PYSEC-2026-3986
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-09-16 10:16 - Updated: 2026-09-19 22:34Apache Airflow Apache Kafka provider versions 1.15.0 before 2.0.0 resolve dotted-path strings found in a Kafka connection's extra field into Python callables via import_string, with no allowlist, and hand them to the confluent-kafka client which invokes them. Deployments that have enabled the Kafka event producer — dag_run_events_enabled or task_instance_events_enabled, both disabled by default — build that client inside the scheduler process, so a user whose only privilege is editing Airflow connections gains arbitrary code execution in the control plane; the Airflow security model limits connection-configuration users to code execution on workers, not the scheduler. Deployments using Google Managed Kafka are not affected, because that code path overwrites any user-supplied oauth_cb; plain brokers and Amazon MSK are exposed. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka 2.0.0 or later, which adds an allowlist configuration option for connection-string callbacks.
| Name | purl | apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka | pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.15.0",
"1.15.1",
"1.15.1rc1",
"1.15.1rc2",
"1.16.0",
"1.16.0rc1",
"2.0.0rc1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86792"
],
"details": "Apache Airflow Apache Kafka provider versions 1.15.0 before 2.0.0 resolve dotted-path strings found in a Kafka connection\u0027s `extra` field into Python callables via `import_string`, with no allowlist, and hand them to the confluent-kafka client which invokes them. Deployments that have enabled the Kafka event producer \u2014 `dag_run_events_enabled` or `task_instance_events_enabled`, both disabled by default \u2014 build that client inside the scheduler process, so a user whose only privilege is editing Airflow connections gains arbitrary code execution in the control plane; the Airflow security model limits connection-configuration users to code execution on workers, not the scheduler. Deployments using Google Managed Kafka are not affected, because that code path overwrites any user-supplied `oauth_cb`; plain brokers and Amazon MSK are exposed. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka 2.0.0 or later, which adds an allowlist configuration option for connection-string callbacks.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3986",
"modified": "2026-09-19T22:34:16.236260Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T10:16:55.060Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/15"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jl4gpok02313yh3rvtvj8qbo11c6zpr2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jl4gpok02313yh3rvtvj8qbo11c6zpr2?users@airflow.apache.org"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72208"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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