PYSEC-2026-3665
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-19 11:56 - Updated: 2026-08-19 12:16Summary
In Glances 4.5.5 the --disable-config-exec flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop secure_popen() from
interpreting the shell operators &&, | and > in AMP command values taken from the configuration file. The
hardening was not applied to the on-alert action command path, which reads its command lines from the same
configuration file. As a result, with --disable-config-exec enabled, a configured alert action that contains >
(file redirection), && (chaining) or | (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file
write / command chaining at the privilege of the glances process when the alert triggers.
Affected code
glances/actions.py (Glances 4.5.5, latest):
ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # line 111 — no allow_operators=, defaults to True
By contrast the AMP modules were fixed:
# glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69
self.set_result(secure_popen(res, allow_operators=self.allow_operators()).rstrip())
# glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60
res = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'), allow_operators=self.allow_operators())
PoC (benign)
glances.conf:
[cpu]
user_critical=1
user_critical_action=echo MARKER > /tmp/poc_marker
Run glances --disable-config-exec and generate CPU load. When the cpu user alert reaches CRITICAL, /tmp/poc_marker
is created — i.e. the > operator was interpreted despite --disable-config-exec. The same > in an [amp_*]
command value is correctly not interpreted.
Impact
Arbitrary file write (>), command chaining (&&) and pipe (|) from config-defined alert actions, contrary to the
guarantee of --disable-config-exec. Trust boundary = the glances configuration file.
Suggested fix
Pass allow_operators=not args.disable_config_exec from GlancesActions.run() into secure_popen() (GlancesActions
already holds args).
Credit
Reported via responsible-disclosure incomplete-fix measurement study.
| Name | purl | glances | pkg:pypi/glances |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "glances",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.3.1",
"1.3.2",
"1.3.3",
"1.3.4",
"1.3.5",
"1.3.6",
"1.3.7",
"1.4",
"1.4.1",
"1.4.1.1",
"1.4.2",
"1.4.2.1",
"1.5",
"1.5.1",
"1.5.2",
"1.6",
"1.6.1",
"1.7",
"1.7.1",
"1.7.2",
"1.7.3",
"1.7.4",
"1.7.5",
"1.7.6",
"1.7.7",
"2.0",
"2.0.1",
"2.1",
"2.1.1",
"2.1.2",
"2.10",
"2.11",
"2.11.1",
"2.2",
"2.2.1",
"2.3",
"2.4",
"2.4.1",
"2.4.2",
"2.5",
"2.5.1",
"2.6",
"2.6.1",
"2.6.2",
"2.7",
"2.7.1",
"2.8",
"2.8.1",
"2.8.2",
"2.8.3",
"2.8.4",
"2.8.5",
"2.8.6",
"2.8.7",
"2.8.8",
"2.9.0",
"2.9.1",
"3.0",
"3.0.1",
"3.0.2",
"3.1.0",
"3.1.1",
"3.1.2",
"3.1.3",
"3.1.4",
"3.1.4.1",
"3.1.5",
"3.1.6",
"3.1.6.1",
"3.1.6.2",
"3.1.7",
"3.2.0",
"3.2.1",
"3.2.2",
"3.2.3",
"3.2.3.1",
"3.2.4",
"3.2.4.1",
"3.2.4.2",
"3.2.5",
"3.2.6.1",
"3.2.6.2",
"3.2.6.3",
"3.2.6.4",
"3.2.7",
"3.3.0",
"3.3.0.1",
"3.3.0.2",
"3.3.0.3",
"3.3.0.4",
"3.3.1",
"3.3.1.1",
"3.4.0",
"3.4.0.1",
"3.4.0.2",
"3.4.0.3",
"3.4.0.4",
"3.4.0.5",
"4.0.1",
"4.0.2",
"4.0.3",
"4.0.4",
"4.0.5",
"4.0.6",
"4.0.7",
"4.0.8",
"4.1.0",
"4.1.1",
"4.1.2",
"4.2.0",
"4.2.1",
"4.3.0",
"4.3.0.1",
"4.3.0.3",
"4.3.0.4",
"4.3.0.5",
"4.3.0.6",
"4.3.0.7",
"4.3.0.8",
"4.3.1",
"4.3.2",
"4.3.3",
"4.4.0",
"4.4.1",
"4.5.0",
"4.5.0.1",
"4.5.0.2",
"4.5.0.3",
"4.5.0.4",
"4.5.0.5",
"4.5.1",
"4.5.2",
"4.5.3",
"4.5.4",
"4.5.5"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68519",
"GHSA-59fj-m2j6-hcxh"
],
"details": "## Summary\nIn Glances 4.5.5 the `--disable-config-exec` flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop `secure_popen()` from\ninterpreting the shell operators `\u0026\u0026`, `|` and `\u003e` in **AMP** command values taken from the configuration file. The\nhardening was not applied to the **on-alert action** command path, which reads its command lines from the same\nconfiguration file. As a result, with `--disable-config-exec` enabled, a configured alert action that contains `\u003e`\n(file redirection), `\u0026\u0026` (chaining) or `|` (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file\nwrite / command chaining at the privilege of the glances process when the alert triggers.\n\n## Affected code\n`glances/actions.py` (Glances 4.5.5, latest):\n```python\nret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # line 111 \u2014 no allow_operators=, defaults to True\n```\nBy contrast the AMP modules were fixed:\n```python\n# glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69\nself.set_result(secure_popen(res, allow_operators=self.allow_operators()).rstrip())\n# glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60\nres = secure_popen(self.get(\u0027service_cmd\u0027), allow_operators=self.allow_operators())\n```\n\n## PoC (benign)\n`glances.conf`:\n```ini\n[cpu]\nuser_critical=1\nuser_critical_action=echo MARKER \u003e /tmp/poc_marker\n```\nRun `glances --disable-config-exec` and generate CPU load. When the cpu `user` alert reaches CRITICAL, `/tmp/poc_marker`\nis created \u2014 i.e. the `\u003e` operator was interpreted despite `--disable-config-exec`. The same `\u003e` in an `[amp_*]`\n`command` value is correctly *not* interpreted.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file write (`\u003e`), command chaining (`\u0026\u0026`) and pipe (`|`) from config-defined alert actions, contrary to the\nguarantee of `--disable-config-exec`. Trust boundary = the glances configuration file.\n\n## Suggested fix\nPass `allow_operators=not args.disable_config_exec` from `GlancesActions.run()` into `secure_popen()` (GlancesActions\nalready holds `args`).\n\n## Credit\nReported via responsible-disclosure incomplete-fix measurement study.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3665",
"modified": "2026-08-19T12:16:24.859967Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T11:56:26.920450Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-59fj-m2j6-hcxh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/5c07c0d96423e9d5b9de71dd92e3717c66f504bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/glances"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59fj-m2j6-hcxh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68519"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Glances: `--disable-config-exec` does not cover on-alert action commands (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53925)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.