ubuntu-cve-2026-53539
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu
Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, when parsing application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, QuerystringParser located the field separator with a two step lookup: it first scanned the entire remaining buffer for &, and only when no & existed anywhere ahead did it fall back to scanning for ;. For a body that uses ; as the separator and contains no &, every field iteration performed a full failed & scan over the entire remaining buffer before locating the nearby ;. With N semicolon separated fields in a chunk of size B, this yields O(B^2) byte comparisons per chunk. An attacker can submit a small crafted body of the form a;a;a;... and cause the parser to spend seconds of CPU per request. A handful of concurrent requests can exhaust worker processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "python3-multipart",
"binary_version": "0.0.5-2ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS",
"name": "python-multipart",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/python-multipart@0.0.5-2ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.5-2",
"0.0.5-2ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "python3-multipart",
"binary_version": "0.0.9-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS",
"name": "python-multipart",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/python-multipart@0.0.9-1ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.5-3",
"0.0.6-1",
"0.0.9-1",
"0.0.9-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "python3-python-multipart",
"binary_version": "0.0.20-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
"name": "python-multipart",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/python-multipart@0.0.20-1?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.20-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "python3-python-multipart",
"binary_version": "0.0.20-1.1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "python-multipart",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/python-multipart@0.0.20-1.1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.20-1",
"0.0.20-1.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, when parsing application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, QuerystringParser located the field separator with a two step lookup: it first scanned the entire remaining buffer for \u0026, and only when no \u0026 existed anywhere ahead did it fall back to scanning for ;. For a body that uses ; as the separator and contains no \u0026, every field iteration performed a full failed \u0026 scan over the entire remaining buffer before locating the nearby ;. With N semicolon separated fields in a chunk of size B, this yields O(B^2) byte comparisons per chunk. An attacker can submit a small crafted body of the form a;a;a;... and cause the parser to spend seconds of CPU per request. A handful of concurrent requests can exhaust worker processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-53539",
"modified": "2026-06-24T09:03:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T18:16:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-53539"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53539"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-53539"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.