RUSTSEC-2025-0009 (CVE-2025-4432)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2025-03-06 12:00 – Updated: 2025-10-28 06:02 – Source websitering::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow
checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by
sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur
in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.
On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may
panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately
68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols
like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large
amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not
attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.
Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but
RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml
profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in
debug mode.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"denial-of-service"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "ring",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/ring"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.12"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4432",
"GHSA-4p46-pwfr-66x6",
"GHSA-c86p-w88r-qvqr"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask()` may panic when overflow\nchecking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by\nsending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur\nin 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.\n\nOn 64-bit targets operations using `ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM}` may\npanic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately\n68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols\nlike TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large\namounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not\nattempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.\n\nOverflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but\n`RUSTFLAGS=\"-C overflow-checks\"` or `overflow-checks = true` in the Cargo.toml\nprofile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in\ndebug mode.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0009",
"modified": "2025-10-28T06:02:18Z",
"published": "2025-03-06T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/ring"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0009.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/briansmith/ring/blob/main/RELEASES.md#version-01712-2025-03-05"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled."
}
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