GHSA-322X-V876-G883
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:19 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:19Summary
The matchFileSnapshot function in src/assertions/snapshots.ts accepted a filePath parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1 or setUpdateMode('all')), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories.
Affected Code
File: src/assertions/snapshots.ts, lines 732-769
export function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void {
const serialized = serialize(actual);
const mode = resolveUpdateMode();
const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);
if (!fileExists) {
if (mode === 'all' || mode === 'new') {
const dir = path.dirname(filePath);
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
}
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, 'utf-8');
The filePath flows from expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath) at index.ts:1033-1035 with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution.
Proof of Concept
import { expect, setUpdateMode } from '@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom';
setUpdateMode('all');
// Writes arbitrary content to any writable path
expect('malicious content').toMatchFileSnapshot('/tmp/exploit/payload.txt');
// Path traversal via relative components
expect('data').toMatchFileSnapshot('../../../tmp/evil.txt');
// In CI environments, could overwrite CI config
expect('injected step').toMatchFileSnapshot('/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml');
Impact
In CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions.
Fix
Fixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on main. The matchFileSnapshot function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to process.cwd(), configurable via optional projectRoot parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error.
export function matchFileSnapshot(
actual: unknown,
filePath: string,
projectRoot?: string,
): void {
const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd();
const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath);
if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) {
throw new Error(
`File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`,
);
}
// ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath`
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.21"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `matchFileSnapshot` function in `src/assertions/snapshots.ts` accepted a `filePath` parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (`UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1` or `setUpdateMode(\u0027all\u0027)`), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/assertions/snapshots.ts`, lines 732-769\n\n```typescript\nexport function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void {\n const serialized = serialize(actual);\n const mode = resolveUpdateMode();\n const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);\n\n if (!fileExists) {\n if (mode === \u0027all\u0027 || mode === \u0027new\u0027) {\n const dir = path.dirname(filePath);\n if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {\n fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });\n }\n fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, \u0027utf-8\u0027);\n```\n\nThe `filePath` flows from `expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath)` at `index.ts:1033-1035` with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```typescript\nimport { expect, setUpdateMode } from \u0027@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom\u0027;\n\nsetUpdateMode(\u0027all\u0027);\n\n// Writes arbitrary content to any writable path\nexpect(\u0027malicious content\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027/tmp/exploit/payload.txt\u0027);\n\n// Path traversal via relative components\nexpect(\u0027data\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027../../../tmp/evil.txt\u0027);\n\n// In CI environments, could overwrite CI config\nexpect(\u0027injected step\u0027).toMatchFileSnapshot(\u0027/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml\u0027);\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIn CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on `main`. The `matchFileSnapshot` function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to `process.cwd()`, configurable via optional `projectRoot` parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error.\n\n```typescript\nexport function matchFileSnapshot(\n actual: unknown,\n filePath: string,\n projectRoot?: string,\n): void {\n const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd();\n const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath);\n if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) \u0026\u0026 resolved !== root) {\n throw new Error(\n `File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`,\n );\n }\n // ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath`\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-322x-v876-g883",
"modified": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T20:19:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/security/advisories/GHSA-322x-v876-g883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom\u0027s Path Traversal in matchFileSnapshot allows arbitrary file write"
}
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