Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

13244 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-P32G-H5J4-3GXX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-17 03:30 – Updated: 2024-08-12 15:30
VLAI
Details

In the module "SoNice Retour" (sonice_retour) up to version 2.1.0 from Common-Services for PrestaShop, a guest can download personal information without restriction by performing a path traversal attack. Due to a lack of permissions control and a lack of control in the path name construction, a guest can perform a path traversal to view all files on the information system.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45382"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-17T02:15:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the module \"SoNice Retour\" (sonice_retour) up to version 2.1.0 from Common-Services for PrestaShop, a guest can download personal information without restriction by performing a path traversal attack. Due to a lack of permissions control and a lack of control in the path name construction, a guest can perform a path traversal to view all files on the information system.",
  "id": "GHSA-p32g-h5j4-3gxx",
  "modified": "2024-08-12T15:30:47Z",
  "published": "2023-11-17T03:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45382"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://common-services.com/fr/home-fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.friendsofpresta.org/modules/2023/11/16/sonice_retour.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P33X-CG95-PHVW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:47 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:47
VLAI
Details

IBM Tivoli IT Asset Management for IT, Tivoli Service Request Manager, and Change and Configuration Management Database 7.1 through 7.1.1.8 and 7.2 and Maximo Asset Management and Maximo Industry Solutions 7.1 through 7.1.1.8, 7.5 before 7.5.0.7 IFIX003, and 7.6 before 7.6.0.0 IFIX002 allow remote authenticated users to conduct directory traversal attacks via unspecified vectors.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-0107"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-04-24T06:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Tivoli IT Asset Management for IT, Tivoli Service Request Manager, and Change and Configuration Management Database 7.1 through 7.1.1.8 and 7.2 and Maximo Asset Management and Maximo Industry Solutions 7.1 through 7.1.1.8, 7.5 before 7.5.0.7 IFIX003, and 7.6 before 7.6.0.0 IFIX002 allow remote authenticated users to conduct directory traversal attacks via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-p33x-cg95-phvw",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:47:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:47:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21694974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97998"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P383-VG63-PPJ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 01:27 – Updated: 2022-04-29 01:27
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in Kai Blankenhorn Bitfolge simple and nice index file (aka snif) before 1.2.5 allows remote attackers to download files from locations above the snif directory.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2003-1335"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2003-12-31T05:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Kai Blankenhorn Bitfolge simple and nice index file (aka snif) before 1.2.5 allows remote attackers to download files from locations above the snif directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-p383-vg63-ppj8",
  "modified": "2022-04-29T01:27:53Z",
  "published": "2022-04-29T01:27:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2003-1335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.bitfolge.de/snif-en.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-P385-79FW-F6RX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 15:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was detected in DV0x creative-ad-agent up to 751b9e5146604dc65049bd0f62dcbdad6212f8a3. Impacted is an unknown function of the file server/sdk-server.ts of the component creative-ad-agent-server. Performing a manipulation of the argument req.params results in path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is now public and may be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The patch is named 3d255865a957f3740b8724dd914502c0f44d4970. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7271"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T13:19:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was detected in DV0x creative-ad-agent up to 751b9e5146604dc65049bd0f62dcbdad6212f8a3. Impacted is an unknown function of the file server/sdk-server.ts of the component creative-ad-agent-server. Performing a manipulation of the argument req.params results in path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is now public and may be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The patch is named 3d255865a957f3740b8724dd914502c0f44d4970. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-p385-79fw-f6rx",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-04-28T15:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DV0x/creative-ad-agent/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DV0x/creative-ad-agent/commit/3d255865a957f3740b8724dd914502c0f44d4970"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DV0x/creative-ad-agent"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/802887"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359926"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359926/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P3H2-2J4P-P83G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:50 – Updated: 2026-05-05 21:43
VLAI
Summary
MCPHub has Path Traversal via Malicious MCPB Manifest Name
Details

MCPB File Upload Handler extracts a ZIP file and reads manifest.json from it. The name field in the manifest is directly concatenated into a file path (line 107) without any sanitization or path traversal character validation. An attacker can craft a malicious MCPB file where manifest.name is set to something like ../../../etc/malicious, causing the file to be extracted to an arbitrary location on the file system. The cleanupOldMcpbServer function (line 110) also uses the unsanitized name, potentially allowing deletion of arbitrary directories.

