Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-65626 (GCVE-0-2026-65626)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 19:53 – Updated: 2026-10-26 19:53

Title

Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose

Summary

The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-203 - Observable Discrepancy

Assigner

EEF CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard A 97/100 over 345 records in the last 180 days details

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/securi…	vendor-advisoryrelated
https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html	related
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626	related
https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit…	related
https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
potatosalad	jose	Affected: 1.3.0 , < 1.11.13 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose::::::::
potatosalad	jose	Affected: 853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8 , < 0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d (git) cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose::::::::

Credits

Peter Ullrich Andrew Bennett Jonatan Männchen / EEF

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
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      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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            "jose_jwa_pkcs1"
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          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose",
          "product": "jose",
          "programFiles": [
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            },
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            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
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            {
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          "cpes": [
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          "modules": [
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              "value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module) instead of the native OTP `public_key` implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (`application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)`, or `JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)` in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through `jose_jwa_pkcs1`."
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_pkcs1\u003c/code\u003e module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. \u003ccode\u003eeme_pkcs1_decode/2\u003c/code\u003e returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid \u003ccode\u003ePKCS#1\u003c/code\u003e v1.5 padding (a leading \u003ccode\u003e0x00 0x02\u003c/code\u003e, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a \u003ccode\u003e0x00\u003c/code\u003e separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and \u003ccode\u003ersaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2\u003c/code\u003e additionally returns \u003ccode\u003e{error, {badsize, _}}\u003c/code\u003e when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in \u003ccode\u003edp/2\u003c/code\u003e is a raw, non-blinded \u003ccode\u003ecrypto:mod_pow/3\u003c/code\u003e, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls \u003ccode\u003edecrypt_private/3\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ersa_pkcs1_padding\u003c/code\u003e) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.\u003c/p\u003e"
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose"
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                    "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
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            "value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
          }
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        "id": "CVE-2026-65626",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-27T15:00:49.240",
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        "published": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.103",
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          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-203"
              }
            ],
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-65626

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-26 20:17 - Updated: 2026-10-27 15:00

Severity

5.9 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "jose_jwa_pkcs1"
          ],
          "packageName": "jose",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose",
          "product": "jose",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
          "vendor": "potatosalad",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.11.13",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.3.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "jose_jwa_pkcs1"
          ],
          "packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
          "product": "jose",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
          "vendor": "potatosalad",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-65626",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-27T15:00:49.240",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 5.9,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.103",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-203"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626 (CVE-2026-65626)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Updated: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Source website

Details

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

N/A (UNKNOWN)


                    
                      medium

References

URL

Type

	https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65626	REPORT
	https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65626	REPORT
	https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65626.html	REPORT
	https://github.com	REPORT
	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose	REPORT
	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit…	REPORT
	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit…	REPORT
	https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/securi…	REPORT
	https://hex.pm/packages/jose	REPORT
	https://repo.hex.pm	REPORT
	https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main…	REPORT
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65626	REPORT
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65626	REPORT

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "10-2build1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "10-2build1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:18.04:LTS",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=bionic"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10-2",
        "10-2build1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "10-2build2"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "10-2build2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10-2build2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "11-2"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "11-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@11-2?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10-3",
        "11-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "13-1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "13-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@13-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "11-2",
        "11-3",
        "11-3build1",
        "11-3build2",
        "13-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "14-2build2"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "14-2build2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "14-2build1",
        "14-2build2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "jose",
            "binary_version": "14-2build1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "libjose0",
            "binary_version": "14-2build1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "jose",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "14-2build1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
  "published": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65626"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65626"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65626.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://hex.pm/packages/jose"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://repo.hex.pm"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65626.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65626"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65626"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-65626"
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-65626 (GCVE-0-2026-65626)

FKIE_CVE-2026-65626

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626 (CVE-2026-65626)

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