PYSEC-2026-2971

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:35 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05
VLAI
Details

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

  • Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
  • Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
  • Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
  • pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

Impacted products
Name purl
py-rattler pkg:pypi/py-rattler

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "py-rattler",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/py-rattler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.10.0",
        "0.11.0",
        "0.12.0",
        "0.13.0",
        "0.13.1",
        "0.14.0",
        "0.15.0",
        "0.16.0",
        "0.17.0",
        "0.18.0",
        "0.19.0",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.20.0",
        "0.21.0",
        "0.22.0",
        "0.23.0",
        "0.23.1",
        "0.23.2",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.6.3",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47425",
    "GHSA-q53q-5r4j-5729"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `rattler-build`, some methods in `py-rattler`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.\n\nResolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.\n\n## Affected\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler\n- Commit: `a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3` (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)\n- Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: `prefix-dev/pixi` @ `e640477`\n- pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue\n\n## Researcher\n\nBerkant Koc \u003cme@berkoc.com\u003e\nPGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2971",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:50.127320Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:35:23.329275Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler/security/advisories/GHSA-q53q-5r4j-5729"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/py-rattler"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q53q-5r4j-5729"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47425"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rattler has an entry-point path traversal in noarch:python install (arbitrary file write)"
}



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