 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:52Directory traversal vulnerability in inc/config.php in ProManager 0.73 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the language parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2687"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-06-13T18:41:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in inc/config.php in ProManager 0.73 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the language parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-2xq7-xf7v-58qw",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:52:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:52:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2687"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29613"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2XRV-6G4W-WCV4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:38 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:04Directory traversal vulnerability in json.php in TomatoCart 1.2.0 Alpha 2 and possibly earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the module parameter in a "3" action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-5907"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-11-17T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in json.php in TomatoCart 1.2.0 Alpha 2 and possibly earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the module parameter in a \"3\" action.",
"id": "GHSA-2xrv-6g4w-wcv4",
"modified": "2025-04-11T04:04:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:38:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/74459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/80689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/111291/TomatoCart-1.2.0-Alpha-2-Local-File-Inclusion.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mavitunasecurity.com/local-file-inclusion-vulnerability-in-tomatocart"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52766"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2XW4-XQVW-CXG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 15:42 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:42Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a path traversal and authorization bypass vulnerability in accountsController.uploadImage that allows authenticated users to overwrite other users' avatars via form-supplied _id and username fields. Attackers can supply a username like /../../../x to bypass the incomplete CVE-2022-1752 sanitization and write png, jpg, jpeg, or gif files outside public/uploads/users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114402"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T13:18:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a path traversal and authorization bypass vulnerability in accountsController.uploadImage that allows authenticated users to overwrite other users\u0027 avatars via form-supplied _id and username fields. Attackers can supply a username like /../../../x to bypass the incomplete CVE-2022-1752 sanitization and write png, jpg, jpeg, or gif files outside public/uploads/users.",
"id": "GHSA-2xw4-xqvw-cxg5",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:42:28Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T15:42:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/polonel/trudesk/blob/v1.2.11/src/controllers/accounts.js#L454-L553"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/@leediay/multiple-vuln-trudesk-1211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/trudesk-through-1.2.11-path-traversal-and-authorization-bypass-via-profile-image-upload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2XX4-JJ5V-6MFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-04 17:27 – Updated: 2023-10-20 17:45Overview
We have identified and addressed a security issue in the Nuclei project that affected users utilizing Nuclei as Go code (SDK) running custom templates. This issue did not affect CLI users. The problem was related to sanitization issues with payloads loading in sandbox mode.
Details
In the previous versions, there was a potential risk with payloads loading in sandbox mode. The issue occurred due to relative paths not being converted to absolute paths before doing the check for sandbox flag allowing arbitrary files to be read on the filesystem in certain cases when using Nuclei from Go SDK implementation.
This issue has been fixed in the latest release, v2.9.9. We have also enabled sandbox by default for filesystem loading. This can be optionally disabled if required.
The -sandbox option has been deprecated and is now divided into two new options: -lfa (allow local file access) which is disabled by default and -lna (restrict local network access) which can be optionally disabled by user. The -lfa allows file (payload) access anywhere on the system (disabling sandbox effectively), and -lna blocks connections to the local/private network.
Affected Versions
This issue affected all versions of Nuclei prior to v2.9.9.
Patches
We recommend all users upgrade to the latest version, v2.9.9, which includes the security fix.
References
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank keomutchoiboi who reported this issue to us via our security email, security@projectdiscovery.io. We appreciate the responsible disclosure of this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37896"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-04T17:27:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-04T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Overview\n\nWe have identified and addressed a security issue in the Nuclei project that affected users utilizing Nuclei as **Go code (SDK)** running **custom templates**. This issue did not affect CLI users. The problem was related to sanitization issues with payloads loading in `sandbox` mode.\n\n## Details\n\nIn the previous versions, there was a potential risk with payloads loading in sandbox mode. The issue occurred due to relative paths not being converted to absolute paths before doing the check for `sandbox` flag allowing arbitrary files to be read on the filesystem in certain cases when using Nuclei from `Go` SDK implementation. \n\nThis issue has been fixed in the latest release, v2.9.9. We have also enabled sandbox by default for filesystem loading. This can be optionally disabled if required.\n\nThe `-sandbox` option has been **deprecated** and is now divided into two new options: `-lfa` (allow local file access) which is disabled by default and `-lna` (restrict local network access) which can be optionally disabled by user. The `-lfa` allows file (payload) access anywhere on the system (disabling sandbox effectively), and `-lna` blocks connections to the local/private network.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nThis issue affected all versions of Nuclei prior to v2.9.9.\n\n## Patches\n\nWe recommend all users upgrade to the latest version, [v2.9.9](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/releases/tag/v2.9.9), which includes the security fix.\n\n### References\n\n- [patch](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/3927)\n- [releases](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/releases/tag/v2.9.9)\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nWe would like to thank **keomutchoiboi** who reported this issue to us via our security email, [security@projectdiscovery.io](mailto:security@projectdiscovery.io). We appreciate the responsible disclosure of this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-2xx4-jj5v-6mff",
