CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13294 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M88M-CRR9-JVQQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-18 18:47 – Updated: 2025-06-10 19:58Impact
A carefully crafted malicious OpenRefine project tar file can be used to trigger arbitrary code execution if a user can be convinced to import it.
Patches
The vulnerability exists in all versions of OpenRefine up to and including 3.7.3. Users should update to OpenRefine 3.7.4 as soon as possible.
Workarounds
Only import OpenRefine projects from trusted sources.
References
A similar issue existed in the Create Project feature (CVE-2018-19859), which was fixed by PR #1901.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.openrefine:main"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37476"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-18T18:47:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-17T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA carefully crafted malicious OpenRefine project tar file can be used to trigger arbitrary code execution if a user can be convinced to import it.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability exists in all versions of OpenRefine up to and including 3.7.3. Users should update to OpenRefine 3.7.4 as soon as possible.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nOnly import OpenRefine projects from trusted sources.\n\n### References\n\nA similar [issue](https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/issues/1840) existed in the Create Project feature ([CVE-2018-19859](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19859)), which was fixed by PR [#1901](https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/pull/1901).",
"id": "GHSA-m88m-crr9-jvqq",
"modified": "2025-06-10T19:58:06Z",
"published": "2023-07-18T18:47:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/security/advisories/GHSA-m88m-crr9-jvqq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/commit/e9c1e65d58b47aec8cd676bd5c07d97b002f205e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/releases/tag/3.7.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/openrefine-zip-slip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenRefine vulnerable to zip slip in project import"
}
GHSA-M8CR-Q935-8J67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-09-18 13:47 – Updated: 2023-03-01 01:34All versions of buttle are vulnerable to Path Traversal. Due to insufficient input sanitization, attackers can access server files by using relative paths when fetching files.
Recommendation
No fix is currently available. Consider using an alternative module until a fix is made available.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "buttle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:45:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-05T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "All versions of `buttle` are vulnerable to Path Traversal. Due to insufficient input sanitization, attackers can access server files by using relative paths when fetching files. \n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo fix is currently available. Consider using an alternative module until a fix is made available.",
"id": "GHSA-m8cr-q935-8j67",
"modified": "2023-03-01T01:34:56Z",
"published": "2018-09-18T13:47:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/358112"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m8cr-q935-8j67"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/990"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in buttle"
}
GHSA-M8CW-Q6XJ-6RV6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:25 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:25Directory traversal vulnerability in the Real-Time Monitoring Tool (RTMT) in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CM) 10.0(1) allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a crafted URL, aka Bug ID CSCup57676.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-3319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-07-14T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Real-Time Monitoring Tool (RTMT) in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CM) 10.0(1) allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a crafted URL, aka Bug ID CSCup57676.",
"id": "GHSA-m8cw-q6xj-6rv6",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:25:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:25:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/94436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/59734"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityNotice/CVE-2014-3319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=34909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1030554"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-M8FG-67J7-CX4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 16:23 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:25Summary
Portainer's backup restore feature accepts a .tar.gz archive and extracts it to a target directory on the server. The extraction function (ExtractTarGz in api/archive/targz.go) constructed output paths using filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name)). This combination does not prevent directory traversal — a tar entry named ../../etc/cron.d/evil resolves to a path outside the extraction root, so a crafted archive can write files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem.
Severity
Medium
CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Exploitation requires administrator access to Portainer's backup restore endpoint. An administrator who is deceived into restoring a malicious archive, or whose credentials are compromised, can use this path to write files outside the Portainer data directory.
Affected Versions
The vulnerability exists in every Portainer release prior to 2.39.0 — ExtractTarGz has used filepath.Clean(filepath.Join()) since it was introduced. The fix shipped with 2.39.0 (patched on develop before the 2.39 branch cut); 2.34.x–2.38.x STS releases are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive a fix.
| Branch | First vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0 | 2.33.8 |
Portainer 2.39.0 and later are not affected — the fix was present from the initial 2.39.0 release. All releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported release.
Workarounds
Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade should:
- Only restore archives from trusted sources. Do not restore archives received from untrusted parties or transmitted over unencrypted channels.
- Use backup encryption. Portainer's optional backup encryption requires the correct passphrase to decrypt before extraction; an attacker without the passphrase cannot craft a valid encrypted archive.
Neither of these replaces the fix.