1. Summary

  • Vulnerability Type: Path Traversal (CWE-22)
  • Sink Location: src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:107
  • Vulnerability Description: The name field from an uploaded MCPB manifest is used directly, without sanitization or normalization, to construct a file system path for directory creation and move operations, which may lead to path traversal attacks.

2. Analysis Logic

Step 1: Inspect the identified sink (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116)

I examined the upload handler and located the file system sink where manifest.name is used to build the final extraction path and write files to that path.

// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116
// Use server name as the final extract directory for automatic version management
const finalExtractDir = path.join(path.dirname(mcpbFilePath), `server-${manifest.name}`);

// Clean up any existing version of this server
cleanupOldMcpbServer(manifest.name);
if (!fs.existsSync(finalExtractDir)) {
  fs.mkdirSync(finalExtractDir, { recursive: true });
}

// Move the temporary directory to the final location
fs.renameSync(tempExtractDir, finalExtractDir);

Analysis: manifest.name is used to build finalExtractDir, which is then operated on by fs.mkdirSync and fs.renameSync. These are file system write/move operations, so if name is user-controlled and unsanitized, this is a path traversal sink. Next, I traced the origin of manifest.name.

Step 2: Trace the source of manifest.name in the upload handler (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:83-104)

I traced back the data flow to see how the manifest is read and validated.

// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:83-104
const manifestPath = path.join(tempExtractDir, 'manifest.json');
if (!fs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {
  throw new Error('manifest.json not found in MCPB file');
}

const manifestContent = fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8');
const manifest = JSON.parse(manifestContent);

// Validate required fields in manifest
if (!manifest.manifest_version) {
  throw new Error('Invalid manifest: missing manifest_version');
}
if (!manifest.name) {
  throw new Error('Invalid manifest: missing name');
}

Analysis: manifest is parsed directly from manifest.json inside the uploaded archive. The only check on manifest.name is that it is non‑empty; there is no sanitization, normalization, or allow‑list validation. Next, I confirmed the entry point for uploading MCPB files to verify user control.

Step 3: Trace the HTTP entry point in src/routes/index.ts:297-299

I located the route that exposes the upload handler.

// src/routes/index.ts:297-299
// MCPB upload routes
router.post('/mcpb/upload', uploadMiddleware, uploadMcpbFile);

Analysis: The /mcpb/upload endpoint invokes uploadMiddleware and uploadMcpbFile, so user‑supplied uploads are the source of the manifest content. Next, I verified the upload middleware behavior.

Step 4: Confirm the upload middleware (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:8-38)

I inspected how the uploaded file is received and stored.

// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:8-38
const storage = multer.diskStorage({
  destination: (_req, _file, cb) => {
    const uploadDir = path.join(process.cwd(), 'data/uploads/mcpb');
    if (!fs.existsSync(uploadDir)) {
      fs.mkdirSync(uploadDir, { recursive: true });
    }
    cb(null, uploadDir);
  },
  filename: (_req, file, cb) => {
    const timestamp = Date.now();
    const originalName = path.parse(file.originalname).name;
    cb(null, `${originalName}-${timestamp}.mcpb`);
  },
});

const upload = multer({
  storage,
  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
    if (file.originalname.endsWith('.mcpb')) {
      cb(null, true);
    } else {
      cb(new Error('Only .mcpb files are allowed'));
    }
  },
  limits: {
    fileSize: 500 * 1024 * 1024, // 500MB limit
  },
});

export const uploadMiddleware = upload.single('mcpbFile');

Analysis: The upload middleware only checks file extension and size. It does not restrict or validate the contents of the archive or manifest.name. Therefore, manifest.name is user‑controlled input. Next, I checked whether any sanitization or normalization is applied before reaching the sink.

Step 5: Verify lack of path validation on manifest.name in src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-110

I verified that no path sanitization occurs between parsing and usage.

// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-110
if (!manifest.name) {
  throw new Error('Invalid manifest: missing name');
}
// ...
const finalExtractDir = path.join(path.dirname(mcpbFilePath), `server-${manifest.name}`);
cleanupOldMcpbServer(manifest.name);

Analysis: Before using manifest.name to construct a file system path, there is no path.resolve/realpath check, no use of basename(), and no allow‑list validation. This confirms that the path is built from untrusted input without defenses.

Step 6: Examine cleanup behavior using the unsanitized name (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:41-52)

I verified how cleanupOldMcpbServer uses the same input.

// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:41-52
const uploadDir = path.join(process.cwd(), 'data/uploads/mcpb');
const serverPattern = `server-${serverName}`;

if (fs.existsSync(uploadDir)) {
  const files = fs.readdirSync(uploadDir);
  files.forEach((file) => {
    if (file.startsWith(serverPattern)) {
      const filePath = path.join(uploadDir, file);
      if (fs.statSync(filePath).isDirectory()) {
        fs.rmSync(filePath, { recursive: true, force: true });
      }
    }
  });
}

Analysis: serverName is used without validation, but the deletion is limited to directories already present in uploadDir as returned by readdirSync. The main traversal risk remains in constructing the path for finalExtractDir and the subsequent file system operations.

Analysis Walkthrough

  • Q1: Does user‑controllable input affect the file path? → Yes. manifest.name is read from the uploaded archive’s manifest.json and used in path.join(...) to build finalExtractDir (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:89-110).
  • Q2: Is the path normalized and validated against a base directory? → No. There is no resolve/realpath + startsWith check before fs.mkdirSync/fs.renameSync (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116).
  • Q3: Is basename()/getName() used to strip directory components? → No. manifest.name is used directly in a template string (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-107).
  • Q4: Is there a valid allow‑list for allowed names? → No. Only an existence check is performed on manifest.name (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-97).
  • Q5: Is the code in a test/demo/deprecated/generated context? → No. This is a production controller and route (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:64-130, src/routes/index.ts:297-299).
  • → Reached leaf node: True Positive

3. Conclusion

True Positive

Key evidence: - manifest.name flows directly into finalExtractDir and is used by fs.mkdirSync and fs.renameSync without sanitization (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116). - manifest.name is parsed from manifest.json inside an uploaded archive, with only a non‑empty check (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:89-97). - The /mcpb/upload endpoint exposes the upload handler that processes user‑supplied archives (src/routes/index.ts:297-299).

