RUSTSEC-2026-0217 (CVE-2026-55093)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-06-18 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-12 17:47 – Source websitetract_nnef::tensors::read_tensor builds a tensor shape from attacker-controlled
32-bit dimensions and computes both the element count product(shape) and the
byte allocation product(shape) * size_of(dt) with unchecked usize
arithmetic. In release builds (no overflow-checks) both products wrap modulo
2^64.
A crafted NNEF .dat tensor can choose dimensions whose wrapped products
collapse to a small value that satisfies the header size-consistency check, while
the true element count stays astronomically large. read_tensor then returns a
Tensor whose reported len (e.g. 2^61 + 7) far exceeds its backing heap
allocation (e.g. 56 bytes). The unchecked accessor as_slice_unchecked
(slice::from_raw_parts(ptr, self.len())) subsequently yields a slice spanning
~18 EiB over the small buffer.
The out-of-bounds read fires automatically during model build (no inference
required), reachable through the default DatLoader resource loader via the
public tract_nnef::nnef().model_for_path / model_for_read API when the
const-folding as_uniform fast-path materializes the over-long constant. The
always-on primitive is a bounded adjacent-heap over-read (information
disclosure); access further past the mapped region SIGSEGVs (denial of service).
No out-of-bounds write or code execution was demonstrated.
Affected: every release line prior to the backported fixes — < 0.21.16,
0.22.0–0.22.1, and 0.23.0. The block-quant path had already received an
analogous blob-size guard; the dense DatLoader path was missed.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 0.21.16, 0.22.2, or 0.23.1. The fix computes the shape product
and byte size with checked_mul and rejects the tensor on overflow
(commit 34c7df2).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-exposure",
"denial-of-service"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"tract_nnef::tensors::read_tensor"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-nnef",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/tract-nnef"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.16"
},
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.2"
},
{
"introduced": "0.23.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55093",
"GHSA-x5mv-8wgw-29hg"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`tract_nnef::tensors::read_tensor` builds a tensor shape from attacker-controlled\n32-bit dimensions and computes both the element count `product(shape)` and the\nbyte allocation `product(shape) * size_of(dt)` with **unchecked `usize`\narithmetic**. In release builds (no `overflow-checks`) both products wrap modulo\n2^64.\n\nA crafted NNEF `.dat` tensor can choose dimensions whose wrapped products\ncollapse to a small value that satisfies the header size-consistency check, while\nthe true element count stays astronomically large. `read_tensor` then returns a\n`Tensor` whose reported `len` (e.g. `2^61 + 7`) far exceeds its backing heap\nallocation (e.g. 56 bytes). The unchecked accessor `as_slice_unchecked`\n(`slice::from_raw_parts(ptr, self.len())`) subsequently yields a slice spanning\n~18 EiB over the small buffer.\n\nThe out-of-bounds read fires automatically during model build (no inference\nrequired), reachable through the default `DatLoader` resource loader via the\npublic `tract_nnef::nnef().model_for_path` / `model_for_read` API when the\nconst-folding `as_uniform` fast-path materializes the over-long constant. The\nalways-on primitive is a bounded adjacent-heap over-read (information\ndisclosure); access further past the mapped region SIGSEGVs (denial of service).\nNo out-of-bounds write or code execution was demonstrated.\n\nAffected: every release line prior to the backported fixes \u2014 `\u003c 0.21.16`,\n`0.22.0`\u2013`0.22.1`, and `0.23.0`. The block-quant path had already received an\nanalogous blob-size guard; the dense `DatLoader` path was missed.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to `0.21.16`, `0.22.2`, or `0.23.1`. The fix computes the shape product\nand byte size with `checked_mul` and rejects the tensor on overflow\n(commit [`34c7df2`](https://github.com/sonos/tract/commit/34c7df2c9bd2a36583e09b52f3e6319bf23102e8)).",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0217",
"modified": "2026-10-12T17:47:59Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/tract-nnef"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0217.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract/commit/34c7df2c9bd2a36583e09b52f3e6319bf23102e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract/commit/34c7df2c9bd2a36583e09b52f3e6319bf23102e8"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Integer overflow in tract-nnef NNEF tensor parser leads to out-of-bounds read on model load"
}
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