Affected Code
ExtractTarGz in api/archive/targz.go constructed output paths without safe containment:
// api/archive/targz.go (pre-fix)
case tar.TypeReg:
p := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name))
filepath.Join resolves ../ components lexically and filepath.Clean normalises the result, but neither verifies the final path remains inside outputDirPath. The fix replaces this with filesystem.JoinPaths, which forces all path components to be relative to the trusted root:
// api/archive/targz.go (post-fix)
case tar.TypeReg:
p := filesystem.JoinPaths(outputDirPath, header.Name)
Impact
- Arbitrary file write at any path accessible to the Portainer process (typically root in containerised deployments), overriding filesystem boundaries of the data directory.
- Potential host persistence by writing to cron directories, SSH authorised key files, or executable paths, depending on how the container is configured and what host paths are accessible.
The practical severity is reduced because exploitation requires administrative privileges within Portainer.
Timeline
- 2026-02-16: Fix merged to develop (#1875).
- 2026-02-25: 2.39.0 released with fix.
- 2026-05-07: 2.33.8 released with backport fix.
Credits
Reported by Kolega.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/portainer/portainer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.33.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.33.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:23:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T22:16:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPortainer\u0027s backup restore feature accepts a `.tar.gz` archive and extracts it to a target directory on the server. The extraction function (`ExtractTarGz` in `api/archive/targz.go`) constructed output paths using `filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name))`. This combination does not prevent directory traversal \u2014 a tar entry named `../../etc/cron.d/evil` resolves to a path outside the extraction root, so a crafted archive can write files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Medium**\n\n**CWE-22** \u2014 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory\n(\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\nExploitation requires administrator access to Portainer\u0027s backup restore endpoint. An administrator who is deceived into restoring a malicious archive, or whose credentials are compromised, can use this path to write files outside the Portainer data directory.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nThe vulnerability exists in every Portainer release prior to 2.39.0 \u2014 `ExtractTarGz` has used `filepath.Clean(filepath.Join())` since it was introduced. The fix shipped with 2.39.0 (patched on `develop` before the 2.39 branch cut); 2.34.x\u20132.38.x STS releases are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive a fix.\n\n| Branch | First vulnerable | Fixed in |\n|--------------|------------------|------------|\n| 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0 | **2.33.8** |\n\nPortainer 2.39.0 and later are not affected \u2014 the fix was present from the initial 2.39.0 release. All releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported release.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAdministrators who cannot immediately upgrade should:\n\n- **Only restore archives from trusted sources.** Do not restore archives received from untrusted parties or transmitted over unencrypted channels.\n- **Use backup encryption.** Portainer\u0027s optional backup encryption requires the correct passphrase to decrypt before extraction; an attacker without the passphrase cannot craft a valid encrypted archive.\n\nNeither of these replaces the fix.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n`ExtractTarGz` in `api/archive/targz.go` constructed output paths without safe containment:\n\n```go\n// api/archive/targz.go (pre-fix)\ncase tar.TypeReg:\n p := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(outputDirPath, header.Name))\n```\nfilepath.Join resolves ../ components lexically and filepath.Clean normalises the result, but neither verifies the final path remains inside outputDirPath. The fix replaces this with filesystem.JoinPaths, which forces all path components to be relative to the trusted root:\n\n```go\n// api/archive/targz.go (post-fix)\ncase tar.TypeReg:\n p := filesystem.JoinPaths(outputDirPath, header.Name)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file write at any path accessible to the Portainer process (typically root in containerised deployments), overriding filesystem boundaries of the data directory.\n- Potential host persistence by writing to cron directories, SSH authorised key files, or executable paths, depending on how the container is configured and what host paths are accessible.\n\nThe practical severity is reduced because exploitation requires administrative privileges within Portainer.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2026-02-16: Fix merged to develop ([#1875](https://github.com/portainer/portainer-suite/pull/1875)).\n- 2026-02-25: 2.39.0 released with fix.\n- 2026-05-07: 2.33.8 released with backport fix.\n\n### Credits\nReported by [Kolega](https://kolega.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-m8fg-67j7-cx4v",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:25:54Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T16:23:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-m8fg-67j7-cx4v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer-suite/pull/1875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/commit/e02ae6b2fb69668d1cd7d07cb873dfcdd9cf1e42"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.33.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Portainer has a path traversal in backup archive extraction that allows arbitrary file write"
}
GHSA-M8GQ-67C7-R7QW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:35 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:46An authentication vulnerability in HPE BSM Platform Application Performance Management System Health product versions 9.26, 9.30 and 9.40, allows remote users to traverse directory leading to disclosure of information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-13985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-30T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An authentication vulnerability in HPE BSM Platform Application Performance Management System Health product versions 9.26, 9.30 and 9.40, allows remote users to traverse directory leading to disclosure of information.",
"id": "GHSA-m8gq-67c7-r7qw",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:46:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:35:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://softwaresupport.hpe.com/km/KM02942065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/52154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-17-721"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M8H8-6RVG-F4MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:49 – Updated: 2024-02-09 16:27Apache Tomcat 4.1.0 through 4.1.37, 5.5.0 through 5.5.26, and 6.0.0 through 6.0.16, when a RequestDispatcher is used, performs path normalization before removing the query string from the URI, which allows remote attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks and read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a request parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.37"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.26"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.5.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.16"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-09T16:27:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2008-08-04T01:41:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Apache Tomcat 4.1.0 through 4.1.37, 5.5.0 through 5.5.26, and 6.0.0 through 6.0.16, when a `RequestDispatcher` is used, performs path normalization before removing the query string from the URI, which allows remote attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks and read arbitrary files via a `..` (dot dot) in a request parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-m8h8-6rvg-f4mg",