4. Remediation Recommendations

  • Add normalization and base directory validation before using manifest.name to construct finalExtractDir (e.g., const resolved = path.resolve(baseDir,server-${safeName}); if (!resolved.startsWith(baseDir)) reject;).
  • Use path.basename() to strip directory components from manifest.name and enforce a strict character allow‑list (alphanumeric, _, -, .) before use.
  • Consider rejecting any manifest.name that contains path separators or traversal sequences, and add unit tests for malicious traversal inputs.
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@samanhappy/mcphub"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:50:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**MCPB File Upload Handler** extracts a ZIP file and reads `manifest.json` from it. The `name` field in the manifest is directly concatenated into a file path (line 107) without any sanitization or path traversal character validation. An attacker can craft a malicious MCPB file where `manifest.name` is set to something like `../../../etc/malicious`, causing the file to be extracted to an arbitrary location on the file system. The `cleanupOldMcpbServer` function (line 110) also uses the unsanitized name, potentially allowing deletion of arbitrary directories.\n\n## 1. Summary\n- **Vulnerability Type**: Path Traversal (CWE-22)\n- **Sink Location**: src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:107\n- **Vulnerability Description**: The `name` field from an uploaded MCPB manifest is used directly, without sanitization or normalization, to construct a file system path for directory creation and move operations, which may lead to path traversal attacks.\n\n## 2. Analysis Logic\n\n### Step 1: Inspect the identified sink (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116)\nI examined the upload handler and located the file system sink where `manifest.name` is used to build the final extraction path and write files to that path.\n\n```ts\n// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116\n// Use server name as the final extract directory for automatic version management\nconst finalExtractDir = path.join(path.dirname(mcpbFilePath), `server-${manifest.name}`);\n\n// Clean up any existing version of this server\ncleanupOldMcpbServer(manifest.name);\nif (!fs.existsSync(finalExtractDir)) {\n  fs.mkdirSync(finalExtractDir, { recursive: true });\n}\n\n// Move the temporary directory to the final location\nfs.renameSync(tempExtractDir, finalExtractDir);\n```\n\nAnalysis: `manifest.name` is used to build `finalExtractDir`, which is then operated on by `fs.mkdirSync` and `fs.renameSync`. These are file system write/move operations, so if `name` is user-controlled and unsanitized, this is a path traversal sink. Next, I traced the origin of `manifest.name`.\n\n### Step 2: Trace the source of `manifest.name` in the upload handler (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:83-104)\nI traced back the data flow to see how the manifest is read and validated.\n\n```ts\n// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:83-104\nconst manifestPath = path.join(tempExtractDir, \u0027manifest.json\u0027);\nif (!fs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027manifest.json not found in MCPB file\u0027);\n}\n\nconst manifestContent = fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, \u0027utf-8\u0027);\nconst manifest = JSON.parse(manifestContent);\n\n// Validate required fields in manifest\nif (!manifest.manifest_version) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Invalid manifest: missing manifest_version\u0027);\n}\nif (!manifest.name) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Invalid manifest: missing name\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nAnalysis: `manifest` is parsed directly from `manifest.json` inside the uploaded archive. The only check on `manifest.name` is that it is non\u2011empty; there is no sanitization, normalization, or allow\u2011list validation. Next, I confirmed the entry point for uploading MCPB files to verify user control.\n\n### Step 3: Trace the HTTP entry point in src/routes/index.ts:297-299\nI located the route that exposes the upload handler.\n\n```ts\n// src/routes/index.ts:297-299\n// MCPB upload routes\nrouter.post(\u0027/mcpb/upload\u0027, uploadMiddleware, uploadMcpbFile);\n```\n\nAnalysis: The `/mcpb/upload` endpoint invokes `uploadMiddleware` and `uploadMcpbFile`, so user\u2011supplied uploads are the source of the manifest content. Next, I verified the upload middleware behavior.\n\n### Step 4: Confirm the upload middleware (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:8-38)\nI inspected how the uploaded file is received and stored.