GHSA-WMFP-5Q7X-987X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 01:04 – Updated: 2026-03-12 14:25Impact
The layout, render, and include tags allow arbitrary file access via absolute paths (either as string literals or through Liquid variables, the latter require dynamicPartials: true, which is the default). This poses a security risk when malicious users are allowed to control the template content or specify the filepath to be included as a Liquid variable.
Patches
The root cause is LiquidJS allows require.resolve() as fallback but doesn't limit the directories it can resolve to. The issue is fixed via #855 and published version 10.25.0 on npm.
Workarounds
Change the files in build time
In build time, through Shell script or Webpack string-replace-loader, change the file content of correxponding file (depending on your package type, for CommonJS it's dist/liquid.node.js) under dist/,
if (fs.fallback !== undefined) {
const filepath = fs.fallback(file)
- if (filepath !== undefined) yield filepath
+ if (filepath !== undefined) {
+ for (const dir of dirs) {
+ if (!enforceRoot || this.contains(dir, filepath)) {
+ yield filepath
+ break
+ }
+ }
}
}
Overriding by fs LiquidJS option
Adding a fs option to override the default fs implementation:
const { statSync, readFileSync, promises: { stat, readFile } } = require('fs')
const { resolve, extname, dirname, sep } = require('path')
const fs = {
exists: async (fp) => { try { await stat(fp); return true; } catch { return false } },
existsSync: (fp) => { try { statSync(fp); return true } catch { return false } },
resolve: (root, file, ext) => resolve(root, file + (extname(file) ? '' : ext)),
contains: (root, file) => {
const r = resolve(root)
return file.startsWith(r.endsWith(sep) ? r : r + sep)
},
readFile: (fp) => readFile(fp, 'utf8'),
readFileSync: (fp) => readFileSync(fp, 'utf8'),
fallback: () => undefined,
dirname,
sep
};
const engine = new Liquid({ fs })
References
Discussions: https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/851 Code fix: https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/855
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "liquidjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T01:04:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T21:16:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe `layout`, `render`, and `include` tags allow arbitrary file access via absolute paths (either as string literals or through Liquid variables, the latter require `dynamicPartials: true`, which is the default). This poses a security risk when malicious users are allowed to control the template content or specify the filepath to be included as a Liquid variable.\n\n### Patches\nThe root cause is LiquidJS allows `require.resolve()` as fallback but doesn\u0027t limit the directories it can resolve to. The issue is fixed via [#855](https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/855) and published version 10.25.0 on npm.\n\n### Workarounds\n#### Change the files in build time\nIn build time, through Shell script or Webpack `string-replace-loader`, change the file content of correxponding file (depending on your package `type`, for CommonJS it\u0027s `dist/liquid.node.js`) under `dist/`, \n\n```diff\n if (fs.fallback !== undefined) {\n const filepath = fs.fallback(file)\n- if (filepath !== undefined) yield filepath\n+ if (filepath !== undefined) {\n+ for (const dir of dirs) {\n+ if (!enforceRoot || this.contains(dir, filepath)) {\n+ yield filepath\n+ break\n+ }\n+ }\n }\n }\n```\n\n#### Overriding by `fs` LiquidJS option\nAdding a [`fs` option](https://liquidjs.com/api/interfaces/FS.html) to override the [default `fs` implementation](https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/blob/1b85fdaa9c535021f7030a239a64003af26d31b5/src/fs/fs-impl.ts#L36-L40):\n\n```javascript\nconst { statSync, readFileSync, promises: { stat, readFile } } = require(\u0027fs\u0027)\nconst { resolve, extname, dirname, sep } = require(\u0027path\u0027)\n\nconst fs = {\n exists: async (fp) =\u003e { try { await stat(fp); return true; } catch { return false } },\n existsSync: (fp) =\u003e { try { statSync(fp); return true } catch { return false } },\n resolve: (root, file, ext) =\u003e resolve(root, file + (extname(file) ? \u0027\u0027 : ext)),\n contains: (root, file) =\u003e {\n const r = resolve(root)\n return file.startsWith(r.endsWith(sep) ? r : r + sep)\n },\n readFile: (fp) =\u003e readFile(fp, \u0027utf8\u0027),\n readFileSync: (fp) =\u003e readFileSync(fp, \u0027utf8\u0027),\n fallback: () =\u003e undefined,\n dirname,\n sep\n};\n\nconst engine = new Liquid({ fs })\n```\n\n### References\nDiscussions: https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/851\nCode fix: https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/855",
"id": "GHSA-wmfp-5q7x-987x",
"modified": "2026-03-12T14:25:23Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T01:04:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-wmfp-5q7x-987x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/3cd024d652dc883c46307581e979fe32302adbac"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "liquidjs has a path traversal fallback vulnerability"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.