"modified": "2024-02-09T16:27:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:49:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/44156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201124638/http://secunia.com/advisories/32120"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201124957/http://secunia.com/advisories/31982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201125002/http://secunia.com/advisories/32266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201141000/http://secunia.com/advisories/32222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090207111236/http://secunia.com/advisories/33797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090225175903/http://secunia.com/advisories/33999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090228074535/http://secunia.com/advisories/31379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090228074540/http://secunia.com/advisories/34013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090308065055/http://secunia.com/advisories/31865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090811003155/http://secunia.com/advisories/35393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090828023853/http://secunia.com/advisories/36249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20100706231759/http://secunia.com/advisories/37460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20110714083521/http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1020623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20110714174318/http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30494"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20120719164745/http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/495022/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20120724210029/http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140723000733/http://secunia.com/advisories/57126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150621204350/http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/507985/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2008-September/msg00712.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2008-September/msg00859.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2008-September/msg00889.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/06cfb634bc7bf37af7d8f760f118018746ad8efbd519c4b789ac9c2e%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/06cfb634bc7bf37af7d8f760f118018746ad8efbd519c4b789ac9c2e@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/29dc6c2b625789e70a9c4756b5a327e6547273ff8bde7e0327af48c5%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/29dc6c2b625789e70a9c4756b5a327e6547273ff8bde7e0327af48c5@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/8dcaf7c3894d66cb717646ea1504ea6e300021c85bb4e677dc16b1aa%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
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"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/8dcaf7c3894d66cb717646ea1504ea6e300021c85bb4e677dc16b1aa@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/c62b0e3a7bf23342352a5810c640a94b6db69957c5c19db507004d74%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/c62b0e3a7bf23342352a5810c640a94b6db69957c5c19db507004d74@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3aacc40356defc3f248aa504b1e48e819dd0471a0a83349080c6bcbf%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3aacc40356defc3f248aa504b1e48e819dd0471a0a83349080c6bcbf@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r584a714f141eff7b1c358d4679288177bd4ca4558e9999d15867d4b5%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r584a714f141eff7b1c358d4679288177bd4ca4558e9999d15867d4b5@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb71997f506c6cc8b530dd845c084995a9878098846c7b4eacfae8db3%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb71997f506c6cc8b530dd845c084995a9878098846c7b4eacfae8db3@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A10577"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A5876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20080827150120/http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4099"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201124618/http://secunia.com/advisories/31381"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201124623/http://secunia.com/advisories/31639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20090201124633/http://secunia.com/advisories/31891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2008/Oct/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2008-09/msg00004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2009-02/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=123376588623823\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=139344343412337\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.avaya.com/elmodocs2/security/ASA-2008-401.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tomcat.apache.org/security-4.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tomcat.apache.org/security-5.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tomcat.apache.org/security-6.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.fujitsu.com/global/support/software/security/products-f/interstage-200902e.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2008:188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0648.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0862.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0864.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2009-0002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2009-0016.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Apache Tomcat Path Traversal Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-M8HP-VH5F-J47F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-07 18:15 – Updated: 2022-10-08 00:00Path traversal vulnerability in AtBroadcastReceiver in FactoryCamera prior to version 3.5.51 allows attackers to write arbitrary file as FactoryCamera privilege.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-07T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Path traversal vulnerability in AtBroadcastReceiver in FactoryCamera prior to version 3.5.51 allows attackers to write arbitrary file as FactoryCamera privilege.",
"id": "GHSA-m8hp-vh5f-j47f",
"modified": "2022-10-08T00:00:17Z",
"published": "2022-10-07T18:15:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/serviceWeb.smsb?year=2022\u0026month=10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M8MH-X359-VM8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-23 21:24 – Updated: 2026-04-23 21:24A path traversal vulnerability in brut/androlib/res/decoder/ResFileDecoder.java allows a maliciously crafted APK to write arbitrary files to the filesystem during standard decoding (apktool d). This is a security regression introduced in commit e10a045 (PR #4041, December 12, 2025), which removed the BrutIO.sanitizePath() call that previously prevented path traversal in resource file output paths.