\n\n```ts\n// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:8-38\nconst storage = multer.diskStorage({\n  destination: (_req, _file, cb) =\u003e {\n    const uploadDir = path.join(process.cwd(), \u0027data/uploads/mcpb\u0027);\n    if (!fs.existsSync(uploadDir)) {\n      fs.mkdirSync(uploadDir, { recursive: true });\n    }\n    cb(null, uploadDir);\n  },\n  filename: (_req, file, cb) =\u003e {\n    const timestamp = Date.now();\n    const originalName = path.parse(file.originalname).name;\n    cb(null, `${originalName}-${timestamp}.mcpb`);\n  },\n});\n\nconst upload = multer({\n  storage,\n  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) =\u003e {\n    if (file.originalname.endsWith(\u0027.mcpb\u0027)) {\n      cb(null, true);\n    } else {\n      cb(new Error(\u0027Only .mcpb files are allowed\u0027));\n    }\n  },\n  limits: {\n    fileSize: 500 * 1024 * 1024, // 500MB limit\n  },\n});\n\nexport const uploadMiddleware = upload.single(\u0027mcpbFile\u0027);\n```\n\nAnalysis: The upload middleware only checks file extension and size. It does not restrict or validate the contents of the archive or `manifest.name`. Therefore, `manifest.name` is user\u2011controlled input. Next, I checked whether any sanitization or normalization is applied before reaching the sink.\n\n### Step 5: Verify lack of path validation on `manifest.name` in src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-110\nI verified that no path sanitization occurs between parsing and usage.\n\n```ts\n// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-110\nif (!manifest.name) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Invalid manifest: missing name\u0027);\n}\n// ...\nconst finalExtractDir = path.join(path.dirname(mcpbFilePath), `server-${manifest.name}`);\ncleanupOldMcpbServer(manifest.name);\n```\n\nAnalysis: Before using `manifest.name` to construct a file system path, there is no `path.resolve`/`realpath` check, no use of `basename()`, and no allow\u2011list validation. This confirms that the path is built from untrusted input without defenses.\n\n### Step 6: Examine cleanup behavior using the unsanitized name (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:41-52)\nI verified how `cleanupOldMcpbServer` uses the same input.\n\n```ts\n// src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:41-52\nconst uploadDir = path.join(process.cwd(), \u0027data/uploads/mcpb\u0027);\nconst serverPattern = `server-${serverName}`;\n\nif (fs.existsSync(uploadDir)) {\n  const files = fs.readdirSync(uploadDir);\n  files.forEach((file) =\u003e {\n    if (file.startsWith(serverPattern)) {\n      const filePath = path.join(uploadDir, file);\n      if (fs.statSync(filePath).isDirectory()) {\n        fs.rmSync(filePath, { recursive: true, force: true });\n      }\n    }\n  });\n}\n```\n\nAnalysis: `serverName` is used without validation, but the deletion is limited to directories already present in `uploadDir` as returned by `readdirSync`. The main traversal risk remains in constructing the path for `finalExtractDir` and the subsequent file system operations.\n\n### Analysis Walkthrough\n- Q1: Does user\u2011controllable input affect the file path? \u2192 **Yes**. `manifest.name` is read from the uploaded archive\u2019s `manifest.json` and used in `path.join(...)` to build `finalExtractDir` (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:89-110).\n- Q2: Is the path normalized and validated against a base directory? \u2192 **No**. There is no `resolve`/`realpath` + `startsWith` check before `fs.mkdirSync`/`fs.renameSync` (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116).\n- Q3: Is `basename()`/`getName()` used to strip directory components? \u2192 **No**. `manifest.name` is used directly in a template string (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-107).\n- Q4: Is there a valid allow\u2011list for allowed names? \u2192 **No**. Only an existence check is performed on `manifest.name` (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:92-97).\n- Q5: Is the code in a test/demo/deprecated/generated context? \u2192 **No**. This is a production controller and route (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:64-130, src/routes/index.ts:297-299).\n- \u2192 Reached leaf node: **True Positive**\n\n## 3. Conclusion\n**True Positive**\n\n**Key evidence:**\n- `manifest.name` flows directly into `finalExtractDir` and is used by `fs.mkdirSync` and `fs.renameSync` without sanitization (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:106-116).\n- `manifest.name` is parsed from `manifest.json` inside an uploaded archive, with only a non\u2011empty check (src/controllers/mcpbController.ts:89-97).\n- The `/mcpb/upload` endpoint exposes the upload handler that processes user\u2011supplied archives (src/routes/index.ts:297-299).\n\n## 4. Remediation Recommendations\n- Add normalization and base directory validation before using `manifest.name` to construct `finalExtractDir` (e.g., `const resolved = path.resolve(baseDir, `server-${safeName}`); if (!resolved.startsWith(baseDir)) reject;`).\n- Use `path.basename()` to strip directory components from `manifest.name` and enforce a strict character allow\u2011list (alphanumeric, `_`, `-`, `.`) before use.\n- Consider rejecting any `manifest.name` that contains path separators or traversal sequences, and add unit tests for malicious traversal inputs.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3h2-2j4p-p83g",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T21:43:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:50:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/samanhappy/mcphub/security/advisories/GHSA-p3h2-2j4p-p83g"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/samanhappy/mcphub/commit/af5b013c09bb0add6b7ad9aaa5b875cf150d2a7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/samanhappy/mcphub"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCPHub has Path Traversal via Malicious MCPB Manifest Name"
}