"modified": "2023-10-20T17:45:19Z",
"published": "2023-08-04T17:27:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/security/advisories/GHSA-2xx4-jj5v-6mff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/3927"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/releases/tag/v2.9.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nuclei Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-2XX7-FJFH-GR5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 03:31A vulnerability was identified in MapQuest Get Directions App 10.16.1 on Android. This vulnerability affects the function getDataColumn of the file ExpoShareIntentModule.kt of the component com.mapquest.android.ace. The manipulation leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84442"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T03:16:48Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in MapQuest Get Directions App 10.16.1 on Android. This vulnerability affects the function getDataColumn of the file ExpoShareIntentModule.kt of the component com.mapquest.android.ace. The manipulation leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-2xx7-fjfh-gr5v",
"modified": "2026-09-02T03:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T03:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NqFuHvwq66hpOfxTWPKlUB1_eMwLvujH/edit?usp=sharing\u0026ouid=100768766778062598194\u0026rtpof=true\u0026sd=true"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-84442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/885452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/397830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/397830/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-3227-R97M-8J95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-22 20:16 – Updated: 2022-04-22 20:16Impact
This vulnerability effects the built-in afire serve_static extension allowing paths containing //.... to bypass the previous path sanitation and request files in higher directories that should not be accessible.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in afire 1.1.0. If you can, just update to the newest version of afire.
Workarounds
If you can't update afire you can simply disallow paths containing /.. with the following middleware.
Make sure this is the last middleware added to the server so it runs first, stopping the bad requests.
use afire::prelude::*;
struct PathTraversalFix;
impl Middleware for PathTraversalFix {
fn pre(&self, req: Request) -> MiddleRequest {
if req.path.replace("\\", "/").contains("/..") {
return MiddleRequest::Send(
Response::new()
.status(400)
.text("Paths containing `..` are not allowed"),
);
}
MiddleRequest::Continue
}
}
let mut server = Server::new(host, port);
PathTraversalFix.attach(&mut server);
References
You can read about the new changes to afire in 1.1.0 here
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory you can email me or message me on discord. [https://connorcode.com/contact]
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "afire"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-34"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-22T20:16:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis vulnerability effects the built-in afire serve_static extension allowing paths containing `//....` to bypass the previous path sanitation and request files in higher directories that should not be accessible.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in [afire 1.1.0](https://crates.io/crates/afire/1.1.0).\nIf you can, just update to the newest version of afire.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you can\u0027t update afire you can simply disallow paths containing `/..` with the following middleware.\nMake sure this is the last middleware added to the server so it runs first, stopping the bad requests.\n```rust\nuse afire::prelude::*;\n\nstruct PathTraversalFix;\n\nimpl Middleware for PathTraversalFix {\n fn pre(\u0026self, req: Request) -\u003e MiddleRequest {\n if req.path.replace(\"\\\\\", \"/\").contains(\"/..\") {\n return MiddleRequest::Send(\n Response::new()\n .status(400)\n .text(\"Paths containing `..` are not allowed\"),\n );\n }\n\n MiddleRequest::Continue\n }\n}\n```\n```rust\nlet mut server = Server::new(host, port);\nPathTraversalFix.attach(\u0026mut server);\n```\n\n### References\nYou can read about the new changes to afire in 1.1.0 [here](https://connorcode.com/writing/afire/update-3)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory you can email me or message me on discord.\n[[https://connorcode.com/contact](https://connorcode.com/contact)]",
"id": "GHSA-3227-r97m-8j95",
"modified": "2022-04-22T20:16:45Z",
"published": "2022-04-22T20:16:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Basicprogrammer10/afire/security/advisories/GHSA-3227-r97m-8j95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Basicprogrammer10/afire/commit/da7904c04f82e1cb43cc42eaf6a1dba072b5c921"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Basicprogrammer10/afire"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Basicprogrammer10/afire/releases/tag/v1.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Relative Path Traversal in afire serve_static"
}
GHSA-322H-WW5H-3M7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 21:31Memphis Documents Library plugin for WordPress before 3.1.6 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files via the mdocs-img-preview parameter. Attackers can send GET requests with traversal sequences to mdocs_img_preview() in mdocs-downloads.php to download wp-config.php containing database credentials. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2023-10-22.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-20100"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T21:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Memphis Documents Library plugin for WordPress before 3.1.6 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files via the mdocs-img-preview parameter. Attackers can send GET requests with traversal sequences to mdocs_img_preview() in mdocs-downloads.php to download wp-config.php containing database credentials. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2023-10-22.",
"id": "GHSA-322h-ww5h-3m7g",
"modified": "2026-10-20T21:31:05Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T21:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-20100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/vulnerabilities/wordpress/wp-memphis-documents-library-lfi.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/136374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/memphis-documents-library"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/53999c06-05ca-44f1-b713-1e4d6b4a3f9f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/memphis-documents-library-wordpress-plugin-3.1.6-path-traversal-via-mdocs-img-preview"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-322X-V876-G883
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:19 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:19Summary
The matchFileSnapshot function in src/assertions/snapshots.ts accepted a filePath parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1 or setUpdateMode('all')), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories.
