UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65625 (CVE-2026-65625)
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Updated: 2026-10-27 00:00 – Source websiteThe pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds. This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "10-2build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "10-2build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:18.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=bionic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-2",
"10-2build1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "10-2build2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "10-2build2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@10-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-2build2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "11-2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "11-2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@11-2?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10-3",
"11-2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "13-1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "13-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@13-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"11-2",
"11-3",
"11-3build1",
"11-3build2",
"13-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "14-2build2"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "14-2build2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build2?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"14-2build1",
"14-2build2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "jose",
"binary_version": "14-2build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libjose0",
"binary_version": "14-2build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/jose@14-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"14-2build1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds. This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65625",
"modified": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65625"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65625"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65625.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-6gxw-6f7r-cjr6"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://hex.pm/packages/jose"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://repo.hex.pm"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65625.json"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65625"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65625"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-65625"
]
}
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