GHSA-P3HW-MV63-RF9W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 19:20 – Updated: 2026-05-05 19:20
VLAI
Summary
gix's submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosure
Details

Summary

Submodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted .gitmodules. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200).

Details

Bug 1: Validation bypass in gix-validate/src/submodule.rs (lines 27-42)

The name() function uses name.find(b"..") which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first .. is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns Ok without checking subsequent ../ sequences:

pub fn name(name: &BStr) -> Result<&BStr, name::Error> {
    match name.find(b"..") {
        Some(pos) => {
            let &b = name.get(pos + 2).ok_or(name::Error::ParentComponent)?;
            if b == b'/' || b == b'\\' {
                Err(name::Error::ParentComponent)
            } else {
                Ok(name)  // Returns Ok without checking rest of string
            }
        }
        None => Ok(name),
    }
}

Bypass: a..b/../../../.git/ passes because find(b"..") returns position 1 (the .. in a..b), checks name[3] == b'b', and returns Ok. The real /../../../ is never checked.

Bug 2: Validation never called in production

gix_validate::submodule::name() has zero production callers (only test code). The names() iterator in gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29 explicitly documents it returns "unvalidated names."

git_dir() at gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:198-204 constructs filesystem paths from raw names:

pub fn git_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
    self.state.repo.common_dir().join("modules").join(gix_path::from_bstr(self.name()))
}

Bug 3: Trust inheritance bypass in Submodule::open()

At gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:270, open() clones the parent repository's options:

match crate::open_opts(self.git_dir_try_old_form()?, self.state.repo.options.clone()) {

The parent's options.git_dir_trust is Some(Trust::Full). At gix/src/open/repository.rs:103-104:

if options.git_dir_trust.is_none() {
    options.git_dir_trust = gix_sec::Trust::from_path_ownership(&git_dir)?.into();
}

Since trust is already Some(Full), the ownership check is skipped entirely. The traversed path is opened with Trust::Full regardless of ownership, bypassing gitoxide's safe-directory protections.

PoC

Compiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 --release mode. All bypass cases confirmed:

BYPASS a..b/../../../.git/           -> PASSED validation
       git_dir = .git/modules/a..b/../../../.git/
       normalized = .git/              (parent repo!)

BYPASS x..y/../../../.git/config     -> PASSED validation
       git_dir = .git/modules/x..y/../../../.git/config
       normalized = .git/config

Attack chain

  1. Attacker crafts a repository with .gitmodules: ini [submodule "x..y/../../.."] path = innocent url = https://attacker.com/repo.git

  2. Victim clones the repository using a tool built on gitoxide.

  3. When the tool iterates submodules and calls submodule.open() or submodule.status():

  4. git_dir() returns .git/modules/x..y/../../.. which resolves to the parent .git/
  5. open_opts() is called with Trust::Full (inherited from parent, ownership check skipped)

  6. The parent's .git/config is fully parsed

  7. The returned Repository object exposes all config values from the traversed path:

  8. remote.origin.url (may contain https://user:token@github.com/...)
  9. http.extraHeader (often Authorization: Bearer <token>)
  10. credential.* sections

  11. core.sshCommand

  12. Accessible via standard API: repo.config_snapshot().string("http.extraHeader"), repo.find_remote("origin"), etc.

Impact

A crafted .gitmodules in a malicious repository causes gitoxide to open arbitrary git directories as submodule repositories with full trust, exposing their configuration including credentials. This is the same class of vulnerability as GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c (path traversal), but through the submodule name vector with an additional trust bypass.

The trust inheritance is the critical amplifier: without it, the traversed path would undergo ownership checks that could block the attack. With it, any git directory reachable via ../ is opened with full trust.