Affected Code
File: src/assertions/snapshots.ts, lines 732-769
export function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void {
const serialized = serialize(actual);
const mode = resolveUpdateMode();
const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);
if (!fileExists) {
if (mode === 'all' || mode === 'new') {
const dir = path.dirname(filePath);
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
}
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, 'utf-8');
The filePath flows from expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath) at index.ts:1033-1035 with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution.
Proof of Concept
import { expect, setUpdateMode } from '@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom';
setUpdateMode('all');
// Writes arbitrary content to any writable path
expect('malicious content').toMatchFileSnapshot('/tmp/exploit/payload.txt');
// Path traversal via relative components
expect('data').toMatchFileSnapshot('../../../tmp/evil.txt');
// In CI environments, could overwrite CI config
expect('injected step').toMatchFileSnapshot('/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml');
Impact
In CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions.
Fix
Fixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on main. The matchFileSnapshot function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to process.cwd(), configurable via optional projectRoot parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error.
export function matchFileSnapshot(
actual: unknown,
filePath: string,
projectRoot?: string,
): void {
const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd();
const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath);
if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) {
throw new Error(
`File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`,
);
}
// ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath`
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.21"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `matchFileSnapshot` function in `src/assertions/snapshots.ts` accepted a `filePath` parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (`UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1` or `setUpdateMode(\u0027all\u0027)`), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/assertions/snapshots.ts`, lines 732-769\n\n```typescript\nexport function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void {\n const serialized = serialize(actual);\n const mode = resolveUpdateMode();\n const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);\n\n if (!fileExists) {\n if (mode === \u0027all\u0027 || mode === \u0027new\u0027) {\n const dir = path.dirname(filePath);\n if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {\n fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });\n }\n fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, \u0027utf-8\u0027);\n```\n\nThe `filePath` flows from `expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath)` at `index.ts:1033-1035` with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```typescript\nimport { expect, setUpdateMode } from \u0027@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom\u0027;\n\nsetUpdateMode(\u0027all\u0027);\n\n// Writes arbitrary content to any writable path\nexpect(\u0027malicious content\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027/tmp/exploit/payload.txt\u0027);\n\n// Path traversal via relative components\nexpect(\u0027data\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027../../../tmp/evil.txt\u0027);\n\n// In CI environments, could overwrite CI config\nexpect(\u0027injected step\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml\u0027);\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIn CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on `main`. The `matchFileSnapshot` function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to `process.cwd()`, configurable via optional `projectRoot` parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error.\n\n```typescript\nexport function matchFileSnapshot(\n actual: unknown,\n filePath: string,\n projectRoot?: string,\n): void {\n const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd();\n const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath);\n if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) \u0026\u0026 resolved !== root) {\n throw new Error(\n `File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`,\n );\n }\n // ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath`\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-322x-v876-g883",
"modified": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/security/advisories/GHSA-322x-v876-g883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom\u0027s Path Traversal in matchFileSnapshot allows arbitrary file write"
}
GHSA-323P-5QR7-Q36J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-12 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 00:31An interface that accepts file uploads from authenticated users extracts the contents of uploaded archives without validating that extracted file paths remain within the intended destination directory. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft an archive whose entries traverse outside the destination directory, causing the extraction process to write files to arbitrary locations with the privileges of that process. This could allow an attacker to inject fabricated records into the system's stored data or tamper with application configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T22:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An interface that accepts file uploads from authenticated users extracts the contents of uploaded archives without validating that extracted file paths remain within the intended destination directory. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft an archive whose entries traverse outside the destination directory, causing the extraction process to write files to arbitrary locations with the privileges of that process. This could allow an attacker to inject fabricated records into the system\u0027s stored data or tamper with application configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-323p-5qr7-q36j",
"modified": "2026-10-03T00:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-12T00:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-254-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-254-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.