An attacker can embed ../ sequences in the resources.arsc Type String Pool to escape the output directory and write files to arbitrary locations, including ~/.ssh/config, ~/.bashrc, or Windows Startup folders, escalating to RCE.
Fix: Re-introduce BrutIO.sanitizePath() in ResFileDecoder.java before file write operations.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apktool:apktool-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39973"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-23T21:24:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T02:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability in `brut/androlib/res/decoder/ResFileDecoder.java` allows a maliciously crafted APK to write arbitrary files to the filesystem during standard decoding (`apktool d`). This is a security regression introduced in commit [e10a045](https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/commit/e10a0450c7afcd9462c0b76bcbff0e7428b92bdd#diff-cd531ebe1014bfd18185bf21585ca5cdb16fbcb07703ebc47949a1b4e4e36bc3) ([PR #4041](https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/pull/4041), December 12, 2025), which removed the `BrutIO.sanitizePath()` call that previously prevented path traversal in resource file output paths.\n\nAn attacker can embed `../` sequences in the `resources.arsc` Type String Pool to escape the output directory and write files to arbitrary locations, including `~/.ssh/config`, `~/.bashrc`, or Windows Startup folders, escalating to RCE.\n\n**Fix:** Re-introduce `BrutIO.sanitizePath()` in `ResFileDecoder.java` before file write operations.",
"id": "GHSA-m8mh-x359-vm8m",
"modified": "2026-04-23T21:24:28Z",
"published": "2026-04-23T21:24:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/security/advisories/GHSA-m8mh-x359-vm8m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/pull/4041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/commit/e10a0450c7afcd9462c0b76bcbff0e7428b92bdd#diff-cd531ebe1014bfd18185bf21585ca5cdb16fbcb07703ebc47949a1b4e4e36bc3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool/releases/tag/v3.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apktool: Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Write"
}
GHSA-M8P8-53VF-8357
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 16:33 – Updated: 2026-03-30 21:25Summary
The nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire /etc/nginx directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service.
Details
The file deletion logic fails to correctly validate and normalize paths containing URL-encoded traversal sequences such as ..%252F.
When such input is processed, the internal path resolution logic attempts to clamp the path into the allowed configuration directory. Instead of rejecting the traversal attempt, the clamping mechanism resolves the path to the base Nginx configuration directory itself.
Because the deletion handler invokes os.RemoveAll, which recursively removes directories, this results in the deletion of the entire /etc/nginx directory.
This behavior creates a dangerous interaction between path normalization and deletion logic:
- Traversal sequences are not rejected.
- Double-encoding (
..%252F) is used to bypass initial shallow filters. - The clamping mechanism resolves malicious paths to the base configuration directory.
- The deletion handler recursively deletes the resolved path.
As a result, an attacker can trigger deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory instead of being blocked by path validation logic.
Root Cause
The vulnerability results from a combination of design flaws:
- Improper Path Canonicalization: URL-encoded traversal sequences are not properly rejected.
- Unsafe Fallback Logic: The
GetConfPathclamping mechanism returns the base configuration directory when traversal is detected instead of rejecting the request. - Unsafe Deletion Primitive: The deletion handler invokes
os.RemoveAll, which recursively deletes directories without additional safeguards. (delete.go)
// Delete the file or directory
err = os.RemoveAll(fullPath)
if err != nil {
cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}
This interaction causes the deletion operation to target the most sensitive directory when a traversal attempt occurs.
Environment
- Server OS: Kali Linux 6.17.10-1kali1 (6.17.10+kali-amd64)
- Nginx UI Version: nginx-ui v2.3.3
- Deployment: Docker / Default installation
Proof of Concept
Steps to Reproduce
-
Log into nginx-ui.
-
Go to Manage Configs and create a Folder named ..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest
-
Observe that the backend resolves the path to /etc/nginx..
-
Now lets create a file called testing.