Honest limitations

  • The traversed path must be a valid git directory (HEAD, objects/, refs/ must exist)
  • The victim's tool must call open() or status() on submodules (tools that only list submodules are not affected)
  • Credential exposure requires the target config to contain embedded credentials
  • Submodule operations currently require explicit user action

Suggested fix

  1. Fix the validation to check ALL .. occurrences (iterate, not single find)
  2. Call gix_validate::submodule::name() in git_dir() before constructing the path
  3. Do NOT inherit git_dir_trust from parent when opening submodule repos -- always re-derive trust from path ownership

Severity

High. Network vector (via clone), requires user interaction (submodule operations). The trust bypass enables credential disclosure from traversed git directories. Confidentiality impact is high.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "gix"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.83.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "gix-validate"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:20:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nSubmodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted `.gitmodules`. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in `Submodule::open()`, this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200).\n\n### Details\n\n**Bug 1: Validation bypass in `gix-validate/src/submodule.rs` (lines 27-42)**\n\nThe `name()` function uses `name.find(b\"..\")` which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first `..` is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns `Ok` without checking subsequent `../` sequences:\n\n```rust\npub fn name(name: \u0026BStr) -\u003e Result\u003c\u0026BStr, name::Error\u003e {\n    match name.find(b\"..\") {\n        Some(pos) =\u003e {\n            let \u0026b = name.get(pos + 2).ok_or(name::Error::ParentComponent)?;\n            if b == b\u0027/\u0027 || b == b\u0027\\\\\u0027 {\n                Err(name::Error::ParentComponent)\n            } else {\n                Ok(name)  // Returns Ok without checking rest of string\n            }\n        }\n        None =\u003e Ok(name),\n    }\n}\n```\n\nBypass: `a..b/../../../.git/` passes because `find(b\"..\")` returns position 1 (the `..` in `a..b`), checks `name[3] == b\u0027b\u0027`, and returns Ok. The real `/../../../` is never checked.\n\n**Bug 2: Validation never called in production**\n\n`gix_validate::submodule::name()` has zero production callers (only test code). The `names()` iterator in `gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29` explicitly documents it returns \"unvalidated names.\"\n\n`git_dir()` at `gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:198-204` constructs filesystem paths from raw names:\n\n```rust\npub fn git_dir(\u0026self) -\u003e PathBuf {\n    self.state.repo.common_dir().join(\"modules\").join(gix_path::from_bstr(self.name()))\n}\n```\n\n**Bug 3: Trust inheritance bypass in `Submodule::open()`**\n\nAt `gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:270`, `open()` clones the parent repository\u0027s options:\n\n```rust\nmatch crate::open_opts(self.git_dir_try_old_form()?, self.state.repo.options.clone()) {\n```\n\nThe parent\u0027s `options.git_dir_trust` is `Some(Trust::Full)`. At `gix/src/open/repository.rs:103-104`:\n\n```rust\nif options.git_dir_trust.is_none() {\n    options.git_dir_trust = gix_sec::Trust::from_path_ownership(\u0026git_dir)?.into();\n}\n```\n\nSince trust is already `Some(Full)`, the ownership check is **skipped entirely**. The traversed path is opened with `Trust::Full` regardless of ownership, bypassing gitoxide\u0027s safe-directory protections.\n\n### PoC\n\nCompiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 `--release` mode. All bypass cases confirmed:\n\n```\nBYPASS a..b/../../../.git/           -\u003e PASSED validation\n       git_dir = .git/modules/a..b/../../../.git/\n       normalized = .git/              (parent repo!)\n\nBYPASS x..y/../../../.git/config     -\u003e PASSED validation\n       git_dir = .git/modules/x..y/../../../.git/config\n       normalized = .git/config\n```\n\n### Attack chain\n\n1. Attacker crafts a repository with `.gitmodules`:\n   ```ini\n   [submodule \"x..y/../../..\"]\n       path = innocent\n       url = https://attacker.com/repo.git\n   ```\n\n2. Victim clones the repository using a tool built on gitoxide.\n\n3. When the tool iterates submodules and calls `submodule.open()` or `submodule.status()`:\n   - `git_dir()` returns `.git/modules/x..y/../../..` which resolves to the parent `.git/`\n   - `open_opts()` is called with `Trust::Full` (inherited from parent, ownership check skipped)\n   - The parent\u0027s `.git/config` is fully parsed\n\n4. The returned `Repository` object exposes all config values from the traversed path:\n   - `remote.origin.url` (may contain `https://user:token@github.com/...`)\n   - `http.extraHeader` (often `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e`)\n   - `credential.*` sections\n   - `core.sshCommand`\n\n5. Accessible via standard API: `repo.config_snapshot().string(\"http.extraHeader\")`, `repo.find_remote(\"origin\")`, etc.\n\n### Impact\n\nA crafted `.gitmodules` in a malicious repository causes gitoxide to open arbitrary git directories as submodule repositories with full trust, exposing their configuration including credentials. This is the same class of vulnerability as GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c (path traversal), but through the submodule name vector with an additional trust bypass.\n\nThe trust inheritance is the critical amplifier: without it, the traversed path would undergo ownership checks that could block the attack. With it, any git directory reachable via `../` is opened with full trust.\n\n### Honest limitations\n\n- The traversed path must be a valid git directory (HEAD, objects/, refs/ must exist)\n- The victim\u0027s tool must call `open()` or `status()` on submodules (tools that only list submodules are not affected)\n- Credential exposure requires the target config to contain embedded credentials\n- Submodule operations currently require explicit user action\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n1. Fix the validation to check ALL `..` occurrences (iterate, not single `find`)\n2. Call `gix_validate::submodule::name()` in `git_dir()` before constructing the path\n3. Do NOT inherit `git_dir_trust` from parent when opening submodule repos -- always re-derive trust from path ownership\n\n### Severity\n\nHigh. Network vector (via clone), requires user interaction (submodule operations). The trust bypass enables credential disclosure from traversed git directories. Confidentiality impact is high.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T19:20:38Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T19:20:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-p3hw-mv63-rf9w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gix\u0027s submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosure"
}

