PYSEC-2026-527
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-07-02 12:46Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in FilterEngine.create_postgres_query allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search). When the external metadata plugin postgres_meta is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python str.format. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via COPY ... FROM PROGRAM.
Details
Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).
Impact
Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)
Who is impacted:
- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the
postgres_metametadata plugin.
What an attacker can do:
- Data modification: PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary
INSERT/UPDATE/DELETEoperations. - Remote code execution: Via PostgreSQL's
COPY ... FROM PROGRAMif the database user has superuser orpg_execute_server_programprivileges. - File system access: Via
COPY ... TO/FROM '/path'if filesystem permissions allow.
Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself
- Full database read access: Extract any table including
identities(password hashes and salts),tokens(active authentication sessions),accounts(user enumeration),rse_settings(storage endpoint credentials), andrules(data management policies) could be extracted. - Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
- Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.
Required attacker privileges: Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search endpoint is available to all authenticated users.
| Name | purl | rucio | pkg:pypi/rucio |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "rucio",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/rucio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "35.8.5"
},
{
"introduced": "36.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "38.5.5"
},
{
"introduced": "39.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "39.4.2"
},
{
"introduced": "40.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "40.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.30.0",
"1.30.1",
"1.30.2",
"1.30.3",
"1.30.4",
"1.30.5",
"1.30.6",
"1.30.7",
"1.30.8",
"1.31.0",
"1.31.0rc1",
"1.31.0rc2",
"1.31.0rc3",
"1.31.1",
"1.31.2",
"1.31.3",
"1.31.4",
"1.31.5",
"1.31.6",
"1.31.7",
"32.0.0",
"32.0.0rc1",
"32.0.0rc2",
"32.1.0",
"32.2.0",
"32.3.0",
"32.3.1",
"32.4.0",
"32.5.0",
"32.5.0.post1",
"32.5.1",
"32.6.0",
"32.6.0.post1",
"32.7.0",
"32.8.0",
"32.8.1",
"32.8.2",
"32.8.3",
"32.8.4",
"32.8.5",
"32.8.6",
"33.0.0",
"33.0.0rc1",
"33.0.0rc2",
"33.0.0rc3",
"33.1.0",
"33.2.0",
"33.2.1",
"33.3.0",
"33.4.0",
"33.4.0.post1",
"33.5.0",
"33.6.0",
"33.6.1",
"34.0.0",
"34.0.0rc1",
"34.0.0rc2",
"34.1.0",
"34.2.0",
"34.3.0",
"34.4.0",
"34.4.1",
"34.4.2",
"34.4.3",
"34.5.0",
"34.6.0",
"35.0.0",
"35.0.0rc1",
"35.0.0rc2",
"35.0.1",
"35.1.0",
"35.1.1",
"35.2.0",
"35.2.1",
"35.3.0",
"35.4.0",
"35.4.1",
"35.5.0",
"35.6.0",
"35.6.1",
"35.7.0",
"35.8.0",
"35.8.1",
"35.8.2",
"35.8.3",
"35.8.4",
"36.0.0",
"36.0.0.post1",
"36.0.0.post2",
"36.1.0",
"36.2.0",
"36.3.0",
"36.4.0",
"36.5.0",
"37.0.0",
"37.0.0rc1",
"37.0.0rc2",
"37.0.0rc3",
"37.0.0rc4",
"37.1.0",
"37.1.0.post1",
"37.2.0",
"37.3.0",
"37.4.0",
"37.5.0",
"37.6.0",
"37.7.0",
"37.7.1",
"38.0.0",
"38.0.0rc1",
"38.0.0rc2",
"38.0.0rc3",
"38.1.0",
"38.2.0",
"38.3.0",
"38.4.0",
"38.5.0",
"38.5.1",
"38.5.2",
"38.5.3",
"38.5.4",
"39.0.0",
"39.1.0",
"39.2.0",
"39.3.0",
"39.3.1",
"39.4.0",
"39.4.1",
"40.0.0",
"40.1.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29090",
"GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
],
"details": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search`). When the external metadata plugin `postgres_meta` is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python `str.format`. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`.\n \n### Details\n\n*Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).*\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin.\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n\n- **Data modification:** PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations.\n- **Remote code execution:** Via PostgreSQL\u0027s `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` if the database user has superuser or `pg_execute_server_program` privileges.\n- **File system access:** Via `COPY ... TO/FROM \u0027/path\u0027` if filesystem permissions allow.\n\n**Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself**\n\n- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies) could be extracted.\n - **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio\u0027s use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.\n- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.\n\n**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-527",
"modified": "2026-07-02T12:46:49.308804Z",
"published": "2026-06-29T11:50:49.082878Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29090"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/rucio"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.