UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626 (CVE-2026-65626)
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Updated: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Source websiteThe pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "10-2build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "10-2build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:18.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=bionic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-2",
"10-2build1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "10-2build2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "10-2build2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-2build2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "11-2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "11-2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@11-2?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-3",
"11-2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "13-1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "13-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@13-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"11-2",
"11-3",
"11-3build1",
"11-3build2",
"13-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "14-2build2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "14-2build2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"14-2build1",
"14-2build2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "14-2build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "14-2build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"14-2build1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626",
"modified": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65626"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65626"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65626.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://hex.pm/packages/jose"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://repo.hex.pm"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65626.json"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65626"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65626"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-65626"
]
}
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