-
Save it and rename it to ..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest (It is not possible to create it directly with the payload name so we have to rename it)
-
Go back to manage configs and Click Delete to remove the file we just created.
-
Check that there is an error:
-
Reload the website and check that the /etc/nginx folder has been completely removed:
Impact
An authenticated user capable of invoking the configuration deletion endpoint can trigger the recursive deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory (/etc/nginx).
This results in: - Immediate failure of the Nginx service due to missing configuration files. - Loss of all Nginx configuration managed by nginx-ui. - Denial of Service for all web services relying on the affected Nginx instance.
As the deletion operation uses a recursive filesystem call, the entire configuration directory is removed, leaving the system unable to restart Nginx until the configuration is manually restored.
A patched version is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.99"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33027"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T16:33:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-30T18:16:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire `/etc/nginx` directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service.\n\n## Details\nThe file deletion logic fails to correctly validate and normalize paths containing URL-encoded traversal sequences such as `..%252F`.\n\nWhen such input is processed, the internal path resolution logic attempts to clamp the path into the allowed configuration directory. Instead of rejecting the traversal attempt, the clamping mechanism resolves the path to the base Nginx configuration directory itself.\n\nBecause the deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively removes directories, this results in the deletion of the entire `/etc/nginx` directory.\n\nThis behavior creates a dangerous interaction between path normalization and deletion logic:\n\n- Traversal sequences are not rejected.\n- Double-encoding (`..%252F`) is used to bypass initial shallow filters.\n- The clamping mechanism resolves malicious paths to the base configuration directory.\n- The deletion handler recursively deletes the resolved path.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can trigger deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory instead of being blocked by path validation logic.\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe vulnerability results from a combination of design flaws:\n\n- **Improper Path Canonicalization**: URL-encoded traversal sequences are not properly rejected.\n- **Unsafe Fallback Logic**: The `GetConfPath` clamping mechanism returns the base configuration directory when traversal is detected instead of rejecting the request.\n- **Unsafe Deletion Primitive**: The deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively deletes directories without additional safeguards. (delete.go)\n```\n\t// Delete the file or directory\n\terr = os.RemoveAll(fullPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n```\nThis interaction causes the deletion operation to target the most sensitive directory when a traversal attempt occurs.\n\n### Environment\n- **Server OS**: Kali Linux 6.17.10-1kali1 (6.17.10+kali-amd64)\n- **Nginx UI Version**: nginx-ui v2.3.3\n- **Deployment**: Docker / Default installation\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n### Steps to Reproduce\n1. Log into nginx-ui.\n\n2. Go to Manage Configs and create a Folder named *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest*\n\u003cimg width=\"1608\" height=\"559\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/738d7d65-7e13-48fa-affc-d5509c43900f\" /\u003e\n\n3. Observe that the backend resolves the path to /etc/nginx.. \n\n4. Now lets create a file called *testing*. \n\n5. Save it and rename it to *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest* (It is not possible to create it directly with the payload name so we have to rename it)\n\n6. Go back to manage configs and Click Delete to remove the file we just created. \n\n7. Check that there is an error: \n\u003cimg width=\"1578\" height=\"696\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51a36310-0676-4fe5-b80c-e0199498efbf\" /\u003e\n\n8. Reload the website and check that the /etc/nginx folder has been completely removed: \n\u003cimg width=\"1313\" height=\"722\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0a9ddd1b-786b-4cf2-8abd-1dc6f3a77807\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user capable of invoking the configuration deletion endpoint can trigger the recursive deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory (`/etc/nginx`).\n\nThis results in:\n- Immediate failure of the Nginx service due to missing configuration files.\n- Loss of all Nginx configuration managed by nginx-ui.\n- Denial of Service for all web services relying on the affected Nginx instance.\n\nAs the deletion operation uses a recursive filesystem call, the entire configuration directory is removed, leaving the system unable to restart Nginx until the configuration is manually restored.\n\nA patched version is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4.",
"id": "GHSA-m8p8-53vf-8357",
"modified": "2026-03-30T21:25:41Z",
"published": "2026-03-30T16:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-m8p8-53vf-8357"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33027"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nginx Configuration Directory Vulnerable to Recursive Deletion via Improper Path Validation"
}
GHSA-M8PW-HGVJ-CWCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:08 – Updated: 2023-09-11 20:34Affected versions of sgqserve resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sgqserve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16215"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:22:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `sgqserve` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-m8pw-hgvj-cwcm",
"modified": "2023-09-11T20:34:10Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:08:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/sgqserve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/419"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in sgqserve"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.