GHSA-P3J9-952W-4QF7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-10 12:30 – Updated: 2024-01-16 21:31
VLAI
Details

The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to upload arbitrary files in all paths of the system under the context of the application OS user (“root”) via a crafted HTTP request. By abusing this vulnerability, it is possible to obtain remote code execution (RCE) with root privileges on the device.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-10T11:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to upload arbitrary files in all paths of the system under the context of the application OS user (\u201croot\u201d) via a crafted HTTP request.\nBy abusing this vulnerability, it is possible to obtain remote code execution (RCE) with root privileges on the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3j9-952w-4qf7",
  "modified": "2024-01-16T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2024-01-10T12:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-711465.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P3MP-3Q3J-C55P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-02-16 09:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been found in CmsEasy 7.7.7.9 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function deleteimg_action in the library lib/admin/image_admin.php. The manipulation of the argument imgname leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1336"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-16T09:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in CmsEasy 7.7.7.9 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function deleteimg_action in the library lib/admin/image_admin.php. The manipulation of the argument imgname leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3mp-3q3j-c55p",
  "modified": "2025-02-16T09:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-02-16T09:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1336"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sinon2003/cve/blob/main/CmsEasy/CmsEasy-v7.7.7.9-PathTraversal-2-2-2.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.295951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.295951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.493685"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P427-GXMQ-74VC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:27 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:27
VLAI
Details

An log-management directory traversal issue was discovered in OverIT Geocall 6.3 before build 2:346977.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-5889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-04-01T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An log-management directory traversal issue was discovered in OverIT Geocall 6.3 before build 2:346977.",
  "id": "GHSA-p427-gxmq-74vc",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:27:11Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:27:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200327142627/https://www.quantumleap.it/geocall-v-6-3-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.quantumleap.it/geocall-v-6-3-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P433-95XH-9WG5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:52 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:52
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in the Admin Defined Commands (ADC) feature in gitolite before 1.5.9.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via .. (dot dot) sequences in admin-defined commands.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-1572"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2011-10-04T10:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Admin Defined Commands (ADC) feature in gitolite before 1.5.9.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via .. (dot dot) sequences in admin-defined commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-p433-95xh-9wg5",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T00:52:07Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T00:52:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1572"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sitaramc/gitolite/commit/4ce00aef84d1ff7c35f7adbbb99a6241cfda00cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=695568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/65542"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://groups.google.com/group/gitolite/browse_thread/thread/797a93ec26e1dcbc?pli=1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2011/q2/197"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2011/q2/209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2215"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46473"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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